Open Access Research Article

CATCHING THE DIGITAL LEVIATHANS: KILLER ACQUISITIONS AND ALGORITHMIC CARTELS: ASSESSING THE EFFICACY OF THE COMPETITION (AMENDMENT) ACT, 2023 AND THE DRAFT DIGITAL COMPETITION BILL

Author(s):
SHREAY AGRAWAL PRIYAVARDHAN BALOT VINAY SACHDEV
Journal IJLRA
ISSN 2582-6433
Access Open Access
Volume 3
Issue 7
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Abstract

Traditional antitrust metrics measure market power through assets, turnover and price. Data-driven digital markets defeat these metrics: services are offered at a zero price, value lies in users and data rather than revenue, and network effects cause markets to tip rapidly toward a single winner. Ex-post investigations by the Competition Commission of India (‘CCI’) are correspondingly slow; the Google Android investigation ran for more than three years before a final order, and appeals followed. India has responded in two ways. The Competition (Amendment) Act 2023 upgrades the existing law by introducing a deal value threshold for merger control, global turnover penalties, statutory recognition of hub-and-spoke cartels, and settlement and commitment procedures. The Draft Digital Competition Bill 2024 proposes a parallel ex-ante regime for Systemically Significant Digital Enterprises, modelled on the European Union’s Digital Markets Act. Using doctrinal research, this paper analyses the notified provisions of the 2023 Amendment and the text of the draft Bill against constitutional benchmarks and comparative regimes in the European Union and the United Kingdom. The paper argues that the 2023 Amendment successfully modernises traditional enforcement, most notably by closing the killer acquisition loophole, though the ‘substantial business operations’ test may catch domestic targets more readily than foreign ones. It remains, however, structurally too slow for digital markets, which justifies an ex-ante regime. Yet by imposing absolute prohibitions without an effects-based defence, the draft Bill risks over-regulation and may chill domestic innovation in the pursuit of curbing foreign incumbents. The paper recommends a countervailing benefits defence, calibrated thresholds, a regulatory dialogue mechanism and an absolute user floor for the deal value threshold.

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Authors: SHREAY AGRAWAL, PRIYAVARDHAN BALOT & VINAY SACHDEVRegistration ID: 1013303 | Published Paper ID: IJLRA13313, IJLRA13314 & IJLRA13315Year: Oct-2026 | Volume: 3 | Issue: 7Approved ISSN: 2582-6433 | Country: Delhi, IndiaPage No.: 676- 692

Article Information

CATCHING THE DIGITAL LEVIATHANS: KILLER ACQUISITIONS AND ALGORITHMIC CARTELS: ASSESSING THE EFFICACY OF THE COMPETITION (AMENDMENT) ACT, 2023 AND THE DRAFT DIGITAL COMPETITION BILL

Authors: SHREAY AGRAWAL, PRIYAVARDHAN BALOT, VINAY SACHDEV

  • Journal IJLRA
  • ISSN 2582-6433
  • Volume 3
  • Issue 7
Citation Download Paper Full Details Search on Google Search on Google Scholar

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International Journal for Legal Research and Analysis

  • AbbreviationIJLRA
  • ISSN2582-6433
  • AccessOpen Access
  • LicenseCC 4.0

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