THE ECONOMIC THEORIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHT AND COMPETITION LAW BY - YOGALAKSHMI R & KANINIKA MAJUMDER*
THE ECONOMIC THEORIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHT AND
COMPETITION LAW
AUTHORED BY
- YOGALAKSHMI R & KANINIKA MAJUMDER*
Abstract
Most of the time, the objectives of
competition law and intellectual property law overlap. Their shared goals are
to advance innovation and improve consumer welfare, and both legal fields are
built on efficient legal theories.
First of all, competition and innovation are
complementary rather than exclusive, as noted by Fine under the heading “European
Commission Competition Law on Technology Licencing”.[1]
Nonetheless, there are conflicting components
in the two statutory frames as well. While the primary goal of patents is to
promote innovation by giving businesses a competitive edge through exclusive
rights, competition law aims to eradicate any actions or behaviours that could
restrict trade, which could deter businesses from making innovative
investments.
Conflicts may emerge as a result of the
tension between these two diametrically opposed and distinct agendas.[2]
This paper mainly discusses about the Tandem
effect between Intellectual property right and Competition Law. Further in this
paper the authors will give an overview of the different theories of
Intellectual property rights and Competition law with the differences between
these two and also the effect of Intellectual property Laws and Competition law
on the economy.
Keywords
Intellectual
Property (IP), Competition Law, Monopolies, Economic Growth, Consumer Welfare, Copyright,
Trademark, Patent pooling and Cross-Licencing
Introduction
In the past, intellectual property
and competition law were sometimes compared to opposing poles on a magnet. Due
to the seeming conflict between the two, the idea that the intellectual
property rights regime creates monopolies in order to promote innovation was
put forth, despite the fact that the main goal of competition law is the
dismantling of monopolies. On the other hand, it has come to light that both
contribute to innovation in today's technologically dynamic markets by working
in tandem and in complementary ways.[3]
Since intellectual property rights [“IPR”] define the boundary within which
rivals can exert monopolies over invention, they often counter the competitive
market ideals and fair playing fields that competition laws aim to achieve. Intellectual
Property Right refers to legal rights having different scopes, durations,
purposes, and effects, such as patents, trademarks, and copyrights.[4]
Intellectual Property laws are
monopolistic; they provide owners and creators of works produced by human
intellectual creativity the only right to do so. According to competition law,
they can result in market dominance or monopolies and stop commercial
exploitation. Abuse of this advantage can lead to a dispute between competition
law and intellectual property rights [“IPR”]
and provide the owner an edge over the rest of the industry or sector.[5]
Intellectual property rights [“IPR”] are essential for a nation's
development since they foster innovation and economic advancement. Strict
enforcement of intellectual property rights greatly boosts economic growth in industrialized
nations. Businesses frequently sell their brands for large sums of money,
underscoring the significance of IPR regulations in the modern world. This
study examines how intellectual property rights[“IPR”] affect the economy, stressing how crucial it is to uphold
people's rights in order to foster innovation and economic expansion.
“Intellectual property” is a word from the 20th century. Trade
secrets law, copyright, patent, and trademark law are the four legal fields
that make up this definition. On the other hand, the notion of intellectual
property has a long history. Although there has always been protection for
intellectual property, formal intellectual property rules and privileges have
only been in place since the 16th and 17th centuries, when copyright was first
established in England and patents were first established in Venice. These
regulations and privileges were imposed as a means of controlling the printing
business and the specific creative good, not to protect the property rights of
authors, publishers, or inventors. [6]
In the European Union, competition law has been crucial to the
development of the single market. Thus, the preservation of healthy competition
and the requirement for deeper single market integration are the two purposes
for which European Commission competition law is implemented. There is a
contention that the goals of European Commission competition law have never
been clearly stated in a formal document or ruling by relevant European Union
bodies. As a result, there is much discussion over the actual goals of European
Commission competition law.
Etro has written extensively on this contentious topic of antitrust
law and intellectual property rights in his book “Competition, Innovation, and
Antitrust, A Theory of Market Leaders and Its Policy Implications.” [7]
Theories of Intellectual Property
Right and Competition Law
Under classical theory a market is
described as a self-regulating system that maintains a balance between supply
and demand. Since individual buyers and sellers have little control over the
market, they are unable to directly affect its price.
According to this theory, there is
perfect competition in a market, which means that efficiency is automatically
maximised and cannot be increased by following competition laws.
But in actuality, markets lack some
of the elements necessary for ideal competition. A market that is really
competitive only exists in principle; in practice, the market is influenced by
a number of outside forces.
Since granting exclusive rights to
intellectual goods—that is, “propertizing” them—allows the owner to charge a
price for access above marginal cost, the traditional focus of economic
analysis of intellectual property has been on balancing incentives for
producing such property with concerns about restricting access to it. Trade
secrets are specifically prohibited from being deemed intellectual property
under the economic theory of intellectual property rights [“IPR”] because they prevent the general
public from benefiting from information that is proprietary to a particular
person or group.
Intellectual
Property and Competition Law-Working in Tandem
Generally speaking, intellectual
property law and competition law are seen as opposing fields. This
contradiction arises from the fact that while competition law attempts to
undermine market power, intellectual property law gives inventors exclusive
control rights, creating a powerful market. To put it another way, competition
law fights against monopolistic rights, whereas intellectual property laws
strive towards their creation. But the idea that competition law and
intellectual property law serve the same goal—that is, to maximize social
welfare—has essentially replaced this strategy in recent years.[8]
There is an interface between
intellectual property right and competition law. However, intellectual property
right and competition law interact, there are two schools of thought.[9]
(i)
The
argument that there is a conflict between intellectual property rights [“IPR”] and competition law, with Intellectual
property right laws providing creators and innovators with a limited monopoly,
while competition law aims to eradicate monopolies and promote competition. The
primary purpose of intellectual property rights [“IPR”] laws, according to those who hold this opinion, is to assign
and protect property rights on items with economic value. However, minimizing
the negative effects of monopoly power resulting from IPRs should be the
primary objective of competition legislation. But in the present era, this
strategy is no longer relevant and is not used.
(ii)
According
to the second point of view, competition law is still essential for
guaranteeing economic growth and innovation. Intellectual property right and
competition laws have complimentary goals in that they both seek to promote
competition, innovation, and the welfare of consumers. Maintaining competition
in the innovation space is critical because it guarantees the greatest possible
outcome for consumers.[10]
The foundation of Indian
competition law is found in Articles 38 and 39 of the Constitution, which delineate
the State's obligation to advance welfare, maintain social order, and allocate
communal resources for the greater benefit. This obligation resulted in the
Monopolistic and Restrictive Trade Practices [“MRTP”] Act, 1969, which was designed to stop wealth concentration
in the economy and was impacted by United States, United Kingdom and Canadian
laws.[11]
Friends in
Disagreement
It is common to refer to the legal
systems of intellectual property rights and competition law as “friends in
disagreement.” In actuality, although having opposing theoretical visions, they
cooperate to promote consumer welfare and maintain both static and dynamic
market efficiency.
From a business standpoint, one may
attempt to think of competition law as attempting to establish a boundary
between legitimate business practices and IPR misuse. It is usually problematic
when and how a line is crossed. One could argue that intellectual property
rights are government-approved monopolies designed to protect consumers and
promote innovation. As such, the whole goal of granting IPRs would be defeated
by early intervention from competition law disciplines. Conversely,
late-arriving competition law intervention and some IPR-related behavior may be
more detrimental to market circumstances than beneficial for innovation and
consumer protection.
Conflict Between
Intellectual Property Right and
Competition
Law
Intellectual property [“IP”] includes all works of art and
literature as well as innovations, as well as names, symbols, images, and
designs that are utilized for commercial purposes. Patents, copyrights, and
trademarks are examples of items with commercial value that are protected by
intellectual property rights, which also prevent others from using
non-corporeal assets for their own benefit.[12]
Intellectual property [“IP”] is separated into two categories:
industrial property, which includes innovations, patents, and trademarks; and copyright,
which includes creative works such as plays, novels, poems, books, films,
musicals, drawings, paintings, photos, sculptures, and architectural designs.
Broadcasters, phonogram manufacturers, and performers are all protected by
copyright laws.[13]
In order to eliminate unfair
commercial practices and monopoly abuse by dominant corporations, competition
law encourages market competition. It is primary goals, which are to prevent
monopoly abuse and advance market health, are consumer welfare and healthy
competition.
The provisions of the Competition
Act, 2002 prohibits the exercise of anti-competitive agreements by the IPR
holders since they are in conflict with the competition policies. Further, the
Act authorizes the Competition Commission of India to penalise the IPR holders
who misuse their dominant position. Furthermore, Section 45 of the Act the
Commission is also authorized to penalise the parties to an anti-competitive
agreement, which is in contravention of Section 3 of the Act.[14]
Intellectual property rights are a
subject of competition law because of market dominance and anti-competitive
implications. By lowering prices for efficient production and stifling
innovation, market dominance can be detrimental to consumers. Moreover, it may
hinder the rise in production and lower sustainable living standards. Firm
protection can stifle innovation and slow the rate at which productivity
increases over time.[15]
Competition law and intellectual
property rights are sometimes viewed as an antagonistic marriage, with
competition law opposing monopolies and Intellectual Property laws possibly
encouraging them. This leads to a clash between the goals of the two laws.
Intellectual property rules and
competition policy both seek to foster innovation, which in turn spurs economic
growth, but they shouldn't be detrimental to the general population. In order
to accomplish economic and consumer welfare and maintain the balance of both
laws, competition authorities must guarantee cohabitation.
The inclination to view intellectual
property as providing market power and, thus, as somewhat at odds with
competition policy, has been another source of friction in the relationship
between intellectual property and competition policy. For instance, in the United
States, courts frequently refer to the rights granted by a patent as a “Monopoly”
or “Patent monopoly”. But there appears to be less of this inclination now. The
European Court of Justice has emphasised that having an intellectual property
right does not automatically grant one a dominant position. Furthermore, the
competition authorities in the United States have made it quite evident that
they “do not presume that intellectual property creates market power in the
antitrust context,” notwithstanding the lack of a conclusive court finding. Rather,
similar to other types of property, competition authorities are now
concentrating on the existence and degree of close substitutes that could limit
the capacity of an intellectual property owner to wield market dominance.
IPR licencing is typically used to
combine complementary inputs like workforces, distribution networks,
manufacturing facilities, and other complementary or blocking intellectual
property. In essence, transactions involving complementary inputs are vertical
in nature; this may hold true even in situations where the licensee and
licensor are rivals in the production of goods covered by the IPR.
Arrangements that would have made it
easier for complementary inputs to be transferred have occasionally been
disapproved of by courts or competition regulators because they believed the
relationship to be horizontal. These misunderstandings might have contributed
to the belief that intellectual property rights and competition law
were incompatible.
In
Australia, the Copyright Amendment Bill 1997 is being considered by the
Australian Parliament. This Bill includes a provision that would transfer
copyright ownership of working journalists' works from them to their
publishers.
The
proposed relocation of copyright generates competition concerns even though its
reach remains unchanged.
I.
Pooling and Cross Licensing
In
agreements known as pooling and cross-licensing, two or more owners of distinct
intellectual property rights provide licences to one another. By assigning or
exclusively licencing their IPRs to a separately governed organisation in a
pooling arrangement, they usually accomplish this. This entity then manages the
licencing of the portfolio and its individual items to the individuals who
contributed the IPRs and, frequently, to third parties. These agreements could
have different terms. Members of the pool may split the earnings using
different formulas, have varying voting procedures or veto rights, and use the
IPRs at no cost or with royalty.
For
instance, two IPR owners controlling blocking patents (a vertical relationship)
should be encouraged to pool or licence their respective IPRs in order to
combine them. Both would be unable to exploit the technology without such a
deal, which would be detrimental to society.
However,
what is the legal aim of the agreement if neither IPR owner requires the other
to compete as efficiently as possible (especially when it comes to creating
"next-generation" products)? In a situation like this, the agreement
probably has the only purpose of setting prices or segmenting markets. For
instance, if manufacturers X and Y establish a pool and the pool grants
licences to X for use of the technology exclusively in North and South America
and to Y for use of the technology exclusively in Europe and Asia, the result
would be to establish each of them as monopolists in their respective regions,
despite the fact that each of them could have competed globally in the absence
of the pool. Likewise, in the event that licences X and Y form the pool at an
extremely high royalty per use, this kind of arrangement may guarantee that
their marginal costs will be so high that they are compelled to price at the
joint monopoly profit-maximization level.
Innovation and Competition: Conflicts over Intellectual Property
Rights in New Technologies
The rapid development of new technologies over the last 20 years or
so—many of which are drastically different from earlier technologies—has led to
a crisis in intellectual property law.[16]
The biggest problem facing proponents of intellectual property
theory in the future will be figuring out how to keep the coherence of the
current schemes or build new ones while also making these schemes flexible
enough to accommodate emerging technologies. Finding a means to balance the
interests of innovators and the general public will be another significant
problem.
The ethical issue that arises when someone copies someone else's
idea is what makes it an intriguing and challenging problem. On the one side,
there is an innovation ethic that states that it is cruel, unjust, and immoral
to steal someone else's ideas and then pass them off as original, often without
even giving the original author credit. Referred to as “plagarism”, it is
typically considered a kind of theft.[17]
The law concurs with this assessment in some cases. However, there is a
competitive culture that has historically supported permitting producers to
create knockoffs of popular goods. When there are numerous producers of
attractive goods, the public interest is served since prices are likely to be
cheaper.[18]
In the Sears-Roebuck v. Stiffel
case[19]
The
company Stiffel was the first to consider producing “pole lamps.” Stiffel aimed
to become the sole producer of these lights, thus it pursued and acquired
patents on the mechanical and design elements of the pole lighting. Despite
being aware of the Stiffel patents, Sears—always a sincere rival—purposefully
imitated the design of the pole lighting. In direct rivalry with Stiffel, Sears
manufactured nearly identical pole lamps and offered them for sale to the
general public at a lower cost. For unfair competition and patent infringement,
Stiffel filed a suit against Sears.
The U.S.
Supreme Court interpreted the patent system as intended to put into the public
domain and open for unlimited copying all subject matters that were of a
patentable sort but that failed to satisfy the invention standard of
patentability, striking down Stiffel's unfair competition claims. The claims
were based on imitation copying of the now unpatented pole lamps.
“Sharing
in the good will of an article unprotected by patent,” the Court wrote, “is the
exercise of a right possessed by all—and in the free exercise of which the
consuming public is deeply interested.”[20]
The US
Guidelines explicitly deal with the issue of distinguishing horizontal and
vertical relationships by stating: “the Agencies ordinarily will treat a
relationship between a licensor and its licensees, or between licensees, as
horizontal when they would have been actual or likely potential competitors in
a relevant market in the absence of the license.” The Technology Transfer
Regulation does not explicitly confront the issue, but implicitly deals with it
in an analogous way in various parts of the Regulation. For example, the black
list excludes licenses from the benefits of the Regulation where “the parties
were already competing manufacturers before the grant of the licence and one of
them is restricted . . . as to the customers he may serve.”
United
States v. Singer Manufacturing Co., [21]
US supreme
court held that Cross-licensing IPRs as a settlement of infringement lawsuits
may be contested if it reduces competitiveness amongst horizontal competitors.
Usually, a task like this would have to demonstrate that there was a horizontal
relationship between the pool members. Stated differently, the resolution of
the patent disputes at the centre of the infringement lawsuit would essentially
be the task of the antitrust challenge. Each party to an infringement lawsuit
usually argues that the other was infringing and that the other could not
legitimately be in the market without a licence. The IPRs would be in a
blocking, or vertical, position if that claim were accurate. The parties would
need to be in a horizontal position for Singer to apply: at least two pool
members would need to have been able to compete without needing to get a
licence for the same IPRs that the other was using.
Intellectual Property Right as an Exception to Competition Law
The
author contended that IPR is an exception to competition law. IP law and
competition law have developed historically as two distinct legal systems.
Everyone has different legislative objectives and strategies for accomplishing
them.[22] Furthermore,
there has been much discussion over the years on the interplay between
competition law and intellectual property law. Although the goals of the two
sets of laws are similar—that is, to advance innovation and improve consumer
welfare—there are certain issues because of how they are implemented
differently.
By
granting exclusive rights, IP law aims to safeguard intellectual property hence
restrict competition. Therefore, from the standpoint of competition, IP protection
may be criticised for granting monopoly rights that will be detrimental to the
interests of consumers. On the other hand, the general tenet of competition law
is that the greatest way to promote consumer welfare is to eliminate barriers
to competition. Competition law can be viewed from the standpoint of
intellectual property rights [“IPR”]
as an interventionist tool that violates the rights of right holders and so
impacts the fundamental principles of intellectual property law. As such,
intellectual property law may jeopardise competition law and vice versa. It is
acknowledged that there is conflict, but not a fundamental contradiction,
between IP laws and competition laws. The objectives of competition law and
intellectual property law are now widely acknowledged by academics,
practitioners, and various legal systems to be complimentary and mutually
reinforcing. Both sets of rules aim to foster innovation and improve consumer
welfare.[23]
Economy and
Intellectual Property Right
Economists may have paid undue attention to the best term for
intellectual property protection. Law and economics analysis may be able to
guide the way to legal reforms that would be beneficial regardless of the
optimal term by taking a closer look at the laws controlling intellectual
property.
The high fixed to variable cost ratio of intellectual property is
the root cause of the conflict between incentives and access that permeates
traditional economic analyses of this type of property. The expenses of creating
intellectual property are typically very high, but once they are incurred, they
are fixed costs because they are not affected by the product.
If software is distributed over the Internet (including digitised
musical recordings), the variable cost and thus the marginal cost are almost
zero. In contrast, the costs that vary with output, that is, the costs incurred
in actually providing the intellectual property to consumers, are often very
low, at least relative to the fixed costs. A price equal to marginal cost is
unlikely to pay total costs when filing costs represent a large portion of
total costs unless marginal cost is rapidly increasing. With marginal-cost
pricing, access to already-existing intellectual property would be maximised
and inefficient entrants would be discouraged or driven out, but the incentive
to produce the property in the first place would be diminished, if not
completely eliminated.[24]
The property rights method automatically relates the creator's
return on investment to the invention's (in the case of patents) or work of
art's (in the case of copyrights) commercial success. However, even after
accounting for the possibility of failure—the common “dry holes” in innovative
and other creative activity—it might produce a return that outweighs the
expenses of creation, which might lead to needless access restrictions.
Unfortunately, given the costs of the system and the existence of
alternative sources of incentives to create such property, economists are
unable to determine whether the current system of intellectual property rights
is, or indeed whether any other system of intellectual property rights would
be, a source of net social utility.[25]
Intellectual Property's Role in
Economy:
•
Provides
exclusive rights to creators.
•
Protects
creator's interest and encourages research and information creation.
•
Prohibits
exploitation or misuse without creator's permission.
•
Creates
a market for inventions, motivating innovation and creation.[26]
Innovations have a positive economic
impact since they lower the cost of product materials. As a result, innovation
and technology updates are essential. People's interests can be safeguarded and
exploitation can be deterred by a strong intellectual property rights [“IPR”] legislation. Such regulations
must be properly enforced because lax laws might be abused and taken advantage
of, which discourages innovation. IPR regulations ought to deter people from
abusing their property and encourage ongoing innovation.
Property owners who possess
intellectual property [“IP”] have
the unique right to assess its fair market value and sell it to anyone. This
supports developers' healthy returns and fosters innovation. But this right can
also be abused, creating a monopoly in the marketplace and causing inequality
and differences in the rates of production and consumption. As a result, it's
critical to strike a balance between the interests of both sides when
encouraging innovation.
Competition Law and Economy
In today's
globalised world, competition has emerged as a key factor. While important,
deregulation, liberalisation, and privatisation are insufficient to guarantee
the smooth operation of markets. Due to price increases, market distortions
hinder growth, prevent markets from producing effective outcomes, and mostly
harm the poor. Therefore, to safeguard and promote the economy's competitive
process, a strong competition legislation is required.[27]
Competition
can lead to increased industry production, increased employment, and decreased consumer costs. Free trade proponents
contend that on its own, it offers all the protections and rules needed for a
welfare state like India. One of the fundamental requirements for a market
economy to function well and be strengthened from within is effective
competition. However, in today's technologically advanced society, competition
is not something that just happens; rather, it is shaped by those who guarantee
its protection and create the proper competition policy, which is itself a
manifestation of competition culture.[28]
When India adopted the concepts of
globalisation, liberalisation, and privatisation in 1991—the New Economic
Policy—it became apparent that new laws and institutions were required. As a
result, the outdated Monopoly and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969 [“MRTP”]
was revised in 1991 to provide the legal system a fresh start.[29]
Conclusion
International forums have examined
and still do so anti-competitive activities relating to Intellectual Property
Right and extensive technology transfer. The anti-competitive clauses of the Trade
Related Aspect of Intellectual Rights [“TRIPS”]
agreement represent the first major step forward for developing country members
of the World Trade Organization [“WTO”],
following the failure of the draft code of conduct on technology transfer
negotiations. These clauses create a framework that gives World Trade Organization
[“WTO”], members significant
latitude in modifying their national competition laws to address
anti-competitive behaviour in technology transfer agreements. Furthermore, the
deliberate application of Trade Related Aspect of Intellectual Rights [“TRIPS”] flexibilities is essential for
the successful transfer of technology. By citizens of poor nations. Instead of
using a rule of reason approach, a developing country member should choose a
per se prohibition model in its competition statute, taking into account the
country's degree of development and the institutional and economic environments.
Competition legislation pertaining to intellectual property rights needs to be
globalized so that there could be reduction of dominance of big brands but at
the same time intellectual property rights would also be protected. Developing
nations should modify their domestic anticompetitive laws to better suit the
demands and environment of their communities. For developing nations hoping to
promote technology transfer and consumer welfare, appropriate IPR-related
competition law and policy towards technology transfer are crucial.
*Yogalakshmi
R, Final year B.B.A. LL. B at Ramaiah Institute of Legal Studies, email- yoga98.vennila@gmail.com. Ph- 9597555432, interested in compliance and enthusiastic to
learn more about Intellectual Property Law and Company Law & Kaninika Majumder, Final year B.B.A. LLB at Ramaiah
Institute of Legal Studies, email-kaninikahim8@gmail.com. Ph- 6290463360,
interested in drafting and pleading - international relations updates and criminal
law
[1] Frank L. Fine, The
EC Competition Law on Technology Licensing, Sweet & Maxwell Ltd.,
London, 2006, p.14
[2] Competition law and Intellectual
Property Rights, The Nature of Frand Defence in Patent Litigation,27-27(2011)
[3] ABIR ROY & JAYANT KUMAR,
COMPETITION LAW IN INDIA 502(2d ed. Eastern Law House, 2014).
[4] Jayashree Watal, Intellectual
Property Rights in WTO and Developing Countries, 2001 (Oxford University
Press), at 1-5
[5] Atul Patel , Aurobinda Panda,
Akshay Deo & Siddhartha Khettry, Intellectual Property Law &
Competition law, 6 J. INT'l COM. L. & TECH. 120-20 (2011).
[6] Daniel Stengel & Berlin,
Intellectual Property in Philosophy,90(1) Archives for Philosophy of law and
social Philosophy 20,20(2004)
[7] Supra note 2 at 29.
[8] Rishika
Sugandh & Siddhartha Srivastava; INTERFACE BETWEEN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND
COMPETITION LAW: INDIAN JURISPRUDENCE, International Journal of Law and Legal
Jurisprudence Studies (Dec 20,2023,10.39 AM), https://ijlljs.in/interface-between-intellectual-property-rights-and-competition-law-indian-jurisprudence/
[9] Allan Asher , Public Lecture,
Interface between the Indian Competition Act 2002 and the IPR Laws in India
(Dec 13,2023, 12.40 PM)http://www.circ.in/pdf/Backgrounder-Public_Lecture_By_Allan_Asher_29May2009.pdf.
[10] Rishika
Sugandh & Siddhartha Srivastava; INTERFACE BETWEEN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND
COMPETITION LAW: INDIAN JURISPRUDENCE, International Journal of Law and Legal
Jurisprudence Studies (Dec 20,2023,10.39 AM), https://ijlljs.in/interface-between-intellectual-property-rights-and-competition-law-indian-jurisprudence/
[11] The Institute of Chartered
Accountants of India, Competition Laws and Policies (2004), at 117-118
[12] Atul Patel, Aurobinda Panda,
Akshay Deo & Siddhartha Khettry, Intellectual Property Law &
Competition law, 6 J. INT'l COM. L. & TECH. 120-22 (2011).
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Atul Patel, Aurobinda Panda,
Akshay Deo & Siddhartha Khettry, Intellectual Property Law &
Competition law, 6 J. INT'l COM. L. & TECH. 120-23 (2011).
[16] Trademark, copyright, and patent laws are
a few examples of the laws pertaining to intellectual property. Every
intellectual property law covers a particular area of knowledge. The
intellectual property laws pertaining to literature are known as copyright law,
while those pertaining to machines, methods, and compositions of matter are
known as patent law. See generally Donald Chisum, Intellectual Property:
Copyright, Patent and Trademark (Matthew Bender, 1980). When new types of
subject matters are created, sometimes they do not fit neatly into one of the
pre-existing categories. Therefore, something of a crisis can be created in the
body of the law.
[17] It may be illegal and in violation
of copyright to copy a book. As a rule, “anyone who violates any of the
exclusive rights of the copyright owner... is an infringer of the copyright.”
U.S.C. Sec. 501(a) (17). “Any person who infringes a copyright will fully and
for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain” is subject to
criminal sanctions, which include jail time, a fine, and seizure of the
infringing works. Section 506 of the U.S.C.
[18] Pemela Samuelson, Innovation and
Competition: Conflicts over Intellectual Property Rights in New Technologies,
12 STHV 6,7(1987)
[19] 376 U.S 225 [1964]
[20] 376 U.S at 231
(Cambridge, New York,2007).
[23]B.N. Pandey & Prabhat Kumar
Saha, Competition Flexibilities in the TRIPS Agreement: Implications for
Technology Transfer and Consumer Welfare, 57 Journal of the Indian Law
Institute 92, 94(2015).
[24] Another
issue is that risk aversion may lead to the underproduction of intellectual
property from a social perspective because the market value of such property is
frequently unpredictable. Kenneth Arrow noted this in a seminal study published
in 1962. The significance of this issue is unclear, though. Diversification may
minimise risk or even remove it, frequently at little expense. For example, a
book publisher can achieve a typical return by releasing a number of books,
some of which are hits while others perform better than expected.
[25] Richard A. Posner, Intellectual
Property: The Law and Economics Approach, 19 Journal of economic Perspectives
57, 57-59(2005).
[26] Anubhav Mishra; The Role of
Intellectual Property Rights in Economic Development (Mar. 10,2021, 12.39 PM), https://www.khuranaandkhurana.com/2021/03/10/the-role-of-intellectual-property-rights-in-economic-development/
[27] Ashok Chawla, Global Business and
Competition Law in India,9, Indian Foreign Affairs Journal 173, 173(2014).
[28] 376 U.S at 231
[29] B.S. Chauhan, Indian Competition
Law: Global Context, 54 Journal of Indian Law Institute 315, 316(2012).