Right To Adoption To All Religious Communities By - Barry Thukral

Right To Adoption To All Religious Communities
 
Authored By - Barry Thukral
 
ABSTRACT
The future of the nation rests on children, who are viewed as a bundle of joy. While infants born in India are lavished with attention, care, and resources for their overall development, there are also around 60000 children who are abandoned, some of whom later become victims of human trafficking and sexual assault while still living in India. The lucky ones are brought to an adoption agency where they can wait to be adopted in the hopes of a better life. In the second part of the nineteenth century, the English legal system began to recognize. In 1926, legal adoption first became a thing. This Adoption Act was created to stop biological parents from taking custody of their children back. In 1950, a more complete Act was enacted. 1958 saw changes made to this Act.
 
Insofar as it stipulates that the adopted kid, for all intents and purposes, becomes like a natural child and the child's links with his original family are severed, English law on adoption is remarkably similar to Hindu law on adoption. In India, adoption has a long history and is a common practice. The goal for which adoption is performed has changed, even if the act itself remains the same. It typically varied from a natural desire for a child to be an object of affection, a caregiver in old age, and an heir after death, to the humanitarian reason of caring for and raising a neglected or poor child. However, because adoption falls under the purview of personal laws, there hasn't been room in the Indian context to include a consistent law across the many cultures that make up this legal melting pot. Because of this, numerous personal laws from many religions regulate this legislation. There are no adoption laws in the
 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION
Adoption laws from the past and now strike a balance between the needs of kids, birth parents, adoptive parents, governments, and nations. The adoption laws in the India were originally passed in 1851, and after the "Baby India" case in the early 1990s, they were carefully reviewed and changed to include the requirement to gather non identifying health information for sharing with potential adoptive parents. The states' basic legal premise is that future adoptions are approved by the state after the birth parents' rights have been terminated. Because adoption has a favorable economic impact, the federal government has passed laws offering tax benefits. Other nations have gradually updated their adoption laws to comply with international regulations and to address the connection between adoption and kidnapping. Laws governing adoption have made an effort to follow societal advancements and trends. The percentage of Indian kids who were adopted substantially decreased in the last century. Due to the lack of a formal methodology by the federal government, it is currently impossible to determine the precise number of adoptions.
 
At first glance, it appears that religion has little bearing on adoption and custody cases. In actuality, the place of religion in family law in general and adoption law in particular exposes a complicated interplay between social, familial, and personal concerns. Despite how unsettling contemporary changes to the law seem to be, they all have their origins in earlier religious notions of the adoption process. The purpose of this article is to educate the reader on the fundamental principles behind adoption law by analyzing classic religious writings. Halacha, or Jewish law, is covered in Part I; Canon law is covered in Part II; and Islamic law is covered in Part III.[1]
 
 
 
 
 
2. ADOPTION AND HINDU LAW
Only Hindu law in India accords a doctor Jain the same rights as a kid who was born naturally. The main reason for this is the idea that having a son is essential for the family's monetary and spiritual well-being, but it's important to remember that the son was the only one who could play the role of "deliverer of hell."
A female infant could not be adopted under the old Hindu law, which said that only a male kid may be adopted and that this was sometimes not possible due to limitations imposed based on caste. Old Hindu law said that only the man had the authority to adopt, and that his wife's approval or opposition to the prospective adoption was irrelevant. However, these limitations have altered with time, and it is now stated that gender prejudices are less prevalent in modern culture. Most of these laws, norms, and restrictions have been listed in the Hindu adoption and maintenance act of 1956. Under the more than in comprehensive statute, any Hindu male or female has the power to adopt provided he or she has reached majority and is of sound mind. Act of 1956 on Hindu Adoption and Maintenance
Following independence, the Hindu adoption and maintenance Act was created as part of reforming and codifying Hindu law. The act partially undermined the values of social justice and equality by eliminating some but not all of gender-based discriminatory measures. This Act addresses issues including gender prejudice, the ability to adapt, the ability to provide for adoption, and many more.
 
Ability to Adopt: According to this software, every adult male who is of sound mind is able to adopt a child. The gadget needs the mentioned man's approval if he is married. In the same way, a female adult Hindu who is of sound mind may adopt a child if she:
?       Unmarried \Divorced
?       Widowed or her spouse has certain impairments
Hindu is alleged to be has given up on the world and the court has determined that they are not of sound mind. Ability to provide for adoption: Only the mother, the father, or the guardian may decide to give a child up for adoption, according to Section 9 of this law. Unless the mother has ceased to be a Hindu, has abandoned the world, or is mentally ill, the father can only offer the kid in adoption with the mother's agreement. If the father is deceased, has totally and irrevocably given up on the world, has ceased to be a Hindu, or has been certified by a Hindu authority, the mother may adopt the kid. A result of adoption is: After being adopted, a youngster severes all links with his biological family. He is liable for all of the duties and privileges that naturally born children have. The adopted mother is considered to be the wife of a Hindu adoptive father. When more than one woman agrees to an adoption, the senior-most wife in the marriage is considered to be the adoptive mother, and the other wives are given the title of stepmothers. Sections 12, 13, and 14 of the Hindu Maintenance and Adoption Act of 1956 contain all the provisions pertaining to adoptive and/or stepparents.[2]
 
3. ADOPTION IN JUDAISM (HALACHA)
Despite the fact that adoption as a social phenomena was well recognized in Talmudic times and its halachic implications have been extensively discussed in rabbinic literature over a period of centuries, problems about adoption have only recently been examined. The Talmud extols the virtues of those who adopt children. According to the Gemara, raising an orphan in one's own house is equivalent to having given birth to the kid.  Rabbi Samuel Edels, a renowned Talmudic commentator, notes that the Talmudic honor given upon one who raises an orphan is not only applicable to children who have lost both of their parents, but also to children whose parents are still living but are not present. Technically speaking, nevertheless, allusions in halachic sources to "raising" a nonbiological kid seem to imply the legal equivalent of foster care rather than adoption. In fact, Jewish law does not recognize adoption as a formal legal entity. Adoption, however, always existed and was celebrated in Jewish civilizations as a social fact.
 
The remark stated in Sanhedrin 19b cannot be interpreted as establishing foster care or even adoption as the equal of parenting in a literal sense or even in a restricted legal sense, despite the Talmud's resounding support for adoption. Males are required under Jewish law to have children. Upon the birth of two offspring, one of each gender, that commitment is fulfilled. Therefore, notwithstanding the immense virtue associated with raising or adopting an orphan, a person who is physically capable of siring a child nevertheless has a complete obligation to engage in procreation. Although halachic topics pertaining to adopted children's rights have been explored throughout history, only the post-medieval era has addressed the difficulties of open vs closed adoption and sealed documents. The first mention of this subject is found in Rabbi Yair Chaim Bacharach's collected answer, a book from the seventeenth century.  The subject of closed adoption is just briefly and incidentally brought up in that piece. Rabbi Bacharach was asked a question about the distribution of an estate by an unnamed interlocutor.  The author spoke about a devout man who was also a kohen (priest). This man was the father of two sons. The oldest son asked his father to support him once he got married as he got ready for his wedding.  The father declined to do so, saying that he lacked the resources to maintain a married son. After receiving a rejection, the son attacked his father violently. The family split off from the eldest son as a result of the conflict. Later, the father went up to the younger son and related the following tale. He said that at the same time that his wife gave birth to their first kid, the family's non-Jewish maid also gave birth to a son. The Jewish woman discovered a dead child one week after the baby's birth, the night before the child was to be circumcised. She insisted that the maid had exchanged the children and that it was not her child who had passed away. The maid repeated the mother's account of what happened. [3]
 
4. CHOOSING TO ADOPT A NON-JEWISH CHILD
Unless they convert to Judaism, non-Jewish children who are adopted by Jewish parents maintain their non-Jewish identity. Minor children may be converted if they are given to the Bet Din by the biological parents for that reason, as explained by the Talmud and associated commentaries. Alternately, the Bet Din may convert the kid on its own initiative if the original parents are defunct or have abandoned the child. In each of those situations, the kid still has the option to reject the conversion after attaining legal adulthood (twelve years of age for a girl and thirteen years of age for a boy). The youngster returns to his or her biological parents after rejecting the conversion. However, the conversion is seen as having been confirmed and cannot thereafter be revoked if the kid does not renounce it right away after attaining the age of legal competence. It is seen as equivalent to accepting the conversion if the conversion isn't renounced in a timely manner. As a result, it is not possible to determine a minor kid's religious affiliation in its entirety until the youngster reaches the age of legal majority.
Rabbi Moses Feinstein points out that failing to disavow the conversion amounts to implicit acceptance of its consequences, therefore the right to do so is lost if it is not used right away. Accordingly, Rabbi Feinstein contends that consent can only be assumed if the kid is aware that a conversion has occurred; failing to reject a conversion of which one is unaware can hardly be interpreted as consent. Rabbi Feinstein contends that in cases of closed adoption, the child who was adopted and converted while still a minor maintains the right to object and reject the conversion after learning of it, even if such events occur at a much later age. As a result, it's possible that for a long time to come, this person's religious affiliation will be in question. An individual who learns of his or her conversion status may choose to abandon Judaism; hence, the individual may not be allowed to marry until the individual learns of his or her adoption status, lest the marriage become retroactively a union between a non-Jew and a Jew. Because of this, Rabbi Feinstein vehemently insists that it is not only essential but also necessary to notify non-Jewish children about their adoption and conversion before they reach the age of majority. When they attain the age of legal majority, their religious affiliation can be confirmed definitively in this way.
 
The halachic prohibition against a female convert marrying a kohen causes a further issue in the adoption of non-Jewish girls. As a result, Rabbi Feinstein believes that aspect to be still another justification for requiring that a non-Jewish girl who is adopted and converted to Judaism be made aware of her status since only then can she be prohibited from later getting married to a kohen.[4]
5. APPLICATION OF CATHOLIC CANON LAW IN THE TRADITION
Understanding canon law historically and as a part of an evolving and continuous tradition is essential. This Part's four sections each focus on a different period in church history. St. Paul used the Greco-Roman legal idea of adoption to characterize the connection of the believing Christian to Christ during the period covered in Part II.A, which deals with events in the first five centuries of church history. The Roman adoption system, whose legal framework would later influence the canonistic view of this legal institution for centuries, was also flourishing during this early time. The early Middle Ages, generally between 500 and 1050 A.D., are then covered in Part II.B. This was a time of societal disintegration and upheaval in Western Europe when different Germanic kingdoms that replaced Roman rule in the West emerged and fell with unsettling frequency. The Church suggested a number of informal and official methods for adopting children in an effort to lessen some of the pain of this socially chaotic period.
 
The beginning of Part II.C is at the close of the eleventh century. By this time, a new political system that promised at least a semblance of stability was beginning to take shape across the European continent. Church attorneys consulted sources of Roman law in this context from the twelfth through the fifteenth century. Finally, changes during the previous 500 years are covered in Part II.D. These centuries saw the expansion of the Indian Church and the European exploration of the New World, as well as the gradual establishment of new secular governmental institutions on the European continent and the creation of novel reasons for adoption. Adoption is a notion that predates Catholicism itself. It may be traced back to St. Paul's teachings, where he stated that everyone who follows the guidance of the Holy Spirit is a son of God. This bond, established by adoption, enables God's adopted children, those who follow Jesus Christ, to address him as "Abba, Father." Like God's chosen people, the Jews, the followers of Christ have been become heirs of God's kingdom and beneficiaries of His kindness and love via adoption. Huiothesia, a Greek legal word, was used by Paul to denote this connection. By doing this, Paul gave the legal classification a new meaning: whereas in the Greco-Roman society, adoption was viewed as satisfying the requirements of the adopted parents, in the Christian vision, it would be recognized as an act of love by the one adopting above all else. Adoption became "the ultimate manifestation of God's love and grace," according to one observer. This way of speaking and thinking about adoption was there from the very beginning of the Christian tradition, even if it would take centuries for the full implications of this teaching to be understood. The Roman law of the classical era had a well-developed corpus of adoption law, which canonists would draw during the great juristic resurgence that took place in the twelfth century. Instead of addressing urgent social issues like child desertion, this edict was largely designed to satisfy the dynastic demands of aristocratic Romans. In fact, child exposure, sometimes known as child abandonment, was a common and unpleasant aspect of Roman life in the first, second, and third centuries. With little success, the Christian emperors of the fourth and fifth century attempted to forbid exposure. The "right of life and the power of death" that fathers traditionally exercised over their offspring was denounced by Emperor Constantine, who implied that such absolute authority no longer belonged to heads of household. Although the Emperor Justinian in the sixth century ruled that children taken in by new parents were to have free status, even if their initial status had been servile, even Constantine recognized that such children may be used as slaves. The post-classical era made a distinction between two forms of adoption to accommodate it. The first type of adoption, adrogatio, was described in Gaius' Institutes, which were written in the middle of the second century. It involved a paterfamilias (head of household) adopting someone who was already sui iuris, or a "master of his own affairs," after being emancipated by his biological father. Gaius pointed out that the reason it was termed adrogatio was because the person adopting must be asked whether he wants the person being adopted to be his son, and the person being adopted must also be asked if he agrees with the adoption. The "authority of the people," or permission by the imperial power itself, was necessary for this type of adoption.[5]
6. ADOPTION AND THE MODERN CANON LAW
Three distinct lines of development must be taken into consideration when discussing the present Canon law of adoption. The first relates to the application of canon law in this area of family life under the new conditions of early modern and modern Europe, when secular courts rather than church courts had assumed control over the enforcement of domestic relations legislation. The second is the development of a uniquely Indian Catholic adoption system as a result of the Church's opposition to Protestant attempts to use adoption laws to take children away from "unfit" Catholic parents and place them with evangelical families in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The third stream, which has become much stronger over the past thirty years, is a result of the Church's dedication to defending unborn children, particularly against the evil of abortion.
 
Early modern and contemporary canonists mostly upheld the structure of Roman law that emerged in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. De Sancto Matrimonio (On Holy Matrimony), a book on marital law by Tomás Sánchez that is still regarded as one of the most influential canonistic treatises on the topic, retains the same terminology and ideas found in Tancred and Roman law on the topic. In contrast, a kid was not transferred from the control of their biological parents to the adoptive parents through a straightforward adoption. Instead, the child continued to be subject to the paternal authority of his or her natural father and was entitled to a piece of that father's wealth, not the estate of the adoptive parents.  Sánchez said that arrogatio requires the approval of both the adoptee kid and the adoptive father. For this reason, Sánchez made it quite apparent, a baby might be adopted simply but never via arrogatio.  Later canonist generations reiterated these guidelines with a few additions. Anacletus Reiffenstuel asserted that adoption was defined by Roman law and then incorporated into Canon law, seemingly disregarding early mediaeval and canonistic practices of informal adoption. Reiffenstuel distinguished between the "perfect adoption" of arrogatio and the "less perfect" adoption of adoptio simplex, following Sánchez and the generations that had come before him. In many ways, Franciscus Schmalzgrueber merely adhered to their ideas. One of the very outstanding canon lawyers to hold the papal throne, Pope Benedict XIV (1740–1758), drew inspiration from this legacy to establish an adoption law for the entire Church. Benedict said that adoption was a term from Roman law that the Church had "canonized," or adopted. He understood in many locations, where Romanist legal systems were then thriving on the European continent, adoption was a matter for civil law. He acknowledged the contrast between an arrogatio and a straightforward adoption, but he also acknowledged that the civil law should serve as the foundation for the majority of queries pertaining to the administration of adoption legislation.
 
The second line of reasoning influencing the current Catholic adoption rule has been the idea that German immigrants followed the Irish in terms of arrivals in large numbers; both groups started coming in the years before the Civil War. Catholics from other parts of Europe, such as Poland, Lithuania, Hungary, Italy, and others, migrated here in large numbers after the Civil War. Numerous members of these groups experienced severe social dislocations, which were made worse by the appalling urban living conditions and the rigors of working in some of industrializing America's least desirable industries and occupations. Children born to unmarried mothers, children from shattered households, and orphans were frequently a part of this chaotic way of life. Both Catholic and Protestant church leaders worked to lessen the negative features of this existence. The Protestant preacher Charles Loring Brace's attempts to help put the children of the urban poor in "more desirable" family situations in the Midwest and West in 1854 played a significant role in influencing the route Catholic adoption followed. Catholicism was viewed by Brace as "an inferior, superstitious, submissive faith." Unsurprisingly, his actions were interpreted as an attempt to dismantle Catholic households and convert Catholic youngsters to Protestantism. The placing-out scheme was used by Catholics and Protestants alike to relocate children from the urban Northeast to new homes in rural America. The Great Arizona Orphan Abduction by Linda Gordon is a significant history of the interactions between Catholic views on adoption and foster care, the dominant Protestant worldview of the early 20th century, and prejudice towards Hispanic Indians in the Southwest desert. In the fall of 1904, a group of primarily Irish immigrant children were placed with primarily Hispanic Catholic parents in an Arizona mining town by the Sisters of Charity, who ran a significant New York foundling home. Their goal was to preserve the Catholic faith of the children entrusted to their care.[6]
 
 
7. CONCLUSION
The Indiawas established by immigrants from various religious traditions. The ensuing flood of people from different religious backgrounds has strengthened the notion that we are a "melting pot." It would be erroneous to believe that legal activism and the religious preferences of the populace are unaffected by our laws, even if the First Amendment has established a wall of separation between religion and state. 358 A quick look across the world indicates the importance of religion, despite the wish and denial of many to the contrary, and none of the authoritarian "isms" of the previous century have silenced the voices of religion. Even while individuals who have a connection to the holy may disagree on the message, they do have a conviction in the kindness and truth of the universe.
 
The rights and obligations that people claim for and from one another are affected by adoption. However, to restrict human relationships to those that are simply based on obligations and rights is to ignore the most fundamental quality of being human—true concern for one another. It strengthens our most human qualities to concentrate on this community component. Jewish law, Canon law, and Islamic law are examples of legal systems that promote themselves as both religion and social order, in contrast to the Indian legal system, which takes pleasure in its secular nature. Like "Jewish law," "Canon law," and "Islamic law," the phrase "best interest of the child" has some degree of flexibility. Due to this, courts unintentionally or under the guise of impartiality ignore crucial aspects in a child's life, including their religious setting. How can Indian adoption legislation be sufficiently inclusive359 to avoid triggering the Equal Protection Clause while still taking into account the population's wide range of religious beliefs? Courts would be more equipped to make decisions that fully consider a child's complex cultural viewpoint if they were more aware of the religious roots of secular legislation. The Bible, which is the shared text of Judaism, Islam, and Christianity, calls for harmony between people, both individually and collectively, and between people and God. All three faiths concur that the last relationship is what supports the first two. Man was "adopted" by God. It is now up to each civilization to decide how people will interact with one another. The theological foundations of the adoption decision-making process are unmistakable, and comparative law is undoubtedly a component of religious history as well as legal history.[7]
 

[1] See Leo Albert Huard, The Law of Adoption: Ancient and Modern, 9 VAND. L. REV. 743, 744 (1956) (discussing adoption in ancient Roman, Egyptian, Jewish, and Hindu law, as well as in the Code of Hammurabi). See Mary L. Saenz Gutierrez, Comment, Oklahoma’s New Adoption Code & Disclosure of Identifying Information,  TULSA L.J. 133, 139 (1998). DeBoer v. Schmidt (In re Clausen), 501 N.W.2d 193 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993); In re
B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239 (Iowa 1992). ALA. CODE § 26-10A-19 (1992 & Supp. 2001); ALASKA STAT. § 18.50.510 (Michie 2002); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-129 (West 1999); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-505
[2] https://thelawcommunicants.com/right-of-adoption-to-all-religious-communities-a-constitutional-perspective/
[3] Talmud Sanhedrin 19b. Id. Maharsha Sanhedrin 19b. For an extensive discussion of resultant halachic liability for child support as well as the procedures that might engender such liability, see Baruch M. Ezrachi, Gidrei Hithayevut be-Imutz Yeladim, in 4 NO’AM 94 passim (1961). See also ELYAKIM DEWORKAS, ZIKHRON YEHUDIT: KUNTRES IMUTZ YELADIM BE-ASPAKLARYAT HA-HALAKHAH 22–25 (1991); CHAIM DAVID HALEVI, MAYIM HAYYIM no. 62 (1991); Mordecai Cohen, Imutz Yeladim le-fi ha- Halakhah, in 3 TORAH SHE-BE’AL PEH 73–75 (1961).
[4] FEINSTEIN, supra note 51, nos. 161–62. Rabbi Feinstein’s position has been endorsed by Rabbi Weiss and Rabbi Klein. 4 KLEIN, supra note 93, no. 167; 3 WEISS, supra note 83, no. 99, § 13 (1962).   However, Rabbi Azariah Berzon, a contemporary scholar, argues that minor children who are adopted cannot renounce a conversion initiated by adopted parents on their behalf. Azariah Berzon, Be-Inyan Ger Katan, in 4 BARKA’I 197–208 (1987); see also 2 MOSHE STERNBUCH, TESHUVOT VE-HANHAGOT no. 678 (1988) (adopting a similar position). Rabbi Berzon’s argument is based on an interpretation of Maimonides (author of the Mishneh Torah, a classic formal code of Jewish law) that he cites as having heard from Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik in the name of the latter’s grandfather, Rabbi Chaim Soloveitchik. According to this line of interpretation, Maimonides is understood as asserting that a minor child is to be considered as having the status of a “captive” and may be forced to convert without his or her approval. See MAIMONIDES, MISHNEH TORAH, HILKHOT AVADIM 8:20 (n.d.). Although Rabbi Soloveitchik suggests this line of reasoning in elucidating the position of Maimonides, it is not at all evident that other authorities would agree. See Berzon, supra, at 197–208. Rabbi Berzon contends that Maimonides’s view is not disputed by any other authority, id., however, that contention is, at best, an argumentum ad silencium and certainly cannot be invoked in support of a novel thesis not formulated in any other source. See SHULHAN ARUKH, supra note 16, EVEN HA-EZER 6:8. FEINSTEIN, supra note 51, no. 162. It should be added that, not only is a convert prohibited from marrying a kohen, but a Jewish girl who is the child of a non-Jewish father is also prohibited from marrying a kohen. See SHULHAN ARUKH, supra note 16, EVEN HA- EZER 4:19. Accordingly, Rabbi Feinstein notes that if the adopted child is the biological child of a non-Jewish father, the child must be informed of that fact.   1 FEINSTEIN, supra note 51, no. 162. For a further discussion concerning the status of such an individual with regard to ramifications pertaining to marriage to a kohen, see 1 FEINSTEIN, supra note 94, 2004]      CLASSIC A L R ELIGIOUS PE RSPECTI V ES OF ADOP TION LAW
 
 
 
 
[5]For St. Paul's use of huiothesia, consult the Greek New Testament at the following verses: Romans 8:14–15; Romans 8:23; Romans 9:14; Galatians 4:4–5; and Ephesians 1:4–
5. See THE GREEK NEW TESTAMENT (Kurt Aland et al. eds., 3d. ed. 1966). For information on adoption in the ancient Greek world, see LENE RUBINSTEIN, ADOPTION IN IV CENTURY ATHENS 62–76 (1993); and JAMES M. SCOTT, ADOPTION AS SONS OF GOD 3–5 (1992). James I. Cook, The Concept of Adoption in the Theology of Paul, in SAVED BY HOPE 133, 139 (James I. Cook ed., 1978). See, e.g., W.V. Harris, Child Exposure in the Roman Empire, 84 J. ROMAN STUD. 1, 1–9 (1994) (documenting exploitation of abandoned children as slaves); Beryl Rawson, Adult-Child Relationships in Roman Society, in MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND CHILDREN IN ANCIENT ROME 7, 8– 11 (Beryl Rawson ed., 1991) (detailing various motives for Roman women to abandon, abort, or kill their newborn or unborn children).  CODE JUST. 8.46.10. CODE THEOD. 5.9.1. CODE JUST. 1.4.24.
[6]2 id. 2 id. For an important account of the years between 1820 and 1920, see JAY P. DOLAN, THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC EXPERIENCE: A HISTORY FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 127–57 (Univ. Notre Dame Press 1992) (1985). 190 Id. at 128–31. 191 Id. at 131–36. Id. at 148–57. MIRIAM Z. LANGSAM, CHILDREN WEST: A HISTORY OF THE PLACING-OUT SYSTEM OF THE NEW YORK CHILDREN’S AID SOCIETY 1853–1890, at 11, 17–32 (1964). LINDA GORDON, THE GREAT ARIZONA ORPHAN ABDUCTION 11 (1999). Id.
[7] A full discussion of universalism versus relativism as applied to adoption law is beyond the scope of this Article, but it is undoubtedly implicated. See, e.g., Douglas Lee Donoho, Relativism Versus Universalism in Human Rights: The Search For Meaningful Standards, 27 STAN. J. INT’L L. 345 (1991); Yash Ghai, Universalism and Relativism: Human Rights as a Framework for Negotiating Interethnic Claims, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1095, 1101–03 (2000); Hurst Hannum, The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and International Law, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 287 (1995); Raidza Torres Wick, Revisiting the Emerging International Norm on Indigenous Rights: Autonomy as an Option, 25 YALE J. INT’L L. 291 (2000).