APPOINTMENT OF JUDGES IN HIGHER JUDICIARY WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO TOPICAL COLLEGIUM SYSTEM IN INDIA BY - D.S. SELVAKUMAR

Authors : D.S. SELVAKUMAR

Registration ID : 108029 | Published Paper ID: IJLRA8029

Year :July-2024 | Volume : II | Issue : 7

Approved ISSN : 2582-6433 | Country : Delhi, India

Email Id : dsselvakumar58@gmail.com

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TOEHOLD TO FOOTHOLD- EMANCIPATING GENDER DISPARITY FROM POLITICS BY - RUPALI GUPTA & SONAL PRIYA

Authors : RUPALI GUPTA & SONAL PRIYA

Registration ID : 108027 | Published Paper ID: IJLRA8027 & IJLRA8028

Year :July-2024 | Volume : II | Issue : 7

Approved ISSN : 2582-6433 | Country : Delhi, India

Email Id : guptarupali1124@gmail.com & psonal2626@gmail.com

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Understanding India’s Approach to Refugee Law: A Comprehensive Analysis by - ROHAN STHANU

Authors : ROHAN STHANU

Registration ID : 108026 | Published Paper ID: IJLRA8026

Year :July-2024 | Volume : II | Issue : 7

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Email Id :rohansthanu2003@gmail.com

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Voices Of Courage: Analysing Whistleblowers’ Laws by - Gunjan Sanklecha &JIYA SAHNI

Authors : Gunjan Sanklecha & JIYA SAHNI

Registration ID : 108025 | Published Paper ID: IJLRA8025 & IJLRA8042

Year :July-2024 | Volume : II | Issue : 7

Approved ISSN : 2582-6433 | Country : Delhi, India

Email Id :sanklechagunjan@gmail.com & dpsjiy9283@gmail.com

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Child Marriage: The Indian Historical And Societal Context by - Florine M. Muchokore & Dr Gurpreet Kaur

Authors : Florine M. Muchokore & Dr Gurpreet Kaur

Registration ID : 108024 | Published Paper ID: IJLRA8024 & IJLRA8176

Year :July-2024 | Volume : II | Issue : 7

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Email Id : florinemuchokore@gmail.com

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NAVIGATING THE NEXUS: UNRAVELING THE INTERPLAY OF COMPETITION LAW, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, AND THE PHARMACEUTICAL LANDSCAPE. BY - BAHITRA BASU & SHRI DHARSHAN R.V

Authors : BAHITRA BASU & SHRI DHARSHAN R.V

Registration ID : 108022 | Published Paper ID: IJLRA8022 & IJLRA2023

Year :June-2024 | Volume : II | Issue : 7

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Email Id : bahitra.basu@law.christuniversity.in & shri.dharshan@law.christuniversity.in

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"THE VEIL OF CONFIDENTIALITY: NAVIGATING TRANSPARENCY CHALLENGES IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION" BY - ANSHIKA SINGH & KIRTI SHANKAR

Authors : ANSHIKA SINGH & KIRTI SHANKAR

Registration ID : 108020 | Published Paper ID: IJLRA8020 & IJLRA8021

Year :June-2024 | Volume : II | Issue : 7

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Email Id : vashisthanshika21@gmail.com & shankarkirti123456@gmail.com

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BACHAN SINGH VS STATE OF PUNJAB (1980) BY: SALEHA HANEEF

Authors : SALEHA HANEEF

Registration ID : 108019 | Published Paper ID: IJLRA8019

Year :June-2024 | Volume : II | Issue : 7

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THE CONCEPT OF ABSOLUTE LIABILITY: THE STUDY ON ITS DEVELOPMENT IN INDIA BY - MUSKAN SHARMA

Authors : MUSKAN SHARMA

Registration ID : 108018 | Published Paper ID: IJLRA8018

Year :June-2024 | Volume : II | Issue : 7

Approved ISSN : 2582-6433 | Country : Delhi, India

Email Id : muskansharma3534@gmail.com

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Doi Link : https://www.doi-ds.org/doilink/07.2024-86339856/THE CONCEPT OF ABSOLUTE LIABILITY: THE STUDY ON IT

THE QUEST FOR TRUTH IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE- REVISITING THE MALIMATH COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS BY - DR. SUMAN MAWAR

Authors : DR. SUMAN MAWAR

Registration ID : 109817 | Published Paper ID: IJLRA9817

Year : Aug-2023 | Volume : II | Issue : 7

Approved ISSN : 2582-6433 | Country : Delhi, India

Email Id : salonisharma2905@gmail.com

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Doi Link :

International journal for legal research and analysis

Abbreviation:IJLRA

ISSN:2582-6433

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[1] Art. 124. Establishment and constitution of Supreme Court:

(2) Every Judge of the Supreme Court shall be appointed by the President by warrant under his hand and seal after consultation with such of the Judges of the Supreme Court and of the High Courts in the States as the President may deem necessary for the purpose and shall hold office until he attains the age of sixty five years:

Provided that in the case of appointment of a Judge other than the chief Justice, the chief Justice of India shall always be consulted.

[2] 217. Appointment and conditions of the office of a Judge of a High Court

(1) Every Judge of a High Court shall be appointed by the President by warrant under his hand and seal on the recommendation of the National Judicial Appointments Commission referred to in article 124A, and shall hold office, in the case of an additional or acting Judge, as provided in article 22 until he attains the age of sixty-two years: Provided that--(a)a Judge may, by writing under his hand addressed to the President, resign his office;(b)a Judge may be removed from his office by the President in the manner provided in clause (4) of article 124 for the removal of a Judge of the Supreme Court;(c)the office of a Judge shall be vacated by his being appointed by the President to be a Judge of the Supreme Court or by his being transferred by the President to any other High Court within the territory of India.

(2) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as a Judge of a High Court unless he is a citizen of India and--(a)has for at least ten years held a judicial office in the territory of India; or(b)has for at least ten years been an advocate of a High Court ' or of two or more such courts in succession;

[3] See, S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, 1981 Supp SCC 87, para 31.

[4] See, Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Assn. v. Union of India, (1993) 4 SCC 441.

[5] Ministry of Law and Justice, Stand of Government on Appointment of Judges, March 2022. “The Constitution (Ninety – Ninth Amendment) Act, 2014 and the National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014 w.e.f. 13.04.2015. However, both the Acts were challenged in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court vide Judgment dated 16.10.2015 declared both the Acts as unconstitutional and void. The Collegium system as existing prior to the enforcement of the Constitution (Ninety-Ninth Amendment) Act, 2014 was declared to be operative.”

[6] Borrowed from the Book,”Appointment, Independence & Accountability of Judges.” - (From Collegium – To NJAC – To Collegium) Prof. (Dr.) Ratan Singh & Dr. Shinkha Dhiman, , First edition 2022 Published by Allahabad Law Agency. Haryana

[7] The table is borrowed from “Appointment of Constitutional Judges in a Comparative Perspective - With a Proposal for a New Model for Hungary Acta Juridica Hungarica, Vol. 54, No. 1, pp. 5-23 (2013)” available below. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2229184

[8] CJI DY Chandrachud on reforming Supreme Court’s Collegium system, Times of India 12.10.2023.

[10] Allahabad High Court’s Chief Justice Pritinker Diwaker has made an explosive allegation against the collegiums, Hindustan Times, 11.23.2023.

[11] Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul termed the collegiums system of selecting constitutional court judges as not the best mechanism, Times of India (March 12, 2023)

[12] Amit Anand Choudary, There has to be workable trust between government and Judiciary, says SC, Times of India (Nov, 8, 2023)

[13] Rishabh Sharma, Center on NEET Paper leak: Isolated incidents shouldn’t affect future of aspirants, India Today (June 20, 2024).

[14] NEET won’t be cancelled: Minister Dharmendra Pradhan, Star of Mysore (June 23, 2024).

[15] Barkha Muthur, ‘UGC-NET paper leaked on dark net’: Education minister on exam row, Business Standard (June 20, 2024).

[1] Barbara J Nelson and Najma Chowdhury (eds) Women and Politics Worldwide. London:Yale University Press,1994

[4] D. Syamala Devi,G. Lakshmi, “Political Empowerment of Women in Indian Legislature:A Study”,The Indian Journal of Political Science,Vol. 66,No.1(Jan-March,2005),pp. 75-92(18 pages)

[5] Piyush Mathur,“Women Reservation is Women Empowerment”Times of India,Nov. 26, 2019.

[7] Robinson, A.., & Gottlieb, J..(2019).How to Close the Gender Gap in Political Participation: Lessons from Matrilineal Societies in Africa.British Journal of Political Science,51,68-92 http://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123418000650

[8] Bhalotra,S..,Clots-Figueras, Irma.,&Iyer,Lakshmi.(2013).Path-Breakers: How Does Women's Political Participation Respond to Electoral Success?. Public Choice:Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal http://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2350805

[9] Milazzo, A.., & Goldstein, Markus. (2017).Governance and Women's Economic and Political Participation: Power Inequalities,Formal Constraints and Norms.The World Bank Research Observer ,http://doi.org/10.1093/WBRO/LKY006

[10] Cascio, Elizabeth U.., & Shenhav, N.. (2020).A Century of the American Woman Voter:Sex Gaps in Political Participation,Preferences, and Partisanship Since Women's Enfranchisement. NBER Working Paper Series http://doi.org/10.3386/w26709

[11] Liu, Shan.,& Banaszak, Lee Ann (2016),Do Government Positions Held by Women Matter? A Cross-National Examination of Female Ministers' Impacts on Women's Political Participation. Politics & Gender ,13,132-162 http://doi.org/10.1017/S1743923X16000490

[12] Universal Declaration of Human Rights ,art. 21 and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights , art. 25.

[13] The effect of women’s representation in parliament and the passing of gender sensitive policies, American Economic Association (aeaweb.org)

[14] United Nations Equal Opportunities Commission,“United Nations targets for proportion of women in leadership and decision-making positions.” Information Paper 556 (2003).

[16] Convention on the Political Rights of Women, Adopted by the Seventh Session of the General Assembly, December 20, 1952, 7 University of Wisconsin Press 173-75 (1953).

[19] United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affair, https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal5

[20] M. Ameen Nisha & Dr.D. Vezhaventhan,“Political empowerment and participation of women in India”120 International Journal of Pure and Applied Mathematics 4721-4736 (2018).

[21] “Constitutional Law: Constitutional and Charter Provisions:Right of Women to Vote.” 16 Michigan Law Review 125.

[22] Ajit Pal Singh “Women’s Participation at Grass Root Level :An Analysis”,47 Mainstream (2009).

[23] Thakkar, Usha and Gawankar, Rohini. 2004.Women in Panchayat :March towards Empowerment, One India One People-Special Number on Women in Politics.

[24] Jain, Devaki. 2000. The Vocabulary of Women’s Politics. Fredrich Ebert Stiftung, Delhi.

[25] ‘Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women’, Millennium Development Goals,

available at .

[26] Desai, S., \& Temsah, G. (2014). Women in Indian Politics: A Long Road Ahead. International Journal of Humanities and Social Science, 4(8), 1-7.

[27] Kishwar, M. (2005). Gender Stereotyping in Indian Media: Implications for Women in Politics. Journal of South Asian Studies, 28(3), 541-565.

[28] Pande, R. (2005). Can Mandated Political Representation Increase Policy Influence for Disadvantaged Minorities? Journal of Public Economics, 89(8), 1535-1558.

[29] Agarwal, B. (1997). "Bargaining" and Gender Relations: Within and Beyond the Household. Feminist Economics, 3(1), 1-51.

[30] Duflo, E., \& Topalova, P. (2004). Unappreciated Service: Performance, Perceptions, and Women Leaders in India. Economic and Political Weekly, 39(48), 5135-5144.

[31] Newman, K. L. (2012). Gender, Political Ambition, and the Decision to Run for Elective Office. American Journal of Political Science, 56(3), 498-510.

[32] PRS Legislative Research. (2021). The Women's Reservation Bill: A Comprehensive Guide. Retrieved from [PRS Legislative Research](https://www.prsindia.org).

[33] International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. (2020). Strengthening Women’s Political Participation Through Grassroots Initiatives. Retrieved from [International IDEA](https://www.idea.int).

[34] Centre for Social Research. (2021). Violence Against Women in Politics: A Global Review. Retrieved from [CSR](https://www.csrindia.org).

[35] Jain, P. (2018). Gender Bias in Media: A Study on Women Politicians in Indian Media. Media Asia, 45(2), 112-125.

[36] Impact of Reservation Quotas on Women's Political Participation in Local Governance" (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance,2020

[37] Political Party Mechanisms for Women's Political Participation"(National Democratic Institute, 2020).

[38] "Educational Campaigns and Women's Political Representation"(Gender and Development Journal, 2018).

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[40] "Monitoring Women's Political Representation: Frameworks and Tools" (International Development Research Centre, 2019)

[1] Whistleblower Protection The National Endowment for the Humanities, https://www.neh.gov/about/oig/whistleblower-protection (last visited Jun 28, 2024)

[2] LAW COMMISSION OF INDIA, REPORT NO. 179: THE PUBLIC INTEREST DISCLOSURE AND PROTECTION OF INFORMERS (2001).

[3] Ani, Three convicted in Satyendra Dubey murder case, Indian Express (March 22, 2010), https://indianexpress.com/article/india/crime/three-convicted-in-satyendra-dubey-murder-case/

[4] Pawan Kumar @Monu Mittal V. State of UP. & Anr, A.I.R. 2015 SC (Cri) 822

[5] SECOND ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS COMMISSION, REPORT NO. 4: ETHICS IN GOVERNANCE (2007).

[6] Agencies, Team Anna demands law to protect whistleblowers, Indian Express (March 9, 2012), https://indianexpress.com/article/india/latest-news/team-anna-demands-law-to-protect-whistleblowers/

[7] Press Trust of India, 4 held in whistleblower officer’s murder case, Indian Express (May 22, 2012), https://indianexpress.com/article/news-archive/web/4-held-in-whistleblower-officer-s-murder-cas/ .

[8] Express News Service, CBI to probe whistleblower’s death in Kerala, Indian Express (February 18, 2011), https://indianexpress.com/article/news-archive/web/cbi-to-probe-whistleblower-s-death-in-kerala/.

[9] False Claims Act, 1863, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3728-3730 (1863).

[10] Lloyd-La Follette Act, 1912, 5 U.S.C. § 7211 (1912).

[11] Whistleblower Protection Act, 1989 5 U.S.C. § 2302 (1989).

[12] Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act, 2012 5 U.S.C. §743 (2012).

[14] Sarbanes Oxley Act, 2002 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2002).

[16] Directive 2019/1937/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2019 Relating to the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law, 2019 O.J. (L 305) 17

[17] Public Interest Disclosure Act, 1998, c.23, Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom (1998).

[18] Public Servant Disclosure Protection Act, 2005 S.C. 2005, c. 46

[19] whistle-blower, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/whistle-blower (last visited Jun 28, 2024)

[20] Section 3, The Whistleblower Protection Act, 2014.

[21] Whistleblower Protection Act LII / Legal Information Institute, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/whistleblower_protection_act (last visited Jun 28, 2024)

[22] The Whistleblower Protection Act, 2014, Section 11

[23] International Best Practices For Whistle-Blowers: What India Can Adopt?, https://www.livelaw.in/columns/whistle-blowers-protection-act-rti-official-secrets-act-wbpa-corruption-169677 (last visited Jun 28, 2024)

[26] The Whistleblowers Protection Bill, 2011, Notice of Amendments, Rajya Sabha, August 5, 2013,

[27] Rajya Sabha Official Debates, February 21, 2014. Any amendments made by Rajya Sabha would have necessitated sending the Bill back to Lok Sabha. Given that Lok Sabha was holding its last sitting that day, the Bill would have lapsed.

[28] The Whistle Blowers Protection (Amendment) Bill, 2015 PRS Legislative Research, https://prsindia.org/billtrack/the-whistle-blowers-protection-amendment-bill-2015 (last visited Jun 28, 2024)

[30] Laws Enacted and Amended in 2014: A Snapshot, https://www.livelaw.in/laws-enacted-amended-2014-snapshot/ (last visited Jun 28, 2024)

[32] “Enactment Of Law Is Sovereign Function”: Delhi High Court Dismisses Plea For Implementation Of Whistle Blowers Protection Act, 2014, https://www.livelaw.in/news-updates/delhi-high-court-whistle-blowers-protection-act-sovereign-function-192652 (last visited Jun 28, 2024

[33] The Whistle Blowers Protection (Amendment) Bill, 2015 PRS Legislative Research, https://prsindia.org/billtrack/the-whistle-blowers-protection-amendment-bill-2015 (last visited Jun 28, 2024)

[34] Competition Commission of India, Competition Commission of India (Lesser Penalty) Regulations, 2024, L-3(4)/Reg-L.P./2023-24 (February 20, 2024).

[35] Competition Act, 2002, §46, No. 12, Acts of Parliament, 2002 (India).

[36] Protection of Trade Secrets Bill, 2024, Cl. 5, No, __of 2024 (India).

[37] LAW COMMISSION OF INDIA, REPORT NO. 289: TRADE SECRETS AND ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE (2024).

[38] Debby Jain, Law Commission Recommends Whistleblower Protection, Says Amendments May Be Brought To Mandate Test Data Disclosure, LIVE LAW (March 9, 2024), https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/law-commission-of-india-289th-report-trade-secrets-economic-espionage 251731#:~:text=In%20a%20recent%20development%2C%20the,government%20use%2C%20and%20public%20interest.

[1] PON STAFF, What are the Three Basic Types of Dispute Resolution? What to Know About Mediation, Arbitration, and Litigation, PROGRAM ON NEGOTIATION HARVARD LAW SCHOOL (Dec. 21, 2023).

[2] Kaya, S., 2019. Suitability of alternative dispute resolution for shareholders disputes. Corporate Governance: Search for the Advanced Practices, p.68.

[3] Farrar, J.H., Watson, S. and Boulle, L., 2012. Dispute resolution in family companies. Canterbury L. Rev., 18, p.155.

[4] Goldberg, S.B., Sander, F.E., Rogers, N.H. and Cole, S.R., 2020. Dispute resolution: Negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and other processes. Aspen Publishing.

[5] Alexander, N., 2022. Mediation and appropriate dispute resolution. Singapore Academy of Law Annual Review of Singapore Cases, pp.670-709.

[6] Rule, C., 2020. Online dispute resolution and the future of justice. Annual Review of Law and Social Science, 16, pp.277-292.

[7] Bichia, M., 2020. Legal Regime of Confidentiality Protection in the Mediation Process and Its Meaning. Law & World, 15, p.188.

[8] Laurie K. Dore, Public Courts versus Private Justice: It's Time to Let Some Sun Shine in on Alternative Dispute Resolution, 81 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 463 (2006).

[1]Devadhe T, “Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, 1982 AIR 1325, ‘Rarest of Rare’ Cases- Legal Vidhiya” (Legal Vidhiya-, April 7 2023) <https://legalvidhiya.com/bachan-singh-v-state-of-punjab-1982-air-1325-rarest-of-rare-cases/> accessed June 18 2024.

[5]Rajendra Prasad v State Of Uttar Pradesh [1979]

[9]Jagmohan Singh v. The State of Uttar Pradesh [1972]

[10]Sreelakshmi M. “BACHAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB” (Law Essentials, 13 October 2021) <https://lawessential.com/case-comments-1/f/bachan-singh-v-state-of-punjab> accessed 8 June 2024

[11] “Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab – The AmikusQriae” (The Amikus Qriae) <https://theamikusqriae.com/bachan-singh-v-state-of-punjab/> accessed 8 June 2024

[1] See David Landau and Rosalind Dixon, ‘Abusive Judicial Review: Courts Against Democracy’ (2020) 53 UC Davis L Rev 1313; Tom Ginsburg and Aziz Z Huq, How to Save a Constitutional Democracy (Univ Chicago P 2018); Stephen Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism: Theory and Practice (Cambridge UP 2013). See also Mark Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights: Judicial Review and Social Welfare Rights in Comparative Constitutional Law (Princeton UP 2009); Katherine Young, ‘A Typology of Economic and Social Rights Adjudication: Exploring the Catalytic Function of Judicial Review’ [2010] Int’l J Const L 385.

[2] E. Delaney, ‘The Federal Case for Judicial Review’ [2022] Oxford Journal of Legal Studies; Giuliano Amato, Benedetta Barbisan, and Cesare Pinelli (eds), Rule of Law vs. Majoritarian Democracy (Bloomsbury 2021).

[3] See pt II of this article; Nick Robinson, ‘Expanding Judiciaries: India and the Rise of the Good Governance Court’ (2009) 8 Washington University Global Studies Law Review 1.

[4] V. Narayan and J. Sindhu, ‘A Historical Argument for Proportionality under the Indian Constitution’ (2018) 2 (1) Indian Law Review; A. Chandra, ‘Proportionality in India: A Bridge to Nowhere’ (2020) 3(2) University of Oxford Human Rights Hub Journal; T. Khaitan, ‘Beyond Reasonableness’ (2008) 50(2) Journal of India Law Institute.

[5] J.H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust (Harvard UP 1980) 102.

[6] R. Dixon, Responsive Judicial Review—Democracy and Dysfunction in the Modern Age.

[7] P. Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution (Oxford UP 1982).

[13] S. Gardbaum, ‘Comparative Political Process Theory’ (2020) 18(4) ICON; Ittai Bar-Siman- Tav, ‘The Puzzling Resistance to Judicial Review of the Legislative Process’ (2011) 91 Boston UnivLR 1915; SR Ackerman, Stefanie Egidy, and James Fowkes, Due Process of Lawmaking: The United States, South Africa, Germany and the European Union (Cambridge UP 2015).

[14] See pt III of this article; Charanjit Lal Chowdhuri v Union of India AIR 1951 SC 41; Ram Krishna Dalmia v S.R. Tendolkar AIR 1958 SC 538 (on reasonable classification and presump- tion of constitutionality); A.K. Roy v Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 710 (upholding preven- tive detention even after the recognition of the due process under art 21 in Maneka Gandhi v Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248 : AIR 1978 SC 597); N.B. Khare v State of Delhi AIR 1950 SC 211 (upholding externment on grounds of subjective satisfaction); Babulal Parate v State of Maharashtra AIR 1961 SC 884 : (1961) 3 SCR 423; Madhu Limaye v SDM, Monghyr (1970) 3 SCC 746 : AIR 1971 SC 2486 (upholding s 144 of the CrPC giving broad discretion to the Executive to determine when prohibitory orders on gatherings should be imposed). See also See P.K. Tripathi, Some Insights into Fundamental Rights (University of Bombay, 1972) where he critiques the reasonable classification test; K.G. Kannabiran, Wages of Impunity: Power, Justice and Human Rights, (Orient Longman 2004); S. Shankar, Scaling Justice: India’s Supreme Court, Anti-Terror Laws, and Social Rights (OUP India 2012).

[15] Subhash C. Kashyap, Our Parliament (2001); M.R. Madhavan, Parliament’ in Rethinking India’s Public Institutions (OUP 2017) 81; Kaushiki Sanyal, ‘Who Gains from Parliamentary Disruption’ (2015) 50(35) Economic and Political Weekly.

[16] M. Verma, ‘Diminishing the Role of Parliament: The Case of the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Bill,’ (2019) 54(45) Economic and Political Weekly.

[17] See art 110 of the Constitution. When a Bill is passed as a Money Bill, the Upper House can only recommend amendments that may or may not be accepted by the Lower House; Arvind

P. Datar and Rahul Unnikrishnan, ‘Making a Money Bill of It’ Indian Express (Delhi, 12 January 2016); S. Parthasarathy, ‘Trickeries of the Money Bill’ The Hindu (Delhi, 11 April 2019).

[18] See rr 252–54 of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in the Council of States, which together provide that once a member asks for actual counting, the Chairman shall pro- ceed with the same. It is pertinent to note that the Parliament was forced to repeal these laws following concerted protests by for farmers more than a year on the outskirts of Delhi.

[19] ‘Election Laws (Amendment) Bill Passed in Lok Sabha Amid Din’ Indian Express (Delhi, 20 December 2021).

[20] See for instance, V. Bhandari, ‘Why the Electoral Reforms Bill is a Problem’ The Hindu

(Delhi, 21 December 2021).

[21] Art 122 states “[t]he validity of any proceedings in the Legislature of a State shall not be called in question on the ground of any alleged irregularity of procedure” See notes 28 to 31 and accompanying text.

[22] David Landau, ‘A Dynamic Theory of Judicial Role’ (2014) 55 BCL Rev 1501.

[23] See generally, A. Kavanagh, ‘The Constitutional Separation of Powers’ in D. Dyzenhaus & M. Thorburn (eds), Philosophical Foundations of Constitutional Law (OUP 2016).

[24] Mattias Kumm, ‘Institutionalising Socratic Contestation: The Rationalist Human Rights Paradigm, Legitimate Authority and the Point of Judicial Review’ (2007) 1(2) European Journal of Legal Studies.

[25] V. Narayan and J. Sindhu, ‘A Case for Judicial Review of Legislative Process in India?’ (2020) 53 VRÜ/World Comparative Law 358, 383-401.

[27] Indeed, the dissenting opinion in K.S. Puttaswamy v Union of India (2019) 1 SCC 1 found such a violation. It is pertinent to note that the majority ruling on this point, finding that the law satisfied the definition of a Money Bill, has been doubted in Roger Mathew v South Indian Bank Ltd (2020) 6 SCC 1 and has been referred to a larger bench for reconsideration.

[28] See references to constitutional construction in Dixon (n 6).

[29] See arts 32, 131-9, 143, 225-8 of the Constitution of India.

[30] For instance, arts 243-O, 262, 363. See the opinion of Justice Chandrachud in K.S. Puttaswamy v Union of India (n 27) [1069]; V. Narayan and J. Sindhu (n 4) 70-73.

[31] Art 118(1) states, “Each House of Parliament may make rules for regulations, subject to the provisions of this Constitution, its procedure and the conduct of its business.”

[32] See arts 110, 190, and 194 of the Constitution of India as illustrations.

[33] It is pertinent to note that the provision for a voice vote provided for in parliamentary rules cannot override constitutional provisions as art 118 stipulates that procedural rules devised by Parliament are subject to the provisions of the Constitution. In fact, the rules of procedure also provide that when a member asks for a division of the votes following a voice vote, the chairman and speaker are obligated to ensure the counting of votes. See V. Narayan and J. Sindhu (n 25) 393–94.

[34] Raja Ram Pal v The Speaker, Lok Sabha (2007) 3 SCC 184.

[35] Ashish Selar v Maharashtra Legislative Assembly 2022 SCC OnLine SC 105.

[36] Ashish Selar v Maharashtra Legislative Assembly (n 35).

[37] Ashish Selar v Maharashtra Legislative Assembly (n 35).

[38] V. Narayan and J. Sindhu (n 25) 394-99.

[39] Charanjit Lal Chowdhuri v Union of India (n 14) [Mukherjea J]; State of Bombay v F.N. Balsara AIR 1951 SC 318.

[40] See V. Narayan and J. Sindhu (n 25) 397-9.

[41] See V. Narayan and J. Sindhu (n 4); A. Chandra (n 4); T. Khaitan (n 4).

[42] In this regard, see for instance Malpe Vishwanath Acharya v State of Maharashtra (1998) 2 SCC 1: AIR 1998 SC 602 (“Social Legislation is treated with deference by the Courts not merely because the Legislature represents the people but also because in representing them the entire spectrum of views is expected to be taken into account. The Legislature is not shackled by the same constraints as the courts of law. But its [sic] power is coupled with a responsibility.”) In fact, one of the crucial arguments against judicial review in the United States is based on the premise that there is an obligation on the Legislature in the American Constitution to evaluate the constitutionality of legislation which the Court cannot interfere with. See JB Thayer, ‘The Original and Scope of Judicial Review’ (1893) 7(3) Harvard L R 129135. Thayer’s seminal albeit dated work is often cited by the Indian Supreme Court to jus- tify judicial restraint. For a recent example see Rajeev Suri v DDA 2021 SCC OnLine SC 7.

[44] For an explanation of these steps that constitute the proportionality test, see D. Grimm, ‘Proportionality in Canadian and German Constitutional Jurisprudence’ (2007) 57(2) Univ of Toronto LJ.

[45] However, the Law Minister did not explain how the proportionality test was satisfied and this instance therefore cannot qualify as deliberation meriting deference.

[46] See the dissenting opinion of Justice Chandrachud in K.S. Puttaswamy v Union of India (n 27) [1066-8, 1076] examining the commitment of judicial review in the Indian Constitution.

[47] D. Kyritsis, ‘Constitutional Review in a Representative Democracy’ (2012) 32(2) Oxford JLS; Ely, Democracy and Distrust (n 5) 102-3.

[48] The judiciary will also be free to consider the law on substantive grounds once the law is passed in a procedurally sound manner.

[49] See discussion in negative and positive rights in Mark Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights: Judicial Review and Social Welfare Rights in Comparative Constitutional Law (Princeton UP 2009).

[50] See for instance, B.N. Rau, ‘Preliminary Notes on the Fundamental Rights’ in Shiva Rao, The Framing of India’s Constitution, Select Documents II 33 (Indian Institute of Public Administration 1966). See Sindhu and Narayan, ‘A “Weak” Justification for Justiciability of Socio-Economic Rights’ (unpublished, on file with the author).

[51] Constituent Assembly Debates, 19 November 1948; See Sindhu and Narayan (n 50).

[52] Olga Tellis v Bombay Municipal Corpn (1985) 3 SCC 545; Narmada Bachao Andolan v Union of India (2002) 10 SCC 408 : AIR 2000 SC 3751, People’s Union for Civil Liberties v Union of India (2011) 12 SCC 675.

[53] Francis Coralie Mullin v UT of Delhi (1981) 1 SCC 608 : AIR 1981 SC 746

[54] See orders passed in People’s Union for Civil Liberties v Union of India (2011) 12 SCC 675 over the course of 16 years.

[55] Bandhua Mukti Morcha v Union of India (1984) 3 SCC 161.

[56] Olga Tellis v Bombay Municipal Corpn (1985) 3 SCC 545.

[57] U. Baxi, The Indian Supreme Court and Politics (Eastern Book Company 1985).

[58] For the phases of the PIL movement see Shyam Divan ‘Public Interest Litigation’ in S. Choudhry, M. Khosla and P.B. Mehta (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Indian Constitution (Oxford University Press 2016).

[59] See Lawyer’s Voice v Union of India, Writ Petition (Criminal) 142/2019 order dated May 8, 2019 where the Supreme Court issued notice in a petition seeking criminal investigation into funding activities of an NGO; Wildlife First v Ministry of Forest & Environment WP (Civil) 109/2008, order dated 13.02.2019 where the Court directed the eviction of tribal persons from forest land; MC Mehta v Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) 10329/2015, order dated 2.9.2019, where the Court laid down guidelines on parking.

[60] Shyam Narayan Chouskey v Union of India 2016 SCC OnLine SC 1411 which the court later walked back.

[61] See orders in Harsh Mander v Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) 1045 of 2018. See also G. Bhatia, ‘The NRC Case and the Parchment Barrier of Article 21’ (Indian Constitutional Law And Philosophy, 26 April 2019) and-the-parchment-barrier-of-article-21/> accessed 10 January 2021.

[62] Amit Sahni v Commr. of Police (2020) 10 SCC 439 : 2020 SCC OnLine SC 808.

[63] P. Chitlakar and V. Gauri, ‘The Recent Evolution of Public Interest Litigation in the Indian Supreme Court’ in S. Krishnaswamy and others (eds), A Qualified Hope: The Indian Supreme Court and Progressive Social Change (Cambridge UP 2019) 77–91, 85.

[64] The approach of the Court in the midday meal case was notably not followed in Swaraj Abhiyan v Union of India (2018) 12 SCC 170. In this case, the Court dealt with a petition seeking relief of rations in states where there were drought-like conditions. The Petitioner also sought the appointment of court commissioners to monitor the implementation of the Court’s orders. The Court refrained from granting this prayer on the ground that the State had pro- vided for such authorities to ensure implementation under the National Food Security Act 2014 but these positions remained vacant. The Court passed orders to ensure that these vacan- cies were filled.

[65] J. Sindhu and V. Narayan, ‘The Supreme Court Has Failed in Its Duty in Handling of Migrant Cases’ (The Quint 18 May 2020) www.thequint.com/voices/opinion/supreme-court- migrant-workers-crisis-no-judicial-review-high-courts-show-way-coronavirus-lockdown> accessed 10 January 2021.

[66] On how constitutional interpretation can support such a position, see J. Balkin, Living Originalism (Harvard UP 2011).

[67] See Distribution of Essential Supplies and Services During the Pandemic, In re (2021) 7 SCC 772 the Supreme Court’s order with respect to the Government’s COVID-19 vaccine policy, where the Court sought data from the Government about the Government’s purchase orders and persons vaccinated till date, which led the Government to modify its vaccination policy to make it more equitable, serves as an important illustration of how the Court can respond to democratic inertia in matters of individual rights without transgressing its own limitations of legitimacy and competence.

[68] See, generally, Katherine Young, ‘A Typology of Economic and Social Rights Adjudication: Exploring the Catalytic Function of Judicial Review’ [2010] Int’l J Const L 385.

[69] See orders passed in Swaraj Abhiyan v Union of India (2018) 12 SCC 170. Sindhu and Narayan (n 50).

[70] M. Tushnet, ‘Thayer’s Target: Judicial Review or Democracy’ (1993) 88 Nw U L Rev 9, 17.

[71] Indeed, there is copious scholarship on the counter-majoritarian difficulty posed by judicial review in the United States. For a survey of this scholarship see, S.B. Prakash & J.C. Yoo,‘The Origins of Judicial Review’ (2003) 70(3) 887, 894-898.

[72] See R.A. Dahl, Democracy and its Critics (Yale UP 1989). Terri Peretti, ‘An Empirical Analysis of Alexander Bickel’s The Least Dangerous Branch’ in Kenneth Ward and Cecilia Castillo (eds), The Judiciary and American Democracy (State University of New York Press 2006).

[73] See the rights provided in pt III of the Indian Constitution.

[75] State of Madras v V.G. Row AIR 1952 SC 196; State of Punjab v Khan Chand AIR 1974 SC 543; Om Kumar v Union of India (2001) 2 SCC 386; Shayara Bano v Union of India (2017) 9SCC 1.

[76] See G Bhatia, The Transformative Constitution: A Radical Biography in Nine Acts (Harper Collins 2019).

[77] Navtej Singh Johar v Union of India (2018) 10 SCC 1 : AIR 2018 SC 4321.

[78] K.S. Puttaswamy v Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1; State of Maharashtra v Indian Hotel & Restaurants Assn (2013) 8 SCC 519 : AIR 2013 SC 2582.

[79] See Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v Union of India AIR 1951 SC 41; Ram Krishna Dalmia v S.R. Tendolkar AIR 1958 SC 538.

[81] Kantaru Rajeevaru v Indian Young Lawyers Assn (2020) 2 SCC 1.

[82] On how this precedent made it to India see Narayan & Sindhu (n 4) 57-62.

[83] On the method of constitutional interpretation see P. Bobbitt, (n 7); C. Chandrachud, ‘Constitutional Interpretation’ in S. Choudhry, M. Khosla and P.B. Mehta (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Indian Constitution (Oxford University Press 2016).

[84] Art 32(2); In fact, the provision was amended to ensure discretion of remedies to the Supreme Court, see Constituent Assembly Debates, 9 December 1948.

[85] For instance, in Anuradha Bhasin v Union of India (2020) 3 SCC 637 : AIR 2020 SC 1308, the Court failed to strike down the internet shutdown imposed in Jammu and Kashmir, which became the longest internet shutdown in a democracy, despite finding that the Government was wrong to not produce the orders before court and that strict standards of proportionality had to be applied. Instead of striking down the measure, the Court, without explanation, passed a direction to the Government to produce the orders and review the situation. The internet in the region was only restored a year after the Court’s decision.

[86] This technique ought to have been applied in the face of protests against the decision of the Court in Indian Young Lawyers Assn v State of Kerala (2019) 11 SCC 1 allowing the entry of women into the Sabarimala Temple. Instead, the Court agreed to review its decision, See Kantaru Rajeevaru v Indian Young Lawyers Assn (n 82).

[87] A good example of a considered approach to standards of review is the Court’s decision in State of Gujarat v Shri Ambica Mills Ltd. (1974) 4 SCC 656 : AIR 1974 SC 1300, where the Court held that in matters of economic decisions promoting welfare (unlike identity-based classifications) the State government should have more leeway to make classifications so as to first determine the success of the welfare measure.

[88] See notes 38 to 45 and accompanying text.

[89] Aharon Barak, Proportionality Constitutional Rights and their Limitations (Cambridge UP 2012), 396–99.

[90] Cora Chan, ‘Proportionality and Invariable Baseline Intensity of Review’ (2013) 33 Leg Stud 1.

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