Open Access Research Article
Jane Doe V Etihad Airways-How The Sixth Circuit Ruling Undermines The Montreal Conventions Goals (By-Karen Bobby)
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Article Details
Jane Doe V Etihad Airways - How The Sixth Circuit's
Ruling Undermines The Montreal Convention's Goals
Authored
by-Karen Bobby
9 BBA
LLB (Hons.)
Christ
(Deemed to be University)
United States Court of
Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Plaintiff: Jane Doe, John
Doe
Defendant: Etihad Airways
No. 16-1042
Decided: August 30, 2017
Citation: Doe v. Etihad
Airways, P.J.S.C., 870 F.3d 406, 417–20 (6th Cir. 2017)
“The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit made substantial changes to the Montreal
Convention, the international agreement controlling an air carrier's
responsibility to passengers for damage to persons or property during international
flight.” Prior to Etihad, courts nearly universally held that although
passengers who experience bodily suffering in an accident are entitled to
physical damages, they are only eligible for emotional damages to the extent
that those damages may be connected to the physiological harm sustained. In
defiance of years of precedent establishing a universal interpretation that
mental anguish must "flow from" a physical injury in order to be
recoverable, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit revised
the Montreal Convention test for mental anguish to allow recovery with any
physical injury.[1]
Facts
In the case of Etihad,
Jane Doe, the plaintiff and her 11 year old daughter were traveling from
Chicago to Abu Dhabi on an Etihad Airways flight (Etihad). A knob that was
supposed to hold Doe's tray table in place had fallen to the floor, leaving it
open in her lap. The knob was discovered on the floor by Doe's daughter during
the flight and was given to Doe, who put it in a seatback pocket. When it was
time to descend, an Etihad flight attendant gave Doe the customary reminder to
put her tray table in the upright and locked position for landing (unaware of
the detached knob). Naturally, Doe was unable to comply. She reached into the
seatback pocket in front of her and punctured her finger on the concealed
hypodermic needle to draw blood. Doe was given a Band-Aid for her finger and
subjected to numerous tests for disease exposure; all of the results were
negative. Doe filed a lawsuit against Etihad, requesting compensation for both
the bodily harm (the needle poke) and "mental agony" brought on by
her potential exposure to numerous infections. John Doe, her husband, asserted
loss of consortium.
Issues
Can passengers receive
compensation for emotional harm that is unrelated to any physical harm they may
have suffered?
Law
Article 17 of the
Montreal Convention[2]
Analysis
According to the
conventional reading of Article 17(1)[3],
a plaintiff is eligible to receive compensation for mental suffering if the
mental harm "flows from" a bodily harm sustained as a result of an
onboard accident. “Notably, there is no requirement of proportionality; mental
suffering damages may be recovered even in the case of a minor physical harm.”
In other words, the conventional understanding specifies a causal link but not
one that is proportional. Contrarily, the Sixth Circuit's approach does not
demand a link between the physical and mental injuries.
“Instead, the physical
harm becomes a litmus test that allows payment of damages for any mental
suffering brought on by the same accident.”
Beginning with the
observation that Doe's only remedy was afforded by Article 17(1) of the
Montreal Convention, the Etihad opinion conceded that cases interpreting the
Warsaw Convention[4],
the forerunner to the Montreal Convention, have persuasive significance in
interpreting the new treaty. It was said that in cases where the drafters of
the Montreal Convention meant to leave something intact, the Warsaw
Convention's legal precedent should apply.
The court next briefly
examined the Second Circuit's ruling in Ehrlich v. American Airlines, Inc.,[5]
a case interpreting the Warsaw Convention, which followed the traditional
meaning. The court erred by reading the phrase literally and coming to the
unpersuasive conclusion that the Warsaw Convention's theory on mental pain
under Article 17(1). The court made no effort to examine the Convention's
actual history, relying instead on its description of the Montreal Convention
as a passenger-minded convention to reach this judgment. According to the
court, the Montreal Convention was created to tip the scales in favor of
passengers. It briefly discussed some of the Convention's justifiable goals,
such as bringing about legal uniformity and modifying the Convention to take
account of the well-established and developed airline industry, in support of
this claim.
Given that the outcome is
the same whether the Etihad reading or the conventional meaning is used, it is
likely that the Sixth Circuit in this case used Etihad as an excuse to rewrite
a test that it believed to be unfair. Despite the fact that the results of
using the conventional interpretation are unfavorable, the courts are not the
appropriate place to bring about change.The Montreal Convention's signatories
have the option of organizing a new convention or revising the current one if
they choose to change the standards for allocating damages for mental distress.
This method preserves the uniformity of interpretation and takes into account
the interests of many nations.
It is a well-established
rule that courts should give the opinions of other treaty parties significant
weight when interpreting international agreements. In reality, the courts of
numerous other parties to the Montreal Convention have referenced the ruling in
Ehrlich and used the conventional view when interpreting Article 17 of that
convention. This is a fundamental tenet of treaty interpretation.
Conclusion
Etihad submitted a
petition for an en banc rehearing following the Sixth Circuit's ruling, but it
was turned down. The U.S. Supreme Court then rejected Etihad's petition for a
writ of certiorari, which it received later. The conflict Etihad creates with other
circuits justifies a reassessment of the decision, “but the U.S. Supreme Court
has not handled a case concerning Article 17 in almost 15 years, and it has
heard comparatively few cases regarding the Montreal and Warsaw Conventions
overall.”[6]
Although the Etihad decision was made not long ago, no court has yet applied
its logic or in any other way adopted it.Courts that have addressed Article 17
of the Montreal Convention after Etihad have continued to follow cases limiting
damages to those that are the result of the bodily injury itself because
Article 17 was written with the intention of being consistent with the
jurisprudence established under the Warsaw Convention.[7]
Etihad, at the very least, makes Sixth Circuit courts a far more desirable
location for future disputes. Foreign air carriers are particularly at danger
because they could be sued in any judicial area where they operate. Therefore,
even if the claim originated elsewhere, foreign carriers who operate any
flights or operations within the Sixth Circuit are more likely to be sued in
this jurisdiction.
Article Information
Jane Doe V Etihad Airways-How The Sixth Circuit Ruling Undermines The Montreal Conventions Goals (By-Karen Bobby)
Authors: Karen Bob
- Journal IJLRA
- ISSN 2582-6433
- Published 2022/08/17
- Volume 2
- Issue 7
About Journal
International Journal for Legal Research and Analysis
- Abbreviation IJLRA
- ISSN 2582-6433
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