INTER-RELIGION HATE SPEECH: A CRITICAL SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS BY - DR. S. KRISHNAN & MS. ANKITA VERMA
INTER-RELIGION HATE SPEECH: A
CRITICAL SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS
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AUTHORED BY - DR. S. KRISHNAN
ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR
SEEDLING SCHOOL OF LAW AND GOVERNANCE
JAIPUR NATIONAL UNIVERSITY, JAIPUR
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CO-AUTHOR -MS. ANKITA VERMA
RESEARCH SCHOLAR,
DEPARTMENT OF LAW
INDIA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF LEGAL RESEARCH, GOA
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Abstract:
We cannot disregard the power of
words, which can become the tool for solving difficulty but if it is misused
then it will become the creator of crisis. In country like India which is
diverse, it is easy to incite immediate breach of peace by using fighting words
on the basis of religion and caste and in present era many controversial person
for getting unfair advantage have been using their freedom of speech and
expression for inciting violence between people belonging to different
religion, caste, beliefs and customs. Because of communal hate campaign, India
has experienced many communal riots in past as well as in present.
The issue of hate speech has received
significant attention from legal scholars and philosophers alike. But the vast
majority of this attention has been focused on presenting and critically
evaluating arguments for and against hate speech bans as opposed to the prior
task of conceptually analysing the term ‘hate speech’ itself. It goes beyond
legal texts and judgments and beyond the legal concept hate speech in an
attempt to understand the general concept hate speech. One of its main aims is
to explode the myth that emotions, feelings, or attitudes of hate or hatred are
part of the essential nature of hate speech. It also argues that hate speech is
best conceived as a family resemblances concept. One important implication is
that when looking at the full range of ways of combating hate speech, including
but not limited to the use of criminal law, there is every reason to embrace an
understanding of hate speech as a heterogeneous collection of expressive
phenomena. Another is that it would be unsound to reject hate speech laws on
the premise that they are effectively in the business of criminalising
emotions, feelings or attitudes of hate or hatred.
As we know that media as fourth
pillar of the constitution because it is a medium for mass communication but if
media allows it to be used as fuel for inciting violence through active
propaganda or reporting then there is need to make media understand that it is
duty of a media to report communal riot in such a manner that it should
harmonize the violence and build people’s confidence in the law which exist for
solving communal problem. In the present era, we have different law which tells
about how media have to report communal dispute. We have different legal
provision which provide punishment for inciting violence through words. At
last, author and co-author would like to suggest that if we have to solve the
problem of hate speech, then media has to understand its duty and government
should implement the laws in strict sense.
Keyword:
Communal riots, hate speech, incitement, offense, freedom of expression,
censorship, Role of Media
INTRODUCTION
A persons’ thoughts affect only
him/her and not other people unless he/she expresses them or acts them out.
Then these thoughts set events in motion which are likely to have effect.
Therefore it is always important to take words seriously and listen, because it
may become necessary to react when words do not express positive thoughts or
views, but harmful, demeaning and hateful opinions towards a specific
individual or a group of individuals. If not counteracted, hate speech will
gradually be normalised and accepted. We catch new words and shortly they
become part of the day to day discourse. Words are also the first tool we use
to change attitudes, norms, dos and donts in our society.
Ancient India is known
for its skepticism towards religion and its toleration to opposing views.
However, the alarming rise of Hindu religious nationalism and Islamic
fundamentalism, and consequently, increasing conflict between freedom of
expression and religion, have been well noted by both academic and public
intellectuals.[1]
The meaning of hate speech, in
contemporary times, has travelled beyond mere offensive speech; it encompasses
speech that is insulting, derogatory, discriminatory, provocative or even such
that it incites and encourages use of violence or results in violent
backlashes. It results in disturbing the harmony and order in society at large.
But more importantly, hate speech becomes a particularly heinous type of hate
crime causing direct physical and psychological harm to the victims of hate
crime. It affects its victims in intangible ways leading to chilling effect on
the victims right to free speech and expression, resulting in exclusion from
participation in the democratic process and public discourse.
In the Indian context, the
contemporary meaning of the term ‘hate speech’ is inextricable from its origins
(as a form of legal action) in colonial attempts ‘to assume the role of the
rational and neutral arbiter of supposedly endemic and inevitable religious
conflicts’. Given this historical context, hate speech has primarily been understood
in India as referring to speech intended to promote hatred or violence between
India’s religious communities. Macaulay, in his commentary upon the Indian
Penal Code, explicitly endorsed this interpretation of ‘hate speech’ under
Indian law, observing that the principle underlying Chapter XV (prohibiting
‘offences relating to religion and caste’) is that ‘every man should be
suffered to profess his own religion, and… no man should be suffered to insult
the religion of another.
Conflict between freedom
of expression and religion in India is well known. The censoring of
books and
films by the State, and
the victimization of
writers, film directors, and
academics by Muslim
fundamentalist and Hindu
religious-nationalist groups
are well noted.
In this context, the Indian Constitution not only empowers media and
free thinkers, but also those who are religiously offended.
Desire among many people
to prohibit religiously hurtful speech (or expression) has become a
focal point of conflict
between religious-fundamentalist groups and free thinkers. Indian Penal Code
provisions 298 and 295A have resulted in the harassment of many writers,
journalists and academics. In addition, use of violence and fatwa is also being
used to suppress freedom of expression by Muslims and Hindu fundamentalist
groups.
What does the state, acting on behalf
of society as a whole, owe to citizens when it comes to regulating speech or
other modes of expression? Some people believe that in answering this question
it makes a positive difference whether or not the speech in question is
insulting, degrading, defaming, negatively stereotyping or inciting hatred,
discrimination or violence against people in virtue of their race, ethnicity,
nationality, religion, sexual orientation, disability, gender identity, for
example; and that it makes a positive difference because such speech implicates
issues of harm, dignity, security, healthy cultural dialogue, democracy, and
legitimacy, to name just a handful of relevant issues. They sometimes use the
term ‘hate speech’ to express that general view.[2]
Critics of hate speech regulations, by contrast, claim that even though it has
become ‘fashionable’ to defend such regulations and even though defenders of
such regulations are (according to critics) ‘well-meaning’[3],
in reality hate speech regulations are themselves harmful to self-realization
and autonomy, ineffective at best and often counterproductive, and damaging to
democracy and legitimacy, amongst other things.[4]
Indeed, to defend hate speech regulations (critics maintain) belies an implicit
wish to defend the regulation of speech that quite plainly should not be
regulated, namely, merely offensive speech.[5]
Defenders of (some) hate speech regulations could respond that the critics are
being patronising; that it is the critics who are adopting a fashionable and
well-meaning yet wrongheaded position. Defenders could even retort that it is
the critics who harbour a secret desire to deregulate all speech even speech
that quite plainly should not be deregulated. But what exactly are the two
sides arguing about here? What is hate speech? Until we can sensibly answer
that question it seems that the debate about hate speech regulations has no
chance of moving forward, much less of being understood by bemused onlookers.
Since every country on the planet has probably witnessed at some point in its
history instances of what could be labelled ‘hate speech’, and virtually every
legal system in the world contains at least one law that could be interpreted
as a ‘hate speech law’, we are all of us caught up in the aforementioned debate
whether we like it or not, and whether or not we know what the debate is
actually about.
Numerous legal scholars have put
forward putative definitions of the term ‘hate speech’.5 Unsurprisingly, all of
these legal scholars have sought, explicitly or implicitly, to define a legal
concept hate speech, meaning a concept that refers to speech that is, or has
been at one time or could be in the future, treated as hate speech for the
purposes of legal regulation in one form or another. Some of these legal
scholars seek to characterise a specific legal concept hate speech that relates
to a particular body of law and legal regime, such as incitement to hatred laws
in England and Wales. Others characterise a cluster legal concept hate speech
that is associated with a class of hate speech laws, such as incitement to
hatred laws. Yet others characterise an umbrella legal concept hate speech that
implicates a range of different clusters or classes of hate speech law, such as
laws proscribing group libel, media regulations limiting negative stereotyping
or stigmatization, laws disallowing insult or denigration, laws banning
incitement to hatred, and so on.6 Because these characterisations differ both
in terms of whether they are grounded in what has been, what is, or what could
be treated as hate speech within a body of law and in terms of the levels of
generality at which they operate, they often wind up saying very different,
often contradictory things about hate speech. Given that hate speech laws provoke
such strong moral reactions, on the part of defenders and critics alike, and
given that legal meanings will themselves draw on a range of deeper values and
principles about which people reasonably disagree, it is no surprise that there
remains such divergence over how to define the very term that stands at the
epicentre of the disagreement.
However, we believe that in order to
understand how best to respond to hate speech, whether this is via bodies of
law and legal regimes and/or through a range of extralegal measures including
counter-speech and education, we must pay serious attention to the fact that
hate speech is not merely a legal concept, in the narrow sense of a concept
that is used and in some cases even defined, explicitly or implicitly, within
bodies of law and legal systems; it is also an ordinary concept that is (a)
used by people who are not legal professionals or writers about the law, and
(b) has a panoply of uses not only within bodies of law and legal systems but
also within a range of other social, cultural, political and economic domains.
If we focus too hard on a legal concept hate speech we risk prejudging what the
right response to the problem of hate speech might be: for, we may have defined
the nature and contours of the phenomena in question precisely with legal
responses in mind. For defenders of hate speech laws, the danger is that if all
one has is a hammer, everything starts to look like a nail. Conversely, for
critics of hate speech laws, if one is fixated on the idea that it is wrong to
use a sledge hammer to crack a nut, then everything starts to look like a nut.
Therefore, we position our analysis much closer to a different scholarly
tradition, one that has attempted to analyse the meaning of the term ‘hate
speech’ using various techniques of conceptual philosophical analysis.
By way of evidence for this last point,
entering the term ‘hate speech’ into Google returns more than eighty million
results.8 No doubt a significant proportion of these results are about the
concept hate speech as it pertains to hate speech law. Indeed, it seems likely
that the term ‘hate speech’ (and its non-English equivalents) often first comes
to the attention of ordinary people through television and radio programmes,
newspaper and magazine articles, Internet message boards, social networking
websites, and Internet news channels that mention the issue of hate speech in
relation to high profile court cases, especially those involving already
recognised public figures. Consider well-reported hate speech cases involving
the French politician Brigitte Bardot, the Australian journalist Andrew Bolt,
the Indian politician Akbaruddin Owaisi, the French comedian Dieudonné M’bala
M’bala, the Kenyan politicians Moses Kuria and Junet Mohamed, and the Dutch
politician Geert Wilders. These and similar cases around the world have all
become trending stories on social media and online news channels.
Nevertheless, the term ‘hate speech’
is also used by people who are not legal professionals and/or writers about the
law, and in the course of talking about events that are not connected with
legal proceedings and where there is virtually no possibility of legal
proceedings. So, for example, at the time of writing, entering the search term
‘hate speech Donald Trump’ into Google returned over four million results.
Indeed, a research group funded by the European Union has recently undertaken a
survey of the media across Europe using the European Media Monitor (EMM) tool
to find hits of the term ‘hate speech’.
Hitherto, the term ‘hate speech’ has
been perhaps most often associated with liberal progressives, or people on the
left of politics – who use it to highlight and problematise speech that they
view as racist, xenophobic, homophobic, Islamophobic, misogynistic, disablist,
or in some other way targeted at minority groups in ways that supposedly
violate ideals of respect, solidarity, tolerance, and so forth. By contrast,
many political and religious conservatives repudiate such uses of the term, and
view them simply as crude attempts to close down meaningful debate on what they
believe are the evils of open-border policies, the failures of multiculturalism
as a social experiment, the lamentable decline of traditional moral values,
political correctness gone made, and so on. Yet even people who are deeply
critical of what they see as an inordinate and dangerous obsession with
identity-based speech will use the term ‘so-called hate speech’, thereby
implicitly acknowledging that the term ‘hate speech’ has an ordinary meaning –
albeit they disapprove of this term given its ordinary meaning. More
importantly, some political and religious conservatives have now consciously
adopted terms like ‘hate speech’, ‘hate mail’, and ‘hate’ to describe speech on
the part of liberal progressives and civil rights activists – speech which, in
the eyes of those political or religious conservatives, picks them out and
attacks them on the basis of their conservative beliefs.
In addition to this, the ordinary
concept hate speech seems to be playing an increasing role in popular culture.
Consider the South Park episode from 2005 in which Cartman’s school
presentation about ‘ginger kids’ – who it is claimed are suffering from
‘gingervitis’ and have ‘no souls’ – causes Kyle to object, ‘That’s not a
lecture, it’s a hate speech.’[6] Or
take the furore surrounding the singer Beyonce’s halftime performance at Super
Bowl 50 in 2016. Some people – including members of the All Lives Matter social
movement – took to social media to describe the fact that Beyonce’s backing
dancers were dressed like Black Panther members, along with the content of her
recent music videos and public statements in support of the Black Lives Matter
movement, as ‘hate speech’.[7]
And no doubt there were defenders of Beyonce’s public stance on the injustices
faced by people of colour in the United States who viewed the portrayal of
Beyonce’s performance and music videos as ‘hate speech’ as itself hate speech.
Or bear in mind what the Harry Potter author, J. K. Rowling tweeted after it
emerged that Donald Trump won the 2016 presidential election. “We stand
together. We stick up for the vulnerable. We challenge bigots. We don’t let
hate speech become normalized. We hold the line.”[8]
Many ordinary people have been
willing to use the term ‘hate speech’ (and its non-English equivalents) for
much the same reason that legal scholars coined the term in the first place,
namely, that it provides a rough but nevertheless serviceable term to describe
phenomena that have been the subject of legal sanctions, of one kind or
another, since the Roman laws on group defamation[9]
but that, in all likelihood, have also been present throughout human history
beginning with the earliest multiethnic societies of the ancient world[10],
that is, the expressive dimensions of identity-based envy, hostility, conflict,
mistrust and oppression. It is also worth remembering at this point that the
term ‘hate speech’ is only the latest in a succession of terms that historically
have been used to refer to forms of speech that attack members of groups or
classes people identified by certain protected characteristics, including, for
instance, ‘race hate’, ‘group libel’ and ‘hate propaganda’.[11]
So for some time societies have found good use for this family of terms. But
what is immediately noticeable, we think, about the term ‘hate speech’ is its
generality, the way it can be used to meaningfully talk about far more
protected characteristics and far more varieties of speech than any of its
predecessors. Thus it seems to me that it makes a material difference that
people use the term ‘hate speech’ rather than these older terms, and it makes a
difference because the term is referring to a much broader and more capacious
concept; and this is not necessarily a bad thing.
THE ORDINARY CONCEPT HATE SPEECH AS A
COMPOSITIONAL CONCEPT?
Let us begin with the idea that the
ordinary concept hate speech might be a complex or compositional concept. To
say that a concept is complex or compositional is to say that it is made from
or composed of other, simpler concepts. These simpler concepts are more basic
or more ordinary concepts in the sense that they include larger classes of
things. Complex or compositional concepts are said to be amenable to a method
of decompositional conceptual analysis: a process of breaking down the complex
concept into its component parts. The standard example is the concept bachelor
which is said to be made from or composed out of three more basic or more
general concepts: (1) adult human, (2) unmarried, and (3) male. Decompositional
conceptual analysis is often used to produce precise definitions, the
specification of a set of necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for the
application of concepts or for the appropriate use of terms used to refer to
concepts. That something falls under each of the more basic or more general
concepts that compose the compositional concept is necessary and jointly
sufficient for that thing to fall under the compositional concept. Thus, it
might be said that something falls under the concept bachelor only if (1) it is
an adult human, (2) it is unmarried, and (3) it is male. And that if something
is (1) an adult human, (2) unmarried, and (3) male, then it is a bachelor.
To apply this method to the ordinary
concept hate speech is to attempt to break down this concept into its component
or constituent parts, its more basic, simpler concepts and to use these
concepts to produce a precise definition. If the ordinary concept hate speech
is a compositional concept, how are its component parts to be identified? One
way is to focus on the words that make up the term ‘hate speech’. In
particular, one could work on the assumption that this term is not simply a
compound noun in its grammatical or syntactical form but also a compound noun
in its meaning or semantic content. In short, one could treat the meaning of
the term ‘hate speech’ as being a function of the meanings of its constituent
parts. Following on from this, one might suppose that in order to divine the
meaning of the term ‘hate speech’ one simply understands the meanings of the
two words ‘hate’ and ‘speech’ and links those meanings to each other in some
appropriate way.[12] For
example, one might suppose that the term ‘hate speech’ is a hyponym of the word
‘speech’. So just as the term ‘olive oil’ denotes a subcategory of oil, the
term ‘hate speech’ denotes a subcategory of speech. What is more, it might be
thought that the word ‘hate’ in ‘hate speech’ functions semantically to tell us
something about the essential nature of the subcategory of speech in question,
namely, that it involves or is intimately connected with emotions, feelings, or
attitudes of hate or hatred. Indeed, the fact that the compound noun ‘political
speech’ is semantically compositional (it denotes a subcategory of speech that
is political in nature) may lead us to assume that the compound noun ‘hate
speech’ adheres to the same principle.
So far I have been assuming that the
ordinary concept hate speech is composed of the two more basic concepts hate
and speech. However, on further reflection we might think that the concept hate
speech is even more complex than the words ‘hate’ and ‘speech’ imply. Perhaps
the concept hate speech is also composed of other concepts. One possibility is
the concept group or class of persons. Most people would instinctively
recognise as hate speech, I think, the slogan of the nineteenth century
nativist, Denis Kearney: ‘To an American, death is preferable to life on a par
with the Chinaman’.[13]
Part of the reason we would recognise this as hate speech is that it is about
or against Chinese people. Similarly, few people nowadays would fail to
understand that between the two insults, ‘Fuck you!’ (one white person to
another white person in anger) and ‘Fuck you, nigger!’ (one white person to a
black person in anger), the latter is more likely to have the label ‘hate
speech’ attached to it. Of course, a racial insult, such as this, can be, and
often is, targeted at or directly addressed to only one individual. But where
the insult takes the form of a pejorative reference to the individual’s race,
the individual may be no more than a representative of an entire group or class
of persons in the mind of the hate speaker. If the addressee is interchangeable,
in that sense, then the hate speech is really about or against the entire group
or class of persons.
HATE SPEECH AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION:
ISSUES AND PROBLEMS
The regulation of hate speech is
largely a post World War II phenomenon.[14]
Prompted by the obvious hnks between racist propaganda and the Holocaust,
various international covenants[15]
as well as individual countries such as Germany[16],
and in the decade immediately following the war the United States[17],
excluded hate speech from the scope of constitutionally protected expression.
Viewed from the particular perspective of a rejection of the Nazi experience
and an attempt to prevent its resurgence, the suppression of hate speech seems
both obvious and commendable.
Current encounters with hate speech,
however, are for the most part far removed from the Nazi case. Whereas in Nazi
Germany hate speech was perpetrated by the government as part of its official
ideology and policy, in contemporary democracies it is by and large opponents
of the government and, in a wide majority of cases, members of marginalized
groups with no realistic hopes of achieving political power who engage in hate
speech. Moreover, in some cases those punished for engaging in hate speech have
been members of groups long victimized by racist policies and rhetoric,
prosecuted for uttering race based invectives against those whom they perceive
as their racist oppressors. Thus, for example, it is ironic that the first
person convicted under the United Kingdom's Race Relations Law criminalizing
hate speech was a black man who uttered a racial epithet against a white
policeman.[18]
Like Nazi racist propaganda, some of
the straightforward racist invectives heard today are crude and unambiguous.
Contemporary hate speech cannot be confined, however, to racist insults.
Precisely because of the strong post-Holocaust constraints against raw public
expressions of racial hatred, present day racists often feel compelled to couch
their racist message in more subtle ways. For example, anti-Semites may engage
in Holocaust denial or minimizing under the guise of weighing in on an ongoing
historians' debate. Or, they may attack Zionism in order to blur the boundaries
between what might qualify as a genuine debate concerning political ideology and
what is pure and simple anti-Semitism. Similarly, American racists have on
occasion resorted to what appears to be a scientific debate or invoked certain
statistics—such as those indicating that proportionately blacks commit more
crimes than whites—^to promote their prejudices under the disguise of
formulating political positions informed by scientific fact or theory.
Even these few observations suffice
to establish that not all contemporary instances of hate speech are alike. Any
assessment of whether, how, or how much, hate speech ought to be prohibited
must, therefore, account for certain key variables: namely who and what are
involved and where and under what circumstances these cases arise.
The who is always plural, for it
encompasses not only the speaker who utters a statement that constitutes hate
speech, but the target of that statement and the audience to whom the statement
in question is addressed—which may be limited to the target, may include both
the target and others, or may be limited to an audience that does not include any
member of the target group.[19] Moreover,
as already mentioned, not all speakers are alike. This is not only because of
group affiliation. Thus, in the context of dominant majority group hate speech
against a vulnerable and discriminated against minority, the impact of the hate
speech in question is likely to differ significantly depending on whether it is
uttered by a high government official or an important opposition leader or
whether it is propaganda by a marginalized outsider group with no credibility.[20]
Furthermore, even the same speaker may have to be treated differently, or at
least may have a different impact which ought to be considered legally
relevant, depending on whom is the target of his or her hate message. Assuming,
for the sake of argument, that black hate speech against whites in the United
States is not the equivalent of white hate speech against blacks, what about
black anti-Semitism? Ought it be considered as yet another instance of black (albeit
inappropriate) response to white oppression?[21]
Or as an assault against a vulnerable minority? In other words, is black
anti-Semitism but one aspect of a comprehensible resentment harbored by blacks
against whites? Or is it but a means for blacks to carve out a common ground
with white non-Jews by casting the Jews as the common enemy? And does it
matter, if the dangers of anti-Semitism prove greater than those of
undifferentiated anti-white hatred?
The what or message uttered in the
context of hate speech also matters, and may or may not, depending on its form
and content, call for sanction or suppression. Obvious hate speech such as that
involving crude racist insults or invectives can be characterized as "hate
speech in form." In contrast, utterances such as Holocaust denials or
other coded messages that do not explicitly convey insults, but are nonetheless
designed to convey hatred or contempt, may be referred as "hate speech in
substance." At first glance, it may seem easy to justify banning hate speech
in form but not hate speech in substance. Indeed, in the context of the latter,
there appear to be potentially daunting line-drawing problems, as the boundary
between genuine scholarly, scientific or political debate and the veiled
promotion of racial hatred may not always be easy to draw. Moreover, even hate
speech in form may not be used in a demeaning way warranting suppression.
Finally, where and under what
circumstances hate speech is uttered also makes a difference in terms of
whether or not it should be prohibited. As already mentioned, "where"
may make a difference depending on the country, society or culture involved,
which may justify flatly prohibiting all Nazi propaganda in Germany but not in
the United States. "Where" may also matter within the same country or
society. Thus, hate speech in an intra-communal setting may in some cases be
less dangerous than if uttered in an inter-communal setting. Without minimizing
the dangers of hate speech, it seems plausible to argue, for example, that hate
speech directed against Germans at a Jewish community center comprising many
Holocaust survivors, or a virulent anti-white speech at an all black social
club in the United States, should not be subjected to the same sanctions as the
very same utterance in an inter-communal setting, such as an open political
rally in a town's central square.
Circumstances also make a difference.
For example, even if black hate speech against whites in the United States is deemed
as pernicious as white hate speech against blacks, legal consequences arguably
ought to differ depending on the circumstances. Thus, for example, black hate
speech ought not be penalized—or at least not as much as otherwise—^if it
occurs in the course of a spontaneous reaction to a police shooting of an
innocent black victim in a locality with widespread perceptions of racial bias
within the police department.
More generally, which of the above
mentioned differences ought to figure in the constitutional treatment of hate
speech depends on the values sought to be promoted, on the perceived harms
involved, and on the importance attributed to these harms. As already noted,
the United States' approach to these issues differs markedly from those of
other Western democracies. Before embarking on a comparison of these
contrasting approaches however, it is necessary to specify two important points
concerning the scope of the present inquiry: 1) there will be no discussion of
the advantages or disadvantages of various approaches to the regulation of hate
speech, such as imposition of criminal versus civil liability; and 2) since all
the countries which will be discussed below including the United States deny
protection to hate speech that incites violence—or, to put it in terms of the
relevant American jurisprudence, that poses "a clear and present
danger"[22] of
violence—what follows will not focus on such speech. Instead, it will be on
hate speech that incites racial hatred or hostility but that falls short of
incitement to violence. This last limitation is important for two reasons.
First, prohibiting hate speech that constitutes a clear incitement to immediate
violence hardly seems a difficult decision. Second, criticism of the United
States for tolerating hate speech does not always seem to take into account the
difference between incitement to violence and incitement to discrimination or
hatred. But, unless this difference is kept in mind, the discussion is likely
to become confusing. Indeed, the key question is not whether speech likely to
lead to immediate violence ought to be protected, but rather whether hate
speech not likely to lead to such immediate violence, but capable of producing
more subtle and uncertain evils, albeit perhaps equally pernicious, ought to be
suppressed or fought with more speech.
CLIMATE OF HATE SPEECH ON RELIGION IN INDIA
Incitement to religious and communal
hatred has been an issue of considerable concern in India. The increasing
reference to religion during elections has heightened communal tensions and
restrictions on the freedom of expression. Hate speech against religious
minorities which was encouraged by certain political parties and actors to
appeal to voters often became the cause of communal tensions and clashes. These
clashes, which have claimed thousands of lives, are seen with concern by many
as a part of real and growing threat to the survival of the nation itself as an
interrelated and secular body. Meanwhile Prime Minister Narendra Modi has
defended India’s human rights record[23],
citing the Constitution - which provides freedom of faith and speech to all
citizens regardless of their background as the ‘real holy book’ for his
government. On the other hand, the annual report of the US Commission for
International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) claimed religious freedom in India was
on a negative trajectory in 2015 as religious tolerance had deteriorated while
violations of religious freedom had increased. When the Prime Minister said,
“800 million of my countrymen may exercise the freedom of franchise once every
five years, but all the 1.25 billion of our citizens have freedom from fear
which they exercise every moment of their lives”, this was clearly not the case
for the Bengali poet Srijato Bandyopadhay. In March 2017, a police complaint
was lodged against him for posting a 12 line poem on social media that
allegedly hurt Hindu religious sentiments. The poem, titled ‘Abhishaap’
(‘Curse’), was posted on Facebook on the day Yogi Adityanath was sworn in as
the Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh.[24]
Trends in religion based hate speech
and freedom of religion can be explored through four categories, namely: hate
speech during elections, hate speech which leads to communal violence, hate
speech which hurts religious sentiments, and hate speech related to beef ban.
According to an analysis of
self-disclosed crime records of candidates who have contested various elections
nationwide over the last 12 years conducted by IndiaSpend, as many as 70
Members of Parliament (MPs) and Members of the Legislative Assemblies (MLAs)
have hate-speech cases pending against them. The date comes from their own
disclosure to the Election Commission (EC) of India. Notable among them are
Minister of State for Food Processing Industries, Sadhvi Niranjan Jyoti;
Minister of State for Human Resource Development, Mr. Ram Shankar Katheria;
Minister for Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises, Mr. Giriraj Singh; Uttar
Pradesh Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath; Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) MPs
Saakshi Maharaj and Raj Kumar Saini; Samajwadi Party MLA Azam Khan; and the BJP
National President Amit Shah.
According to the report, 399
candidates with hate speech cases have been fielded by different political
parties in various parliamentary and state legislative elections over the past
12 years.[25]
Political parties consider religion as a vote bank. Although the Supreme Court
had ruled that no political party or contender can seek votes in the name of
religion, caste, race, community or language ahead of Uttar Pradesh election.
But the data shows that political parties and candidates use religion for
collecting votes. In September 2014, the EC reprimanded BJP MP Yogi Adityanath
for provoking enmity during his speech in Noida ahead of UP by-polls. The EC
criticised him for allegedly invoking religion to appeal for votes on the basis
of religious grounds.
CASES OF HATE SPEECH-LED COMMUNAL VIOLENCE
Media reports indicate 296 incidents
of communal violence occurring in the first quarter of 2017 in India both
online and offline, following 703 incidents in 2016. Data shared by the
government in parliament show a decline in communal violence in 2016 as
compared to 2015. According to the data, Uttar Pradesh has the highest
occurrence of communal violence with 162 incidents in 2016, followed by
Karnataka, Maharashtra, and Madhya Pradesh.[26]
There are many cases of hate speech
reported in India by numerous media. Abuse or attacks targeting a community
verbally on the basis of personal attributes such as race, ethnicity, religion,
sexual orientation etc., are amplified online and are commonly categorised as
hate speech. Hate speech also covers content which may not be abusive in nature
but is sufficient to incite violence against a particular section of the
society. In July 2017, an offensive post by a class 11 student on Facebook sparked
communal violence in West Bengal.[27]
In June 2017, Karnataka police arrested two people for posting hate messages on
Facebook which were also circulated via popular messaging services like
WhatsApp causing violence against the targeted communities.[28]
In another incident in Mumbai in
October 2016, police arrested a person named Barun Kashyap for encouraging
enmity between Hindus and Muslims.[29]
The accused used social media to circulate false information, provoking
vigilante harassment for the same. Later, he was let out on bail and the trial
is ongoing. In July 2016, Maharashtrian Hindu nationalist Shiv Sena Party
leader, Uddhav Thackeray, during an interview with his party’s publication
Samana, called for action declaring the country a Hindu state. He affirmed that
this would be to prevent attacks on Hindu.[30]
In December 2015, the then Uttar
Pradesh Minister Azam Khan was quoted as saying that many Rashtriya Swayamsevak
Sangh (RSS) leaders are unmarried because they are homosexuals.[31]
In response to his comments, Hindu Mahasabha chief Kamlesh Tiwari made an
objectionable comment against Prophet Mohammed which led to his arrest.[32]
The protest has led to the Kaliachak riots. In September 2014, Gujarat Police
arrested Sunil Jagdishsinha Rajput whose Facebook post provoked Muslims to go
on riot. He was booked under IPC 153(C) and 295(C) and denied bail. Vadodara
police had banned internet to prevent the spread of hate messages through
social media which would inflate the riot.[33]
CASES OF HURTING RELIGIOUS SENTIMENTS
In June 2016, the former MP and
current Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath of the BJP stated that
Mother Teresa had been on a mission to Christianize India.[34]
Many Catholic Bishops termed Adityanath’s comments rash and denied that Mother
Teresa had ever engaged in conversion. Following Adityanath, some social media
users also stated that Mother Teresa had engaged in forcible conversions.
In April 2017, the Delhi BJP
spokesperson filed a complaint against senior advocate Prashant Bhushan for his
tweets against the Hindu god, Krishna. The complainant, Tajinder Pal Singh
Bagga, accused Bhushan of intentionally and deliberately posting “derogatory
remarks, for the purpose of insulting and outraging the religious sentiments of
Hindu community”.[35]
Bhushan later clarified his position, stating that his criticism was directed
at the Uttar Pradesh government’s ‘Anti-Romeo’ squad. The squad, which was
instituted to check eve-teasing, was widely criticised as instituting moral
policing.
In April 2017, Odisha police arrested
Mohammed Asif Khan for posting derogatory remarks on Hindu deities on Facebook
which caused violence in the area. The violence started after derogatory
comments about the deities Ram and Sita were posted on a Facebook page which
produced severe damage in the area.[36]
In March 2017, police arrested Anuj
Gupta from the Lohta area of Varanasi for inciting religious frenzy on
WhatsApp. The accused had shared an objectionable post about Prophet Mohammad
in several WhatsApp groups.[37]
In March 2017, a police complaint was
lodged against the eminent Bengali poet Srijato Bandyopadhay for posting a 12
line poem on social media that allegedly hurt Hindu religious sentiments.[38]
The poem titled ‘Abhishaap’ (‘Curse’) was posted on Facebook on the day Yogi
Adityanath was sworn in as Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister.
On 20 September 2016, a blogger from
West Bengal named Tarak Biswas was arrested for criticising Islam after a
complaint about hurting religious sentiments was lodged against him by
Sanaullah Khan, a Trinamool Congress leader. Human rights activists, while
disagreeing with the content of his post, demanded his release, citing the case
to be a violation of the right to freedom of speech and expression. He was
booked under Section 295A and 298, besides 66, 67 and 67A of the IT Act.[39]
In March 2015, Karnataka police
arrested Sriram Yadapadithaya, former telecom company executive, for posting
objectionable messages against Christianity on Facebook.[40]
The Mangaluru Catholic Diocese lodged a complaint to police, arguing that
Yadapadithaya’s comments questioned basic doctrines of Christianity. The case
was registered under Section 66 of IT Act and Sections 153A, 153B and 295A of
IPC.
In September 2014, a Muslim cleric,
Imam Mehadi Hasan, was slapped by a man while being taken to court for
allegedly hurting Hindu religious sentiments by making objectionable comments
about the festival of Navratri. The cleric had sparked the controversy by
calling the state’s most popular festival, Navratri a “festival of demons”. VHP
had taken strong objection to the cleric’s comment and sought his arrest. He
was booked under IPC Section 295(A).[41]
In August 2013, Bangalore-based
writer Yogesh Master was arrested over his derogatory remarks on the deity
Ganesha in his Kannada novel Dhundi. The recently published novel had caused
public outrage for depicting the goddess Parvati as involved in an illicit
relationship. The complaint was lodged by various Hindu groups which accused
the author of blasphemy and hurting religious sentiments.[42]
In November 2012, Maharashtra Police
arrested Shaheen Dhada for questioning the total shutdown in Mumbai for Bal
Thackeray’s funeral in a Facebook post. Her friend, Renu Srinivasan, was
arrested for merely liking the post. The two were charged under Section 295 (A)
for hurting religious sentiments, apart from Section 66 (a) of the Information
Technology Act 2000, even though no religious issue was involved. The charges
under Section 295 (A) were later dropped and the girls were charged with
Section 505 (2) of the IPC, which pertains to statements that create or promote
enmity, hatred or ill-will between classes.[43]
BEEF BAN-RELATED HATE SPEECH
In July 2017, a BJP leader heading a
regional minority cell in Maharashtra was attacked by a group of eight people
for allegedly carrying beef. A recorded video of the attack went viral on
social media. The police stated that the man was accosted by a group of eight
persons while returning home on his two-wheeler. The ground demanded to check
what he was carrying and had attacked him when he resisted.[44]
Another incident of violence related
to suspicion regarding beef possession occurred in Mandsaur, Madhya Pradesh in
July 2016. Two Muslim women were brutally beaten up by members of Bajrang Dal,
a Hindu extremist group. A video of the incident shot by an onlooker revealed
that the police did nothing to save the women, who were beaten for
approximately half an hour. Investigation revealed that the women had been
carrying buffalo meat, which was not illegal. Subsequently, the authorities
filed a different a case against the women for carrying the meat without a
permit. The police also arrested four of the attackers, but did not take action
against the inaction of the police personnel present during the attack.
In June 2017, a Hindu religious
leader, Sadhvi Saraswati, said that beef eaters should be hanged during a
meeting of Hindu religious outfits. The meeting, a four day long All India
Hindu Convention, which had been held in Goa caused tension in the Legislative
Assembly of Goa, with several politicians calling for the Sadhvi’s arrest for
hate speech.[45]
In April 2017, Bonditha Acharya, a
human rights activist from Assam, was threatened with rape, acid attacks, and
death threats on social media for condemning the arrest of three people for
possessing beef.[46]
THE NORMALISATION OF HATE
On 6 December 2017, Mohamed Afrazul,
a Bengali Muslim migrant worker, was hacked to death with a meat cleaver in
Rajsamand in Rajasthan; his body was then burnt at the scene. The man on trial
for his murder, Shambhulal Regar, had the entire attack videotaped and uploaded
on YouTube along with a sermon against what he called the “entrapment” of Hindu
girls by Muslim men. The video instantly went
viral, and many expressed their horror at both the gruesome act of
violence and the impunity with which the video was released.[47]
At the same time, Regar’s deed earned him a band of supporters, particularly
from the Vishwa Hindu Parishad who saw him as a hero who acted to stop “love
jihad”—a divisive term denoting the marriage of a Muslim man with a Hindu
woman, popularised on social media and picked up without critique by many in
the mainstream.[48]
Crucially, while there were several incendiary tweets across India about
so-called love jihad in the months before the attack, none were geotagged
within a hundred kilometers of Rajsamand. This implied that the online material
that radicalised Shambhulal was unlikely to have been created within his
community. Rather, hateful narratives constructed elsewhere were being
broadcast and subsequently followed far away
Six weeks after Afrazul’s brutal
murder, Indian Administrative Service officer RV Singh, the District Magistrate
for Bareilly in Uttar Pradesh asked on his Facebook page why “taking
processions through Muslim localities and shouting anti-Pakistan slogans” had
become a trend. “Why? Are they Pakistanis?” he asked. His post was triggered by
an incident of violence in late January in Kasganj, Uttar Pradesh, where a
group of young Hindu men from the Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad, the
student wing of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), rode through the
predominantly Muslim town on a self-declared “Tiranga Yatra” (“journey with the
Tricolor”), shouting slogans. The local Muslim villagers were in the midst of a
flag hoisting ceremony to mark India’s Republic Day as the provocative
procession rode through. Clashes ensued, in which a Hindu boy died, leading to
a social-media outburst of hate against Kasganj’s Muslims. IAS officer Singh’s
post, while catalysed by this violence, had also referred to an earlier incident
from the summer of 2017 when a group of Kanwariyas—Hindu pilgrims who carry
water from the Ganges to their local Lord Shiva shrines—took their rowdy convoy
through another predominantly Muslim town of Khailam, in Bareilly district.
Singh sought to point to what he saw was an emerging pattern of provocation and
violence between Uttar Pradesh’s Hindus and Muslims.
The backlash to Singh’s Facebook post
seeking tolerance between communities was swift and harsh. The
bureaucrat—presumably upper caste as his name suggests, and privileged, and
whose profession is defined by its sworn commitment to the Constitution—was
trolled and abused online ruthlessly, until he was accused by the state’s
Deputy Chief Minister for speaking on “behalf of a political party.” He would
later delete the post.[49] Less
than two weeks after the Republic Day incident, local police arrested two
people for circulating “inflammatory and communal” messages against Muslims on
social media in Kasganj. One of the two was the administrator of a WhatsApp
group where the messages had been posted and so was held liable for the content
that was posted on it.[50]
The two incidents occurred in two
different states within short driving distance from the national capital. Both
of these states are governed by the BJP, which also sits in power at the Centre
and, as the political vehicle for the RSS’ Hindutva ideology, is accused by
opposition politicians of being the benefactor towards such violence even
before they came to power in 2014. As supporters of the BJP erupted on social
media in a cacophony of offendedness and defensiveness, both incidents
underscored an emerging domestic security challenge posed by the coalescing of
real-world, hyper-nationalist, volatile identity politics with the spaces accorded
by digital platforms for open expression. Where does populist, online hate
against India’s minorities become the sanction for, or a reflection of the
violence taking place against them offline, in the real world?
The divisions that bureaucrat RV
Singh alluded to in his social media handle are not necessarily new. These
faultlines, it may be said, lay dormant for long, only to erupt in recent years
and finally crack open years of constitutionally bound principles of political
and religious freedoms, freedom of speech, and tolerance towards diversity.[51]
In the extant ecosystem, rumours, fake news, propaganda and hate speech online
coexist—and not necessarily in a linear fashion—with abuse, radicalisation and
violent extremism. What then are the parameters for mapping social media
behaviour that contributes to a climate in which violence (verbal and physical)
is normalised as a response to religious, political or ideological differences?
One post or tweet in defense of perpetrators of such acts, is enough to encourage
trolls and bullies—until posts are removed, threats are made, or criminal cases
are filed. In a digital universe where bigotry and hate abound, is there a
window to roll back? Can India reclaim civility in public discourse? Or is the
“offendedness” of the majority leading to another kind of radicalisation
altogether?
To be sure, social-media platforms
are also used to speak out against violations of the principles that are
enshrined in India’s Constitution. Yet, in case after case of communal rioting
and mob violence, local law enforcement agencies are dealing with a new
reality—of factories of rumour-mongers spreading fake news, fanning tensions
and bringing them to boiling point. In July 2017, for example, communal
violence erupted in North 24 Parganas town Basirhat, after Muslim mobs went on
a rampage, angered by a post by a Hindu boy about the return to Hinduism by
local families who had converted to Islam. A 65-year-old man was killed in the
melee.[52] A
few months before the incident, also in West Bengal, the state Criminal
Investigation Department arrested the local secretary of the BJP’s Information
Technology (IT) Cell for posting a manipulated video on Facebook with an
intention to create communal tension.[53]
For much of 2017, social media giants
were forced to answer tough questions on the role they have played in fomenting
hate and radicalisation online. Twitter and Facebook, in particular, are being
made to account for their blind eye towards polarising fake news reports and
computer ‘bots’[54] programmed
to widely disseminate such articles on their platforms. However, an equally
significant challenge is posed by the algorithms used by these platforms, which
distort realities and create alternate ones in echo chambers of like-minded
users where beliefs are perpetuated, even those that are premised on hate and
lies.[55]
In January 2018, a United States Senate Committee summoned representatives from
Facebook, Google and Twitter who have long argued that their role is simply
that of platforms, not content providers. This narrative has helped these
companies avoid both the threat of regulation, and legal liability. Recently,
going under fire for their ambiguous responses to questions of how their
platforms are being used to spread hate, these companies have scrambled to
evolve their community standards to expand definitions of, and check, hate
speech.
In response to questions on tackling
extremist content on their platforms (especially in the context of terrorist
propaganda) these social media companies claim that they have gone beyond
simply screening and removing extremist content and are creating more counter-messaging.
The US, however, as well as European nations, are pushing them to target,
counter and take down not only material for recruitment and propaganda posted
by Islamist terror groups like ISIS, but also other extremist content. In fact,
the German government has gone one step further and passed laws against hate
speech, imposing heavy fines on internet companies if they fail to identify and
take down either terrorist content or hate speech within 24 hours of it being
posted.
DEFINING HATE AND ‘HATE SPEECH’
Categorising and defining “hate” is
perhaps one of the most perplexing questions of our times, especially because
the definition is uniquely tied to the impact of what has been said. In a
socially networked world where comment is free and reactions are instant, lines
between violent personal abuse and/or speech inciting violence against a
community or group are becoming increasingly blurred. At times, even if intent
and language are not explicitly hateful, the implications can be. The Observer Research
Foundation study defined “hate” as “expressions that advocate incitement to
harm (particularly, discrimination, hostility or violence) based upon the
targets being identified with a certain social or demographic group. It may
include, but is not limited to, speech that advocates, threatens, or encourages
violent acts.” The report also indicates that hate speech may be prone to
manipulation at critical times—during election campaigns, for example, or used
by those in power to curb legitimate dissent—where hate speech can take on the
contours of what Cherian terms “hate spin”.
A UNESCO report published in 2015
defines “hate speech” as that which is situated at “the intersection of
multiple tensions. It is the expression of conflicts between different groups
within and across societies.” Increasingly, the internet is opening up spaces
for ideas and information that transcend geographical and other barriers. Thus,
the internet’s transformative potential is providing both opportunities and
challenges as it tries to balance the fundamental right to freedom of
expression, with the defence of human dignity and protection from violence and
discrimination. Multilateral treaties such as the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) have sought to define the contours of hate
speech. Multi-stakeholder processes like the Rabat Plan of Action have also
been initiated to bring clarity and suggest mechanisms to identify hateful
messages. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, for its part,
has pointed out that “virulent and hate laden advocacy can trigger the worst of
22 crimes.
Many European countries—which have
taken the lead in tackling right-wing radicalisation by proscribing neo-Nazi
groups[56],
for example—place value on the principles of civility and respect.[57]
Most social media companies, however—each with their own set of standards—are
headquartered in the US. Unlike India which imposes reasonable restrictions on
free speech, the US protects the principle as an absolute, fundamental right
even if it may sometimes mean guaranteeing the most offensive, xenophobic or
discriminatory language. As a result, cases filed by victims of hate speech and
cyber-violence or abuse can end up languishing in the criminal justice system.
Magistrates record statements and accept First Information Reports, but unless
the perpetrator is a known actor, any access to them is blocked as social media
companies delay acting on requests—citing either the danger of violating user
privacy, or else, bouncing off the legal provisions of their host countries.
The TK Viswanathan Committee,
constituted in 2017, recommended amendments to the Indian Penal Code, the Code
of Criminal Procedure and the Information Technology Act that include stringent
provisions for online hate speech. “The Supreme Court itself clearly states
that hate speech must be viewed through the lens of the right to equality, and
relates to speech not merely offensive or hurtful to specific individuals, but
also inciting discrimination or violence on the basis of inclusion of
individuals within certain groups. It is important to note that it is the
consequence of speech that is the determinative factor in interpreting hate
speech, more so than even perhaps the content of the speech. This is also
broadly reflected in the Law Commission’s report that identifies the status of
the author of the speech, the status of victims of the speech, the potential
impact of the speech and whether it amounts to incitement as key identifying
criteria of hate speech.[58]
In India today, there is a narrative
that seeks to widen the gulf between the country’s majority Hindus and the
minorities. Such a narrative embraces a host of patterns, including: the rising
incidence of lynchings and “public disorder”
over cow slaughter[59],
the questioning of Muslims for their allegiance and patriotism towards India,
the drumming up of support to rightly abolish Triple Talaq, while ignoring
patriarchy and violence that similarly oppress Hindu women inside marriage, the
backlash against inter-faith marriages, the anti-conversion attacks on
Christians, the labelling of those speaking out for communal harmony as
“terrorist sympathisers”, the overarching anti-Muslim rhetoric on Twitter and
Facebook when India was confronted with the challenge of accepting Rohingya
refugees fleeing Myanmar, and the complete rejection of any conversations
around human rights violations against civilian populations in the
conflict-ridden Kashmir valley. India has been recognised globally for its
negligible statistics on indoctrination and recruitment to pan-Islamist terror
groups like ISIS and Al-Qaeda. Yet, armed conflicts within the country lend
themselves to peculiar paradigms of hate and violence. Kashmir’s complex
political history and a legacy of broken political promises, have been reduced
to the simplest binary: Hindu vs. Muslim, Nationalist vs. Traitor. The
discourse lends no space for a dialogue on ways to end the violence.
In neighbouring Myanmar, right-wing
Buddhist extremists[60]
have been held liable by the United Nations (UN) for fuelling anti-Muslim hate
as hundreds of thousands of Rohingyas find themselves stateless. Meanwhile, a
recent report by Amnesty International[61]
holds the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) responsible for the massacre of
99 Hindus. This has fuelled the steady justification[62]
used by India’s right-wing Hindus to demand that the government deny asylum to
refugees. The UN has also censured Facebook[63] for
not being prompt in taking down hate speech in the context of the Rohingyas’
plight. While there is no question that terror groups like ISIS are attempting
to infiltrate refugee camps and recruit from them, there are those who argue
that the radicalised Rohingyas comprise a small fraction of the 500,000 of them
living in camps in Bangladesh, and the majority are refugees. These voices,
however, have come under a volley of now-familiar abuse. As majoritarian groups
seek to define clear battle-lines, a large swathe of people caught in the
crossfire are either ignored or written off as collateral damage.
In 2006, five years after the 9/11
terror attacks in the US, social scientist Arjun Appadurai defined the concept
of “predatory identities” in his seminal work, “The Fear of Small Numbers: An
Essay on the Geography of Anger”.[64]
These identities, Appadurai argues, require the extinction of other, proximate
social categories that emerge especially out of pairs that often have had long
histories of contact, some mixing, and even stereotyping. Predatory identities
are often majoritarian, based on claims made on behalf of a threatened
majority; they could be religious, linguistic or racial. Appadurai argues that
these predatory identities “emerge in tension between majority identities and
national identities.” Here, it is important to distinguish between “the
majority” and “majoritarian identity”. Appadurai defines “majoritarian” as the
“objectively larger group in a national polity” striving to close the gap
between the majority and “the purity of the national whole.” When does majoritarianism
turn violent?[65]
In the case of India, these
identities have been hardened by the history and memory of the Partition in
1947 and the ensuing, permanent state of conflict between India and the newly
formed Pakistan created as a nation state ostensibly to provide haven for the
subcontinent’s Muslims. These predatory identities, therefore, do not take
kindly to those in India who advocate for dialogue with Pakistan, or urge the
government to address human rights violations by the armed forces as they fight
militants and terrorists, whether in the country’s tribal heartland or in the
disputed Jammu and Kashmir region. They are labeled ‘Naxals’ or seditious.
Artists and writers, for example—
especially those who are not Hindu, and who challenge a public consumed by
dogma in the name of faith—are called “anti-Hindu” and therefore
“anti-national”. Many have been at the receiving end of a backlash by a growing
hyper-nationalist, ultra-religious right wing that has rioted, assaulted or
vandalised in retaliation for this perceived persecution.[66]
After Jawaharlal Nehru University student Umar Khalid was shot at outside the
venue of a public event he was to attend on 13 August 2018, two young men
claimed responsibility for it in a video that circulated on social media and
claimed, “by attacking Khalid we wanted to give a gift to the people on the
occasion of Independence Day.”[67]
Even those who may not agree with Khalid’s politics recognise that the
relentless baiting and abuse of JNU students as “anti-national” has put a
target on his back.[68]
IMPACT OF HATE SPEECH ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
Right to freedom of speech and
expression is one of the most essential liberties recognized by the democratic
States.[69]
The concept of liberty has been primarily influenced by the principle of
individual autonomy. The liberal theory of free speech views speech as an
intrinsic aspect of autonomous individual, hence any restriction on exercise of
this liberty is always subject to judicial scrutiny. The objective of free
speech in a democracy is to promote plurality of opinions. The importance of
allowing expression, howsoever, unpopular has been stressed by J.S. Mill in the
following words, in his work ‘On Liberty’: If all mankind minus one, were of
one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be
no more justified in silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power,
would be justified in silencing mankind.[70]
The importance of allowing diversity
of opinion has guided the principles of free speech. Thus, even a speech that
is ‘vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp’32 is protected from
State intervention. Hate speech is an expression which is likely to cause
distress or offend other individuals on the basis of their association with a particular
group or incite hostility towards them. There is no general legal definition of
hate speech, perhaps for the apprehension that setting a standard for
determining unwarranted speech may lead to suppression of this liberty.
The philosopher Jeremy Waldron argues
that, while purely offensive speech may not justify restrictions, there is a
class of injury, amounting to more than hurt sentiments but to less than harm,
in the sense of physical injury, that demands restriction in democratic
frameworks. Where speech injures dignity, it will do more harm than simply
offend its target. It would undermine the “implicit assurance” that citizens of
a democracy, particularly minorities or vulnerable groups are placed on the
same footing as the majority.[71]
While the right to criticise any group should continue to exist, speech that
negates the right of a vulnerable group should be regulated.
Free speech has always been
considered to be the quintessence of every democracy. The doctrine of free
speech has evolved as a bulwark against state’s power to regulate speech. The
liberal doctrine was a measure against the undemocratic power of the state. The
freedom of expression was one of the core freedoms that were incorporated in
the Bill of Human Rights.[72]
The greater value accorded to the expression, in the scheme of rights, explains
the reluctance of the law makers and judiciary in creating exceptions that may
curtail the spirit of this freedom. Perhaps, this is the reason behind the
reluctance in defining hate speech.
The issue of hate speech has assumed
greater significance in the era of internet, since the accessibility of
internet allows offensive speeches to affect a larger audience in a short span
of time. Recognising this issue, the Human Rights Council’s ‘Report of the
Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of
opinion and expression’[73]
on content regulation on internet, expressed that freedom of expression can be
restricted on the following grounds[74],
namely:
·
child
pornography (to protect the rights of children),
·
hate
speech (to protect the rights of affected communities)
·
defamation
(to protect the rights and reputation of others against unwarranted attacks)
·
direct
and public incitement to commit genocide (to protect the rights of others)
·
advocacy
of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to
discrimination, hostility or violence (to protect the rights of others, such as
the right to life).
IDENTIFYING THE CRITERIA OF HATE SPEECH
Freedom of speech is an essence to a
democratic society, and limitations are subject to scrutiny. The Supreme Court
of India in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India had differentiated between three
forms of speech, discussion, advocacy and incitement.[75]
It was held by the Court that a speech can only be limited on grounds of
exceptions mentioned in article 19(2) when it reaches the threshold of
incitement. All other forms of speech, even if offensive or unpopular have to
be protected under article 19(1)(a). Incitement is the key to determining the
constitutionality of restriction on free speech.
The courts in some countries have
refrained from identifying criteria of hate speech. However, through an
analysis of the decisions of the different State jurisdictions, certain parameters
may be summarised:
(i)
The extremity of the speech: In order to qualify as hate speech,
the speech must be offensive and project the extreme form of emotion.[76]
Every offensive statement, however, does not amount to hate speech. The
expressions advocacy and discussion of sensitive and unpopular issue have been
termed ‘low value speech’ unqualified for constitutional protection.[77]
(ii)
Incitement: In Shreya Singhal, the speech must
amount to incitement in order to be restricted. This is an accepted norm to
limit speech. The imminent threat to lawless action test laid down by United
States Supreme Court also echoes the same reasoning.[78]
Moreover, incitement to discrimination lies at the heart of hate speech
principles. The principles of hate speech have always come into conflict with
two concepts, liberty and equality.[79]
However, critics of free speech suggest that this concept of neutrality, where
all speeches are accorded similar status, often leads to creation of
discriminatory environment especially for the minorities and the marginalised,
since they are generally not well placed to make their voices heard. They argue
that in light of the ‘great disparities of wealth and power, free speech’s
formal equality results in massive substantive discrimination in the
marketplace of ideas’.[80]
Liberty and equality are
complementary and not antithetical to each other. The intent of freedom of
speech is not to disregard the weaker sections of the society but to give them
equal voice. Similarly, the intent of equality is not to suppress this liberty
but to balance it with the necessities of a multicultural and plural world,
provided such constraint does not unduly infringe on the freedom of expression.
Thus, incitement to not only violence but also to discrimination has been
recognized as a ground for interfering with freedom of expression.
(iii)
Status of the author of the speech: European Court of Human Rrights has
recognized that position of the author of the speech is important in
determining the legality of limitation imposed by the State. Thus
‘interferences with the freedom of expression of a politician … calls for the
closest scrutiny on the Court’s part’.[81]
The Supreme Court in Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan[82]
was approached to sanction hate speech on a similar ground. The petitioners
sought court’s intervention to declare “hate speeches” delivered by elected
representatives, political and religious leaders as unconstitutional. The
petition was specifically addressed to the people who held power to influence
society on a large scale. The Court recognizing the negative impact of hate
speech referred the matter to Law Commission for in depth examination.
(iv)
Status of victims of the speech: The status of the targeted audience
is also important in determining whether a speech can be limited. European Court
of Human Rrights in Lingens v. Austria[83] distinguished
between the status of public and private individuals in this regard and
remarked that: …the limits of acceptable criticism are accordingly wider as
regards a politician as such than as regards a private individual. Unlike the
latter, the former inevitably and knowingly lays himself open to close scrutiny
of his every word and deed by both journalists and the public at large, and he
must consequently display a greater degree of tolerance.
(v)
Potentiality of the speech: The potential impact of the speech
has to be viewed to determine the speaker’s state of mind at the time speech
was rendered. In Ramesh v. Union of India[84],
Supreme Court examined the validity of the restriction on the basis of the
potential of the movie to impact the audience.
(vi)
Context of the Speech: Every seemingly hateful speech may
not be termed as a hate speech. The context in which the speech was made is
essential in determining its permissibility. The context of expression has
always been looked into while adjudging the restriction.[85]
BLASPHEMY LAW AND THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH
Blasphemy means an act of insult or
contempt or lack of reverence to a deity or things which are held to be sacred
or inviolable. There are various blasphemy laws in India the Chief one being
Section 295A of the Indian penal Code, 1860 which is used to prevent insult to
Christianity, Islam and Hinduism. Article 19(2) of the Constitution only
allowed for reasonable restriction upon the freedom of speech in the interest
of public order, section 295A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. However cast its
net much wider, by criminalising all speech that was intended to outrage
religious feelings. It could be called ‘over-breadth’- it covered speech that
the state could legitimately regulate under constitution (i.e. speech causing
public disorder) and speech that it couldn’t (i.e. mere religious insult with
no public disorder).
As scholar Neeti Nair records, “It
was with a view to control such religiously triggered violence, while assuring
religious committee that their ‘sentiments’ were going to be protected, that
Section 295A was drafted”.[86]
Even at that time, the drafting committee voiced its doubts about wide wording
of the section, and predicted that it might come to be used to target not just
the ‘scurrilous scribbler’, but also religious dissent and critique. There are
various examples and history has proven those fears justified.
Internationally there has been an
infringement of rights and violation of freedoms under many colonial rules and
also under brutal regime of Hitler who had created his own ministry in the Nazi
governance to centralise the control of German culture and intellectual life
that the citizens over there lived.[87]
In the, Hitler appointed Joseph Goebbels as the Reich Propaganda Minister.
Hitler then appointed Joseph Goebbels as the Minister of Reich Propaganda in
the Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda. The ultimate goal
was to create an impression in the minds of other nations that the Nazi party
has the backing of the population in all its work and motions and that the news
media of Germany was controlled by the Nazi party also that it handled the
visual arts, literature, theatre, music and broadcasting. The history has
enough evidences of the ministry which aimed only to spread the Nazi ideology
in the minds of the people and its consequences.
AN EFFORT TO FIND SOLUTION
Without having free speech in a
country, the search for truth is not possible, neither can there be a discovery
of truth nor such discovery will be useful. An abuse of freedom of speech which
is a thousand folds is better than the complete denial of free speech. An abuse
that is rendered may die in a day but the aftermath and denial of it stays on
for life of the people affected. It not only tramples upon the rights of the
people but also their hopes. Rather than as attempt to draw a conclusion, it is
believed that one should never be drawn. The grey area existing between the
freedom of speech & expression subject religious sentiments of others must
be left undecided. Malleable standards need to be applied to this subject which
is as sensitive as religion in this republic and the application of a
strait-jacket formula might prove to be counterproductive in the future.
The perennial conflict at hand
between freedom of speech and offending the sentiments of people has a special
significance in the socio-religious milieu of India. Can it not then be
justifiably argued that in a country where something as trivial as the release
of a fictional movie can stir up violence and nation-wide protests, there is a
greater need of restrictions to be placed on the freedom of speech? Then
another question arises as to what exactly these restrictions would be and the
extent to which they would be applicable. However, though laws are to be
applied equally to all, it is rarely seen that restrictions on speech are
placed on the representatives of the government in power. A prime example of
this is ‘the Saamna’, the mouthpiece of the Shiv Sena, known for its rants
against the people of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and the Muslim Community.
The definition of hate speech is
still subject to wider intellectual and academic debate. How existing law looks
at it is what is at issue. Since it has been laid down in freedom of speech and
expression which an important constitutional right, hate speech concept has
been manipulated to achiever the ulterior motives in many different ways.
Ulterior motives are being achieved through hate speech under the right of
speech & expression and in law courts are not able to prosecute hate
speeches or its charges brought before them, with success, because of absence
of clear provisions of Indian Penal Code.
As provided in the Jakarta
Recommendations which is on regional consultation of “Expression, Opinion and
Religious Freedoms in Asia”, and which also included expert participants such
as UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to
freedom of opinion and expression observed the following:
·
There
is a need to revise and strengthen the existing anti-discrimination legislation
so as to meet universal standards on equality across all groups, communities,
men and women;
·
To
punish incitement of violence and hatred which may result in discrimination
& hostility, laws should be enacted and implemented in a transparent,
non-selective and non-arbitrary manner.
·
The
religious minorities’, parliamentarians should be enabled to raise issues
relating to freedoms of expression and religion, and the intersection of these
rights, in the parliament and other platforms.
·
Incitement
of hatred resulting in violence should be condemned and prevented, also all
instances of violations of freedom of speech should be condemned.
·
Fight
against hate speech cannot be isolated. It should be discussed on a wider
platform such as the United Nations. All governments which are responsible or
regional bodies and regional and international actors should respond to this
threat.
Freedom of speech and expression has
been established as a key freedom required for sustaining democracy. However,
with every right comes responsibility; and therein, is the need for a
limitation on the right to freedom of speech and expression so as to prevent
the destructive and regressive effect it could have. The founding fathers of
our Constitution were cognisant of the history and the need to highlight the
responsibility attached to freedom of speech and expression. Thus, there is a
need to convince and educate the public on responsible exercise of freedom of
speech and expression.
The Constitution in its working,
however, required amendments to article 19 so as to add several new grounds of
restrictions upon the freedom of speech and expression; initially, under the
Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 followed by the Constitution
(Sixteenth Amendment) Act, 1963. The new grounds of restrictions added were (i)
friendly relations with foreign states (ii) defamation or incitement to an
offence (iii) the sovereignty and integrity of India (iv) security of State (v)
decency and (vi) contempt of court.
In pursuance of the aforesaid
constitutional provisions, certain provisions such as section 153A, section
153B and section 295A, were added in IPC to deal with particular category of
offences which fall in general expression of hate speech. In IPC those
provisions of hate speech fall under the categories of Offences Relating to
Religion, Offences Against Public Tranquillity and Criminal Intimidation,
Insult and Annoyance. Section 124A penalises sedition, 153A penalises promoting
enmity among groups on various grounds and doing acts prejudicial to maintenance
of harmony, section 153B penalises imputation assertions prejudicial to
national integration, and section 295A penalises malicious acts intended to
outrage religious feelings which supplement section 298 which relates to
uttering words with intent to wound the religious feelings. Section 505 deals
with statements conducing to public mischief.
The reading of above provisions make
it clear that there is no water tight compartment to deal with the various acts
relating to hate speech which generally overlap. In a particular situation hate
speech may become sedition. In the case of Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar[88],
the Supreme Court upheld section 124A IPC as constitutionally valid, following
the view of the Federal Court in Niharendu Dutt Majumdar v. Emperor[89]
and did not accept the interpretation given to it by the Privy Council in Emperor
v. Sadasiv Narain Bhalerao.[90]
In Niharendu[91], the
Federal Court held that “public order or the reasonable anticipation or
likelihood of public disorder” was the gist of the offence of sedition and that
in order to be punishable under section 124A, - “the acts or words complained
of must either incite to disorder or must be such as to satisfy reasonable men
that that was their intention or tendency”. The Supreme Court in Kedar Nath
Singh[92]
interpreted section 124A to mean that an utterance would be punishable under
this section only when it is intended or has a reasonable tendency to create
disorder or disturbance of the public peace by resort to violence.
Hate speech poses complex challenges
to freedom of speech and expression. The constitutional approach to these
challenges has been far from uniform as the boundaries between impermissible
propagation of hatred and protected speech vary across jurisdictions. A difference
of approach is discernible between the United States and other democracies. In
the United States, hate speech is given wide constitutional protection; whereas
under international human rights covenants and in other western democracies,
such as Canada, Germany, and the United Kingdom, it is regulated and subject to
sanctions.
TOWARDS AN EFFECTIVE RESPONSE TO HATE SPEECH
The legal framework employs a variety
of methods to curb hate speech in India. Primarily the law, as we have seen in
the preceding section, makes it a crime to utter certain types of hate speech.
This crime is punishable by imprisonment of varying durations, with or without
fine. Most of these provisions are also cognizable as well as being
non-bailable and non-compoundable. In effect, this makes the legal provisions
very stringent with serious implications. Apart from this, as per the medium of
propagation i.e. print, television or internet, hateful content is banned,
censored or leads to shutdown of the host site. In case of print, the
authorities under the criminal procedure code have power of seizure of the
material in question as well. Despite
this elaborate framework of law and policy hate speech cases continue to grow.
It has been opined that this growth is certainly not because the law is lax
rather it is the faulty implementation of the law that needs to be closely
examined.
The effective and judicious
implementation of laws is a challenge that is not easily surmounted. At the
same time, the question that begs to be answered is whether the legal framework
is enough to address the challenges of regulating hate speech given the
delicate balance that needs to be struck in dealing with hate speech cases and
meting out justice to the parties involved. The harm that hate speech propagates
is not only deleterious but has extremely dangerous consequences. The
exposition of the legal framework above has shown that it works in a limited
sphere. There is no scope for repairing the damage that hate speech does to the
society at large neither is there space for victim rehabilitation or any means
of redressal. It is the need of the hour, therefore, to look beyond the rigors
of criminal law in search of answer to an effective response to hate speech.
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION OF HATE SPEECH
Alternative Dispute Resolution
proposes a paradigm shift in the way the legal system administers justice. It
shifts the focus from court-centred formal legal proceedings to the settlement
of the dispute between parties by way of negotiation, mediation, arbitration
and/or conciliation. The importance of this approach for redressal of disputes
cannot be overemphasised in light of the fact that it works in a time bound
manner focused at arriving at settlement between parties as opposed to pursing
the matter in a court of law which are already overburdened with the load of
cases pending for years, bound by procedural formalities.[93]
Various methods of alternative
dispute resolution in context of criminal matters have been employed with
success such as “victim-offender mediation, victim-offender panels, victim
assistance programs, community crime prevention programs, community service,
plea bargaining” etc.[94]
in select jurisdictions worldwide. The administration of criminal justice
stands to gain greatly from adopting alternate means of resolution in criminal
matters. Firstly, it fulfils the ideal of providing restorative justice to the
victims of crime by offering a chance of victim-offender reconciliation and
begin the process of healing for the victim and expiation for the offender.[95]
Secondly, the alternate dispute mechanism has the capacity to be modified as
per the goals to be achieved and still continue to function within the form and
conditions laid down by law. Thirdly, it is a viable method for the parties
from financial point of view as the cost borne by the parties is significantly
lower in comparison to the formal process of trial. Fourthly, the flexible
procedure allows the parties to arrive at a settlement without suffering the
time consuming of specific court proceedings.
However, when it comes to adopting to
alternative means of resolution in criminal matters, the caveat is obvious:
this approach cannot be employed uniformly for all offences. Its efficacy
remains to be tested in the class of offences that fall into the category of
grave, serious or heinous type of offences. While the adoption in India of
alternate means of settlement of criminal matters has been mired with much
trepidation and employed with varying degree of success, globally the trend
leans towards resolution by alternate means with the courts being the last
resort.
The example of Australia is an
interesting study when it comes to resolving hate speech cases by means of
mediation as an alternative to criminal proceedings. It has done so by
providing for a civil mechanism in addition to pre-existing criminal law
framework banning hateful speech. Under the federal setup, Australia has both
federal laws created by Parliament and laws of the various States. Incitement
by speech on grounds of race, colour, descent, ethnic origins is an offence
under the criminal code[96]
amongst other laws which also include grounds such as religion, disability and
HIV/AIDS status as well.
For example, The Racial
Discrimination Act which is a federal law and the Anti-Discrimination Act, of
Tasmania proclaims as unlawful conduct that “offend, insult, humiliate or
intimidate another person or group of people” on any of the specified grounds. It
sets up a mechanism wherein an aggrieved individual can lodge a complaint
before the empowered Commission or Tribunal as per the law. The empowered body
shall then proceed to conduct enquiry into the complaint lodged before it. In
case the complaint is found to be valid upon investigation, the next step is
calling for a conciliation conference. This order for conciliation may also direct
for conciliation of parties through other means of resolution and can be issued
either before or after the inquiry has commenced. It is the aim of the
conciliation conference to negotiate an agreement which is acceptable to the
complainant. If parties agree to a resolution by conciliation, the commission
may record the terms of the agreement.
A study of the Australia’s civil hate
speech laws concludes that though the number of cases dealt with under this
mechanism is modest but it gains significance in light of the fact that
thecriminal hate speech laws are seldom invoked where civil remedy has been
available.[97] The
remedy of civil wrong as the prevalent and preferred form of recourse has
resulted in the person’s availability and willingness as member of the targeted
group to “step up” and invoke the legislation. While this may present its own
set of problems such as the law not being able to accord uniform protection to
all the vulnerable communities that are targets of racism and prejudice but the
study concludes that the fact that laws are there makes them feel less
vulnerable. The statistics of report show that fewer than 200 complaints were
registered. In the decade from 1990 to 2010 that averages to fewer than 4000
complaints. Out of these 2% complaints were the subject of binding
determination by court whereas more than half were about common remedy of a
court ordered apology or correction or removal of unlawful material. Damage
orders are rare and where made, the compensation amount is modest. No one has
ever gone to jail.[98] These civil mechanisms are attempt to
influence the behaviour of the hate speaker, by encouraging them to agree to
desist or to apologise or if that fails, by imposing fines. They have provided
a framework for direct community advocacy.[99]
The above stands in contrast to the
approach of those jurisdictions that emphasize on criminal law like India. When
it comes to adjudication of hate speech offences under the Indian criminal law
framework, it is mired with time-consuming formalities of procedure. The
criminal procedure code mandates that sanction for prosecution by the
government is required.[100]
The sanction is a threshold limitation on the referral of incidents for
criminal prosecution. But this grant sanction is itself based on individual
discretion of the official. Once the complaint is registered with the police,
the guilt of the accused can only be adjudged by the court after a full-length
trial. During trial, there is a heavy burden of proof for the parties to prove
that the act had been done with the culpable state of mind directed at inciting
hatred, enmity or aimed to offend any group or class of persons. This entire
process is time consuming and might take years to conclude. Justice for the
aggrieved parties in such cases is but a distant dream.
Like Australia, India stands to gain
immensely from introduction of alternate means of settlement of disputes for
hate speech offences. At the same time, it is pertinent to note that this kind
of an approach needs to be suitably modified so as to work within the existing
system in India. This could begin with court ordered mediation or conciliation
between parties that could greatly contribute to unburdening of the court’s
case load and arrive at a comparatively early decision in the matter. Moreover,
the punishment and penalties attached to the offences would also need a rethink
in light of the fact that the existing punishments have not been a deterrent
for future cases and do not contribute to the restoration of the harm that hate
speech inflicts at large.
[1] Amit Singh, “Conflict between Freedom of Expression and Religion in India –
A Case Study”, Centre for Social Studies,
University of Coimbra, 29th June, 2018.
[2] Alexander Tsesis, Destructive Messages: How Hate Speech Paves
the Way for Harmful Social Movements (New York, NY: New York University
Press, 2002); Bhikhu Parekh, ‘Hate Speech: Is There a Case for Banning?’,
Public Policy Research 12 (2005-2006): 213–223; Steven J. Heyman, Free Speech and Human Dignity (New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008); Alexander Brown, Hate Speech Law: A Philosophical Examination (London: Routledge,
2015).
[3] Miklos Haraszti, ‘Forward’, in M.
Herz and P. Molnar (eds.) The Content and
Context of Hate Speech: Rethinking Regulation and Responses (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2012); Martha C. Nussbaum, ‘Law for Bad Behavior’, The Indian Express, February 21, 2014.
Available at
http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/law-for-bad-behaviour/.
[4] C. Edwin Baker, ‘Hate Speech’, in
M. Herz and P. Molnar (eds.) The Content
and Context of Hate Speech: Rethinking Regulation and Responses (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2012); Ronald Dworkin, ‘Reply to Jeremy Waldron’,
in M. Herz and P. Molnar (eds.) The
Content and Context of Hate Speech: Rethinking Regulation and Responses
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Robert Post, ‘Interview’, in M.
Herz and P. Molnar (eds.) The Content and
Context of Hate Speech: Rethinking Regulation and Responses (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2012); Nadine Strossen, ‘Interview’, in M. Herz and
P. Molnar (eds.) The Content and Context
of Hate Speech: Rethinking Regulation and Responses (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2012); Eric Heinze, Hate
Speech and Democratic Citizenship (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).
[5] Robert Post, ‘Hate Speech’, in I.
Hare and J. Weinstein (eds.) Extreme
Speech and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); James
Weinstein, ‘Hate Speech Bans, Democracy and Political Legitimacy’,
Constitutional Commentary, forthcoming
[6] South Park, Season 9, Episode 11,
aired on Comedy Central US, November 9, 2005.
[7] Adam Howard, “Beyoncé Super Bowl
Performance Inspires Protest, Counter-protest”, NBC News Online, February 10, 2016. Available at http://www.nbcnews.com/news/nbcblk/beyonc-super-bowlperformance-inspires-protest-counter-protest-n515996.
[8] J. K. Rowling, @jk_rowling,
Twitter, November 8, 2016. Available at https://twitter.com/jk_
rowling/status/796252371739430913.
[9] David Riesman, “Democracy and Defamation:
Control of Group Libel”, Columbia Law
Review 42 (1942): 727–780, p. 728.
[10] Lionel Casson, Everyday Life in Ancient Egypt, Revised
and Expanded Edition (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), pp.
58–59.
[11] Samuel Walker, Hate Speech: The History of an American
Controversy (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), p. 8.
[12] David Boromisza-Habashi, Speaking Hatefully: Culture, Communication,
and Political Action in Hungary (University Park, PA: Penn State University
Press, 2013), pp. 35–36; Gagliardone et al., Mapping and Analysing Hate Speech
Online, p. 9.
[13] Cited in Elmer Sandmeyer, The Anti-Chinese Movement in California
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1973), p. 65.
[14] Friedrich Kiibler, “How Much
Freedom for Racist Speech? Transnational Aspects of a Conflict of Human Rights”,
27 Hofstra L. Rev. 335,336 (1998).
[15] International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, art. 20(2), 999
U.N.T.S. 171, S. EXEC. DOC. E, 95-2 (1978) (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976)
(stating that "[a]ny advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that
constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be
prohibited by law").
[16] Friedrich Kiibler, How Much
Freedom for Racist Speech? Transnational Aspects of a Conflict of Human Rights,
27 Hofstra L. Rev. 335,336 (1998).
[17] Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S.
250 (1952) (upholding the constitutionality of a statue criminalizing group defamation
based on race or religion). Although Beauhamais has never been formally
repudiated by the Supreme Court, it is fundamentally inconsistent with more
recent decisions on the subject.
[18] Anthony SkiUen, “Freedom of Speech”,
Contemporary Political Philosophy:
Radical Studies, 139,142 (Keith Graham ed., 1982).
[19] The identity of the audience
involved may be relevant for a variety of reasons, including assessing the harm
produced by hate speech, and devising effective legal means to combat hate
speech. For example, demeaning racist propaganda aimed at a non-target audience
may be a necessary step in the creation of a political environment wherein
policies of genocide might plausibly be implemented. See generally GORDON W.
ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE (1954). Thus, the German people might never
have countenanced the Nazi policy of extermination of the Jews, had they not
been desensitized through years of vicious anti-Semitic propaganda. See
FRANKLYN S. HAIMAN, SPEECH AND LAW IN A FREE SOCIETY 87 (1981). Consistent with
this, hate speech directed at a non-target audience might well be much more
dangerous than if exclusively addressed to a target-group audience.
[20] “Counting the Jews”, NATION, Oct. 3,1988, at 257.
[21] Because of prevailing social and
economic circumstances, it has often been the case that the whites with whom
black ghetto dwellers have the most—often unpleasant— contacts, namely
shopkeepers and landlords, happen to be Jews. See Vince Beiser, “Surviving The
Rage in Harlem”, JERUSALEM REP., Feb.
8,1996, at 30.
[22] Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S.
47 (1919).
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[43] PTI. (2012, November 19). Two
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[44] Dahat, P. (2017, July 13). BJP
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[45] IANS. (2017, July 18). Arrest
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at http://www.firstpost.com/
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[46] The Wire Staff. (2017, April 10).
Activist in Assam Threatened With Rape and Acid Attacks For Condemning Beef
Arrests. Available at https://thewire.in/122670/bondita-acharya-beef-bajrang-dal/.
[47] “Video: Man burnt alive in
Rajasthan’s Rajsamand after being axed for alleged love jihad”, FE Online, 7
December, 2017. Available at https://www.financial
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[48] The Times of India (TOI) describes
the Vishwa Hindu Parishad, or VHP as a conservative Hindu nationalist
organization that abides by the ideologies of Hindutva and is often
characterized as “militant” for initiating anti-social activities like the Ram
Janmabhoomi movement The Times of India (TOI) describes the Vishwa Hindu
Parishad, or VHP as a conservative Hindu nationalist organization that abides
by the ideologies of Hindutva and is often characterized as “militant” for
initiating anti-social activities like the Ram Janmabhoomi movement.
[49] Pankul Sharma, “Trolled, abused,
Bareilly DM takes down FB post, stands by his remarks ”, Times of India , 31st January , 2018 . Available at
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/bareilly/trolled-abusedbareilly-dm-takes-down-fb-post-stands-by-his-remarks/articleshow/
62715214.cms.
[50] “Kasganj violence: Uttar Pradesh
Police arrests 2 for circulating communal messages on WhatsApp”, Indo-Asian
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[52] Snigdhendu Bhattacharya, “Teen
behind Facebook post that led to Basirhat clashes re-arrested, booked for
attempt to murder”, Hindustan Times,
15 February, 2018. Available at https://www.hindustantimes.com/kolkata/teenbehind-facebook-post-that-led-to-basirhat-clashes-re-arrested-bookedfor-attempt-to-murder/story-HDZpLtfMTSVOke6QoEsPdI.html.
[53] Koushik Dutta, “BJP IT cell secy
held in Asansol for posting ‘fake’ video on social media”, Hindustan Times, 13 July, 2017. Available at https://www.hindustantimes.com/
kolkata/bjp-it-cell-secretary-arrested-in-asansol-for-posting-fakevideo-on-social-media/story-GSLBmA1746fQlk5YupJrgI.html.
[54] David Ingram, “Twitter bars
tactics used by ‘bots’ to spread false stories”, Reuters, 22 February, 2018. Available at
https://www.reuters.com/article/ustwitter-bots/twitter-bars-tactics-used-by-bots-to-spread-false-storiesidUSKCN1G52R1?utm_campaign=trueAnthem:+Trending+Content&u
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[55] Tomas Chamorro-Premuzic, “How the
web distorts reality and impairs our judgement skills”, The Guardian, 13 May, 2014. Available at https://www.theguardian.com/media-network/media-network-blog/
2014/may/13/internet-confirmation-bias.
[56] The United Kingdom proscribed
‘National Action’ a right wing, Neo-Nazi group as a terrorist outfit in
December, 2016.
[57] Whitman, James Q. “Enforcing
Civility and Respect: Three Societies”, Faculty Scholarship Series (2000), P.
646. Available at http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/ fss_papers/646/
[58] Amber Sinha, “New Recommendations
to Regulate Online Hate Speech Could Pose More Problems Than Solutions”, The Wire, 14 October 2017. Available at https://thewire.in/187381/new-recommendations-regulate-onlinehate-speech-problems/.
[59] Rupa Subramanya, “Has India become
“Lynchistan?”, ORF, 1 July, 2017.
Available at https://www.orfonline.org/expert-
speak/has-india-becomelynchistan/.
[60] Poppy McPherson, “ ‘We must
protect our country’: extremist Buddhists target Mandalay’s Muslims”, The Guardian, 8 May, 2017. Available https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2017/may/08/buddhistextremists-anti-muslim-mandalay-ma-ba-tha.
[61] “Myanmar: New evidence reveals
Rohingya armed group massacred scores in Rakhine State”, Amnesty International,
22 May, 2018. Available at
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/05/myanmar-newevidence-reveals-rohingya-armed-group-massacred-scores-in-rakhinestate/.
[62] Krishnadas Rajagopal, “‘Illegal’
Rohingya refugees pose security threat, Centre tells SC”, The Hindu, 18 September, 2017. Available at https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/rohingya-refugees-illegalpose-security-threat-centre-tells-sc/article19708554.ece.
[63] Tom Miles, Simon Daniel Lewis and
David Ingram, “U.N. investigators cite Facebook role in Myanmar crisis”, Reuters, 13 March, 2018. Available at
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-facebook/u-ninvestigators-cite-facebook-role-in-myanmar-crisis-idUSKCN
1GO2PN.
[64] Appadurai, Arjun, The Fear of Small Numbers, Duke
University Press, 2006, pp.21-23.
[66] Sanjay Kumar, “The Rise of the
Right Wing”, The Diplomat, 23
October, 2011. Available at https://thediplomat.com/2011/10/the-rise-of-the-right-wing/.
[67] Alok Singh, “Attack on Umar
Khalid: Delhi Police detain duo who claimed responsibility”, The Indian Express,
20 August, 2018. Available at https://indianexpress.com/article/cities/delhi/attack-on-umar-khaliddelhi-police-jnu-5315070/.
[68] Khalid, along with nine others
including former Students union (JNUSU) president Kanhaiya Kumar were expelled
in 2016, after being accused of sedition for organising protests against what
they called ‘judicial killings’ of Afzal Guru and Maqbool Bhat- the former found
guilty in the terror attacks on India’s Parliament in December 2001, and the
latter, a Kashmiri separatist leader who formed the Jammu and Kashmir
Liberation Front (JKLF). Bhat was hanged in 1984, Guru in 2013. Khalid has
challenged his expulsion order in court.
[69] See Handyside v. United Kingdom,
Application no. 5493/72(1976).
[70] J.S. Mill, On Liberty and Utilitarianism 4 (Bantam Classic, New York, 2008).
[71] New York Times v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964).
[72] William A. Schabas, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights :
The Travaux Préparatoires (Volume I) lxxiii (Cambridge University Press,
New York, 2013).
[73] Human Rights Council, Report of
the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom
of Opinion and Expression, 17th Session, A/HRC/17/27 (May 16, 2011), available
at : http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/17session/A.HRC.17.27_en.pdf.
[74] Ibid.
[75] Shreya Singhal v. Union of India,
AIR 2015 SC 1523.
[76] [2013] 1 SCR 467.
[77] 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
[78] Brandenburg v. Ohio 395 U.S. 44
(1969). The Appellant was convicted under an Illinois statute making it a crime
to “Advertise or publish, present or exhibit in any public place ...any
lithograph, moving picture, play, drama or sketch, which portrays ...
depravity, criminality, unchastity, lack of virtue of a class of citizens, of
any race, colour, creed or religion which said publication or exhibition
exposes the citizens of any race, color, creed or religion to contempt,
derision, or obloquy or which is productive of breach of peace or riots.”
[79] Police Dept. of City of Chicago v.
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972)
[80] J. Weinstein, Hate Speech,
Pornography and Radical Attack on Free Speech Doctrine 93 (Westview Press,
Colorado, 1999).
[81] Incal v. Turkey, Application no.
41/1997/825/1031 (1998).
[82] AIR 2014 SC 1591.
[84]
AIR 1988 SC 775.
[85] See e.g. Bobby Art International
v. Om Pal Singh Hoon, AIR 1996 SC 1846.
[86] For a recent account of the
legislative debates leading to the enactment of section 295A; See Neeti Nair,
Beyond the ‘Communal’ 1920s: The Problem of Intention, Communal Pragmatism, and
the Making of Section 295A of the Indian Penal Code, 50 Indian Economic Social
History Review 317 (2013) available at;
http://ier.sagepub.com/content/50/3/317, DOI: 10.1177/0019464613494622.
[88] AIR 1962 SC 955.
[90] AIR 1947 PC 84
[91] AIR 1942 FC 22
[92] AIR 1962 SC 955.
[93] Law Commission of India, 245th
Report On Arrears And Backlog: Creating Additional Judicial (Wo)Manpower (July,
2014)
[94] United Nations Office On Drugs And
Crime, Handbook On Restorative Justice Programmes (2006) available at :
https://www.unodc.org/pdf/criminal_justice/Handbook_on_Restorative_Justice_Programmes.pdf
[95] Ibid.
[97] Katharine Gelber,
“Reconceptualizing Counter-speech in Hate- Speech Policy (with a focus on
Australia) in Michael Herz, Peter Molnar (eds.), The Content and Context of
Hate Speech : Rethinking Regulation and Responses (Cambridge University Press,
2012).
[98] Luke McNamara, Katharine Gelber,
“Explainer : How do Australia’s laws on hate speech work in practice”, The
Conversation, May 9, 2014. available at :
https://theconversation.com/explainer-how-do-australias-lawson-hate-speech-work-in-practice-26105
[99] Katharine Gelber, Luke McNamara,
“The Effects of Civil Hate Speech Laws : Lessons from Australia” 49(3) Law and
Society Review 631-664 (2015).