THE QUEST FOR TRUTH IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE- REVISITING THE MALIMATH COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS BY - DR. SUMAN MAWAR
THE QUEST FOR TRUTH IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE- REVISITING THE
MALIMATH COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS
AUTHORED
BY - DR. SUMAN MAWAR
Associate Professor,
Government Law College, Ajmer, Rajasthan.
ABSTRACT
‘Satyameva Jayate’- Truth alone Triumphs,
enunciates the Indian ideology which confers the zenithally importance to
truth. Truth and Justice are somewhat synonymous for the common man, and thus,
when justice fails, truth stands defeated. The Malimath Committee in its Report
on Reforms in Criminal Justice System, 2003 deliberated on the need to attain
the ultimate end, not in terms of acquittal or conviction, but truth. Referring
to the observations of Dr. R. Venkataraman, Former President of India, the
Committee reiterated that “the Judge is not concerned with the truth; he is
only concerned with the proof.” In fact, the law of evidence clearly enumerates
that either the evidence is proved, disproved, or, not proved. In other words,
facts of a case are to be established by means of evidence, which is submitted
before the Court, and, the latter has to decide whether the facts are thereby
established. In case the Court is convinced to the point of ‘beyond reasonable
doubt’, conviction is maintained for the accused, whereas in all other cases,
it is acquittal. It is merely presumed that truth will surface from the
individual version of facts presented by the prosecution and the defense in presence
of the Judge, who appears to have little or no say in the drama that unfolds
before him in the court room. He simply plays the role of a mute spectator at
the contest between two parties and declares who has won and lost. The Malimath
Committee criticized this system to be profoundly loaded in favor of the
accused and accordingly made recommendations to incorporate appropriate changes
in the law.
An illustration may be given from K.
Venkateshwarlu v.State of Andhra Pradesh(2012) where the Court found itself
helpless to give justice to a polio-ridden child rape victim; although it was
proved that she was sexually assaulted by the accused, a police officer.
Lamenting on the acquittal, the Court said: “The demeanor of Aruna, the tears
in her eyes, her walking out of the Court after looking at the appellant,
pricks the judicial conscience….”
A decade and a half later since the Committee
suggested necessary amendments to shift the core focus of criminal justice to
attainment of truth, little has been achieved. Except for sparing aspects of
victim participation, the remaining suggestions have gone unhindered. The
present system suffers from the same laxity as before. The paper analyses
recent judicial trends to indicate the continued ineptness of the adversarial
system to achieve justice, and consequently truth, and the dire need to bring
about changes.
Key Words: Malimath Committee, Adversarial System, Truth, Justice, Victims.
INTRODUCTION
The Indian spirit vests the highest importance to
truth. The aphorism, Satyameva Jayate (Truth alone succeeds) is engraved in our
National Emblem “Ashoka Stambha” and all our saga narrate the goodness of
truth.[1] Truth
is a cherished ideal of India and the cornerstone of our justice system. Truth being
the very basis of justice protects the innocent and punishes the guilty. For an
average person, truth and justice holds the same connotation, and thus, when justice
flounders, truth stands defeated. The Malimath Committee in its Report on Reforms
in Criminal Justice System, 2003 considered the need to attain the ultimate end,
not in terms of acquittal or conviction, but truth.[2]
For criminal justice dispensation, India follows
the “adversarial system” which has been handed down by our British Colonial Rulers.[3] In an
adversarial criminal justice system, the Judge acts as a neutral fact finder
who remains passive throughout the proceeding.[4] He
allows all sides of arguments in the court room which eventually take the shape
of a combat which must be adequately using all available resources. He
dispassionately examines the evidence forwarded by the parties during disposition,
his only objective being, resolving the dispute.[5] Here,
it is presumed that truth will come up from the individual versions of the facts
forwarded by the prosecution and the defense before a neutral judge.
Considering several lacunas in the adversarial
system of justice delivery, the Malimath Committee in its 2003 report pointed
out that this system has led to a situation where large numbers of criminals escape
convictions. In such a system, ascertainment of truth becomes a distant goal;
either due to the errors on the part of investigation officer, prosecution,
witnesses, or on account of stringency of the laws of evidence. To do away with
the lacunas of adversarial system; the committee recommended that the “presumption
of innocence” and “proof beyond reasonable doubt” be substituted with a lower
standard, for example, “the Court’s conviction”.[6] The
committee further recommended incorporation of certain attributes of inquisitorial
system of investigation and administration of justice in the present criminal
justice system. The committee emphasized on the dire need to reform the entire
criminal justice system keeping in mind the justice to the victims in terms of adequate
compensation, legal representation and witness protection.[7]
The present paper contends that decade and a half
later since the Committee suggested necessary amendments to shift the core focus
of criminal justice to attainment of truth, little has been achieved. It
analyses recent judicial trends to indicate the continued ineptness of the
adversarial system to achieve justice, and consequently truth, and the dire
need to bring about changes.
·
Indian
Adversarial System and Its Limitations
India follows an age-old criminal justice system
founded on the Penal system established by our colonial rulers. In an adversarial
system, the Judge acts as a neutral arbitrator without actively taking part in
the legal battle carried out in the court rooms. The liability of gathering
evidence rests with the parties (the prosecution and the defense) and a duty is
vested on the court of sovereign appraisal of the evidence collected during
investigation.
During the trial, the prosecution and the defense
submit their variant of events and argue their case in front of a neutral adjudicator.
Here, unless contrary is proved; the accused is presumed to be innocent and, in
case of a reasonable doubt as to whether the guilt is credibly proved, the
accused is allowed acquittal.[8]
Unlike the inquisitorial system of justice, where
Judges play an active role, direct the court room debate, shoulder the role of
the principle interrogator of witnesses and defendant, inquire into the charges
and asses all pertinent evidence; in an adversarial system, the Judge merely
acts as a umpire at the hearing. The Judge ensures that the trial is conducted
observing due process.[9] Thereafter,
it is decided whether the defendant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt and
hearing is conducted on the sentence given. Lawyers are chiefly accountable for
leading the evidences and interrogating witnesses.[10] (Cramton,
2002) At first, each witness gives their evidence-in-chief, thereafter they may
be cross-examined. Adversarial system is regulated by the idea of “Proof beyond
reasonable doubt,”
Unlike the inquisitorial system of justice, where
Judges play an active role, direct the court room debate, shoulder the role of
the principle interrogator of witnesses and defendant, inquire into the charges
and asses all pertinent evidence; in an adversarial system, the Judge merely
acts as a umpire at the hearing. The Judge ensures that the trial is conducted
observing due process.[11]
Thereafter, it is decided whether the defendant is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt and hearing is conducted on the sentence given. Lawyers are chiefly
accountable for leading the evidences and interrogating witnesses.[12] At
first, each witness gives their evidence-in-chief, thereafter they may be
cross-examined.
Adversarial system is regulated by the idea of
“Proof beyond reasonable doubt,” unlike the inquisitorial system where the
appeasement of the Judge towards attainment of truth holds greater value.
Furthermore, right to silence inherent in our Constitutional mandate of right
against self-incrimination is an integral part of this system. It is argued
that here the defendant has got stronger protections and the role of the victim
is not prominent.[13] The
system does not differentiate between the police and the prosecution. It
creates a close knit between the police, prosecution, and the State which tries
to convict the defendant. The system fails to recognize the police as a
separate authority having responsibilities independent of the prosecution with
relation to attainment of truth.[14]
Critics claim that the adversarial system is more perturbed with unraveling
disputes than detecting the endmost truth.[15] This
system places an exorbitant on victory and hence persuades manipulation and
deception.[16] Also,
people with inadequate resources cannot buy equal access to justice as that of
affluent ones.[17] The system
is characterized by the fact that lawyers spend more time avoiding truth than
seeking it.[18]
In the adversarial system, since the parties
direct the litigation, they are persuaded to submit only the evidence that is
beneficial to them and to repress evidence that is not.
Critics maintain that the ‘rules of evidence’,
which were created to guarantee fairness to all parties actually work against
fairness by suppressing necessary information which should have been submitted
before the Judge, who is supposedly the fact finder in the case. The Indian law
of evidence clearly enumerates that either the evidence is proved, disproved,
or, not proved. In other words, facts of a case are to be established by means
of evidence, which is produced before the Court, and, the latter has to decide
whether the facts are thereby established. In case the Court is convinced to
the point of ‘beyond reasonable doubt’, conviction is maintained for the
accused, whereas in all other cases, it is acquittal. Though the goal of truth
to be attained at the end of a judicial process is an ideal expressed in the
Higher Courts (High Courts of State and the Supreme Court of India); the accent
to ‘winning at any cost’ without adequate concern towards truth-seeking is the
prime focus when it comes to adversarial system.[19]
Judicial truth in India is exclusively concerned with the facts established according
to the law of evidence which may be far from the reality of actual facts.
Criminal trials in an adversarial system are prone to manipulations of all
sorts and since the contesting parties determine the scope of the dispute, they
bring selective evidence in the Court.[20]
It is argued that the present adversarial system
is not only unresponsive towards the victims’ predicament and rights, it does
not permit the presiding Judge to rectify the anomalies in the investigation or
in the issue of production of evidence in the Court.[21]
QUEST FOR
TRUTH OR PROOF?
According to Swami Vivekananda, for an average
man, truth tantamount to justice and thus, when truth flounders, justice also
fails.[22]
However, there is no place for truth in the present criminal justice system
that is followed by India. On one hand, lawyers are more concerned with
resolving controversies and representing their client’s interests rather than
finding truth; on the other hand, Judges are merely concerned with ‘proof’, and
not ‘truth’.[23]
Through their entire career, the lawyers involve
themselves bootlicking their rich clients who expect them to manipulate the
substance and procedure of law.[24] Eventually,
truth becomes a casualty and a premium is put on winning.
In the case of Gurbachan Singh v. Satpal Singh[25] it was held that in an adversarial system of justice,
“proof beyond reasonable doubt” and “presumption of innocence” still maintain a
pivotal position. The maxim that “it is better to acquit ten guilty persons
than convict an innocent one” is nowhere mentioned in the criminal law books,
but is a rule of prudence founded on public policy. In the case of Naba Kishore Rout
v. the State[26],
1990 it was held that Where
the proof of an offence with certainty of criminal law is established to the
effect that the offence has been committed and that no other person but the
accused must have committed the offence; then the Court considers the case to
have been proved “beyond reasonable doubt”. “Proof beyond reasonable doubt”
does not admit fanciful possibilities and stems out from the idea of
“presumption of innocence” embedded in our adversarial system(SK Badar
Alias SK. Badiruddin v. State of Orissa, 1995[27]).
In the case of Gurbachan Singh v. Satpal Singh[28]
it was held that Even though “proof beyond reasonable doubt” holds high value,
the Supreme Court pointed out that inflated fidelity to the rule of benefit of
doubt must not be exercised to the extent that justice becomes sterile. In the
case of Neelam Katara v. Union of India and others[29],
the Court further added that it is a fact that administration of justice is of
great significance in our society, and it may be true that let hundred escape
but do not let an innocent to be punished, but this plea cannot be outstretched
so as to provide an escape route for the accused and usurp the administration
of justice.
The Court on various instances condemned the inert
role played by the judges and accentuated the significance of finding truth.
For example, in Ram Chander v State of Haryana[30],
Justice Chinnappa Reddy opined that in adversary system, the judge plays the
role of an umpire or referee wherein he allows the trial to take the shape of a
match between the prosecution and the defense with the unavoidable contortions
flowing from aggressive, confrontational, and competing elements infiltrating the
trial procedure (Ram Chander v State of Haryana,[31]).
He further added that if a Criminal Court is to be an effectual tool in
assuring justice, the presiding judge must refrain from being a bystander and a
mere audiotape. He must become an accomplice in the trial by manifesting sharp
dynamic interest and by throwing questions to the witnesses in order to
determine the truth (Ram Chander v State of Haryana,[32]).
Similar views were given in State of Karnataka v. Suvarnamma[33] (2015)
where the Supreme Court said that even though we are governed by the
adversarial system, the Court cannot be a taciturn observer predominantly in
criminal cases and the key obligation of the court is to unleash the truth from
material on record (State of Karnataka v. Suvarnamma[34]).
The judiciary has further advanced the need of
social justice adjudication as an alternative to mere adversarial approach as
mere adversarial means may not be apt. After all, the ultimate duty of the
courts is to facilitate the cause of social justice (Badshah v Urmila
Badshah Godse and another[35]).
The Supreme Court has accorded greater value to social context adjudication
when it comes to enforcement of rights of the vulnerable section of the society(Vishaka
and others v. State of Rajasthan and others[36]; Aruna
Ramachandra Shahbaug v. Union of India & others[37]);
though,as Prof. Madhava Menon puts it, adversarial legalism is the only reality
in trial Courts where evidence law would dismiss social- context arguments as
hearsay[38]. He further
contended that the adversarial system functions in a manner wherein unequal
parties are set against each other and the judge is more leaned towards proof
than truth. Primarily, this system steers to the impediment of the weaker party[39].
The Judges are expected not to act like a
recording equipment to document whatever is being stated by the witnesses;
rather, they are conferred with wide powers under Sec.165 of the Evidence Act,
1872 and Sec.311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. In the case of Nellore
v. Intha Ramana Reddy[40],
the Court said that all criminal trials resemble a voyage in which the
unearthing of truth is the pursuit. It is the task of the moderator Judge to
investigate every possibility open to him in order to ascertain the truth and
to promote the cause of justice (Nellore v. Intna Ramana Reddy[41]).Thus,
the judge is vested with the powers given by Sec. 165 of the Evidence Act,
1872, which gives him the right to put questions to witnesses. The Supreme
Court further observed that the outcome of a criminal proceeding cannot be entirely
left in the hands of the parties and it is the duty of the Courts to ensure
that the pertinent questions are not left unattended (Raghunath v. State
of UP[42]).
The presiding Judge must not be a bystander but should become an accomplice in
the trial and educe all congruous materials essential for reaching the right
end for finding out the truth (Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh and another v.
State of Gujarat and others[43]).
Though it is the key principle of the law of
evidence that the highest possible degree of proof or the best evidence should
be produced before the Court, in the case of Mohan Lal Shamlal Soni v.
Union Of India and another[44],
where the best evidence could not be put forward by the prosecution before the
Court, the Supreme Court put a serious question on the Judge. The Court
interrogated whether the presiding officer is vested with a legal duty of his
own, separate from the parties, to take an effective role in discovering the
truth or should he merely sit as an umpire and assert at the end of the warfare
as to who won and who lost (Shamlal Soni v. Union Of India and another[45]).
The Court furthermore added that the scope and ambit of Sec.311 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 is sufficiently extensive to cover any Court at any
stage or any enquiry, trial, or other proceedings, and that the discretionary
power can be administered on any person if it is a requisite to secure new
evidence so as to reach a valid and just decision.
The Supreme Court advanced the duty of the Court
to detach the wheat from the husk and pointed out that although in each case it
must be appraised to what extent the evidence is acceptable, but, just because
in few respect, the Court considers the same to be inadequate, the same cannot
be discarded or ignored in totality (Shakila Abdul Gafar Khan v. Vasant
Raghunath Dhoble[46]).
As long as the chaff, cloud, and dust remain, they will clog the very truth,
and the criminals will be clothed under a protective layer of ‘benefit of doubt.’
(Mohan Singh and another v. State of MP[47])
The Malimath committee envisaged that even though
the foundation of the criminal justice system is investigation by the police,
but, adversarial system does not compel the judge to undo the anomalies in the investigation
with the endeavor of discovering the truth.[48] In Samaj
Parivartan Samudaya and Ors. v.State of Karnataka and Ors.[49]
it was held that the fundamental principle of an investigation is to extract
the truth by conducting fair and appropriate investigation, in harmony with law
and to make certain that the culpable are penalized. The Court must insure that
powerful persons are not able to abuse or usurp the investigation so as to
suffocate a fair investigation, the consequence being an escape route for
offenders (Samaj Parivartan Samudaya and Ors. v .State of Karnataka and
Ors.[50]).Similarly,
in the case of Mithilesh Kumar Singh v State of Rajasthan[51]
it was held that in an adversarial system of administration of justice,
fairness of investigation is the very first requirement for fairness of trial
and a trial based on one- sided and biased investigation can hardly be fair(Mithilesh
Kumar Singh v State of Rajasthan[52]).
Considering several lacunas in the adversarial
system, the Malimath Committee in its 2003 report laid down the foundations for
a restructured criminal justice system. The committee focused on adopting
certain features of the inquisitorial system in our justice delivery mechanism
to improve upon the existing vice.
RECOMMENDATIONS
OF MALIMATH COMMITTEE
The Malimath Committee was constituted for a
thorough review of the whole criminal justice system of the country so that
methodical reforms may be made to recover the existing legal depravity. The
Committee dwelt on several aspects of the system including the primary
principles of justice administration.
Truth as the core focus: The committee indicated
that nothing but truth must be the cornerstone of the Criminal Justice System[53]
since justice is defeated if truth does not prevail[54].The committee
addressed the fact that in an adversarial system of justice administration, the
Judge, being too apprehensive to preserve an unprejudiced position, never takes
the lead to determine the truth. However, in an inquisitorial system, the Judge
is conferred with a affirmative duty to unleash the truth and the judicial
police are required to assemble evidence for and against the accused, in an
unbiased manner, under the direction of an independent Judicial officer, “the
Judge of instructions.”[55]
After all, to recoup the missing confidence of common mass on Judiciary, the
Courts must become vigorous seekers of truth and everyone should lend a hand to
the Court in its pursuit for truth.
Attributes of inquisitorial system to be embraced:
It is imperative that our system adopts some features of the inquisitorial
system with necessary modifications since inquisitorial system is more
proficient in the sense that the investigation is directed by the judicial
magistrate ensuing good number of conviction. The committee alerted the Courts
to seek out truth, to assign a more dynamic role to the Judges, to render
instructions to the investigating officers and prosecution agencies in matters
of investigation, and to lead evidence with the purpose of realization of truth[56].
To confer duty on every Court to discover truth:
The committee envisaged that ample authority has been given to the Judges by
virtue of Sec. 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 wherein the Court is
given discretion to summon any person as a witness or re-call and re-examine
any person who has been previously examined if it is necessary for arriving at
a just decision[57]. The
committee pointed out that ‘just decision of the case’ does not equate to ‘the duty
of discovering the truth’ and in reality, when the witnesses are examined, the
Courts scarcely interrogates. Furthermore, the trend of decisions is that the
power under Sec. 311 should be exercised with immense caution[58].
Thus, the committee suggested necessary amendments to this section imposing a
duty on every Court to “suo moto cause production of evidence for the purpose
of discovering the truth”.
Justice to victims: The committee pointed out that
the criminal justice system at hand is heftily in favor of the accused and it
does not sufficiently focus on justice to the victims. The victim is the one
who’s right has been pervaded by the accused, but he is not given any right to
partake in the criminal trial, except as a witness[59]. It recommended
that the victim should be given the right of active participation in a trial so
that he may furnish such information which would aid the Court in unearthing
the truth or ensuring the production of new evidence necessary to render justice[60]. It
further endorsed that victims must have the right to prefer an appeal against
acquittals[61] and right
to compensation.[62]
To shift the trends in “burden of proof” and
“standard of proof”: The committee specified that it is the obligation of the
Courts to discover the ultimate truth and pass judgments accordingly. Since
India follows adversarial system of justice, the Judge acts as a referee to see
whether the case has been proved “beyond reasonable doubt” by the prosecution.
By shifting the trends in “burden of proof” and “standard of proof”, the
unreasonable burden on the prosecution may be reduced. This in turn will block
the escape routes for the criminals, who have been taking huge advantage of the
lacunae of this system for years[63]. The
committee suggested that the standard proof be set at a midway between “proof
beyond reasonable doubt” (as followed in India) and preponderance of
probabilities (as followed in Europe). It called for a ‘clear and convincing
standard.’[64]
To reverse “presumption of innocence” and “right
to silence”: The committee indicated that “presumption of innocence” of the
accused and “right to silence” are inter alia well recognized principles of
criminal jurisprudence. “Right to silence” of the accused is a fundamental
right which germinates from the right against self- incrimination conferred by
Article 20(3) of the Indian Constitution. While explaining the accurate range
and meaning of “right to silence”, the committee referred to examination of the
accused under Sec.313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. It emphasized on
the fact that sec.313 will not contradict the right of the accused against
self-incrimination because he may decline to respond to the questions put to
him and no coercion is involved herein. Thus, the Court is empowered to place
any questions to the accused during trial which would give him a chance to
clarify the state of affairs appearing against him in the evidence and if the
accused willingly makes self-incriminatory statement, it may be taken into
account, either in favor of him or against him.[65]
However, the fact that the accused may reject to answer the questions put to
him not only results in immense bigotry to the prosecution, but also hampers
the pursuit for truth. Thus, the committee suggested that Sec. 313 should be
substituted by Sec.313A, 313B and Sec.313C and that he should file a statement
to the prosecution revealing his stand.[66]
In fact, in similar lines, the Supreme Court of
India has held that in case the accused remains numb to the questions put to
him by the court under Sec.313 of Cr.P.C., 1973, wherein he is expected to come
out with an clarification, leads to an unfavorable inference against the
accused (Prahlad v. State of Rajasthan[67]).
The extensive recommendations given by Malimath
Committee were atypically straightforward in the sense that common people have indeed
lost trust in the present criminal justice system, and that victims feel
disregarded and unattended. However, a glance at the criticisms against
Malimath report posed by Upendra Baxi propagate that, most of the
recommendations in the report are based on knee jerk reactions and not on sound
legal propositions. For example, Prof. Baxi maintains that, the report has
significant acquaintance with what has been already stated. At the outset of
the report, Andre Gide’s quote “Everything has been said already, but as no one
listens, we must always begin again” assuages the readers into considering that
the report is a compiled version of existing acumen.[68]
Baxi maintains that reversing the “presumption of innocence”
and “right to silence” would challenge the cardinal principle of criminal
justice administration. In fact, “presumption of innocence” is an essential
right under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The same
has been incorporated under Article 20(3) of the Indian Constitution. Reversing
presumption of innocence through prompt action, without establishing an
evidence- based relationship between high rates of acquittals vis-à-vis
presumption of innocence, questions the credibility of the Malimath report.[69]
Besides, the report talks about incorporation of
certain good points of inquisitorial system presuming that it “may” strengthen
the present adversarial system. However, not much of research has gone into
that presumption. Prof. Baxi argues that the only jurisdiction referred herein
is France which is ruled by jury system and where offices of Magistrates and
Prosecutors are interchangeable. Whether such a system is feasible for India
has not been clarified in the report.[70]
The Committee emphasizes on the quest for truth
and warrants the judges with extraordinary powers. However, court room trials
centre on facts, and established facts lead a judge towards educated guesses to
what really happened.[71]
Under such circumstances, the place of truth remains dubious.
Other critics have questioned the very
constitution of the Committee with judges, bureaucrats, police, academician
etc. In fact, it had no women members; nor prominent criminal law attorneys.[72] Moreover,
the Committee sidelined its discussion on the rights of poor and marginalized sections
like dalits who are victimized at the hands of the system. Though the Committee
advanced on the assumption that greater conviction rate shall meet the ends of
justice; yet critical human rights concerns, like wrongful arrest and
detention, torture and custodial violence, crisis in legal aid, and growing number
of under-trials, remained unaddressed.[73]
True that the concerns flagged by Malimath
regarding a less-than-functional criminal justice system in India have been
slammed on grounds of being hasty, flawed, and ambiguous; yet, it cannot be
disregarded that the Committee made efforts towards revamping the entire system
on the brink of collapse. The three major apparatus of the criminal justice
machinery in India, the police, the court, and the prison, need discrete but
coordinated reforms to induce tangible changes[74].Though
legislative intent relies more on facts than popular opinion, Malimath’s
recommendations, and rightly so, concluded that Indian criminal justice
administration will proceed towards a new track bearing better justice
dispensation once and for all, if the rights of the victims are recognized and
established, along with the rights of the accused.
RESPONSE TO
MALIMATH- LITTLE DONE, VAST UNDONE
Out of the several recommendations made by the
Malimath Committee, barely a few have been acted upon. These include, inclusion
of victim compensation scheme through Sec. 357A of Cr.P.C, 1973; insertion of
victim protection through Sec. 357C of Cr.P.C, 1973 which talks about providing
treatment to victims free of cost; amendment to Sec. 372 of Cr.P.C, 1973 which
provides the victim with the right to prefer an appeal against any order passed
by the Court acquitting the accused or imposing lesser sentence or inadequate
compensation; insertion of sub-section (8) to Sec.24 Cr.P.C, 1973 which gives a
right to the victim to engage an advocate of his choice to assist the
prosecution and infusion of sub-section (5) to Sec. 313 of Cr.P.C, 1973 wherein
the Court is given the power to take assistance from the prosecution and
defense to prepare relevant questions to be put before the accused.
However, the changes have made little difference
to the conviction rate(Ranjan, 2017, p.46). Thus, decade and a half later since
the Malimath Committee gave its recommendations; the situation still remains
grim as ever.
Even though the Judge is vested with inquisitorial
powers as inculcated under Sec.165 of the Evidence Act, 1872, and Sec.311 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 that allow a Judge to seek any information
necessary to obtain proper proof of relevant facts and to ask for production of
vital evidence or examination of a witness who is not a part of the prosecution
or defense case, the Court, time and again, has talked about the ‘caveat’ that
this power, which is vast and wide, should be exercised judiciously and with
immense caution (Natasha Singh v. Central Bureau of Investigation[75]; Rajaram
Prasad Yadav v. State of Bihar and another[76]).
The Court emphasized that though the discretion to examine witnesses under Sec.
311 Cr.P.C, 1973 is wide, but, the width requires corresponding vigilance (Himanshu
Singh Sabharwal v. State of M.P.[77]).The
Court even warned that Sec. 311 Cr.P.C, 1973 or Sec.165 of the Evidence Act,
1872, cannot be exercised “to fill a lacuna in the prosecution case” and it
must be perceived as an innate flaw in the milieu of prosecution, the benefit
of which should in effect go to the accused (Rajendra Prasad v. Narcotic
Cell[78]).
Thus, in a situation where the evidence is concluded or where the prosecution
has closed the case, Sec.165 of the Evidence Act, 1872 would have no
application even though the prosecution fails on a material aspect (Omprakash
Shankarlal Sharma v. State of Maharashtra[79]).
The Court has furthermore held that once a witness is examined-in-chief and
cross-examined, such witness cannot be recalled and re-examined under Sec.311
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to deny evidence, even though the
witness had given inconsistent statement before any other Court or forum (State
of MP v. Vinod Mudgal and Ors.[80]).Similarly,
recalling an investigating officer after the closure of the evidence has been
refused on the ground that such is not essential to arrive at a just
decision(Chandran v. State of Kerala, 1985).
The Court has held that “lacuna in the prosecution
case” should not be treated as irreparable and the Court should be liberal in
allowing such errors to be ameliorated (Rajendra Prasad v. Narcotic Cell[81]).
Thus, Sec.311 of Cr.P.C, 1973 or Sec.165 of Evidence Act, 1872 can be exercised
with the intention of discovering the truth in order to facilitate the court to
arrive at a just decision of the case (U.T. of Dadra and Nagar Haveli and
another v. Fatehsingh Mohansingh Chauhan[82]).
In fact, the Court has inherent power to recall a witness under Sec.311 of
Cr.P.C. 1973, if he is ready to give evidence materially dissimilar from what
he has given in the trial (Raj Deo Sharma v. State of Bihar[83]);
but ironically, the Court found it helpless to give justice to a polio-ridden
child rape victim; although it was proved that she was sexually assaulted by
the accused, a police officer. (K. Venkateshwarlu v. State of Andhra
Pradesh[84])
Lamenting on the acquittal, the Court said:
“The demeanor of Aruna, the tears in her eyes, her
walking out of the Court after looking at the appellant, pricks the judicial
conscience….” (K. Venkateshwarlu v. State of Andhra Pradesh[85])
Similarly, where a six year old girl was taken to a field by the accused, who
seduced her with sweets, and thereafter committed rape on her, and smashed her
face with bricks, the Supreme Court maintained the acquittal of the accused by
the lower Courts on the ground of grave lapses by the investigation or
prosecution including non-examination of material witness and elimination of
vital evidence (State of Gujarat v. Kishanbhai[86]).
The sheer anguish of the Court, though palpable in the judgment, could not
serve the cause of justice to an innocent child or her immediate family.
In Lalu v. State of MP (2003), the Court held that
the evidence adduced by the prosecution was not considered worthy of credence
because the prosecution failed to adequately ascertain the culpability of the
accused. The wife of the deceased, who was sitting by his side, when the
deceased received knife blows, avoided and evaded all questions put to her in
cross-examination and thus, her testimony, was discarded completely and the
conviction of the trial Court for the offense punishable under Sec. 302 of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860, was set aside.
Similarly, in the case of Babu v. State of
Kerala[87],
where the deceased died within 15 days of her marriage due to cyanide poisoning
which was procured by the accused appellant who manipulated the deceased to
take it as an oral contraceptive, and where the High Court of Kerala set aside
the acquittal of the accused by the trial Court on the ground that all the
circumstances necessary to establish guilt against the appellant was proved by the
prosecution, the Supreme Court of India emphasized on “the principle of
presumption of innocence” and “benefit of doubt”. Highlighting the statement of
the accused which was furnished under Sec.313 Cr.P.C, 1973, that he had seen
the deceased along with another man in a compromising position, the Supreme
Court held that the trial Court’s judgment was adequately reasoned as the
sequence of circumstances were found patchy. Accordingly, the accused was
acquitted on the ground of material contradictions in the prosecution case,
though the truth appeared far from it.
In similar lines, the Supreme Court in the case of
Joydeb Patra v. State of West Bengal[88]
held that since the prosecution could not prove its case beyond reasonable
doubt that the deceased died due to poison administered by the accused persons,
the lower Courts should not have declared the appellant guilty simply because
they could not elucidate under what situation the deceased had died. In fact,
the Court stressed that Sec.106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 do not
alleviate the prosecution from justifying the case “beyond reasonable doubt.”
Only after the prosecution proves the case “beyond reasonable doubt,” the
burden in relation to such facts which was within particular knowledge of the
accused may be transferred to the accused for explaining the same (Joydeb
Patra v. State of West Bengal[89]).
In a like manner, where it was proved that the deceased had died due to several
burn injuries in her body and that she was brutally assaulted by her husband
and in-laws for want of dowry, the Supreme Court chose to rely on the evidence
given by the appellant husband where he claimed to have been acquainted with
the handwriting and signature of his wife, and affirmed that the chit which was
discovered from the dressing table was indeed a suicide note from his deceased
wife where she clearly mentioned that nobody but she alone was responsible for
her death (Vipin Jaiswal v. State of Andhra Pradesh[90]).
The Court stressed on the onus of the prosecution “to prove beyond reasonable
doubt” the ingredients of section 498A and section 304B of the Indian Penal
Code, 1860. It furthermore held that the Trial Court and the High Court could
have compared the handwriting and signature of the alleged note with some of
the other handwritings of the deceased under Sec.73 of the Indian Evidence Act
or could have gone for an expert’s opinion under Sec. 45 of the Evidence Act,
but they never resorted to these provisions (Vipin Jaiswal v. State of
Andhra Pradesh[91]).
In Niranjan Panda v. State of Orissa[92],
where the victim was a minor girl under the age of 12 years who in her evidence
testified that a man dragged her into the place of occurrence which was dark
and raped her, the High Court of Orissa retained the conviction by the Sessions
Court on the ground that the evidence on record could not prove the charges
“beyond reasonable doubt”. The Court stressed on the right of innocence and
furthered that every man is presumed innocent until contrary is proved; the
burden of proving everything which is necessary for the establishment of charge
lies with the prosecution (State of Rajasthan v. Mohan lal[93]).Correspondingly,
in Lakhan Hari Yadav v. State of MP[94],
after appreciation of evidence in the trial Court, when the appellant was held guilty
of the offences of rape and criminal intimidation, the High Court of Madhya
Pradesh held that since after the alleged act, the prosecutrix as well as the
accused wore their respective undergarment and lungi, the probability that the
prosecutrix was actually a consenting party to the act, cannot be precluded.
Thus, benefit of doubt was given to the appellant and the conviction was set
aside. So was the case of Md. Ali v. State of U.P. (2015), where
the Supreme Court set aside the conviction of the appellant by the lower Courts
on ground of benefit of doubt which arose due to the delay in lodging F.I.R,
non-examination of witness, medical evidence, testimony of the prosecutrix and
allied circumstances.
In the Pipili Gang Rape case, where the deceased
victim was a 19 year old Dalit girl, the Court acquitted the accused persons of
rape on account of lack of evidence[95]. When
the family of the deceased faced constant threats to not give evidence in the
Court, the case was transferred to Bhubaneshwar (Babuli Behera v. State
of Odisha[96])
and eventually the Pipili incident melted into thin air. Similarly, in the case
of State of Gujarat v. Kishanbhai [97]
where the trial Court held that the prosecution has “proved the case beyond
reasonable doubt” and sentenced the convict with death for committing rape and
brutal murder of a child as young as 6 years, the High Court acquitted
Kishanbhai giving justification like deficiencies in investigation and
incongruity in the prosecution case. Aggrieved by the order of the High Court,
the State of Gujarat approached the Supreme Court wherein it was held that the
investigating officers had miserably failed in discharging their duties and the
misery of the victim’s family remained unaddressed. Regretting the acquittal due
to evident blunder in the investigation and prosecution of the case and
material inconsistencies in the evidence produced; the Court concluded by stating
that- “A heartless, merciless criminal, who has committed an extremely heinous
crime, has gone scot-free…We are trained to adjudicate without taking sides,
and without being mindful of the consequences…We could not serve the cause of
justice to an innocent child…”
More than 15 years have passed since the Malimath
Committee gave its recommendations. Still, the above discussion poses real
questions on the existing approach of the judicial system towards dispensation
of justice which is far away from truth.
CONCLUSION
The quest for truth is an eternal quest of
mankind. It has its basis in the philosophy which tries to comprehend the very
nature of ‘truth’. However, in legal context, the truth-inquiry the Courts
delve into is different in the sense that, the questions revolve around finding
the correct answer to the questions posed before it; for example: did the
accused do the act? A system which forms decisions on the basis of competing
version of events is anything but true; it is a sort of ‘weak deflationist
understanding of truth’[98]. The
Malimath Committee emphasized on this very aspect of decision making premised
on traditional principles of criminal jurisprudence and procedural fairness as
negating the quest for truth and, in a sense, of justice. In fact, plethora of decisions
delivered by the Courts has indicated a failure of truth and consequently, justice,
either because of shoddy investigation, or absence of evidence, or some other material
lapses. In each of the cases, over-emphasis on the presumption of innocence,
right of silence, right against self-incrimination, proof beyond reasonable
doubt etc. on one hand, and the Judge’s perceived neutrality on the other, have
tilted the balance unjustifiably in favor of the accused, causing grave
injustice to the injured party. It has also generated a sense of void,
insecurity, and diffidence in the society and towards the criminal justice
system as a whole. Time is ripe for an overhaul in the system as there can be
no justice without truth. To quote the words of Rabindranath Tagore, ‘Facts are
many, but the truth is one’; and thus, the purpose of the justice system should
be towards securing that truth which shines clear and constant.
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