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SEPARATION OF POWERS IN A DEMOCRACY: THE INDIAN PERSPECTIVE

Author(s):
Shubhangi Gupta Prakriti Mishra
Journal IJLRA
ISSN 2582-6433
Published 2023/04/12
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Volume 2
Issue 7

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SEPARATION OF POWERS IN A DEMOCRACY: THE INDIAN PERSPECTIVE
 
Authored By - Shubhangi Gupta, 3rd year (B.A. LLB)
Co-Author - Prakriti Mishra, 3rd year (B.A. LLB)
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of separation of powers was originally initiated in the writings of Montesquieu in the spirit of laws, where Montesquieu refers to the division of government. responsibilities into three separate branches of government to ensure that none of the branches encroach on another's domain. The real purpose of introducing the policy was to prevent the concentration of power and ensure checks and balances. Separation of Powers is practiced in India but not so strictly. The three main areas of government perform the tasks of others in one way or another. Presently, the research paper evaluates the separation of powers as envisioned by the constitution of India and the difficulties faced in practice by the three wings of government in the implementation of constitutional provisions in letter and spirit. However, each wing of the government must keep an internal check to ensure they do not end up violating the rights of the people. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has recognized that the Separation of Powers is a part of the basic structure of the Indian Constitution. In this context, the author felt the need to examine the ‘Constitutional Plan and Practice concerning Separation of Powers in India’.
The doctrine of separation of powers contemplates the idea that government functions must be a tripartite division of legislative, executive, and judicial power. Three organs should be independent, distinct, and sovereign in their sphere so that one does not cross the territory of the other. Aristotle who was the first to perceive and see that specialization exists function in each constitution developed this doctrine. Later theorists such as Montesquieu, John Locke, and James Harrington described these functions as legislative, executive, and judicial. All the theories that were handed down by these political thinkers about the doctrine of separation of powers were on the basic premise that people's liberties should be protected from tyrannical rulers when all powers are vested and exercised by the same persons.
The framers of the Indian constitution did not recognize its doctrine of separation of powers in a rigid sense. Unlike U.S. Constitution, this doctrine was not strictly enforced in the Constitution of India. It can't be seen clearly but can be witnessed in the differentiation made at discharge functions of various branches of government v the Constitution. This doctrine is not entirely foreign to us Constitution. As it is reviewed, important ideal law like Ram Jawaya v. Condition of Punjab plainly illustrates this rule. Justice Mukherjee in the moment case said: “It can in all likelihood be said that Constitution does not consider supposition, by one organ or a piece of the State, of capacities that fit in with another. The official for sure can practice the forces of departmental or subordinate enactment when such powers are designated to it by the governing body. It can likewise when so enabled, exercise legal capacities in a restricted manner[1]
The Constitution of India has been founded upon the fundamental principle of Rule of law. It must be remembered that the quality of excellence of governance is evaluated on the touchstone of efficacy and the strength of the Judicial mechanism.
 
2.  ESSENCE OF DEMOCRACY
An integral part is the doctrine of separation of powers in the development of democracy. Democracy dictates the system in which every citizen can breathe without fear of retribution, express themselves, and promote their interests. It allows him to live the life of his choice to the extent that he does not interfere with other people's rights. In this context, it can be assumed that a system of checks and balances exists among the three organs of government to ensure a strong nurtured democratic system. The legislature, the judiciary, and the executive are the pillars of democracy. No democracy contemplates the granting of absolute power to any single body.
 
The brake and counterbalance system is one of them the most salient features of our constitutional system. Tree organs practically cannot be separated into three waterproof bins because their interdependence ensures effective management. They must work in harmony and in harmony to achieve meaningful nutrition and purposeful progress for citizens. Although, minimal interventions are always desirable. As has been observed by the Hon’ble Chief Justice Balakrishnan, “the Constitution lays down the structure and defines the limits and demarcates the role and function of every organ of the State including the judiciary, and establishes norms for the interrelationships, checks, and balances.”
Thus, all three bodies are expected to work in harmony instead prefers only one of the organs. Providing absolute power is the bane of democracy. The goal itself was supposed to protect and support the historical struggle for freedom and democratic rights of the people.
 
The conscience of our Constitution speaks through its Preamble and the dynamics of its goal are spelled-out, out in its various provisions. The people's will finds its best expression in the very words inscribed in the Preamble “We the People of India” and “do hereby Adopt, Enact and Give ourselves this Constitution”. Thus, the people who are sovereign exercise this sovereign power in choosing their representatives to the Parliament.[2]
 
3.  MEANING OF SEPARATION OF POWERS: TRUE ASPECT
Theory, to put it euphemistically, is universal in nature, it can be understood as expressly committed to achieving political freedom, an essential part of which is the limitation of government power, and this is best accomplished by the formation of divisions. In this way, however, it must be recognized that it recognizes the need for government action to provide a suitable climate for individual growth is complementary to it does not conflict with the view that strongly reiterates that government is being limited they are an essential part of the theory. One of the main problems with access to literature on the concept of separation of powers is that several authors describe exactly what he means, what his essential delicacies are, and how applies to other concepts. One such attempt; is nevertheless made in his book Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers by Professor Vile. Division government into three branches or divisions, legislative, executive, and judiciary is essential to the establishment and preservation of democratic freedom. There is a corresponding recognizable role for each of these branches governmental, legislative, administrative, or judicial. Every government branch must be limited to fulfilling its role and must not be allowed to do so to interfere with the functions of other branches. In addition, individuals who constitute these three government agencies must be separated and distinct and no entity should be allowed to be a member of more than one branch simultaneously. Accordingly, branches will be a check for others and no single group of people will be able to control the machinery of the state.
 
3.1  LEGISLATURE
The Legislature has been accorded high respectability in the country’s Constitution of India. It is mainly about the enactment of general legal rules that apply to all aspects of dealing with its citizens and institutions. The Parliament is the Union. The Legislature of India consists of two bodies, namely the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha. Makes laws, imposes taxes, approves borrowings and prepares and fulfills the budget, has an exclusive can declare war, can open investigations, especially against executive power, appoints the head of the executive branch, and sometimes appoints a judge as well as he has power ratify treaties. How he anchors for the will of the people by securing true and intact democracy, it can be said that it is not possible all by the legislature itself. It is an immediate threat to democracy if absolute power is given to the holder of the nation's purse. According to make the executive responsible to the people's house, The Constitution provides for a proper mechanism of checks and balances to the doctrine of separation of powers. The whole system has other aspects that can help achieve the same. Hence this questions the role of the other two pillars: the judiciary and executive.
 
3.2  JUDICIARY
The framers of our Constitution wrote it so carefully that it ensures an independent and impartial judiciary interpreter of the Constitution and guardian of the rights of citizens through judicial review. This he orders judicial power to interpret laws but not to make them. They are not set general standards of behavior for the government. This brings us to the recent debate as to whether this is the case the behavior of the judiciary can be characterized as judicial review or judicial activism. The higher Judiciary in India esp. the honorable Supreme Court, the most powerful judiciary in the world, became the epicenter of disputes about its role in fun and decisive public petitions, deciding these petitions, the judiciary issues many directions to the government, which includes making laws in many areas. The point is that the judiciary is overstepping its bounds and overstepping its bounds in the field of executive or legislative. And if it is, it is in the event, then, what is the legitimacy of the exercise of these powers? The role of the judiciary should be limited to control only the constitutionality of the legislation and not the proceedings of the government to pass the law. The scope of judicial review is not beyond the scope of the inquiry whether it is attacked law or executive action that falls within the competence of legislative or executive authority or is by fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution or its other mandatory provisions.
“It is a commonplace that while the Legislature enacts the law the Executive implements it and the Court interprets it and, in doing so, adjudicates on the validity of executive action and, under our Constitution, even judges the validity of the legislation itself. And yet it is well recognized that in a certain sphere, the Legislature is possessed of judicial power, the executive possesses a measure of both legislative and judicial functions, and the Court, in its duty of interpreting the law, accomplishes in its perfect action in a marginal degree of legislative exercise. Nonetheless, a fine and delicate balance is envisaged under our Constitution between these primary institutions of the State”[3]
 
3.3                       EXECUTIVE
The executive branch can veto laws, command the military, issue decrees o declarations (for example, declares a state emergency) and promulgate legal regulations and executive orders, may refuse to spend money allocated for certain purposes, can appoint judges, and has the power to grant pardons convicted criminals. As well as the other two pillars of democracy Equally, the executive is expected to be non-disruptive Other two. It is always said that the executive is independent of two, but the mismatch persists. It is a completely eroded practice. The reason is that the executive is questioned every time for their actions by the Judiciary and the Legislature. This will dilute it maximum independence of the executive. That's not it the question of liability arises only in the event executive. Judiciary and legislature are equally responsible but in their cases, the built-in system would be from within available to perform these functions. This is the real state of things that exist in practice. Though the Indian Constitution allocates executive powers to the President and Governors (Article 53 (1) and Article 154 (1), they are empowered with certain legislative powers (Articles 123, 213, and 356) and certain judicial powers (Articles 103 and 192). Similarly, the legislature exercises certain judicial functions (Articles 105 and 194) and the judiciary exercises few legislative and executive functions (Articles 145, 146, 227, and 229). However, the judiciary is made separate from the executive in the public services of the State (Article 50).
 
4.  THE EXECUTIVE AND THE LEGISLATURE IN THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION
In the early years of the Republic, the Supreme Court had already recognized that the Indian Legislature had a distinctly superior position vis-à-vis the other organs of the State. The observation made by Justice S.R. Das is a testimony to this in the famous case of A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras [1950 SCR 88]: “Although our Constitution has imposed some limitations… [It] has left our Parliament and the State Legislature supreme in their respective fields. In the main, subject to limitations…our Constitution has preferred the supremacy of the Legislature to that of the Judiciary…and the Court has no authority to question the wisdom or policy of the law duly made by the appropriate Legislature…and this is a basic fact which the Court must not overlook.”[4]
 
Executive powers- All executive activities of the Union government are taken on his behalf. Appoints officials The Union Government, the Prime Minister, and the Council of Ministers at recommendations of the Prime Minister, the President of the Supreme Court, and judges Supreme Court and High Court on the advice of the Chief Justice India. Appoints Chairman UPSC, Controller and Auditor General of India, Attorney General of India, Chief election commissioner and other election commissioners, The Governor of the States, the members of the Finance Commission, and ambassadors.
 
Judicial powers- The President appoints the Chief Justice Supreme Court and other judges on the advice of the Chief Justice. The President enjoys legal immunity. He can grant pardon, forgiveness, respite, or remit punishment. President a judge may be dismissed by a two-thirds majority of its members present in two houses. If they are considering a question of law or a matter of public importance that has arisen may apply the advisory opinion of the Supreme Court. However, they can or may not accept this view.
 
Legislative powers- The President convenes both chambers of parliament and adjourns the meeting of both chambers and can dissolve Lok Sabha but uses these powers according to the recommendation of the Council of Ministers headed by the Minister. He delivers the inaugural address of Parliament at the beginning of the first session every year, where he outlines new government policies. A bill that Parliament has approved can become law only after the president gives them agree with it. He can return the bill to Parliament for revaluation, but this is not the case with a cash account. But just in case Parliament is sending it back for the second time, the president is obliged to sign it. The President can promulgate regulations when parliament is not in session but must ratify it within six weeks. Moreover, this is the case only in the case of the Union and Concurrent list.
 
However, it cannot be said that the principle would separation of powers does not apply to the relationship between the executive and the legislature. Despite such express powers Executive, certain gray areas cry out for better application of the principle. It is important to maintain the division of power between the executive and the legislature where legislators exercise executive power. Legislators exercise their control over the executive many times their power to lead executive boards and agencies of various descriptions, ability to participate in executive committees which award contracts or select beneficiaries of various welfare schemes. Second, allocating the annual fund to legislators they are given the executive to carry out activities in their constituency disguised powers that lead to corruption over some time. However, the President appoints the Council of Ministers in consultation with the Prime Minister generally involves assistance and recommendations of the Council of Ministers. This shows that the area within which he enjoys independence is very limited and nominal. Article 74(1) clarifies that the executive director has to act with the assistance and advice given by the Cabinet. Some constitutional provisions also provide powers, Privileges, immunities of deputies, immunity from court vetting for house proceedings, etc. Such provisions thereby, in a way, make the legislation independent.
 
5.  THE EXECUTIVE AND JUDICIARY IN THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION.
One should think of that everything is not written even in a written Constitution. Many things may develop as a part of constitutional development. India can learn from the naming of judges in other nations. The Judicial Appointments Commission, an autonomous organization in the United Kingdom, is in charge of selecting judges for courts and tribunals. Three of its 15 associates come from the community of judges, while the remaining members, including the chairman, are chosen through an open enlisting process. In the United States, the President appoints judges to the government courts with the Senate’s advice and consent.
The argument keeps originating from time to time that in the procedure of selecting judges in the Supreme Court and High Courts, there is assert nepotism, which is called ‘Uncle Culture’ in the Judiciary — people having close social relations are likely to be appointed as judges. There are more people whose known are already in high positions in the judiciary. In such a situation, it is essential to understand what the collegium system is, how it works, what the government’s resistances are regarding it, what kind of system the government wants instead, and what could be the system’s disadvantages preferred by the government. The collegium of the Supreme Court is made up of five senior-most judges including the Chief Justice of India (CJI). They regard the appointment of judges in the Supreme Court or the raising of judges of the High Court to the Supreme Court and the raising of judges of High Courts as Chief Justices. In case of a deviation of opinion, the majority view is considered.
Since the Constitution mentions that consultation with the CJI is necessary for appointing the Judiciary, the collegium model germinated. Judges in the High Courts are also appointed on the proposal of the Collegium, which includes the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the CJ of the High Court, and the Governor of the State.           
The Collegium is kind of a new system and three decisions of the Supreme Court are responsible for its existence, which are known as Judges Case. 
The S.P. Gupta case[5] is the first case, which is also known as the Judges Transfer Case. In this case, the Supreme Court said that the Chief Justice should not have full control over the appointment of judges and said that the government should also have a role in the formation of the Collegium. The Court meant referring with the most senior judges is required. 
 
In the second case, a petition was filed by the Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association (SCARA) in 1993. In this case, the previous judgment of the supreme court overruled the previous judgment. A nine-judge bench said that in the appointment of judges, the opinion of the Chief Justice should be considered over the opinion of others. And then in the third case in 1998, the presidential reference to the Supreme Court was sent to question, the meaning of the consultation in Articles 124, 217, and 222 of the Constitution. The SC said that the CJI will not be the only one as a part of the consultation process. Thus the supreme court made the size of the collegium bigger consisting of five judges. The separation of powers between the government and the judiciary is visible in the Constitution. The job of the Supreme Court is to safeguard the Constitution and the fundamental rights of the people. For this, it can also reconsider the decisions of the legislature which according to it are not by the doctrine of basic structure.
Another question comes into the picture when the judges are appointed by the governments, then to what degree justice can be foreseen in the cases of public interest challenging the government, and how much can be expected if the elected person of the government wrongs the decision of the government’s permission? The Constitution is such a document that it should keep growing with time. The Supreme Court has a huge responsibility on itself to be transparent in the selection process of judges.
The Collegium is the right way, but it could not do its work over some time. It did not meet with the expectation of its formation. Ever since the Collegium was formed, no step has been taken to bring transparency in appointments and this system. Legal solidarity has been raising the bar for bringing transparency in the functionality of the judiciary on a timely basis. After the government hindered the Judiciary during the Emergency, the Supreme Court judicially understood the Constitution and brought the collegium system. In any case, the judges shall not involve in politics. The loyalty of judges should be to the Constitution and not to any respective person. If the Executive has the final say in the appointments of judges, it can be dangerous for democracy.
When the NJAC was struck down by the Supreme Court, a bench of judges at that time did admit that there were inconsistencies in the existing collegium system and that it needed to be reformulated. Former Chief Justice JS Verma, who in 1993 wrote the judgment that created the collegium system, later said he had “changed his mind and veered round to the view that a National Judicial Commission which gives a role to the Executive in the appointment of judges is a better alternative.” 
In light of major reservations about the powerfulness of the current system, former Chief Justice, AM Ahmadi, who had opposed the collegium system by filing a dissenting opinion, supported a return to the pre-collegium procedure.
The question arises here, what initiatives have the Judiciary, taken in the last so many years to reform itself:
  • When the name of a relative, friend, or acquaintance of the person whose name is being discussed in the collegium, the concerned person should not be a part of it because it is a conflict of interest.
  • There should be a secretariat of the collegium where a record should be kept of what is being discussed in the meetings and on what basis the appointments were made, all these should be known.
In 2016, the High Court requested that the Law Service correct the Notice of Strategy (MOP), a significant piece of the collegium framework, which is a sort of understanding between the legal executive and the public authority on the arrangement of judges. The High Court requested that the Law Service alter the MOP and present it under the steady gaze of the High Court. Be that as it may, there has been no revision in the MOP. The SC said, "Once the collegium in its insight or as you would suspect in the absence of it had worked out the MOP there is no unpredictable that is to happen."
The three mainstays of a republic — the Leader, the Lawmaking body, and the Legal executive — cooperate freely. A majority rules government endures when conflict. A fundamental mental comprehension of decency is important for the legal framework. Establishment becomes powerless if a foundation doesn't hold an Aristotelian origination of the state's liability regarding the benefit of everyone.
The important tenet that every organ endeavors for the greatest good of humankind were the basis for Montesquieu’s doctrine of the separation of powers. Thus, the judiciary’s function is distinct from that of the Executive. 
The collegium should have a proper, lasting staff that gathers information like judges’ judgments and case records, examines them, and makes psycho-social determinations. The oppositions between the Executive and Judiciary are not good for democracy and rule of law, it further hazards the smooth and independent functioning of the judiciary. An Independent judiciary is a claimant for the sound functioning of judicial administration. 
On the other hand, the judiciary must avoid vaulting its jurisdiction and ponder to make itself more accountable and transparent. It is the need of the hour that both the government and the Apex Court should do something special to make this process transparent, fair, and robust. The system must select the best possible people on merit who uphold the constitution and democratic traditions with letter and spirit. Regrettably, both only want to increase or maintain their respective influence and create an ineffective system that ensures things beyond doubt. 
6.     THE JUDICIARY AND LEGISLATIVE UNDER THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION.
The tenet of the detachment of abilities suggests that every mainstay of a vote-based system - the chief, lawmaking body, and the legal executive - carries out isolated roles and goes about as independent substances. The chief is vested with the ability to settle on approach choices and carry out regulations. The lawmaking body is engaged to give institutions. The legal executive is liable for arbitrating questions. The convention is a piece of the fundamental construction of the Indian Constitution[6] even though it isn't explicitly referenced in its text. Consequently, no regulation might be passed and no alteration might be made to the Constitution going amiss from the precept. Various organizations force balanced governance upon one another yet may not violate upon one another's capabilities. Hence, the legal executive activities legal audit over the leader and authoritative activity, and the governing body surveys the working of the chief. There have been a few situations where the courts have given regulations and strategy-related orders through their decisions. These incorporate the Vishakha situation where rules on lewd behavior were given by the High Court, the request for the Court guiding the Middle to disperse food grains (2010), and the arrangement of the Exceptional Examination Group to supplant the General Board of Trustees laid out by the Middle for researching dark cash stores in Swiss Banks. In 1983 when Equity Bhagwati presented a public interest suit in India, Equity Pathak in a similar judgment cautioned against the "enticement of crossing into an area which appropriately relates to the Council or the Leader Government"[7] Equity Katju in 2007 noticed that, "Courts can't make privileges where none exist nor could they at any point continue making orders which are unequipped for requirement or violative of different regulations or settled lawful standards. To see that legal activism doesn't become legal adventurism the courts should act with alert and legitimate limitation. It should be recalled that courts can't run the public authority. The legal executive ought to act just as an alert; it ought to guarantee that the leader has become alive to play out its obligations." [8] While there has been some conversation on the issue of activism by the legal executive, it should be noticed that there are likewise occasions of the council utilizing its regulation-making powers to turn around the result of certain decisions. (M.J. Antony has alluded to a couple of them in his article in the Business Standard here.) We examine beneath a few late occurrences of the governing body upsetting legal professions by passing regulations with review impact. On September 7, 2011 the Parliament passed the Traditions Change and Approval Bill, 2011 which reflectively approves all obligations forced and moves made by specific traditions authorities who were not approved under the Traditions Act to do the expressed demonstrations. A portion of the obligations forced was truth be told tested under the steady gaze of the High Court in Chief of Customs versus Sayed Ali in 2011[9]. The High Court struck down the duty of obligations since these were forced by unapproved authorities. Bypassing the Traditions Bill, 2011 the Parliament avoided the judgment and revised the Demonstration to approve specific authorities to exact obligations reflectively, even those that had been held to be unlawful by the SC. One more case of the assembly superseding the choice of the High Court was found in the Fundamental Items (Alteration) Statute, 2009 which was passed into a Demonstration. The High Court had decided that the cost at which the Middle will purchase sugar from the plant will incorporate the legal least value (SMP) and an extra measure of benefits that the factories share with farmers.[10] The Correction permitted the Middle to follow through on a fair and gainful cost (FRP) rather than the SMP. It likewise got rid of the necessity to pay the extra sum. The alteration applied to all exchanges for the acquisition of sugar by the Middle beginning around 1974. Essentially, the change overruled the Court’s choice. The leader attempted to avoid the Peak Court choice through the Adversary Property (Revision and Approval) Mandate, 2010. The Court had given a writ to the Overseer of Foe Property to return ownership of specific properties to the legitimate beneficiary of the proprietor. In this way, the Chief gave a Law under which all properties that were stripped from the Overseer for legitimate beneficiaries by a Court request were returned to him. The Mandate slipped by and a Bill was presented in the Parliament. The Bill is right now being analyzed by the Parliamentary Standing Board of Trustees on Home Undertakings. These models feature a few occasions where the lawmaking body has acted to switch legal proclamations. The legal executive has additionally acted in a few occurrences in hazy situations isolating its job from that of the chief and the governing body. The principle of detachment of abilities isn't arranged in the Indian constitution. To be sure, it could be challenging to define a severe boundary outlining the partition.  However, it may be necessary for each pillar of the State to evolve a healthy convention that respects the domain of the others.
7.     NEED FOR HARMONY
There is a need for checks and balances in the constitutional governance of the country and also in the political program. Separation of power is a part of the Indian Constitution. It has almost become a characteristic feature and the doctrine of separation of power is not separable from the processes of evolution of democracy. The doctrine of separation of power is an effective safeguard against different situations that any of the arms of the State may move presently, tomorrow, or afterward. The vital question is the way in which the Fathers of the Indian Constitution revived it, the way in which the first Prime Minister, Pandit Nehru had a vision of it -- the three organs of the State must have a joint participation in it. No unshared primacy has been given to any of the arms of the State. It is also true that the popular will of the people finds a central place in the understanding of those where the framers of the Constitution. The centrality of the will of the people is expressed very disgustingly in the Preamble of the Indian Constitution. 
 
8.     CONCLUSION
The hypothesis of the detachment of abilities is an inescapable piece of a majority rules government's development. None of the republic's three distinct organs can assume control over the elements of the others. The chief, administrative, and legal parts of government cooperate to overcome any barrier and make government run as expected. The regulation of partition of abilities in the severe sense is bothersome and eccentric and subsequently till now it has not been completely acknowledged in any of the nations, yet this doesn't imply that the precept has no importance in the realm of today. The rationale behind this tenet is as yet substantial. The rationale behind the regulation is of the extremity as opposed to the severe arrangement, meaning in this manner that the focal point of power should be spread to keep away from absolutism. Consequently, the convention can be better valued as a precept of 'check and equilibrium'. A voting-based government and various individuals like India can't work under a constitution with a severe partition of abilities. Be that as it may, the three mainstays of government can collaborate fairly on account of conscious and moderate sacred utilitarian covers. By overcoming any barrier between the administrative, leader, and legal branches of government, shared cooperation like this works on the productivity of government. A majority rules system can't work well without complying with the convention of the division of abilities.


[1] Akash Trikha, Anwesha Tripathy, (Separation of Powers: Indian Perspective), Palarch’s Journal of Archaeology of Egypt/Egyptology 17(6). ISSN 1567-214
[2] Nidhi Singh, Anurag Vijay, (Separation of Powers: Constitutional Plan and Practice), International Journal of Scientific and Research Publications, ISSN 2250-3153, Volume 3, Issue 11, November 2013
[3] Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India 1984 3 S.C.C. 161
[4] Nidhi Singh, Anurag Vijay, (Separation of Powers: Constitutional Plan and Practice), International Journal of Scientific and Research Publications, ISSN 2250-3153, Volume 3, Issue 11, November 2013
[5] AIR 1982 SC149
[6] Keshavananda Bharti vs. State of Kerala AIR 1973 SC 1461
[7] Bandhua Mukti Morcha AIR 1984 SC 802
[8] Aravali Golf Club vs. Chander Hass (2008) 1 SCC (L&S) 289
[9] Supreme Court in Commissioner of Customs vs. Sayed Ali (2011) 3 SCC 537
[10] Mahalakshmi Mills vs. Union of India (2009) 16 SCC 569

Article Information

SEPARATION OF POWERS IN A DEMOCRACY: THE INDIAN PERSPECTIVE

Authors: Shubhangi Gupta, Prakriti Mishra

  • Journal IJLRA
  • ISSN 2582-6433
  • Published 2023/04/12
  • Volume 2
  • Issue 7

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