NAVIGATING LEGAL FRONTIERS: THE PERSONHOOD PUZZLE OF ARTIFICIALLY INTELLIGENT ENTITIES IN INDIA AND THE NEXUS OF RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND ACCOUNTABILITY BY: ADITYARAJ VOJHALA

NAVIGATING LEGAL FRONTIERS: THE PERSONHOOD PUZZLE OF ARTIFICIALLY INTELLIGENT ENTITIES IN INDIA AND THE NEXUS OF RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND ACCOUNTABILITY
 
AUTHORED BY: ADITYARAJ VOJHALA
Student, SVKM’s NMIMS Kirit P. Mehta School of Law
 
 
ABSTRACT
In an enigmatic realm where natural and artificial entities converge, the concept of personhood in India unfolds as an uncanny paradox. Thus the author, through this research, embarks on a legal odyssey that commences in the ethereal domains of deities and corporate entities, exploring the bestowed rights upon these traditionally recognized entities. However, the narrative takes an unforeseen twist as we journey through the labyrinthine corridors of jurisprudence, delving into the intriguing proposition of extending personhood to Artificially intelligent entities. The juxtaposition between the rights inherent in the divine and corporate, and the emerging discourse on AI personhood, sets the stage for an exploration of unprecedented dimensions. In the hallowed halls of justice, we delve into the ancient echelons of deities- entities with rights etched in time, and corporate entities, each a legal persona scripting its narrative in the theatrics of courtrooms. This uncanny lens serves as a portal through which we navigate the uncharted territories of AI personhood, questioning established norms and challenging the very essence of what it means to be a legal person. The law perspective, fuelled by a fervent pursuit, dangling on the precipice, to confer legal personhood upon Artificially intelligent entities, pirouettes through the profound purpose of endowing artificial intelligence with the coveted status of a legal person. This intricate movement gracefully traverses a symphony of juridical ideas, culminating in a fundamental question: Can the law be amended to bestow personhood upon Artificial Intelligence, or are we poised for a legal narrative with an unforeseeable twist?
INTRODUCTION
On July 4, 1981, a grim event occurred at Kawasaki Heavy Industries. An engineer, conducting maintenance on a partially powered robot, entered a restricted area. The machine, interpreting him as an obstacle, swiftly hurled him onto nearby machinery with its powerful hydraulic arm. He met instantaneous demise—a haunting testament to the perilous intersection of the man and the machine.[1] Another incident in South Korea unfolded on November 9, 2023, when a man in his 40s, employed by a robotics company, lost his life as a result of a robotic mishap. While inspecting the sensor operations of an industrial robot at an agricultural produce distribution center, the machine malfunctioned. In a devastating error, the robot failed to differentiate between the man and the boxes of bell peppers it was handling. The consequence was grim as the robotic arm, designed for lifting and palletizing, pressed the man's upper body against the conveyor belt, resulting in fatal injuries to his face and chest.[2] In the aftermath of this chilling yet harrowing incident, the world probably found itself thrust onto the stage of Artificial Intelligence, where machines played a dramatic role, leaving humanity to ponder the unforeseen plot twists in the script of technological progress. In the pursuit of endowing machines with human-like cognition, AI emerged as a powerful yet precarious frontier. The tragic demise of the engineer, a consequence of a partially powered robot's misjudgement, served as a stark catalyst for the world to confront the implications of AI. As the nation of Bharat embarks on this transformative journey, the incident acts as an indelible cautionary tale, prompting a critical examination of the ethical and existential questions surrounding the integration of intelligent machines into the fabric of our lives. Who is to blame for incidents involving artificial intelligence, such as the tragic event at Kawasaki Heavy Industries in 1981 or in South Korea? Or Is it the developers, the operators, or should the technology itself bear some level of responsibility? How do we navigate accountability in the increasingly complex interactions between humans and intelligent machines?
So, the assertion is that in grappling with such complicated challenges of artificial intelligence, the country may need to consider unconventional solutions. One intriguing avenue could involve assessing the possibility of granting personhood to AI entities. This approach would entail recognizing AI systems as legal entities, subject to rights and responsibilities. While a radical proposition, it opens avenues for a more nuanced and accountable integration of intelligent machines into society. This concept could be explored further, considering the potential implications, ethical considerations, and societal impacts, fostering a comprehensive and forward-thinking approach to the evolving relationship between humans and artificial intelligence in Bharat.
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1.      What is the current legal framework for AI in India?
2.      How has the concept of personhood evolved?
3.      How does it apply to deities and corporations?
4.      How do deities and corporations currently have legal personhood?
5.      Can these frameworks be extended to AI entities in India?
6.      How can an accountability framework be established for AI entities?
7.      How do rights and responsibilities interplay in the Indian legal context?
8.      How can these insights inform the Indian legal landscape?
 
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
1.      Examine the current legal framework for artificial intelligence in Bharat, focusing on identifying key challenges and regulatory gaps.
2.      Explore the historical evolution of the legal concept of personhood and its application to deities and corporations.
3.      Investigate how deities and corporations currently enjoy legal personhood and consider the feasibility of extending these frameworks to artificial intelligence entities in India.
4.      Analyze the constitutional rights and legal protections afforded to artificial intelligence entities, comparing them with the rights of deities and corporations.
5.      Propose mechanisms for establishing accountability for artificial intelligence entities, taking into account the interplay of rights and responsibilities within the legal context of India.
6.      Identify and analyse the primary ethical concerns associated with extending legal personhood to artificial intelligence entities, and suggest strategies for addressing them within the Indian legal framework.
7.      Assess the potential socio-economic implications and technological challenges that may arise from recognizing personhood for artificial intelligence, and propose policies and legislative reforms to mitigate these challenges.
 
METHODOLOGY
The paper has been constructed in a way to skilfully execute research that satiates each research question posed during the rudimentary stages of the study. This study has been framed using literature published in various journals, news articles, case judgments and books.
 
THE THEORY OF PERSONHOOD
In the Ram Mandir case[3], a pivotal question emerged: How does the law recognize and shape the rights and responsibilities of individuals, known as 'legal persons,' and how has this influenced human rights throughout history?
In the judgment, their Hon’ble Lordships asserted that in the law, it's important to recognize the things or groups it's supposed to control[4]. They call these things or groups "legal persons." To be a legal person means the law officially sees you as something with rights and responsibilities. The law can control how legal persons act and deal with each other. So, being a legal person means having certain rights and duties under the law and being able to make agreements with other legal persons. Who or what counts as a legal person depends on the law.
 
Legal systems around the world have changed over time. In the past, some people were not recognized as having legal rights. For instance, ethnic groups and slaves were deprived of rights during colonial invasions[5], but now, in countries with constitutional democracies, almost everyone is seen as having legal rights. The idea of legal rights has also been extended beyond just people.[6] We now have something called an "artificial legal person" or "juristic person."[7] This means that even objects or things that aren't people can be seen as having legal rights. For example, a group of people together (like in a cooperative society or corporation) can be seen as one legal person. Also, in some cases, representations of the divine in the form of deities, trusts, the environment, ships, and corporations can be considered a legal person. Salmond explained that a joint-stock company or a municipal corporation is considered a person in the eyes of the law, even though it's not a real person. In legal theory, a person is anything the law sees as capable of having rights and duties. This includes not only human beings but also anything else that can have interests and can do things that affect others. So, in the eyes of the law, a person is anything to which the law gives the ability to have interests, rights, acts, and duties.
 
In simple terms, I would say that legal identity can be given to almost anything, and the reason behind it is what really matters[8]. It's not uncommon, for instance, to treat objects like ships or even ideas as if they have legal rights. However, legal experts note that we usually assign legal identity to things that we already think of in human terms, like referring to a ship as "she." Whether it's a vessel, an idol, a group of people, or even artificial intelligent beings, the choice depends on what's practical in the law, and it doesn't change the kind of legal identity granted[9]. The important part is why we're doing it – the purpose it serves. So, when the law gives legal identity to something, it's like saying that thing, whether a physical object or an artificial intelligent being, has its own legal existence with certain rights and responsibilities, separate from its physical form.
 
PERSONHOOD UNVEILED
The term or concept of “Personhood” through the modern ages has a rich historical origin, tracing back to the Greek-Roman period, where it initially referred to the masks worn by stage actors.[10] The Roman law recognised rudimentarily two forms of persons: “person natura” (natural persons) and “persona fictae” (fictional persons)[11]. Generally, there are two types of person which the law recognized, namely the natural and artificial person[12]. Thus, in the intricate realm of legal personhood, the conventional notion of a person solely as a human being proves insufficient[13]. Natural persons embody both legal and factual personhood, whereas legal persons, also known as fictitious, juristic, artificial, or moral, possess legal standing but lack tangible existence. The main difference between a "juristic person" and a "natural person" is that the former, like corporations[14] or organizations, doesn't have its own real personality; its personality is more like a legal fiction[15]. In contrast, a natural person, like an individual, has a genuine and inherent personality. Legal entities, both real and imagined, attain personhood through legal fictions, a testament to the law's capacity to attribute personality even when none exists in reality[16]. The law's creation of legal persons involves personifying tangible entities, endowing them with a semblance of real existence through fictitious personalities. This concept challenges a simplistic view, especially when considering slaves who were historically devoid of legal personality[17]. Legal persons, despite their fictitious nature, take on various forms dictated by the law's discretion. The widely accepted notion that corporations are personae fictae[18], or fictitious persons[19], faces scrutiny in modern legal discourse. Some scholars posit a new theory treating corporate personality as a genuine reality rather than a mere legal construct.
 
DEFINING PERSONHOOD
While, it’s a common misconception among the masses at large that “personhood” and “humanhood” are terms that can typically be used interchangeably.[20] but do, they mean the same, while “Humanhood” primarily denotes membership in the homo sapiens species, a biological classification; “personhood” delves into a more complex set of attributes that confer moral and legal significance. Black’s Law dictionary defines “personhood” ‘a person is any being whom the law regards as capable of rights and duties’[21]. 
 
Boethius, a philosopher of the early 6th century CE, gives the definition of "person" as "an individual substance of a rational nature" ("Naturæ rationalis individua substantia").[22] The definition emphasizes both individuality and rationality as essential attributes of personhood[23]. Then in the naturalist epistemological tradition, extending from Descartes to Locke and Hume, personhood is associated with continuous consciousness and the capacity for framing representations, formulating plans, and acting on them[24]. However, Charles Taylor[25] critiques this naturalist view, arguing that the essence of personhood goes beyond a mere "performance criterion." He proposes a significance-based perspective, asserting that what matters to individuals is crucial in defining personhood. This view highlights uniquely human matters of significance that differentiate persons from other entities exhibiting complex adaptive behaviour.
Francis J. Beckwith[26] introduces the substance view of personhood, dissociating it from function. According to this view, the moral significance lies in the being of a person rather than their functioning[27]. Even individuals lacking certain cognitive capacities, such as young children or those with disabilities, are considered persons based on their inherent nature.
 
Wennberg's[28] exploration of ethical issues in terminal choices for permanently unconscious patients centers on the contention that the special value of human life lies in personal consciousness, enabling individuals to participate in God's creative and redemptive purposes. He aligns personal identity with John Locke's view[29], defining it by the continuity of consciousness and the developed capacity for mental states. Contrary to traditional Christian perspectives, Wennberg reduces humanness to a purely biological notion, aligning it with Homo sapiens classification and dismissing the need for theological and philosophical dimensions. Wennberg's concept of personhood, rooted in developed capacities like thinking and agency, supervenes upon human biological life. He introduces the notion of potential persons and asserts that personhood is a degreed property, with an intrinsic maximum. Wennberg's supervenience relation posits that personhood depends on the functional structure of a biological human, suggesting that changes in humanness affect the presence or absence of personhood. This nuanced perspective raises critical questions about the nature of humanness, personal identity, and personhood within the context of ethical decision-making regarding end-of-life scenarios.
 
The way we think about things in metaphysics, like living and non-living stuff, affects how we see the law for non-living things. Imagine if we follow the substance view, which gives special rights to living things based on their inner qualities. We might start thinking about giving similar rights to non-living things, like ecosystems or natural features, because of their importance. This could mean legal rights for them based on their essential nature. When we talk about property-things, which can change without a strict identity, it could guide how we make laws for the environment. Laws might focus on how people affect non-living things, like causing pollution or destroying habitats. The idea is that human actions play a big role in the condition of non-living things. Thinking about capacities in a hierarchy, like in living things, could also influence how we see the importance of different non-living things. For example, a river system might be seen as valuable not just for what we can get from it right away, but also for its overall role in nature. It's like saying some non-living things have different levels of importance. In law, we might use the idea of genus/species relationships to sort non-living things into categories with different rights. Each type of non-living thing could get its own set of protections and rights. But, there are challenges, like objections to the substance view. Some people worry it doesn't match with facts or is too abstract. Figuring out how to give rights to non-living things in a clear way could be tough for legal systems. So, when we talk about metaphysics in law, it shapes how we see the rights, responsibilities, and groups for non-living things in nature.
 
J. P. Moreland[30] supports this perspective by emphasizing the importance of an entity's essence within a natural kind. The unity of dispositions, capacities, parts, and properties stems from the entity having an essence, allowing it to maintain identity through change.
 
Harry Frankfurt delves into the connection between personhood and free will[31]. He suggests that the concept of a person is intimately linked to the ability to have first- and second-order desires, including the capacity for reflective self-evaluation. Frankfurt contends that the criteria for personhood capture attributes central to our humane concerns and what we regard as important in our lives. Nikolas Kompridis[32] introduces an intersubjective basis for personhood, suggesting that personal identity is constituted and sustained through relations with others. Erasing these relations might erase the conditions of self-intelligibility. Mary Midgley defines a person as a conscious, thinking being with self-awareness[33]. She acknowledges the law's role in creating persons, emphasizing the role of consciousness in personhood. Thomas I. White[34] outlines criteria for personhood, including being alive, aware, capable of feeling sensations, having emotions, possessing self-awareness, recognizing others, and exhibiting sophisticated cognitive abilities. White's criteria, while somewhat anthropocentric, acknowledge that some animals, such as dolphins, could be considered persons[35].
 
Max Radin acknowledges that while the term "person" commonly refers to a human being in everyday language and literature, its technical definition in the legal context diverges significantly. In legal terminology, Radin suggests that one could argue that "person" does not denote an individual human being but rather a collective entity formed by legal relationships.[36]
 
WHAT RIGHTS DOES AN ARTIFICIAL LEGAL PERSON HOLD?
To possess legal personality is to serve as the subject of rights and duties. Granting legal rights or imposing legal duties is essentially conferring legal personality. In the Sabarimala case[37], Advocate J. Sai Deepak[38] contended that deities, as non-living entities, possess constitutional rights, including fundamental rights under Article 25[39]. However, only two Hon’ble judges, Hon’ble Justice R.F. Nariman and Hon’ble Justice D.Y. Chandrachud, addressed this argument. They concluded that the rights under Part III of the Indian Constitution, including Article 25, are exclusive to "natural persons" and cannot extend to non-living entities like deities or Hindu idols, even if legally recognized, due to their juristic personality granted by legal fiction. Consequently, it could be interpreted here that non-living entities may not enjoy the full the legal spectrum of rights, as recognition of their juristic personality does not encompass all the rights accorded to natural persons.
 
Top of Form
GODS IN THE LAW: PERSONIFYING DEITIES WITHIN  THE LAW
The contemporary Indian law recognizes deities as juristic persons[40]. However, articulating the idea of personhood within the Indian atmosphere, encounters a translation challenge, as the term 'person' is a Western imposition on Indian culture. The absence of an equivalent concept in Sanskritic languages complicates the status of 'person' in India, as classical Indian schools of Jurisprudence traditionally utilizes terms such as “?tman”[41], “puru?a”[42], “j?va”, “??vara”[43], “bhagav?n”[44], “avat?ra”[45], and “m?rti”[46] when referring to both human and divine entities, bypassing the Westernized connotations of 'person'[47]. English law recognises only one class of artificial legal persons via, the corporations that are really personification of groups or series of individuals. These are classified into the corporation aggregate and the corporation sole.[48]
 
For Instance, In the 1991, Bumper Development Corporation Ltd v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis[49] case, the English Court of Appeal questioned whether a Hindu temple and idol could legally proceed. The court noted challenges in treating God as a legal entity, making litigation between temples impractical. It emphasized the need for identifiable juristic persons, linking Hindu idols with the temple's name, reflecting legal complexities in foreign contexts. This challenge of applying the English Common law to the personality of the Hindu idol was addressed by Hon’ble Justice Raymond West in Manobar Ganesh Tambekar v. Lakbmiram Govindram[50]. The Hindu law recognizes not only corporate bodies with property rights vested separately from individual members but also juridical persons known as foundations[51]. Unlike English law, Hindu law doesn't necessarily require a trust.  A Hindu can establish a religious or charitable institution without needing a trust. The ruler protects the endowment as long as it aligns with moral principles. Unlike English law, a trust is not mandatory.
 
DIVINE LEGALITY: A JOURNEY THROUGH INDIAN JURISPRUDENCE ON DEITIES AS JURISTIC PERSONS
As established time and again in the course of this research, a juristic person, like any other natural person is in law also conferred with rights and obligations and is dealt with in accordance with law. In other words, the entity acts like a natural person but only through a designated person, whose acts are processed within the ambit of law. When an idol was recognized as a juristic person[52], it was known it could not act by itself. Here, it is imperative that  I clarify that when legal personality is granted to a Hindu idol, it doesn't mean giving legal status to the divine entity, the 'Supreme Being,' in Hinduism. The 'Supreme Being' is considered formless and universal. In the Law of Hindu endowments, the focus is on providing legal personality to the 'purpose behind the idol.'[53] This means that the legal recognition is directed towards the objective or purpose represented by the idol rather than the divine entity itself.
 
In dealing with Hindu idols, they're given legal recognition not just for religious worship but also to handle real-world disputes, especially those involving property tied to the idols. This legal status helps courts navigate conflicts over contested properties linked to Hindu idols, ensuring fair treatment. Even without a specific trust in place, the law safeguards the idol's properties. While the properties were under dispute, there was no challenge to the legal standing of the first plaintiff. The focus then turned to determining the specific properties associated with the deity, a topic explored further in later parts of the judgment.
 
In 1869, a significant legal discussion arose in the Indian courts, specifically in the case Maharanee Shibessouree Debia v. Mothooranath Acharjo[54]. The case involved a civil suit against the shebait (caretaker) of a 'talook' dedicated to a deity's service. The court ruled that since the 'talook' was devoted to religious services, all associated rents and lands legally belonged to the deity. The shebait, in this context, was recognized as a manager rather than the lawful owner, with limitations on alienating the property. Another case, Prosunno Kumari Debya v. Golab Chand Baboo[55], posed the question of attaching profits from dewuttur lands during succeeding shebaits' terms due to judgments against a former shebait. The court emphasized the inalienable nature of properties designated for religious purposes and associated charities. This legal precedent confirmed restrictions on the shebait's ability to alienate or charge such properties.
 
The Dakor temple case[56] delved into the nature of a deity as a juridical person. The dispute arose between the hereditary manager and priests of the Dakor temple and the shevaks (trustees) of the deity. The shevaks, originally responsible for temple services, began treating the offerings as their own, deviating from established customs. The court recognized the concept of artificial juridical persons under Hindu law and ruled against the shevaks' absolute proprietary rights, ordering the recovery of misappropriated property. This case reveals devotees' perception of the deity, emphasizing their interest in ensuring proper worship and dignity for the deity. The court did not distinctly separate the idol/deity from the Dakor temple, treating it as a unified juridical person.
For instance in the case of Bhupati Nath Smrititirtha vs Ram Lal Maitra[57], the Hon’ble Calcutta High Court, through Hon’ble Justice Chatterjee., emphasized that Hindus do not worship the physical "idol" itself, whether made of clay, gold, or other materials. Instead, they worship the eternal spirit of the deity or specific attributes represented by the idol. The use of a physical form is considered a convenient and suggestive representation for contemplation, serving as a symbol or emblem. The manifestation or presence of the deity is believed to occur through the recitation of mantras associated with that particular deity, or, according to some, it leads to the gratification of the deity. This thus establishes the symbolic nature of idol worship in Hinduism, where the focus is on the spiritual essence rather than the material form. This was reaffirmed by Hon’ble Justice Banerjee in Ram Jankijee Deities & Ors vs State Of Bihar And Ors.[58]
 
Then, In the case of Vidyapurna Tirtha Swami v Vidyanidhi Tirtha Swami[59], the Hon’ble Madras High Court explored the legal nature of idols, temples, and mutts. Hon’ble Justice B Ayyangar raised an interesting idea about whether the community benefiting from the institution could be seen as a corporate body acting as the juristic person in control. This community would work through individuals like dharmakartas or panchayats, responsible for managing the trusts. He point out that, practically, it doesn't matter much whether the presiding idol or the community of worshippers is considered the juristic person holding the properties. From a legal standpoint, opinions may differ on which theory is more scientific. The choice, as per a legal scholar, is more about form than substance. Justice Ayyangar made an interesting observation that one societal interest served by giving juristic personality to the idol is protecting the interests of devotees. While acknowledging that similar protection could be achieved by granting juristic personality to the devotees as a collective, he leaned towards personifying the idol for practical and convenient reasons.
 
In the Mullick case[60], a pivotal judgment on the legal standing of Hindu idols, the court firmly established the deity's status as a juristic entity, rejecting the notion of treating them as mere chattels. The court emphasized that, in line with Hindu customs and legal traditions, Hindu idols are recognized as having juristic personality, with the legal capacity to initiate legal actions. This landmark ruling discarded the idea of family idols being viewed as conventional property and asserted that damaging or degrading such idols was beyond the authority of their custodians. The judgment highlighted the sanctity associated with Hindu deities, acknowledging their legal rights. Additionally, the Hon’ble court cited an excerpt from the Rambrahma Chatterjee case[61], vividly illustrating the deity's dynamic role in daily worship, reinforcing the perception of the deity as a living, natural person in the dharmic worldview, deserving of the highest respect and endowed with comprehensive rights.
 
The Hon’ble Madras High Court extensively deliberated on the constitution of a Hindu idol when interpreting the definition of a temple as 'a place of public religious worship.'[62] According to the Hon’ble court, a temple earns the status of a place of public religious worship only when the idol is installed and consecrated through the pranaprathistha or 'vivification ceremony.' Before this consecration, the idol is not considered an object of worship, and it is only after the completion of this ritual that the deity is deemed to commence residing within the idol.
 
Then in the landmark Shiromani Gurdwara case[63], the Supreme Court recognized Guru Granth Sahib, the Sikh holy book, as a juristic person. The ruling acknowledged the flexible nature of this concept, stating that any entity, living or inanimate, could be considered based on its utility and societal needs. It emphasized the importance of adapting to diverse faiths, criticized attempts to equate different religions, and highlighted the role of faith and conviction in designating Guru Granth Sahib as a juristic person. The judgment underscored the need to contextualize the concept according to the specific requirements and beliefs of each community.
 
In the Devta Shringa Rishi v. State[64] case, a writ petition was filed in 2011 at the Himachal Pradesh High Court. The deity Shringa Rishi is portrayed as the main plaintiff, but with a unique legal characterization as a 'perpetual minor.' This term, introduced by the British[65], acknowledges the belief in India that a deity can receive donations and own temple property. The deity, as a perpetual minor, filed the case through its temple administrator (kardar). The legal issue involves the representation and rights of the deity within the framework of this legal fiction.
 
In simpler terms, legal personality is not bestowed on the 'Supreme Being,' but rather on the specific purpose represented by the idol. As in the case of minor a guardian is appointed, so in the case of idol, a Shebait or manager is appointed to act on its behalf. In that sense, relation between an idol and Shebait is akin to that of a minor and a guardian. As a minor cannot express himself, so the idol, but like a guardian, the Shebait and manager have limitations under which they have to act.
Historically, gifts dedicated to religious purposes were sufficient. Property dedicated to a pious purpose, following Hindu law, is considered beyond commercial transactions. For example, lands bestowed on a Hindu idol cannot be sold. The idol is treated as a juridical person, and those in possession of its offerings are responsible for their proper use, similar to trustees, even without explicit acceptance. As a result, the Hindu idol is considered a juridical subject, and the pious idea of the donors or worshippers embodied in the idol is granted the status of a legal person. Therefore, the Hindu idol is deemed capable of holding property, similar to a natural person. Crucially, a Hindu idol is established, consecrated, and endowed based on the religious customs of Hindus[66], and courts acknowledge it as a juristic entity.
 
While a shebait is a manager and not a trustee in the technical sense, it wouldn't be accurate to describe shebaitship as merely an office[67]. A shebait not only has duties related to the endowment but also holds a beneficial interest in the debutter property[68]. As noted by the Judicial Committee, in most such endowments, the shebait has a share in the benefits derived from the debutter property, determined by the terms of the grant, custom, or usage[69]. Even when no emoluments are attached to the shebait's office, they still enjoy some form of right or interest in the endowed property, which partly resembles a proprietary right. Therefore, the concept of shebaiti combines elements of both office and property[70], duties and personal interest, and these elements are intertwined and cannot be separated from each other.
 
The precise legal status of a shebait may not be easily defined, but its implications are well established. According to the pronouncement of the Judicial Committee in Vidya Varuti v. Balusami,[71], it's clarified that the role of a shebait in relation to debutter property differs from that of a trustee in English Law. In English Law, the legal estate in trust property is held by the trustee for the benefit of the cestui que trust. However, in Hindu religious endowments, the entire ownership of the dedicated property is transferred to the deity or the institution itself as a juristic person, and the shebait or mahant is merely a manager.
 
In the case of Bishwanath And Anr vs Shri Thakur Radhaballabhji & Ors[72], the Supreme Court allowed a case filed by the idol represented by a worshipper. The context was a situation where the shebait was found to be alienating the property of the idol. The court held that if a shebait fails to fulfill his duties properly, a devotee has the right to approach the court as a "friend of the deity." This ruling signifies the court's recognition of devotees' standing to protect the interests of the idol and its property when the appointed custodian, the shebait, is not acting in the deity's best interest.
 
In the case of Sri Jagannath Temple Puri Management Committee vs. Chintamani Khuntia, it was determined that the duties carried out by sevaks (temple servants) in the temple are considered to be of a secular nature. Additionally, the payments made to these sevaks were deemed as remuneration. This thus signifies a recognition that the activities within the temple, even if associated with religious rituals, can have a secular character, and the compensation provided to the sevaks is considered as payment for their services rather than solely as offerings or religious donations.
 
NATURE AS AN ENTITY
On the 20 March 2017, the Hon’ble High Court of Uttarakhand (Salim v State of Uttarakhand and Others[73] declared that the: “Ganga and Yamuna Rivers and all their  tributaries and streams…. are juristic persons with all the corresponding rights duties and liabilities of a living person”[74] The Hon’ble court appointed three officials to act as legal custodians responsible for conserving and protecting the rivers and their tributaries and ordered a management board be established within three months.[75] The court’s decision was necessary because both rivers are “losing their very existence” and both “are sacred and revered and presided over by goddesses”
On 30 March 2017, the Hon’ble Uttarakhand High Court re-examined a previous (failed) petition Lalit Miglani v State of Uttarakhand and Others [76] and declared that:

“We, by invoking our parens patriae jurisdiction, declare the Glaciers including Gangotri & Yamunotri, rivers, streams, rivulets, lakes, air, meadows, dales, jungles, forests wetlands, grasslands, springs and waterfalls, legal entity/ legal person/juristic person/juridicial person/ moral person/artificial person having the status of a legal person, with all corresponding rights, duties and liabilities of a living person, in order to preserve and conserve them. They are also accorded the rights akin to fundamental rights/ legal rights.” [77]
 
Sierra Club v. Morton[78] is one of the first cases in which the issue of legal standing of inanimate objects as living objects came up for consideration. In his well-known dissent, Justice Douglas argued that the modern societal focus on preserving the ecological balance should grant legal standing to environmental entities, allowing them to bring lawsuits for their own protection. He acknowledged that even inanimate objects could participate in legal proceedings, and he viewed a river as a vibrant symbol representing all the lives it supports. As a plaintiff, the river would articulate the interests of the entire ecological community it sustains.
 
Efforts were made to embrace eco-centrism in the country, where nature was prioritized over humans in decision-making. Eco-centrism sought to grant legal rights to nature, departing from the human-centric approach of anthropocentrism that only recognized moral duties toward the environment. The judiciary's transition from a human-centric to an eco-centric perspective was evident in the case of Animal Welfare Board v. A. Nagaraja[79]. In this case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court emphasized that animal welfare should take precedence over traditional practices like bull killing. The judgment marked a three-stage evolution in the judiciary's approach to environmental issues. Initially, environmental protection was driven by human self-interest. Subsequently, the focus shifted to sustainable development, considering the well-being of future generations. Ultimately, legal recognition was given to nature as a living being with its own rights.
 
FORMALIZING LEGALITY: THE JOURNEY TO CORPORATE PERSONHOOD
The corporation, widely acknowledged as an artificial legal entity in Company law, holds a central position in legal discourse. The notion of treating a collective of individuals as a singular legal entity has roots dating back to the inception of human civilization, with examples scattered across history, including guilds, partnerships, and early unincorporated businesses.
In the Ram Mandir case[80], the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India cited Phillip Blumberg's work "The Multinational Challenge to Corporation Law"[81] to bolster its understanding of the legal nature of corporations. Blumberg's insights emphasized the well-established recognition of the legal personality of corporations dating back to the fifteenth century, when craft guilds and trading companies received charters from the Crown. The court noted the contributions of legal scholars such as Sir Edward Code in the seventeenth century, as well as Blackstone and Kyd in the late eighteenth century, who confidently expounded on the nature, creation, and legal attributes of corporations[82]. Significantly, their commentary extended beyond ecclesiastical and municipal entities to encompass business corporations, providing historical context and depth to the court's deliberations in the Ram Mandir case[83].
 
Blumberg further notes that, until the nineteenth century, the recognition of a corporation for business purposes necessitated a specific governmental decision, either a charter from the Crown in England or an act of Parliament[84]. In the United States, legislative acts were required for corporate status. However, with the advent of general incorporation statutes over a century ago, corporations could be formed through simplified procedures, diminishing the state's role to procedural specifications and administrative acknowledgment of compliance.
 
The legal personality of a corporation, historically granted by governmental acts, evolved with the preference for incorporation as the primary business method. Incorporation statutes allowed individuals to establish companies, marking a shift from government-granted corporate personality to statutory frameworks. While this evolution outlines changes in the basis of corporate personality, it does not delve into the underlying reasons for conferring legal personality, offering limited assistance in understanding the contemporary legal landscape.
 
The landmark case of Salomon v. Salomon and Co. Ltd[85] marked a pivotal moment in corporate law by establishing the principle of a separate legal entity for companies. This principle holds that a company possesses its distinct existence apart from its individual members. As a result, shareholders are shielded from personal liability for the company's actions and obligations. In essence, this concept grants limited liability to the members of the company, contrasting with partnerships where individual members may be personally liable for the entity's wrongs. Therefore, if a company is involved in any wrongdoing, the liability is confined to the company itself, and its members are generally not held personally accountable for such actions. The Salomon case laid the foundation for the modern understanding of corporate entities and significantly influenced corporate jurisprudence worldwide.
 
In the case of Tata Engineering Locomotive Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar and others[86], the Supreme Court affirmed the concept that a corporation is deemed a natural person with its independent existence. This legal entity, characterized by its unique seal and name, stands separate from its individual members. Notably, the liability of shareholders is limited to the capital they have invested in the company. However, the practical reality is that, being an artificial entity, a company cannot autonomously perform actions; it requires individuals to conduct its business operations. In instances where fraudulent activities or wrongdoing is suspected, the courts may resort to "lifting the corporate veil." This legal doctrine allows the courts to unveil the corporate entity's facade and identify the individuals behind its actions. While a corporation is recognized as a separate legal person, the veil may be lifted when there is a need to attribute actions or responsibilities to the individuals directing or controlling the company's affairs. This legal principle strikes a balance between acknowledging the distinct legal personality of a corporation and holding individuals accountable when their actions warrant scrutiny.
 
In the 1958 case of R.T. Perumal v. John Deavin And Anr.[87], it was ruled that members of a company cannot assert ownership over the company's property, whether during its operation or in case of dissolution. The court also clarified that a company itself cannot hold insurable interest in its property. This decision underscores the clear separation between the company's assets and the personal claims of its members, emphasizing the unique legal identity of the company.
In Abdul Haq v. Das Mal[88], where Das Mal, an employee, sought payment for unpaid wages, the Court clarified that the appeal was directed against the company itself and not its directors or members. This ruling emphasized the legal separation between the company and its individual members or directors. 
In Som Prakash Rekhi vs. Union of India & Anr.[89], the court established the concept that a legal person is any entity other than a human being to which the law attributes personality. The court emphasized that corporate personality is not a myth but a reality, stating that it is a legal person. The passage highlights that the jurisprudence related to corporations is grounded in reality, not an illusion or fictitious construction of the law. It acknowledges that legal personality is extended to entities other than human beings, and corporations are one form of legal persons created by the law, endowed with various attributes to achieve specific legal purposes. The court recognizes the significant role of legal imagination in extending the concept of personality to entities beyond individuals.
In Floating Services Ltd. v. MV San Fransceco Dipaloa[90], the Court went further to establish that a company, being a distinct entity from its members, possesses the legal standing to sue even one of its own members. This case reinforced the concept of the independent legal personality of a company, allowing it to engage in legal proceedings against its members if necessary.
 
AI AS A LEGAL PERSON
A question arises what can be considered as an AI? AI involves making a machine exhibit behaviour deemed intelligent if performed by a human.[91] It is essential to note that this definition is contrary to fact that the machine's behaviour is considered intelligent, but it does not imply the machine's actual intelligence or thought processes. This perspective aligns with the Turing test[92], evaluating a machine's ability to achieve outcomes indistinguishable from those of a human agent[93]. AI, in this context, is characterized by outcomes and actions rather than intrinsic intelligence or cognition. The definition encompasses a spectrum of applications featuring interactive, autonomous, and self-learning agents capable of handling tasks that traditionally require human intelligence.
 
I argue that artificial intelligence entities should be treated as natural slaves is rooted in the belief that, as artifacts created by human labour, they should be considered the property of their makers. To this regard, John Locke's view on property[94], rooted in the labour theory, argues that private ownership is legitimate only when earned through personal work. In Two Treatises of Government, he asserts that the state of nature, where people interact, has rules restricting property accumulation. Key aspects include labour as the rightful basis for ownership and conditions on accumulation, extending from the natural state to civil society. Locke sees money as a fair institution allowing unlimited accumulation within moral bounds.
 
Drawing parallels to historical debates on private property, particularly influenced by John Locke's philosophy, my claim suggests that the creators of AIs have a right to own them[95]. My assertion challenges the idea that the artificial creation of AIs should automatically relegate them to a status of ownership, prompting a deeper examination of the implications for their entitlement to constitutional personhood and the rights associated with it.
 
CONCLUSION
The recognition of deities as juristic persons in the Indian legal system stresses upon the idea that, despite being legal entities, they necessitate a guardian or custodian to act on their behalf. This concept mirrors the understanding that these entities, though endowed with legal personality, cannot independently express themselves or fulfil legal obligations. It establishes a parallel with the relationship between a minor and a guardian in legal proceedings. This perspective opens up intriguing possibilities for the application of similar principles to artificial intelligence (AI).  In the context of deities as juristic persons requiring a guardian even as legal entities, the case of Devta Shringa Rishi[96] case serves as a relevant illustration. In this case, the deity Shringa Rishi is treated as a 'perpetual minor,' and the legal fiction introduced acknowledges the need for a guardian, referred to as a 'kardar' or temple administrator, to represent the deity's interests in legal matters.
 
Similarly, the case of Shri Thakur Radhaballabhji[97] exemplified the recognition of devotees as potential guardians or protectors of the deity's interests. The Hon’ble Supreme Court allowed a case filed by the idol represented by a worshipper, emphasizing that if a shebait fails to fulfill duties properly, a devotee has the right to approach the court as a "friend of the deity,[98]" showcasing the guardian-like role of devotees in safeguarding the deity's property.
 
The recognition of deities as juristic persons, as exemplified in cases like the Ram Mandir case[99] and 'Devta Shringa Rishi case'[100] stresses a broader legal principle. This principle holds that entities, whether possessing physical existence like idols or non-physical existence, which do not fall under the classification of human beings, require a representative or guardian to act on their behalf in legal matters. In these cases, the deity, having legal personality, is akin to a non-human entity that necessitates someone to represent its interests, make decisions, and fulfill legal obligations. This representation is crucial, whether it be in the form of a trust for the Ram Mandir[101] or a designated guardian for the perpetual minor deity in Devta Shringa Rishi case[102]. The appointment of a guardian or custodian acknowledges that these entities, despite their juristic personhood, lack the inherent capability to navigate legal complexities independently.
 
Extending this principle beyond religious contexts, it opens a theoretical framework applicable to entities with both physical and non-physical existence, such as artificial intelligence or environmental entities like rivers and glaciers[103]. The idea is that any entity, regardless of its nature, may benefit from a designated representative or guardian to ensure responsible and lawful actions in the legal realm. This theoretical idea aligns with the evolving legal landscape that addresses the rights and responsibilities of non-human entities, promoting a nuanced and inclusive approach to legal personhood.
 
The legal recognition of companies as juristic persons in the business world aligns with the broader principle that entities, whether possessing a physical existence, like idols[104], or a non-physical existence, such as companies, require a representative or guardian to act on their behalf in legal matters.
 
In the realm of corporate law, companies are treated as separate legal entities distinct from their shareholders[105]. Much like deities or other non-human entities, companies[106], with their own legal personality, need someone to represent their interests, make decisions, and fulfill legal obligations. This representation often takes the form of corporate officers, directors, and appointed agents who act on behalf of the company in various capacities.
 
For instance, when considering the legal status of a company, its ownership, management, and decision-making processes involve designated individuals who serve as guardians or representatives of the corporate entity[107]. This principle is reflected in the appointment of boards of directors, CEOs, and other officers who steer the company's course, make legal decisions, and navigate complex business and regulatory landscapes.
 
This approach ensures accountability, responsible governance, and adherence to legal norms within the dynamic and complex business environment. Much like deities who are physical representations of the supreme being, AI systems which are far less inferior and lower in strata than a deity could operate as legal entities in certain contexts, yet they lack independent agency. Just as a shebait or manager is appointed to act on behalf of a deity[108], the notion of assigning a responsible custodian or guardian to oversee the actions and decisions of AI systems emerges.
 
In conclusion, to give personhood to AI entities is to embark on a legal odyssey where silicon and circuits meet statutes and safeguards. In the realm of juristic persons, from deities needing temple administrators to companies relying on CEOs, the concept finds a contemporary twist with the potential inclusion of artificial intelligence. Whether navigating divine realms, corporate boardrooms, or the digital frontier, it appears that in the eyes of the law, even silicon minds might need a guardian angel—or perhaps, a guardian algorithm.
 
“Personhood to Artificial Intelligence boldly rewrites the narrative where algorithms earn a seat at the table of legal recognition.”

[1] Shubham Singh, Attribution of Legal Personhood to Artificially Intelligent Beings, Bharati Law Review 194-201 (2017).
[2] FP Staff, Death by Robot: Machine confuses man for a box of vegetables, crushes worker in tragic accident, (Nov. 9, 2023), https://www.firstpost.com/tech/death-by-robot-machine-confuses-man-for-a-box-of-vegetables-crushes-worker-in-tragic-accident-13369122.html.
[3] M siddiq v. Mahant Suresh Das & Ors, (Supreme Ct. India 2019).
[4] Ibid
[5] John William Salmond, Jurisprudence: Or, The Theory of the Law (1907).
[6] Fatima Alves et al., The Rights of Nature and the Human Right to Nature: An Overview of the European Legal System and Challenges for the Ecological Transition, 11 Frontiers in Environmental Science (2023).
[7] Markus Zimmer, Extending Court-Protected Legal Person Status to Non-Human Entities , 8 IJCA [viii] (2017).
[8] Supra Note 3
[9] Ibid
[10] Raj Balkaran & Taylor McComas, Pur??a Studies.
[11] Studley et al., Juristic Personhood for Sacred Natural Sites: A Potential Means for Protecting Nature, 24(1) Parks 81-96 (2018).
[12] Ghadas & Zuhairah Ariff Abd, Real or Artificial? Jurisprudential Theories on Corporate Personality, 4 US-China Law Review 6 (2007).
[13] Supra Note 5
[14] Visa A. J Kurki, Legal Personhood, Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy 1929-1934 (2023).
[15]  Supra Note 5
[16] Philippe Fauquet-Alekhine, Legal Personhood and Robotics: Birth of the Smart Android and of the Biodroid, 24 Advances in Research 163-174 (2023).
[17] Supra Note 5
[18] Supra Note 11
[19] Ibid
[20] Anubha Singh Dhapwal, Personhood: India and UK Comparison, Available at SSRN 4384998 (2021).
[21] Visa AJ Kurki, A Theory of Legal Personhood (2019).
[22] Jenny Teichman, The Definition of Person, 60 Cambridge University Press on behalf of Royal Institute of Philosophy 175-185 (1985).
[23] Ibid
[24] Charles Taylor, The Concept of a Person, 1 Philosophical Papers 97-114 (1985).
[25] Ibid.
 
[26] Francis J Beckwith, Abortion, Bioethics, and Personhood: A Philosophical Reflection, (2001).
[27] Ibid
[28] JP Moreland, Humanness, Personhood, and the Right to Die., 12 Faith and Philosophy 95-112 (1995).
[29] Ibid
 
[30] Ibid
[31] Harry G Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, 68 The Journal of Philosophy 5-20 (1971).
[32] Nikolas Kompridis, Technology’s Challenge to Democracy: What of the Human?, 8 PARRHESIA 20-33 (2009).
[33] Mary Midgley, Persons and Non-Persons, In defense of animals 52-62 (1985).
[34] Thomas I White, Dolphin People, 49 The Philosophers' Magazine 36-43 (2010).
[35] Ibid
[36] Maheswari et al., Stone Gods and Earthly Interests: The Jural Relations and Consequence of Atributing Legal Personality to Hindu Idols, 16 National Law School of India Review 4 (2004).
[37] Kantaru Rajeevaru v. Indian Young Lawyers Association, (Supreme Ct. India 2020).
[38] J Sai Deepak, India, that is Bharat: Coloniality, civilisation, constitution (2021).
[39] Supra Note 37
[40] Deepa Das Acevedo, Deities’ Rights?, Journal of Law and Religion 1-19 (2023).
[41] Supra Note 10
[42] Ibid
[43] Ibid
[44] Ibid
[45] Ibid
[46] Ibid
[47] Ibid
[48] Supra Note 36
[49] Bumper Development Corporation Ltd v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, (England and Wales Ct. App. 1991).
[50] Manohar Ganesh Tambekar And Ors v. Lakhmiram Govindram And Ors, 12 ILR 247 (Bombay High Ct. 1887).
[51] Ibid
[52] Pramatha Nath Mullick v. Pradyumna Kumar Mullick, 25 BOMLR 1064 (Bombay High Ct. 1925).
[53] Supra Note 3
[54] Maharanee Shibessouree Debia v. Mothooranath Acharjo, 13 Moo IA 27 (Privy Council 1869).
[55] Prosunno Kumari Debya & Anr v. v. Golab Chand Baboo, 2 IA 145 (Privy Council Calcutta 1874).
[56] Supra Note 50
[57] Bhupati Nath Smrititirtha v. Ram Lal Maitra, 37 ILR 128 (Calcutta High Ct.).
[58] Ram Jankijee Deities & Ors v. Bihar And Ors, (Supreme Ct. India 1999).
[59] Vidyapurna Thirtha Swami, Minor v. Vidyanidhi Tirtha Swami (Died), 1 MLJ 105 (Madras High Ct. 1904).
[60] Supra Note 52
[61] Rambrama Chatterjee v. Kedar Nath Baneerjee, 30 C.L.J. 483 (Calcutta High Ct. 1922).
[62] Shri Thakur Gokul Nathji Maharaj & Anr v. Nathji Bhogi Lal, AIR 552 (Allahbad High Ct. 1953).
[63] Shriomani Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee, Amritsar V. Shri Som Nath Dass & Ors, (Supreme Ct. India 2000).
[64] Devta Shring Rishi Ji v. Himachal Pradesh, (High Ct. Himachal Pradesh 2011).
[65] Daniela Berti, Plaintiff Deities. Ritual Honours as Fundamental Rights in India, Journal of Law and Religion 13 (2016).
[66] Sri Marthanda Varma (D) Thr. Lrs. & Anr v. Kerala & Ors, (Supreme Ct. India 2020).
[67] Bhupendra Nath Mukherjee v. Monohar Mukherjee, 77 Ind Cas 783 (Calcutta High Ct. 1923).
[68] Angurbala Mullick v. Debabrata Mullick, 2 SCR 1125 (Supreme Ct. India 1951).
[69] Vidya Varuthi Thirtha v. Balusami Ayyar, 24 BOMLR 62 (Bombay High Ct. 1922).
[70] Bhabatarini Debi v. Ashalata Debi, 46 BOMLR 212 (Bombay High Ct. 1944).
[71] Vidya Varuthi Thirtha v. Balusami Ayyar, 24 BOMLR 62 (Bombay High Ct. 1922).
[72] Bishwanath And Anr v. Shri Thakur Radhaballabhji & Ors, 2 SCR 618 (Supreme Ct. India 1967).
[73] Salim v. Uttarakhand, (Uttarakhand High Ct. 2017).
[74] Supra Note 11.
[75] Ibid.
[76] Lalit Miglani v. Uttarakhand, (Uttarakhand High Ct. 2017).
[77] Ibid.
[78] Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (U.S. Supreme Ct. 1972).
[79] Animal Welfare Board Of India v. A. Nagaraja & Ors, 7 SCC 547 (Supreme Ct. India 2014).
[80] Supra Note 3
[81] Phillip I Blumberg, The multinational challenge to corporation law: the search for a new corporate personality (1993).
[82] Ibid
[83] Supra Note 3
[84] Supra Note 81
[85] Solomon v. Solomon, 11 WLUK 76 (House of Lords, United Kingdom 1896).
[86] Tata Engineering Locomotive Co. Ltd v. Bihar, AIR 40 (Supreme Ct. India 1964).
[87] R.T. Perumal v. John Deavin And Anr, AIR 43 (Madras High Ct. 1960).
[88] Abdul Haq v. Das Mal, 19 IC 595 (1910).
[89] Som Prakash Rekhi v. Union Of India & Anr, 1 SCC 449 (Supreme Ct. India 1981).
[90] Floating Services Ltd v. Mv San Fransceco Dipalola, 52 SCL 76 (Gujrat High Ct. 2004).
[91] John McCarthy et al., A Proposal for the Dartmouth Summer Research Project on Artificial Intelligence, 27 AI Magazine (2006).
[92] James H Moor, An Analysis of the Turing Test, 30 Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition 249-257 (1976).
[93] Thomas C King et al., Artifcial Intelligence Crime: An Interdisciplinary Analysis of Foreseeable Threats and Solutions, 26 Science and engineering ethics 89-120 (2020).
[94] Stephanie A Bell et al., A Chartalist Critique of John Locke's Theory of Property, Accumulation, and Money: Or, Is It Moral to Trade Your Nuts for Gold, 62 Review of Social Economy 51-65 (2004).
[95] Ibid
[96] Supra Note 64.
[97] Supra Note 72.
[98] Ibid.
[99] Supra Note 3.
[100] Supra Note 64.
[101] Supra Note 3.
[102] Supra Note 64.
[103] Supra Note 76.
[104] Supra Note 3.
[105] Jean-Philippe Robe, The Legal Structure of the Firm, 1 Accounting, Economics, and Law (2011).
[106] Supra Note 85.
[107]Murray A Pickering, The Company as a Separate Legal Entity, Contemporary Australian Corporate Law (1968).
[108] Supra Note 3