Open Access Research Article

THE SURVIVAL OF COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM AMIDST POLITICAL POLARISATION: CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES AND INSTITUTIONAL RESILIENCE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF INDIA AND GERMANY

Author(s):
VAMIKA VASHISTH HARSH VARDHAN
Journal IJLRA
ISSN 2582-6433
Access Open Access
Volume 3
Issue 7

Abstract

Cooperative federalism depends upon the capacity of constitutionally distinct governments to coordinate public policy while preserving their respective spheres of authority. Political polarisation places this relationship under considerable pressure. Institutions designed to facilitate negotiation may become arenas for partisan confrontation, fiscal disagreements may be interpreted as political discrimination, and constitutional disputes may develop into conflicts over democratic legitimacy. This research paper examines the survival of cooperative federalism amidst political polarisation through a comparative study of India and Germany. The study adopts a doctrinal, descriptive, analytical and comparative methodology based entirely on secondary sources, including constitutional provisions, judicial decisions, institutional reports, academic books and scholarly articles. The Indian constitutional framework is examined through the distribution of legislative powers, the Inter-State Council, the Finance Commission, the Goods and Services Tax Council and judicial decisions concerning federalism. The German framework is analysed through the Basic Law, the Bundesrat, fiscal equalisation and institutional arrangements governing relations between the Federation and the Länder. The comparative analysis demonstrates that neither constitutional recognition nor the mere existence of intergovernmental institutions guarantees effective cooperation. India's federal structure combines substantial State responsibilities with significant Union powers, making consultation and fiscal predictability essential to maintaining constitutional balance. Germany's system incorporates the Länder directly into federal law-making through the Bundesrat, encouraging negotiation while sometimes producing delays and complex political bargaining. The paper argues that cooperative federalism does not require the elimination of political disagreement. Instead, its survival depends upon institutions capable of transforming disagreement into constitutional dialogue, transparent decision-making and negotiated compromise. It concludes that regular intergovernmental consultation, predictable fiscal arrangements, respect for constitutional boundaries and accessible dispute-resolution mechanisms are essential to strengthening federal resilience in both countries.

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Author Details

Authors: VAMIKA VASHISTH & HARSH VARDHANRegistration ID: 1013455 | Published Paper ID: IJLRA13455 & IJLRA13456Approved ISSN: 2582-6433 | Country: Delhi, IndiaPage No.: 2327-2357

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International Journal for Legal Research and Analysis

  • AbbreviationIJLRA
  • ISSN2582-6433
  • AccessOpen Access
  • LicenseCC 4.0

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