THE EFFECTS OF ADVERSE POSSESSION ON PROPERTY RIGHTS BY - SUHANI PANDEY
THE EFFECTS OF ADVERSE POSSESSION ON PROPERTY RIGHTS
AUTHORED BY - SUHANI PANDEY
AN
INTRODUCTION TO ADVERSE POSSESSION
HISTORICAL TRACING
“Squatters’ Rights” being widely used
as a synonym for adverse possession, it becomes clear at the outset who the
primary beneficiaries of these laws are. A squatter may be described as “one
who settles on another’s land, particularly on public lands, without a title”,[1]
though in this paper, the focus will primarily be on occupation of private
property. General public conceptions about squatters steers towards the
negative; they are perceived as “criminally inclined, unemployed, and not
interested in working.”[2]
The focus of this paper is not on dispelling this notion, but it must be
acknowledged that the people gaining most benefit from these laws are as much
citizens as the ones who may bear losses due to it, and certainly as much as
the ones decrying the idea entirely, and hence it is crucial that all interests
be carefully considered before reaching any conclusions about the necessity of
adverse possession. To start with, a historical tracing is crucial to lay the
basis for the social importance and longevity of this notion. The famous
expression that “possession is nine-tenths of the law” is also worth
considering for this discussion.
The concept of squatter’s
rights predates the modern understanding of property laws, finding mention as
far back as in the Code of Hammurabi in 2250 BC, with a passage declaring: “If
a man give a field to a gardener to plant as an orchard and the gardener plant
the orchard and care for the orchard four years, in the fifth year the owner of
the orchard and the gardener shall share equally: the owner of the orchard
shall mark off his portion and take it.”[3]
The implication underlying this law can be interpreted as a view in favour of
the one actually maintaining a property, even if he not be the actual owner of
the same.
Similarly, as with much
of the legal system, influences in the present understanding of adverse
possession laws are found in the ancient Greco-Roman tradition, though the laws
present here are considerably weighed in favour of actual owners of property,
the wealthy land-owning classes. The concept of precarium was present
among the Roman property laws, under which the actual owner could allow another
person to cultivate the land belonging to him, and that cultivator would then
acquire rights in the property as against any third party, but not against the
actual owner himself.[4]
Thus, in both of these ancient ideas, though there was respect for the notion
that the one taking care of a property should be able to reap benefits from it,
his rights in the land were ultimately only equal, if not inferior to, the
rights of the one who had paid for the land. Ownership rights by purchase were
given primacy and consequently the interests of the land-owning classes were
naturally bolstered.
In the Common Law
Tradition developed in England, post feudalism strong property rights were
formed for the protection of individual liberty, where it was not the state in
control of the individual’s right to possess and alienate his property.[5]
Under this system, the concept of adverse possession was first identified as a
doctrine in the Statute of Westminster in 1275,[6]
later modified in the Statute of Limitations in 1623,[7]
which set a 20-year limitation for a plaintiff in a suit claiming a property as
his own to establish adverse possession claims. This time period was later
changed to 12 years by an amendment in 1833.[8]
Similar laws regarding adverse possession were found in early American systems,
as well as in many legal systems in former British colonies.
PRESENT
UNDERSTANDING
Present laws regarding adverse
possession can be clearly identified within the wider historical context, as
updated, modified versions of old British laws, with ancient Roman legal
influences. Even today, the Limitation Act, 1963, by Article 65 of Schedule 1,[9]
prescribes a time limit of 12 years for a suit for possession of immovable
property or any interest therein based on title, from when possession by
another becomes adverse to the interests of the one claiming to be the actual
owner, for the latter to file a suit claiming ownership over the property in
question, failing which he loses his title over the property. In addition,
through case laws, a number of tests and guidelines have been laid down to
identify instances of adverse possession.
To start with, merely possession for
a period of 12 years is not enough to establish a case of adverse possession.
The possession must be shown to in some way be actually adverse towards the
person claiming the title to the property, along with the date at which this
possession became adverse, to determine the date at which the limitation period
is to start being calculated. In addition, the possession must be “adequate in
continuity, in publicity, and extent”.[10]
Any person claiming title to a
property through adverse possession must establish three factors- nec vi,
meaning that his possession was without force and adequate in continuity; nec
clam, meaning his possession was without secrecy and adequate in publicity;
and nec precario, meaning his possession was without permission and
adverse to a competitor.[11]
From these factors a constructive knowledge is bestowed upon the original title
holder on the basis that but for his due diligence, he would have known of the
possessory owner before period of 12 years expired, and would have hence filed
a suit for claiming his title within the limitation period.
Animus Possidendi of the possessory owner must also be
established with evidence to back it up- he must have the manifest intention to
hold the property, adversely affecting the rights of the title holder, in
denial of the latter’s rights, restricting him from enjoyment of his property.
The possession must be “commenced in wrong and aimed against a right”.[12]
Once these factors have been
established, and the period of 12 years is extinguished, the holder of the
title loses the right to eject the person holding the property by adverse
possession, and the right, title, and interest in the property is vested in the
possessory owner.[13]
Hence, the earlier notion that though the latter would take possession, the
rights in title would remain vested with the former, had been established. The
possessory owner effectively replaces the previous owner, and along with the
right to possess gets vested with all the rights to enjoy the property,
including the right to file suit for declaration of his title, protect his
title as defendant in a suit, and file permanent injunction against the
previous owner or any other person attempting to temper with his rights to
enjoy his property.[14]
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF ADVERSE POSSESSION
RIGHTS OF THE
ORIGINAL OWNER
From the discussion above it becomes
clear that the continued existence of squatter’s rights puts a disadvantage
upon the original owner who has purchased, inherited, or acquired the property
in any other lawful manner. The legal questions raised by this doctrine shall
be examined in the next chapter. Before moving on to that discussion, this section
reflects upon whether there are any benefits provided to the original owner by
adverse possession laws.
A prominent justification for these
rights as providing benefit to the owner comes from an economic argument- it
may encourage landowners to make adequate use of their land, rather than
neglecting it. However, this justification has been criticised, on the ground
that the pursuit of this goal should be through social and economic policy in
planning and housing law, rather than through technical methods of limitation
laws.[15]
The idea is that the threat of adverse possession of one’s land would act as a
motivating factor to keep track of one’s own properties. The roots of this can
be found in ancient laws, such as in the Code of Hammurabi, which provides “if
a chieftain or a man leaves his house, garden, and field… and someone else
takes possession of his house, garden and field and uses it for three years; if
the first owner returns and claims his house, garden, and field, it shall not
be given to him, but he who has taken possession of it and used it shall
continue to use it.”[16]
Hence, it may be said that it is a moral imperative upon an owner to care for
and keep conscious of his properties. Per Indian case laws, one of the
essential features of establishing adverse possession is nec clam[17]-
the possession by another was not a secret, and had the original owner been
cognizant of his belongings, he could have filed an eviction suit before the
end of the limitation period. This justification may hence find some use in
presenting adverse possession as a tool to keep landowners in check, however,
it cannot be said that it presents the doctrine as a benefit for them.
An area where there may actually be a
benefit to the original owner arises in the case of unregistered property. In
situations where title deeds to any land have been lost or destroyed, ownership
may be vested to the person in possession on the grounds of adverse possession.
A conveyance transaction then takes place on the basis of possessory ownership.[18]
This person may or may not be the original owner of the property, however, for
the original owner, this opens up an avenue to claim rightful ownership when no
evidence can be found to establish it otherwise. The situation may be the same
in the case of inherited ancestral property where no title deeds can be found.
There if this law is applied then the assumption would be that the family
residing in the property for a long period of time is the rightful owner.
However, this justification fails in the face of Indian judgements, where
another crucial element of establishing adverse possession is nec precario[19]-
the possession must be actually adverse to the original owner. Clearly, where
no original owner can be determined, and indeed the one claiming title to the
land is claiming to be the original owner himself, this element cannot be
established. One cannot be acting in a manner that distinguishes one’s own
right to property. In addition, there is of course the fact that the crux of
this matter is that there is no documentation proving ownership- the one
claiming to be the “original owner” may very well not be. There is no guarantee
that even this justification provides for any actual benefit to the original
owner.
Hence, it is quite obvious that any
benefit that the real owner of a property can derive from the continued
existence of adverse possession rights is negligible, if not non-existent. It
is not surprising, therefore, that these rights are controversial. A glimpse of
the conflict surrounding this issue is visible in examining the case of J A
Pye (Oxford) v Graham and Anr.[20],
a British case on adverse possession where a number of differing judgements
were given at different stages of the process, ultimately ending up before the
European Court of Human Rights as J. A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v United Kingdom.[21] Ultimately, it was held that although
this doctrine was in contravention of the right to peaceful enjoyment of one’s
property,[22]
enshrined in the European Convention of Human Rights, this was held to be a
“proportionate and thus permissible” interference, and thus this doctrine was
held to be human-rights compliant. Similarly, despite the obvious drawbacks to
the original owners, most jurisdictions around the world continue to protect
and respect squatters’ rights. The question then remains whether the benefit to
the possessory owners is high enough to override the harm caused to owners.
RIGHTS IMBUED IN
THE SQUATTER
As has already been stated at the
outset, the function of these laws seems very clearly to be to provide a
benefit to the possessory owner, the squatter. More often than not, it is
likely that this individual is one experiencing houselessness, seeking shelter
in a building left abandoned. Quite obviously one who is well-off and has the
ability to acquire housing though legal means would not resort to squatting,
unless there was an element of deep malice towards the original owner involved.
There is, hence, a strong case to be made for the fact that adverse possession
laws serve a social function in providing housing to those in need.[23]
The idea of using this doctrine as a
solution for houselessness, however, is also one that has been criticised, on
the same grounds as the criticism regarding the justification of encouraging
use of unused land. The criticism emphasises the fact of houselessness being an
extremely complicated issue, requiring well thought-out policy solutions in the
form of government intervention. The criticism derides the idea of squatters’
rights serving as a solution to the issue as a naïve one.[24]
However, it would be a mistake to entirely dismiss the role played by this
doctrine in providing housing. Quite obviously, it is not any sort of permanent
solution, or even one beneficial to any more than a small minority of those in
need of housing. Yet it cannot be denied that in current times, at least in the
Indian context, there is a lack of effective measures to provide adequate
housing to the poor. People living in slum dwellings have a population of over
42 million across the country.[25]
When there is no other option available, this doctrine may serve as a
life-saver. Rather than write it off as serving no purpose, the ideal solution
would be to create housing and poverty alleviation programmes which lead to it
no longer being a necessity. In lieu of those programmes, adverse possession
serves as a band-aid over a bullet wound.
On the legal side, the rights vested
with the possessory owner had been considerably widened, and now resemble the
rights of a legal owner in nature, including rights to appear as defendant in a
suit before a court as owner of the property, file for title of the property,
and file permanent injection against anyone trying to stop him from enjoying
his property.[26] In
theory, this creates a situation placing the possessory owner on the same
playing field as the previous, actual owner. In practise, however, the
enjoyment of these rights is a process filled with difficulties. An example of
this comes from the case of the “13th Street Squatters” of New York
City in the United States. They claimed titles of several abandoned buildings,
claiming themselves as “homesteaders”, and spent a significant amount of their
own money in making renovations to the buildings to make them a liveable space.
They were then evicted by the city, and could not claim title by adverse
possession in court, as they were unable to prove that they had been
continually living in the property for the required amount of time prescribed
by the period of limitations (10 years, in this case).[27]
The inherent bias against the poor in
the legal system is a factor that needs be considered when analysing this
doctrine. It is considerably more difficult for the possessory owner to
establish himself as such, with rules requiring him to prove intention, length
of occupation, and publicity of possession.[28]
Without documentation these are extremely hard to show, and it is more likely
than not that a case gets dismissed for lack of evidence. Similarly, the
resources present with a would-be possessory owner are likely to be negligible
compared to those of a legal owner of land. Given these considerations, the
chances of the squatter getting evicted, threatened into giving up claims to
ownership, or losing the court case are extremely high.
COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS OF NEEDS
The standard argument lays down two
benefits to adverse possession: firstly, it clears the title to a land, thereby
increasing its marketability, and secondly, it prevents valuable land from
being left empty for long periods of time.[29] Neither
of these arguments is one benefitting the original, legal owner- indeed,
through the above discussion, it was established that squatters’ rights by and
large serve as a cost upon the original owners, who must invest into monitoring
their properties lest they lose their title and interest. These arguments are
not directly beneficial to the squatters either. Who they do benefit is the
State- when more use is made of land, it contributes to overall capital growth
for the economy. Hence, a piece of agricultural land being cultivated by one
who does not own it is a better alternative to the land being left unutilised
by the one with ownership of it. Similarly, an abandoned house being possessed
by a squatter will in most cases lead to movement in the markets as the
squatter purchases the bare necessities required to make a space liveable, more
than what would happen with the title holder having no use for it and thus
providing for no amenities.
On a balance of outcomes, adverse
possession serves as more of a benefit to the squatters than to original
owners, even taking account of the hardships faced by the squatters. It is a
legislation almost that almost entirely serves to provide for the poor at the
cost of the rich. This would in many situations be surprising to see in
capitalist economies. However, taking into account the benefit accrued to the
State as mentioned above, the logic may be seen as to why unlawful at first
possession of a property by one not paying for it is preferable than the
property being left abandoned by the lawful owner. In addition, the continued
existence of these laws serves as a threat to lawful owners to make use of all
their properties, thereby promoting more economic activities on land that would
otherwise be left unused.
On a pure balancing of needs, it is
evident on the face of it that the squatters are in a position of great
disadvantage compared to the owners. Economically, they are much worse off.
Individual property rights in capitalist economies do not work off of ideals of
who “deserves” to have what, however, when looking between one who is in a
position of poverty having to resort to squatting in abandoned, unliveable
buildings, and one who has enough properties to his name that he is able to
lose track of the state of occupation of one for over a decade, it is hard not
to say that the property serves a better purpose in the hands of the former. In
this sense this doctrine promotes more of a socialist understanding of polity
and economy, providing for a more equitable distribution of land among the
population.
Additionally, the concept of
“proportionality” as given by the European Court of Human Rights in the Pye
Case[30]
is interesting to consider here. The Grand Chamber stated that a 12-year
limitation period “pursued a legitimate aim in the general interest”.
Additionally, it was held that the extinguishment of title at the end of the
period was “not without reasonable foundation”. It was held here that the
doctrine of adverse possession strikes a fair balance between the demands of
the general interest and the interest of the individuals concerned.
JUDICIAL UNDERSTANDING ON EXCEPTIONS TO
LEGAL OWNERSHIP
IMPLICATIONS ON
CRIMINAL AND TORT LAW
For adverse possession to arise, it
is necessarily preceded by a tortious wrong. The tort of trespass must be
committed, continuously over a long period of time, for a right to vest in the
possessory owner. There is inherent an element of unlawfulness in the
requirement that the possession by the squatter be adverse to the interests of
a lawful owner.[31] Hence,
there is an exception created in the arena of tort law by the application of
this doctrine. As far as the realm of Civil Law in concerned, the committing of
a tort does nor bar one from availing squatters’ rights, on the contrary the
former is required to bring the latter into operation.
Criminal Law, however, is governed by
the maxim ex turpi causa non oritur actio, the notion that a person will
not be able to pursue a cause of action if it arises from his own illegal act.
The idea behind this is that no one should be able to gain benefit from
committing a crime. Hence, in a situation where squatting is considered a
crime, logically it would be derived that adverse possession can no longer be
claimed. This, however, puts a restriction on the functioning of the doctrine
that has not been mentioned elsewhere.
The British case of Best v The
Chief Land Registrar[32]
dealt with this issue. Here, a plaintiff was squatting in a residential
building which he believed to be abandoned. He made several improvements to the
flat before finally moving in, and applied to the Land Registry to become the
new proprietor of the flat, within the provision of the Act providing for
adverse possession.[33]
However, crucially, three months before he made this application, a new Act
came into effect in Britain, which made it illegal to squat in a residential
building.[34] This
thus had the effect of making the plaintiff having committed not just a
tortious wrong but also a criminal act.
The judge in deciding whether the
Plaintiff should be given title by adverse possession stated that the maxim of ex
turpi causa non oritur actio should only be seen as a starting point and
not as an absolute rule which cannot be modified to fit different situations.
Here, it was held that the civil law regimes, in this case the law of
limitations and doctrine of adverse possession, served a social purpose which
outweighed the benefits of application of the given maxim. It was held that
there was greater public interest in accepting than in denying the Plaintiff’s
claim, furthering the idea that squatters’ rights serve a social purpose where,
on balance of benefit to the squatter versus loss to the original owner, the
interests of the squatter win out.
In this instance, the presence of a
criminal wrong did not prevent the application of the doctrine of adverse
possession. This, however, is not always the case. Per guidelines laid down in
Indian cases, the doctrine only comes into effect is the possession was without
force (nec vi).[35]
Hence, where violence is present, no right can be claimed. There is hence in
every situation a balance of costs and benefits, between the owner and the
trespasser, between Civil Law and Criminal Law, only after consideration of all
of which any verdict can be reached regarding rights in property. This issue is
thus not a uniform or uncomplicated one.
A HUMANISTIC
APPROACH
B.B. Pande in calling for recognition
of basic human needs for all as rights, expounds upon the numbers of the
homeless residing in slums in Indian cities. The population goes as high as 30
lakhs in Delhi NCT alone. This paper takes the view that housing, as a basic
human need, should be considered a human right for all.[36]
The case of Olga Tellis v Bombay Municipal Corporation[37]
was mentioned here, which is an interesting study of courts taking a humanistic
approach towards the dilemma of squatting. Here the petitioners were the
pavement/slum dwellers of Bombay city, their forcible eviction by the city
before the Courts, on grounds of violation of their fundamental rights under
Article 19 and Article 21 of the Constitution. Here, though the Court held that
the eviction of the Petitioners by the city was not unreasonable, as no person
has the right to encroach on places earmarked for public purposes, they
directed the Respondents to provide alternative dwellings for the pavement
dwellers at a reasonable distance so as to ensure they were able to reach their
area of work. It was further held that slums which had been in existence for a
long period of time and which had been improved and developed would not be
removed unless the land on which they stood was earmarked for public purposes,
in which case alternative dwellings were to be offered to them. the Court held
that it was to be the highest priority of the State Government to relocate the
slum dwellers who were being evicted. Hence, the Court here, though not
condoning squatting at a public place, still took the approach of housing as a
basic human need, and directed that it was to be the responsibility of the
State to provide for them. in an interesting differentiation from private
property, the period of limitation does not apply where land is to be used for
public purposes. Were this direction of housing for all being a State
responsibility to be applied uniformly across the nation, the instances of
adverse possession would be likely to dramatically decrease in number.
THE CASE OF
ROHINGYAS
The case of political refugees such
as the Rohingyas is another interesting consideration to the problem of
squatting. Fleeing from their home countries, these refugees set up camps,
which over the years develop into settlements, which have sometimes been
referred to as “emergency urbanism” or “exigent cities”.[38]
An example of such a settlement and the uncertainties it brings is visible in
examining a 2013 family of squatters in the NCR region. The 65 families were
squatting on one land that had recently been sold, hence they had been told to
relocate. The conditions in the slums were further borderline unliveable, even
when they are not evicted.[39] Public sentiment towards these groups of
people is generally negative, and as non-citizens with negligible resources,
they do not have the opportunity to assert any squatter’s rights, even if the
same were to be applicable. Hence, the general notion towards political
refugees squatting in camps or settlements is that of a problem that needs to
be solved, however, unless the government takes measures for the provision of
housing to these refugees, the are unlikely to be in a position to stop
squatting. While it would be most desirable for all sections of society,
especially those on whose lands the settlements have been set up, if squatters
were removed, this solution can only come about through government intervention
and the recognition of housing as a human right.
CONCLUSION
To see adverse possession as a
necessary law in a civilized society, rather than an encroachment upon
individual property rights, one may need to shift their view of the concept of
“ownership”. As was stated by Curtis and Ruoff, “Misunderstandings have
sometimes arisen from an unwarrantable belief that title deeds are sacrosanct
documents, whereas the truth is that neither a conveyance nor a land
certificate retains its value if the landowner is so lax or so indifferent as
to lose physical control of his land.”[40]
This belief hence lends credence to the idea that it is the onus upon property
owners to be responsible towards their land and its maintenance, and if they
fail to do so, it is fair and just that they lose ownership. When they lose
physical control of the land, hence, it does not follow that they should retain
right and interest in the property.
It is obviously
understood that those who lose their rights and whose lands get forsaken through
adverse possession would be hostile towards the existence of these laws. What
must be understood at the same time is that, in most cases, the squatters do
not have any more desire to be in the position they are present in, and are
only occupying the land of someone else out of desperation. The ideal solution
for both of these parties inevitable involves government intervention and
housing programmes. It is the onus upon the State to provide housing for the
unhoused, to prevent situations of squatting, among other benefits. However, in
a country with as large and diverse a population as India, with millions
houseless, the task is a daunting one. In the meantime, before housing can be
provided for all, the solution should not be the eradication of adverse
possession laws. This would create a dilemma where millions of citizens would
have literally nowhere to go.
Instead, a
solution to strengthen adverse possession laws is proposed. Even with this
doctrine being nominally available, most in need would find it extremely
difficult to assert their rights under it, due to lack of information and legal
resources. It is a temporary balm, but one which must be available.
[1] BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1403
(6th ed. 1990).
[2] Sachar R, The Realization of Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights: The Right to Adequate Housing (U.N. Commission on Human
Rights [Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities]), 46th Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 8, U.N. Doc.
[3] THE CODE OF HAMMURABI
Section 60 (2250 BC)
[4] Lintott AW, Judicial Reform and Land
Reform in the Roman Republic (Cambridge University Press 1992)
[5] Locke J and Tully J, A Letter
Concerning Toleration: Humbly Submitted (Hackett Publishing Company 1989)
[6]
Statute of Westminster the First Chapter 39 (1275)
[7] Limitations Act (1623)
[8] Limitation of Actions (1833)
[9] Limitation Act Art. 65
Schedule 1 (1963)
[10] SM Karim v MST Bibi Sakina [AIR
1964 SC 1254]
[11] Balkrishnan v Satyaprakash and
Ors. [(2001) 2 SCC 498]
[12] T. Anjanappa v Somalingappa [(2006)
7 SCC 570]
[13] Ravinder Kaur Grewal and Ors. v
Manjit Kaur and Ors. [(2019) 8 SCC 729]
[14] Somnath Burman v Dr. S.P. Raju
and Anr. [(1696) 3 SCC 129]
[15] Wylie J, ‘Adverse Possession- Still an
Ailing Concept?’ (2017) 58 Irish Jurist 1
[16] THE CODE OF HAMMURABI Section
30 (2250 BC)
[17] Ibid at 11
[18] Wylie J and Woods U, Irish Conveyance
Law, vol 4 (Bloomsbury Publishing 2020)
[19] Ibid at 11
[20] UKHL 30 2002 UKHL 30
[21] (2007) 46 EHRR 1083
[22] European Convention in Human
Rights Art. 1 Protocol 1 (1953)
[23] Cobb N and Fox L, ‘Living Outside the
System? The (Im)Morality of Urban Squatting after the Land Registration Act
2002’ (2007) 27 Legal Studies 236
[24] Ibid at 15
[25] Report of the Committee on Slum
Statistics/ Census (Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation
National Buildings Associations (2010)
[26] Ibid at 14
[27] Gardiner B, ‘Squatters’ Rights and Adverse
Possession: A Search for Equitable Application of Property Laws’ (1997) 8
Indiana International & Comparative Law Review
[28] Ibid at 11
[29] Baker M and others, ‘Property Rights by
Squatting: Land Ownership Risk and Adverse Possession Statutes’ (2001) 77 Land
Economics 360
[30] Ibid at 21
[31] Goymour A, ‘SQUATTERS AND THE CRIMINAL
LAW: CAN TWO WRONGS MAKE A RIGHT?’ 73 The Cambridge Law Journal 484 (2014)
[32] [2014] EWHC (Admin) 1370
[33] Land Registration Act Schedule
6 (2002)
[34] Legal Aid, Sentencing and
Punishment of Offenders Act s.144 (2012)
[35] Ibid at 11
[36] Pande, B, ‘Reorienting the Rights
Discourse to Basic Human Needs’ (2008)
[37] (1983) 3 SCC 545
[38] SANYAL R, ‘Refugees’ [2018] The Post-Conflict
Environment 135
[39] Pandit A, ‘Rohingyas in NCR Are Safe but
Miserable’ Times of India (9 July 2013)
[40] Curtis GH and Ruoff R.T.B, Curtis &
Ruoff on the Law and Practice of Registered Conveyancing (Stevens 1965)