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MISUSE OF ARTICLE 356 & PRESIDENT RULE BY – PRANAV S. JAGTAP
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MISUSE OF ARTICLE 356 &
PRESIDENT RULE
AUTHORED BY
– PRANAV S. JAGTAP
ABSTRACT
The Constitution of India is an instrument that
provides for a federal structure in the country and also specifies definite
functions for central and state government. The jurisdiction of central and
state government with regard to the law-making process has been explicitly
mentioned in Schedule 7 of the Constitution. However, there are certain
circumstances through which the central government can enter the jurisdiction
of states and the Presidential proclamation of emergency is one of the tool.
INTRODUCTION
The incorporation of
emergency powers in the Constitution of India were subject to a lot of debate
and discussion in the Constituent Assembly with regard to its possibility of
endangering the federal polity. What has been an irony of political circumstances
that the aspect of emergency was foreseen to have remained as the least used
provisions, finally turned out to be amongst the most misused provisions of the
Constitution. These provisions were incorporated in the Constitution believing
that these would be the dead letters but to the utter dismay they became the
death letters of the Constitution.
Polity of the country
bears testimony to the fact that these provisions seemed to have paved way for
settling personal scores with the states being ruled by other parties. In one
way or the other the parties in control by manipulating these constitutional
provisions have more or less succeeded in quenching their political
animosities.
India has a vast and
diverse population, with a large number of people living in abject poverty.
Extraordinary situations are not novel to the Indian political scene. Therefore
extraordinary powers to deal with these situations become necessary. The power
contained in Article 356 is both extraordinary and arbitrary, but it is an
uncanny trait of extraordinary power that it tends to corrupt the wielder. A
close scrutiny of the history of its application would reveal that Article 356
is no exception.
One of the most significant provisions of the Indian
constitution is Article 356. During the finalization of the text of the
Constitution this provision had attracted notice and debate but the Chairman of
the Drafting Committee, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, had opined that the provision was
meant to be used only in the “rarest of the rare cases”.
Keywords – Constitution,
Jurisdiction, Government, President, Federal, Emergency.
PRESIDENT
RULE
Emergency provisions are
listed in Part XVIII of the Indian Constitution. President’s Rule is dealt with
under Article 356 of the Indian Constitution. Article 355, which mentioned that
“every state must be protected against external aggression and internal
disturbance and it should be ensured that the government of every state is
carried on following the provisions of this Constitution” under the Indian
Constitution does not explicitly conclude how the Union must perform its duty
to protect a State against external aggression and internal disturbance; it is
left to the Union’s assessment as to how to deal with any such circumstance as
it emerges. It has been stated in Article 356 as to how it must carry out its
duty to make sure that each State’s government is executed in compliance with
the Constitution’s provisions.
Article 356 of the Indian Constitution gives the
President the power to impose the President’s Rule on any state in case the
constitutional machinery of that state fails. When and if the President gets a
report from the Governor of the state or is otherwise convinced or satisfied
that the state’s condition is such that the state government cannot rule as per
the Constitution’s provisions, he can then, based on his assessment, impose
President’s Rule in that State or, if a state fails to adhere to all orders
made by the Union on subjects over which it has authority, President’s Rule can
be enforced.
The establishment of the President’s Rule in any state
requires parliamentary consent and must be approved by both House of
Parliaments within two months of its execution.
Hereafter, a simple majority’s approval is required
for the establishment of the President’s Rule, which can stay in effect for six
months. It can be prolonged for three years with legislative permission every
six months after its implementation.
Article 357 contains some consequential measures relating to the
exercise of legislative powers under the proclamation established under Article
356.[1]
CONSTITUENT
ASSEMBLY DEBATES ON ARTICLE 356
The Constitutional draft,
prepared by the drafting committee of the Constituent Assembly of India,
contained Article 188 which empowered the Governor to proclaim the taking over
the state Government such a proclamation was to have the maximum validity of two
weeks. The Art 188 read as:
"If at any time the Governor of a state is
satisfied that a grave emergency has arisen which threatens the peace and
tranquillity of the state and that it is not possible to carry on the
Government of the state in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution,
he may by proclamation declare that his functions shall, to such extent as may
be specified in the proclamation, be exercised by him or in his discretion and
any such proclamation may contain such incidental and consequential provisions
as may appear to him necessary or desirable for giving effect to the objects of
the proclamation including provisions for suspending in whole or in part the
operation of any provisions of the Constitution relating to anybody or authority
in the state.”2
The draft article 278, which deals with imposition of
emergency in a state, brought President into the picture. The Governor was
under a Constitutional obligation to transmit his proclamation to the President
who, if satisfied that the Government of the state could not be run in
accordance with the provision of the Constitution, could take over in his hands
the functioning of the state Government and declare that "the powers of
the legislature of the state shall be exercise only by Parliament."such
was the original provision made in the
Constitutional draft. Article 188 was completely
deleted, thereby empowering the President alone to assume the functions of the
state Goverment in the event of a breakdown of the constitutional machinery.[2]
Article 356 of the
Constitution, which laid down that the President "may assume to himself
all or any of the functions of the state" in the event of the
"constitutional failure of state machinery", was thoroughly debated
in the Constituent Assembly. While the members of the drafting committee headed
by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar strongly defended the Article for the sake of preserving
national unity, H.V. Kamath, S.L. Saxena and a few others were strongly against
it. Kazi Syed Karimudin, a Muslim member from the central province, was very
specific in his criticism:
"Suppose, for example, in West Bengal the party
which is in opposition to the Centre is elected, then even though the
Government for West Bengal may feel that the internal disturbance in West
Bengal is not sufficient for suspending the Constitution, still the will of the
Centre will be imposed and the ideologies of the Centre will be imposed on the
state.”[3]
Replying to the criticism, Dr. Ambedkar said,
"I do not altogether deny the possibility of these
Articles being abused or employed for political purposes. But that objection
applies to every part of the Constitution which gives power to the Centre to
override the Provinces. Proper thing we ought to expect is that such Articles
will never be called into operation and that they would remain a dead letter.”5
Such assurances
notwithstanding, there continued to persist a good deal of confusion as to the
exact meaning of the words,"Constitutional failure of state
machinery." During the debates. H.N. Kunziu asked Dr. Ambedkar to spell
out its meaning but Ambedkar gave a somewhat evasive reply:
"When we say that the Constitution must be
maintained in accordance with the provisions contained in this Constitution we
practically mean what the American Constitution means namely that the form of
the Constitution must be maintained."[4]
But this does not explain
anything and while speaking again on this Article. Dr. Ambedkar instead of
making its meaning clear confused them further by saying:
"The expression "failure of the
machinery" I find, has been used in the Government of India Act,
1935.Everybody must be quite familiar therefore, with its de facto and de jure
meaning.
I do not think any further explanation is
necessary."[5]
Naziruddin Ahmed, disenchanted with the vagueness of
the Article, had this to say;
“This Article says practically nothing.It says amost
everything.It enables the centre to interfere on the slightest pretext and it
may enable the centre to interfere on the gravest occasion.Socarefully guarded
is its vagueness, so elusive is its draftsmanship that we cannot but admire the
drafting committee for its vagueness and evasions."[6]
It is also difficult to agree with Dr. B.R. Ambedkar
that this phrase has the same meaning in the present Constitution which had in
the Government of India Act, 1935, because the present Constitution is not a
carbon copy of that Act. Given the fact that the country was in the grip of
communal agitation and separatist movements at the time when the Constituent
Assembly was debating the issue, the Article was approved in the interest of
national security without, any conclusive explanation of "constitutional
failure of state machinery."9
Since independence, Art
356 has become a powerful weapon in the hands of the Union Government and many
State Governments has become the casualty due to unethical invocations of the
Article. Precisely, as if to prove the predicaments of the Article 356, all
these years of independence has caused so much harm and injury to the federal
scheme, which had very carefully been built into the Constitution, that it has
come out as not only the most widely debated, discussed and commented upon
Article, but also the one demanded by various political parties and other
agencies to be deleted from the Constitution. Time and again, this Article,
mainly due to the Centre's highly dominating role sometimes results in the
dismissal of state Governments on the basis of recommendations made by
Governors invoking the power vested in him by under Article 356, more to
satisfy the Union Government for political gains. A related aspect widely
discussed but not settled for a very long time was the power of the Governor to
dismiss the Chief Minister and dissolve the legislature or invite any one of
his choice to form the government.[7]
The Aricle 356 has been used most arbitrary by the
Union Government for dismissing state Government of the parties other than the
party in power at the Centre.In Kerala after 1957 general election,Chief
Minister E.M.S.Nambudripal government was toppled in July 1959, while still
enjoying majority in the legislature. The Central government interference was a
clear-cut case of political prejudice. Ten years later, West Bengal had a
similar story to tell. First in November 1967 and then in March 1970, elected
governments were dismissed. While the Janata Party government at the Centre
dismissed nine Congress ruled state governments in 1978 and when Congress (I)
came to power at the Centre after 1980 election, it repeated the same tone by
dissolving nine non-Congress governments in 1980. In 1984, in Andhra Pradesh
govt. (NTR Govt.) and in 1985, Jammu & Kashmir government (Farukh
government) was dismissed on partisan grounds.[8]
In 1983, central Government appointed Sarkaria Commission
which was headed by Justice R.S. Sarkaria to examine the relationship between
Centre and State Government in the country and also suggest relevant changes
within the framework of Constitution. This commission recommended that Article
356 can be used "very sparingly, in extreme cases, as a measure of last
resort, when all other alternatives fail to prevent or rectify a breakdown of
Constitutional machinery
in the state.”[9]In its
final report, Sarkaria Commission explored the extensive misuse of Article 356
and made important recommendations to check its misuse. Despite this, misuse of
Article 356 continued, In 1988 Nagaland and in 1989, Karnataka state
governments were dismissed by the Central Government.[10]
In 1992 President's Rule was imposed in four Bharatiya
Janata Party (BJP) ruled states (Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and
Himachal Pradesh) by the Congress party government on the ground that they were
not implementing sincerely the ban imposed by the Centre on religious
organizations. In a landmark judgment in S. R. Bommai case in 1994, the Supreme
Court upheld the validity of this proclamation on the ground that secularism is
a "basic feature" of the Constitution. But the court did not uphold
the validity of the imposition of the President's Rule in Nagaland in 1988,
Karnataka in 1989 and Meghalaya in 1991. The court also held that in no case
should a state assembly be dissolved without Parliament approving the
proclamation, and that test of strength could only be conducted on the floor of
the house.[11]
The invocation of
President's Rule to facilitate or to recover for political horse-trading
continued even after the 1994s.Notable examples are - Gujarat 1996, U.P. 1996,
Bihar 1999, Goa 1999, Bihar 2005, Arunachal Pradesh and Uttrakhand 2016.
In the year 2002, the National Commission to review
the working of the Constitution, headed by retired Supreme Court judge, Justice
Nanepalli Narayana Rao Venketachaliah submitted a Consultation paper on
Union-State relations. The report criticized the Central Government for not
following the concept of co-operative federalism. Finally the National
Commission recommended that Article 356 should not be deleted, but it does need
an Amendment.[12] However,
this has not been implemented yet. Almost all the ruling parties at the Centre
have been blamed of misusing the power of Article 356 for political reasons.
ARTICLE 356
PROVISIONS IN CASE OF FAILURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL MACHINERY IN STATE
(1) If the President, on receipt of
report from the Governor of a State or otherwise, is satisfied that a situation
has arisen in which the Government of the State cannot be carried on in
accordance with the provisions of this Constitution, the President may by
Proclamation-
(a)
assume
to himself all or any of the functions of the Government of the State and
all or any of the
powers vested in or exercisable by the Governor or any body or authority in the
State other than the Legislature of the State;
(b)
declare
that the powers of the Legislature of the State shall be exercisable by or under the authority of Parliament;
(c)
make
such incidental and consequential provisions as appear to the President to be
necessary or desirable for giving effect to the objects of the Proclamation,
including provisions for suspending in whole or in part the operation of any
provisions of this Constitution relating to any body or authority in the State:
Provided that nothing in
this clause shall authorise the President to assume to himself any of the
powers vested in or exercisable by a Figh Court, or to suspend in whole or in
part the operation of any provision of this Constitution relating to High
Courts.
(2) Any such Proclamation may be revoked
or varied by a subsequent Proclamation.
(3) Every Proclamation under this article
shall be laid before each House of Parliament and shall, except where it is a
Proclamation revoking a previous Proclamation, cease to operate at the
expiration of two months unless before the expiration of that period it has been
approved by resolutions of both Houses of Parliament:
Provided that if any such
Proclamation (not being a Proclamation revoking a previous Proclamation) is
issued at a time when the House of the People is dissolved or the dissolution
of the House of the People takes place during the period of two months referred
to in this cause, and if a resolution approving the Proclamation has been
passed by the Council of States, but no resolution with respect to such
Proclamation has been passed by the House of the People before the expiration
of that period, the Proclamation shall cease to operate at the expiration of
thirty days from the date on which the House of the People first sits after its
reconstitution unless before the expiration of the said period of thirty days a
resolution approving the Proclamation has been also passed by the House of the
People.
(4) A Proclamation so approved shall,
unless revoked, cease to operate on the expiration of a period of six months
from the date of issue of the Proclamation:Provided that if and so often as a
resolution approving the continuance in force of such a Proclamation is passed
by both Houses of Parliament, the Proclamation shall, unless revoked, continue
in force for a further period of six months] from the date on which under this
clause it would otherwise have ceased to operate, but no such Proclamation
shall in any case remain in force for more than three years:
Provided further that if
the dissolution of the House of the People takes place during any such period
of [six months] and a resolution approving the continuance in force of such
Proclamation has been passed by the Council of States, but no resolution with
respect to the continuance in force of such Proclamation has been passed by the
House of the People during the said period, the Proclamation shall cease to
operate at the expiration of thirty days from the date on which the House of
the People first sits after is reconstitution unless before the expiration of
the said period of thirty days resolution approving the continuance in force of
the Proclamation has been also passed by the House of the People.
(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in
clause (4), a resolution with respect to the continuance in force of a
Proclamation approved under clause (3) for any period beyond the expiration of
one year from the date of issue of such Proclamation shall not be passed by
either House of Parliament unless ?
(a)
a
Proclamation of Emergency is in operation, in the whole of India or, as the
case may be, in the whole or any part of the State, at the time of the passing
of such resolution, and
(b)
the
Election Commission certifies that the continuance in force of the Proclamation
approved under clause (3) during the period specified in such resolution is
necessary on account of difficulties in holding general elections to the
Legislative Assembly of the State concerned:
Provided that in the case of the
Proclamation issued under clause (1) on the 6th day of October, 1985
with respect to the state of Punjab, the reference in this clause to “any
period beyond the expiration of two years.” [13]
AMENDMENTS
Original Provisions of Art. 356.- The Proclamation under Art. 356
may be revoked at any time by the President. Subject to this, it remains in
operation for two months. If, however, within that period, it is approved by
resolution of both Houses of Parliament the duration of the Proclamation can
extend to 6 months. The duration can be extended by similar action on the part
of Parliament for successive period of 6months at a time.
The maximum duration of
the Proclamation under Art. 356 is three years and cannot be extended beyond
that period by Parliament.
Under 38th Amendment 1975) — The satisfaction of the President as to the
break-down of the State Constitutional machinery was made final and
non-justiciable (i.e., it cannot be questioned in any court. Sub-Clause (5)].
42nd Amendment. - The 42nd Amendment of 1976 substituted one year for six
months. In this way the proclamation could be extended for one year each time
by resolutions in Parliament instead of for six months only each time.
44th Amendment 1978.- To prevent the misuse of Art. 356, the following
safeguards are devised :-
(i)
The
Proclamation in the first instance would be in force only for 6 months (instead
of for one year under the 42nd Amendment) on approval in this respect by a
resolution of Parliament. In this way the modification made by the 42nd
Amendment is nullified and the original constitutional position restored :
(ii) State Emergency can be continued only
for 6 months more by the approval of Parliament.
Ordinarily it cannot be extended beyond one year.
(iii) It can be extended beyond one year
only if:
(a)
An
Emergency under Art. 352 is in force in the whole of India or in the State (or
part of the State) concerned;
(b)
The
Election Commission certifies that there are difficulties in holding a general
election to the State Legislative Assembly and that for this reason the
Proclamation under Art. 356 has to be extended. This provision is new and is
intended to be an effective safeguard against abuse of power under Art.356 by
the Central Government. The existing limit of three years is retained.
Democratic rule is thus expected to be restored with the minimum of delay .
(iv) The 38th amendment inserted cl.(5) in
Art.356 to make the satisfaction of the president as to breakdown of
constitutional machinery in the state final and conclusive. This is dropped by
the 44th Amendment.[14]
48th Amendment Act, 1984.— Amended Cl. (5), Article 356, and inserted a new
proviso in clause (5), namely, "provided that in the case of the
Proclamation issued under clause (1) on the 6th day of October, 1983 with
respect to the State of Punjab, the reference in this clause to "any
period beyond the expiration of one year" shall be construed as reference
to "any period beyond the expiration of two years".
Under the existing clause
(5) the Presidential Proclamation of October 6, 1983, with respect to Punjab
could not continue in force for more than one year unless the *special
circumstances" mentioned therein were satisfied. This was enacted to meet
out the special circumstances prevailing in the State of Punjab due to on going
agitation by a group. Though the Legislative Assembly was kept in suspended
animation and a popular Government could be installed, having regard to the
prevailing situation in the State, yet the continuance of the Proclamation beyond
October 6, 1984, was necessary.
The amendment made Art.
356(5) inapplicable in the existing conditions in the State of Punjab.
64th Amendment Act,
1990 — Art. 356 was
again amended by the Constitution (64th Amendment) Act, 1990 in order to
provide for extension of the President Rule in the State of Punjab for another
6 months as the situation there was not favorable for holding Assembly
elections. The amendment added a new proviso after clause (4) in Art. 356 which
substituted the words "three years and six months" for the words
"three years" and also provided that the conditions laid down in
Clause (5) would not apply to the Proclamation issued under clause (1) on 11th
May, 1987 with respect to the State of Punjab. The Constitution (67th
Amendment) Act, 1990, extended the period of President Rule in the State of
Punjab for a further period of 6 months. Accordingly, it has substituted the
words "four years" for the words "three years and six
months" in Clause (4) of Art. 356 of the Constitution.[15]
S.R
Bommai v. Union of India (1994)
S.R Bommai v Union of
India[16] is one of
the significant judgments passed by the Apex court on President’s rule imposed
through Article 356. This landmark verdict was pronounced by a special bench of
nine judges that has increased the scope of Article 356, which was being widely
misused, and it also assisted in preserving the federal structure and balancing
it with India’s unification. This judgment put an end to the union government’s
unconstitutional dismissal of State governments. This judgment overruled the
decision of the State of Rajasthan v Union of India.
In 1989, S.R Bommai was the Chief Minister of
Karnataka. An issue emerged when many
MLAs defected from his
party, which questioned Bommai’s majority in the Assembly. Bommai’s proposition
to the Governor to conduct a floor test to prove the majority was rejected. The
governor sent a report to the President stating that Bommai’s party does not
have majority and there is no other party that can form a government, and hence
President’s Rule must be imposed. Accordingly, President issued a proclamation
in 1989, which was later approved by Parliament, and Bommai’s government was
dismissed. S.R Bommai challenged the constitutionality through a writ petition
before Karnataka High Court.
The court dismissed the
petition, and hence he appealed before Supreme Court. There was a similar
situation in the states of Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Meghalaya, Nagaland, and
Himachal Pradesh, and hence all cases were collectively heard by Apex Court.
The main issues before the court were – the President’s rule imposed in these
states invalidated the federal structure of India, and it also negated the
principle of democracy. Hence, whether the proclamation of the President’s rule
in six states was constitutionally justified? The second issue was the scope
and extent of judicial review. The third issue was the meaning of the phrase “a
situation has arisen in the government of a state cannot function under the
provisions of this Constitution” in Article 356(1).
With a 5:4 majority, the
Supreme Court stated that President Rule enacted in states of Meghalaya,
Karnataka, and Nagaland was unconstitutional. With a full majority, the court
stated that the dismissal of state governments in Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh,
and Himachal Pradesh was not in accordance with the secular nature of the
Indian Constitution. Although Sarkaria Commission recommendations are not
binding, the SC considered them. The bench gave seven opinions, where the
judges emphasized the federal nature of the constitution, and it opined that
federalism could not be imposed in a strict sense. On the second issue, the
bench stated that the proclamation of the President’s rule is subject to
judicial review. However, the judiciary can only lengthen its jurisdiction to
the administrative aspect and restrict itself to the relevant material on the
basis of which the President corroborates his subjective satisfaction. However,
when it comes to the question of safeguarding constitutionality, the court
reserves its right to repeal any verdict that ultra vires with the
Constitution. In case the proclamation is proved to be unconstitutional, the
court has the power to reinstate status quo ante and thus restore the
Legislative Assembly. The bench also stated that State Assembly could not be
dismissed without prior approval from Parliament, and the President is allowed
only to suspend the Assembly. Article 356 can only be invoked in a scenario where disobedience with the
Constitution is of nature that leads to a situation of impasse, and there is no
scope of the remedy, and the functioning of the State has become impossible.
The bench stated that floor tests must be conducted mandatorily as it helps to
determine the legitimacy of government.
This judgment can be
perceived as the most significant step taken by the judiciary to limit the
misuse of power by the executive. This verdict is the epitome of judicial
review. It is a very welcoming change that will have a lasting impact on
reducing the Union government’s abuse of power on states. Yet, there is still
minimal scope for misuse of Article 356 by the Centre on the excuse that States
are exploiting their powers and are acting against the Constitution. Hence the
actual protection would have been full judicial review encompassing an inquiry
into the legitimacy and accuracy of the facts relied on passing the
proclamation of President Rule. However, it was a sad state of affairs to see
that there was no unanimous majority on the scope of judicial review. The minority
judgments show an overcareful perspective and pay no attention to the reality
of the political nature of India. Any kind of deviation from this judgment will
lead to a lack of implementation of another basic feature of the Constitution,
i.e., federalism.
This verdict is
considered a watermark in determining and supporting the federal nature of the
Indian Constitution. This present case can be paralleled with Baker v Carr, a
case that has molded the American political-legal system and had importance in
constructing federalism. Both the judgments in these cases were pronounced at a
time when the Centre was questioned with a rationale of equality and consistent
interpretation of provisions at regional levels. The Bommai ruling is often
considered a significant verdict in the sphere of activist role. The judiciary
facilitates the execution of principles of democracy. Thus Article 356 got a
wider development in the Bommai case.
RAMESHWAR PRASAD (VI) V. UNION OF INDIA[17]
In the case of Rameshwar
Prasad (VI) v. Union of India (2006), the Supreme Court of India reaffirmed and
reiterated the principles established in the landmark case of S.R. Bommai v.
Union of India (1994). This case was significant as it addressed the proper
application of Article 356 of the Indian Constitution, which deals with the
imposition of President's Rule in states.
The central issue in Rameshwar Prasad
(VI) v. Union of India revolved around the dismissal of the Bihar Assembly by
the Governor under Article 356. The petitioners challenged this decision,
arguing that it was arbitrary and unconstitutional.
In its ruling, the Supreme Court
emphasized the importance of the President's satisfaction under Article 356
being based on relevant and objective material. The Court stressed that the
President's decision to impose President's Rule should not be influenced by
extraneous or irrelevant considerations. Instead, it should be founded on
substantial and valid grounds that demonstrate a breakdown of constitutional
machinery in the state.
By emphasizing the requirement for
the President's satisfaction to be based on relevant material, the Court aimed
to prevent the misuse of Article 356. This ruling sought to ensure that the
imposition of President's Rule is justified only in cases where there is a
genuine constitutional crisis or breakdown of governance in the state.
In essence, Rameshwar Prasad (VI) v.
Union of India reinforced the principles laid down in the Bommai case, which
established guidelines for the exercise of President's Rule and underscored the
importance of judicial review to prevent its arbitrary use.
S.P.ANAND V. H.D. DEVE GOWDA[18]
In the case of S.P.
Anand v. H.D. Deve Gowda (1996), the Supreme Court of India addressed the
dismissal of the Uttar Pradesh government under Article 356 of the
Constitution.
The background of the
case involves the imposition of President's Rule (Article 356) in Uttar Pradesh
by the central government. The dismissal of a state government under Article
356 is a significant constitutional issue, as it involves the suspension of
democratic governance in a state and the imposition of direct rule by the
central government.
In this case, the
Supreme Court reiterated that the power conferred upon the President under
Article 356 is not absolute and unchecked. Instead, the Court emphasized that
the exercise of this power is subject to judicial review. This means that the
decisions made by the President or the central government to invoke Article 356
can be examined by the judiciary to ensure that they are not arbitrary or
motivated by extraneous considerations.
The Court's ruling
reaffirmed the principle established in earlier cases, such as the landmark
S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) case, which laid down guidelines for the
exercise of President's Rule and emphasized the importance of preventing its
misuse. In essence, the judgment in S.P. Anand v. H.D. Deve Gowda emphasized
the role of the judiciary as a check on executive power, particularly in
matters concerning the imposition of President's Rule and the dismissal of
democratically elected state governments.
By asserting the judiciary's authority to review decisions related
to Article 356, the Supreme Court sought to uphold the principles of
constitutionalism, federalism, and democratic governance in India. This case
highlighted the importance of ensuring that the use of extraordinary powers,
such as President's Rule, is consistent with the principles of the Constitution
and is not employed for political expediency or undue interference in state
affairs.
[1]
Dr.J.N.Pandey;Constitutional Law of India;Central law agency 57thEdition2020 2Maheshwari,
S. P. 4
[3]
Dua, B. D. (1979). President's Rule in India: A Study in Crisis Politics. Asian
Survey. June Issue. P. 613-614 5Pylee, M. V., P. 643
[7]
Sastry, G. (2007). Role of Government in Indian Federal System: New Dimensions
under Article 356. In D. S.
Ram (Ed.),
Federal System and Coalition Government in
India.Kanishk Publisher, New Delhi, P. 107
[8]
Singh, S. (1989). Tension Areas in Centre-State Relation in India. in A. G.
Saini (Ed.), Confrontational Politics in India.
Commonwealth Publisher, New Delhi, P. 195-196
[10]
Nair, S.M. (1991). Governor and Chief Minister in Indian States: Conflicts and
Relation. Deep & Deep Publication. New
Delhi, P. 206
[11]
Kapoor, B. K. (2016). Deteriorating Centre-State Relationships: Causes &
Concerns. Global Publication, New
Delhi, P. 220
[12]
Sharma, R. K. (2016). Live and kicking the "dead letter" of the
Indian Constitution. Journal on Contemporary
Issues
of Law, vol. 2 Issue 8, P. 4
[13]
P.M Bakshi; The Constitution of India; Universal Publication Edition, 2002
Article Information
MISUSE OF ARTICLE 356 & PRESIDENT RULE BY – PRANAV S. JAGTAP
Authors: PRANAV S. JAGTAP
- Journal IJLRA
- ISSN 2582-6433
- Published 2024/04/24
- Issue 7
About Journal
International Journal for Legal Research and Analysis
- Abbreviation IJLRA
- ISSN 2582-6433
- Access Open Access
- License CC 4.0
All research articles published in International Journal for Legal Research and Analysis are open access and available to read, download and share, subject to proper citation of the original work.
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of International Journal for Legal Research and Analysis.