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An analysis on Law of Sedition & the ambiguity of its jurisdiction along with juxtaposition of Article 19(1)(a).
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An analysis on Law of
Sedition & the ambiguity of its jurisdiction along with juxtaposition of
Article 19(1)(a).
Authored By - K. Sumanth
ABSTRACT:
The
judicial understanding of sedition in relation to freedom of speech and
expression reflects the evolution of the judiciary's attitude over time. It is
alarming that this law, Section 124-A of the Indian Penal Code, which was
implemented during the Colonial era to stifle freedom movements and punish
freedom fighters, is still used arbitrarily. Applying a sedition law
arbitrarily goes against the fundamental principles of constitutionalism
because the rule of law already exists in our nation. The question I would like
to answer through this research paper does the safeguarding of power,
therefore, justify the neglect or suppression of Article 19 (1)(a), and whether
this is not a transgression of democratic principles The judiciary has been the
torchbearer for resolving legal conflicts. Apart from the vagueness of
restrictions connected to sedition, it has reduced the scope of the offence of
sedition in order to protect freedom of speech and expression, which has time
and again been determined to be a necessary feature in a democratic setup. The
law has been used in a variety of ways to restrict freedom of speech and
expression in India which is vague as free speech is the soul of a democratic
country. These prohibitions traverse all cultural, religious and political
boundaries.
Key Words: Sedition,
Article 19(1)(a), Democratic Principles, Judiciary.
Introduction:
Section
124-A of the Indian Penal Code states that "whoever brings or attempts to
bring into hatred or contempt, or stimulates or attempts to inspire
disaffection against, the Government constituted by law, by words, either
spoken or written, or signs, or visible representation, or otherwise."[1]
Problem
in the sedition law is that it is uncertain about its jurisdiction and it
contacting authority regarding the article 19(1)(a) which is leading to the
growing instances that this law has been weaponized as a convenient tool
against political circumstances to suppress & Descent free speech.
Therefore
it is contended that there is an ambiguity in the jurisdiction of sedition law
and it is supressing the democratic principles under article 19(1)(a) which
places the basic freedom of the citizen and the democracy in Jeopardy.
The
main objective of this research is to understand whether the law has been
misused by the government authorities and people in power. Has there been any
ambiguity in the jurisdiction of law to which there is an infringement of the
freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by the Indian Constitution. Another thing to think about is whether or
whether article 19(2) overuses the word "sedition" and, if so, in
what context. The legal advisory committee stated that sedition as defined by
the Indian Penal Code didn't require any anticipation or tendency to actuate
disorder, thus on the one hand, we agreed that sedition was a crime against the
public peace and that it was somehow connected to a public concern. To define
the concept of the Law of Sedition, to analyse the contemporary legal
challenges to the Law of Sedition critically, to recommend and offer ways to
ensure that the Law of Sedition is enforced correctly for the benefit of the
average person.
In
Kedar Nath v. State of Bihar[2] the Court upheld the
constitutionality of Sec 124-A of the Indian Penal Code. Only activities that
promote violence or disorder are punishable under this section, according to
the judgement; acts lacking this tendency are not. Section 124-A of the Indian Penal
Code does not contravene Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution.
Attempts
to arouse disaffection were regarded similarly, whether successful or not. As a
result, even if a person only sought to incite emotions, they could be held
guilty. This clause does not apply to comments that indicate dissatisfaction
with administrative or other government acts but do not provoke or attempt to
inspire hatred, contempt, or alienation. Approval is the inverse of
disapproval.[3] Even if one disagrees with a
man's ideas or actions, one may still admire him. Thus, sedition and treason
are logically related.
Background of the Law:
Law
of sedition has a conflicting authority regarding freedom of speech and
expression. The natural right theory of John Locke explains that people are
equal and have a set of inalienable natural rights. The fundamental natural
rights include the right to question the government and the right to free and
independent ideas, right to life liberty and property thus the natural law
theory complains with current sedition laws which is giving its citizens with
the aforementioned right i.e. the ability to question the government.[4] But the sedition law in
addition to the aspects discussed in the theory will cover a broad range of
activities, including hosting public gatherings, establishing clubs and unions,
holding demonstrations, etc.
In
the past, numerous Indians have been accused of violating the law. Bal Ganga
Dhar Tilak and Mahatma Gandhi, two prominent freedom fighters, are accused of
violating the Sedition Act. Provision 124-A of the Indian Penal Code was
established in 1870 after the British provincial government realised it needed
a distinct section to address the breach. In the Queen-Empress v. Tilak case,[5] Bal Gangadhar Tilak was
charged with sedition for publishing a newspaper article about the Maratha
warrior Shivaji that advocated his revolt against the British government. This
case clarified what is meant by "disaffection." Disaffection is
described as any form of hostility directed at the government, including
hatred, dislike, antagonism, and contempt. The term "disloyalty" may
be the most appropriate because it encompasses all forms of antagonism toward
the government. Section 124A of the IPC was altered in 1989 as a result of the
case's verdict, and the interpretation was changed from disloyalty and
antagonism to sedition. In Queen-Empress v. Ramchandra Narayan[6] and Queen-Empress v. Amba
Prasad,[7] the Tilak ruling was
followed.
“The
following are the significant distinctions between the current and the
abolished provisions:
(1)
The section's explanation is no longer included.
(2)
The offence carries harsher penalties.
(3)
In the past, encouraging or attempting to encourage animosity or hatred between
classes was illegal. Promoting or attempting to foment animosity or hostility
amongst various castes, communities, racial groups, or religious groups is now
illegal. It is important that when naming various groups, the language of the
modified section does not include the qualifiers "of citizen."
(4)
Any conduct that a person commits that is detrimental to the upkeep of harmony
between castes, communities, racial or linguistic groupings, or that disturbs
the peace of the public, is punished.”[8]
Constituitionality of IPC
Section 124-A :
After
the Indian Constitution went into effect, section 124-A of the Indian Penal
Code, 1860, was challenged on the grounds that it violated Article 19(1)(a) of
the Constitution's basic right to freedom of speech and expression. Every
citizen has the right to freedom of speech and expression under Article
19(1)(a) of the Constitution. Concerning the justifications for acceptable
restrictions, see Article 19(2).
There,
sedition is not considered as a justification for legitimate limits. The
question now is whether the IPC's Section 124-A puts reasonable limitations on
the freedom of speech and expression protected by the Constitution's Article
19(1)(a). Furthermore, it was contended that the definition of sedition was
ambiguous and that including it in the Constitution would complicate matters.
The legitimacy of this section was restored after the Constitution went into
effect.
Ramesh
Thapar v. State of Madras[9] was heard by the Supreme
Court. The petitioner argued before the Supreme Court that the injunction
prohibiting the publication of his paper 'Crossroads' was unconstitutional.
Roads'
by the Madras State since it violated his fundamental right to freedom of
movement. Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution grants him the right to free
speech and expression. It was held that because clause (2) of Article 19 allows
the imposition of restrictions on freedom of speech and expression only in
cases where there is a danger to public security, an enactment that can be
applied in cases where no such danger exists cannot be held to be
constitutional or valid to any extent. Finally, the Supreme Court granted the
petitioner's application under Article 32 of the Constitution and overturned
Madras State's order forbidding the entry and circulation of the paper in the
state.
In
Tara Singh Gopi Chand v. State of Punjab,[10]
272 section 124-A of the IPC was declared illegal for violating the freedom of
speech and expression granted by Article 19(1). (a). The Court also declared
India to be a sovereign democratic state. Government can depart and be caused
to go without jeopardising the state's foundation. A sedition statute, while
important during the period of foreign rule, has become ineffective due to the
nature of the change that has occurred. The Constitutional First Amendment) Act
of 1951 amended Article 19(2) to include the phrases "in the interest
of" and "public order" in order to avoid the constitutional
issues that arose as a result of the preceding cases. This included legislative
limitations on the freedom of speech and expression.
In
Ram Nandan v. State of Uttar Pradesh,[11]
the court determined that section 124-A of the IPC imposed restrictions on
freedom of expression that were not in the best interests of the general
public, thereby infringing this fundamental right. As a result, it concluded
that section 124-A is unconstitutional since it cannot be justified by the
expression "in the sake of public order."
In
Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar,[12]
274 in 1962, the Supreme Court overturned this decision and ruled that the
sedition act was valid. The Court made a distinction between "the
Government created by law" and "persons for the moment being engaged
in carrying out the administration" while affirming the judgment's
legitimacy. The Court made a clear distinction between betraying one's
allegiance to the government and criticising its policies without causing a
commotion by using force. The State's outward sign was intended to stand in for
the latter. Any attempt to overthrow the legitimate government would jeopardise
the State's continued existence. Any fair criticism of government officials. It
will not be a crime under this rule to endeavour to improve the functioning of
the government. According to the Supreme Court, the essence of the crime of
sedition is acts that have the "effect of overthrowing the
government." According to the Supreme Court, "a citizen has the right
to say or write or express in any other way, whatever he wants about the
Government or its measures in the form of criticism or comment, so long as he
does not incite people to violently oppose the Government established by law or
with the intent to cause public disorder."
The
primary criminal code in India is the Indian Penal Code, 1860. It is a thorough
code that aims to cover all important areas of criminal law. This Act's goal is
to give India a comprehensive penal law. 46 The Act does not repeal the
criminal laws that were in place in India when it came into effect, despite not
having that as its primary goal. This is because not all offences are included
in the Code, and it is possible that some offences may still have been
committed but were not included in the Code since they were not meant to be
free from punishment.
The reasons for why Indian
Penal Code needs reforms:
India's
primary criminal code is the Indian Penal Code of 1860. It is a comprehensive
code intended to address the core concepts of criminal law This Act aims to establish India's general
penal code. Although not the initial step as the criminal laws that were in
force at the time of passage are not repealed by the Act, being implemented in
India This was because the Code did not contain all of the breaches, some of
which might still not have been covered by the Code. It wasn't meant to be a
way to avoid punishment.
Despite
the fact that this Code codifies the entirety of the applicable legal framework
and is exhaustive with regard to the subjects it declares to be governed by the
law, numerous additional criminal legislation controlling a variety of offences
have been enacted in addition to the code. The Indian Penal Code of 1860 has
five hundred and eleven sections and is organised into twenty-three Chapters.
The Code begins.
with
an introduction, offers justifications for any exceptions made, and addresses a
variety of offences. Thus, Chapter 6 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, also
contains sections that specify offences against the state or nation and their
associated penalties.
Despite
the fact that the Criminal Procedure Regulation was developed by the British in
1862 as a general rule. With the passage of the Evidence Act in 1872, it was
finished in terms of criminal justice. The efficacy of the Code of Criminal
Procedure has been improved via multiple revisions. The Law Commission made a
number of recommendations to improve the Criminal Procedure Code when it gained
independence. The abolition of jury trials was one of these modifications, and
the main goal of these reforms was to speed up and improve the efficiency of
the criminal justice system. In 1973, Parliament ultimately passed the Code of
Criminal Procedure, which has subsequently undergone multiple revisions.
Implementation of the law:
The
use of Section 66A to arrest people for posting (and liking) Facebook comments,
for critical political speech, and other offences has gained it some notoriety
recently. The English Communications Act, whose reach has been drastically
reduced following claims of abuse, served as the primary inspiration for much
of Section 66A. Its original intent was to combat spam and online harassment.
It hardly needs to be said again that its execution has greatly exceeded its
intended goal. Beyond ineffective execution, there is a compelling argument for
the Court to declare at least a portion of Section 66A illegal since it
infringes on the right to free speech guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) of the
Constitution.
Section
66A makes it illegal to send "any electronic mail or electronic mail
message for the purpose of causing annoyance or inconvenience" via a
computer resource or communication device, as well as to send "any
electronic mail or electronic mail message for the purpose of causing annoyance
or inconvenience" (S. 66A(a)). One of the elements of the offence is thus
online communication that is "grossly insulting,"
"menacing," or causes "annoyance" or
"inconvenience."
The
Allahabad High Court had to intervene to save Arun Jaitley after he posted on
Facebook that he disagreed with a Supreme Court ruling. According to an Uttar
Pradesh magistrate in the Mahoba district who made the decision to initiate a
sedition case and issue summonses against Jaitley, no one has the authority to
disobey a Supreme Court decision.
However,
the Allahabad High Court quashed the accusation and summons against Jaitley on
the grounds that they did not adhere to section 124A of the IPC. There are
serious consequences when a criminal inquiry starts. It affects a citizen's
life and freedom and has major repercussions. As a result, when exercising
authority, the magistrate must apply judicial judgement.[13]
The
following adjustments to India's Law of Sedition could be introduced, according
to the 42nd Law Commission Report 1971:
(1)
Given the controversy concerning the function of purpose in S.124A, an
amendment that establishes a casual link between the words and the security and
safety of the state should be enacted. The Mens Rea should be expressed as
"intentionally or consciously intending or knowing it (the words or
representatives in question) to jeopardise India's or any State's integrity or
security or to incite public discontent."
(2)
In situations where a verbal assault on the Constitution, the Legislature, or
the administration of justice was brought under the purview of this Section,
the Law Commission also backed the English rule. Desecration of the National
Anthem, Flag, or Constitution was also recommended as a new Section that would
constitute a felony.
(3)
The Law Commission thought the punishment Section, which only permits
imprisonment for a maximum of three years or for life, was unusual. It
suggested a maximum prison term of seven years, with the alternative of a fine.
The
place where the sedition was written, uttered, published by the authorities, or
with the consent of the accused is where the crime was committed. The process
adheres to the analogy of slander in this regard as well. A violation of this
section is a cognizable offence. It is triable by the Court of Session and is
neither bailable nor compoundable.
To be
found guilty under section 124-A, it must be shown that the accused used the
disputed words to
(a)
incite or attempt to incite hatred or contempt,
(b)
excite or attempt to excite disaffection, and
(c)
direct that disaffection towards the Government recognised by Indian law.
Abuse of the law of sedition
in the twentieth century:
In
the twenty-first century, the number of erroneous sedition charges has
increased, and the legislation is increasingly being exploited as a political
tool to stifle legitimate protests against the government. Despite the fact
that the accused were simply exercising their right to free speech and
expression, multiple cases and F.I.R.s were brought against them under section
124-A of the IPC. No particular data or information about the number of
sedition-related arrests or cases has been made available on purpose. However,
it remains true that section 124-A of the IPC has been and continues to be
abused. The meaning of sedition, which is the iterated thought in each
scenario, is determined by the manner in which the law is employed by the user.
State authorities, civil society organisations, ideological groups, and
ordinary citizens are constantly redefining the boundaries of sedition. Sedition
today can range from supporting a rival cricket team to engaging in acts of
terrorism and war, as evidenced by this formation.
Observation on Abuse Of
Sedition Laws
through case laws:
In
the case of Dr. Vinayak Binayak Sen v. State of Chhattisgarh,[14] a similar position was
held. This case is a great example of how the statute of sedition has been
abused by the government to silence genuine criticism. In this instance, the
police apprehended businessman Piyush Guha, one of the accused. At the time of
his detention, the police said he was in possession of a considerable quantity
of material meant to stimulate naxalite activity, and they confiscated these
papers. Letters were delivered to Piyush Guha by Binayak Sen, who had obtained
them from Narayan Sanyal during a jailhouse meeting. Piyush Guha was instructed
to transmit the letters to the secret code numbers indicated in the letters.
The police detained Binayak Sen for being a member of an illegal group,
providing assistance to a terrorist organisation, and assisting an illegal
organisation. He was further charged with sedition. A trial court convicted him
of sedition and sentenced him to life in jail. Sen's bail motion was denied by
the High Court of Chhattisgarh on the grounds that he posed a danger to
national security, and his conviction was affirmed. The High Court determined
that Sen was in possession of materials that aimed to stir hate and
dissatisfaction against the legal government. And the right to freedom of
speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) must be used appropriately and
does not include the right to cause public unrest or disruption of law and
order. Sen filed a plea for special leave with the Supreme Court in response to
the High Court of Chhattisgarh's denial of bail. Binayak Sen was given bail and
his sentence was suspended by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court provided no
explanation for the ruling. Several recent analyses have speculated on the
order's rationale. In the same way that simple possession of Mahatma Gandhi's autobiography
does not make a person a Gandhian, the possession of Naxal literature does not
constitute a person a Naxalite who would be guilty of sedition.
In
the case Sanskar Marathe v. State of Maharashtra and Others,[15] Aseem Trivedi, a
24-year-old award-winning cartoonist, was charged under sections 124-A of the
Indian Penal Code, 66 of the Information Technology Act, and of the Prevention
of National Honour Act. He produced cartoons criticising and lampooning
government corruption. The Bombay High Court ruled that accusations of sedition
under section 124-A of the Indian Penal Code seek to criminalise only those
actions that are intended or likely to cause unrest or disruption of public
peace by the use of violence. The Court ruled that a person has the freedom to
criticise or remark on the Government or its policies as long as he does not
promote violence against the legal government or intend to create public
disturbance. The purpose of this provision is to criminalise only those
behaviours that are intended or likely to cause unrest or disruption of public
peace by the use of force. Consequently, it is evident that the provisions of
section 124 A of the IPC cannot be invoked to punish the criticism of persons
currently engaged in administration or the use of strong language to express
disapproval of government measures in an effort to improve and alter them
through lawful means. Cartoonist Aseem Trivedi's section 124A charges were
subsequently dismissed. The court said that the State Home Department must offer
recommendations to the police as prerequisites for using section 124A of the
Indian Penal Code only if an act incited violence or disrupted public order. In
addition, a written legal opinion with justifications must be given before any
allegation of sedition may be imposed.
This
was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in its 1983 case Balbir Singh v. State of
U.P.[16] The Supreme Court
determined that listening to talks does not constitute such an activity. There
was no evidence indicating that anybody who listened to remarks attempted to
aid, advocate, advise, or enable the commission of a crime.
In a
similar case involving processions advocating for a separate Khalistan state,
the Chandigarh High Court overturned the conviction of a Dal Khalsa member who had
been jailed by a lower court under sections 124A and 153 of the Indian Penal
Code. The Court determined that mere words do not constitute the crime of
sedition unless they seek to cause disruption or disturb the public peace via
the use of violence. In another contentious case, Simranjeet Singh Mann v.
Union of India[17] , the president of the
Shromani Akali Dal-Amritsar, Simranjit Singh Mann, was accused with four
separate counts of sedition. As the Senior Superintendent of Police in
Faridkot, he was charged of spreading pro-Khalistan propaganda and aiding
Bhindranwale and his followers by supplying weaponry. His name was also linked
to the murder of former Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. The Supreme Court
ruled that the mere chanting of slogans does not constitute sedition, hence the
Section 124A case should be dismissed.
In
Gurjatinder Pal Singh v. State of Punjab,[18]
the accused petitioned the Punjab and Haryana High Court to invalidate the FIR
lodged against him under sections 124A and 153B of the Indian Penal Code. In
this lawsuit, the petitioner advocated for the construction of a buffer state
known as Khalistan and referred to the Constitution of India as a
"useless" document. The High Court referenced the Supreme Court's
ruling in Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab and ruled that the accused's casual
shouting of certain slogans without the intent to cause disturbance did not
violate sections 124A and 153B of the Indian Penal Code.
In
Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v. State of Andhra Pradesh,[19]
the Supreme Court noted the cavalier way in which the lower court had imposed
the penalty under section 124-A of the Indian Penal Code. Bilal Ahmed Kaloo was
allegedly an active member of 'Al-Jehad,' a terrorist group whose mission was
to free Kashmir from the Indian Union. The allegations against him were that he
incited communal enmity among Muslim youngsters in Hyderabad and forced them to
undertake military training. It was also stated that he was spreading the
rumour that the Indian Army was cruelly treating Kashmiri Muslims. He was
arrested and charged under sections 124-A, 153A, and 505(2) of the
International Penal Code, sections 3(3), 4(4), and 5 of the Terrorists and
Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, and section 25 of the Arms Act.
Regarding the violation of section 124-A of the Indian Penal Code, the court
cited the Kedar Nath Singh case. Since there was no accusation that Bilal Ahmed
Kaloo acted against the government in the indictment, the conviction under
section 124-A of the Indian Penal Code was deemed invalid. The court convicted
him of violating the Arms Act but acquitted him of violating the Indian Penal
Code.
In
Nazir Khan v. State of Delhi,[20] the defendant Nazir Khan
was a member of militant groups like Jamet-e-Islamic and Al-e-Hadees. He took
part in terrorist actions in India. He abducted two visitors to India and
sought the release of 10 terrorists in exchange for the foreigners. The trial
court convicted the defendants and claimed that they attempted to 'overwhelm'
the Government of India with illegal force, as well as incite hate and
discontent among a segment of the Indian populace against the Government.
The
Supreme Court determined that the purpose of sedition is to promote discontent
and rebellion, stir up hostility to the government, and cast the administration
of justice into disrepute, and that the very nature of sedition is to inspire
the people to revolt. The crime of sedition has therefore been "clearly
established."
In P.
J. Manual v. State of Kerala,[21] the Kerala High Court noted
that in a contemporary democracy, it must be determined whether the printing or
preaching of protest, or even challenging the basis or structure of government,
may be imputed as "provoking disaffection against the government."
The elements of the sedition offence must be evaluated in accordance with both
the text and the spirit of the Constitution.
In
another case, Bharat Desai v. State of Gujarat,[22]
in which a journalist was charged with sedition for publishing an article
exposing the ties between the Police Commissioner and Latif, the Mafia Don, the
court reached the same conclusion. On the basis of various confessions recorded
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the claims were made. The defendant
petitioned the High Court to dismiss the sedition proceedings. The Gujarat High
Court dismissed the sedition allegations on the basis that the content of the
reports did not constitute sedition.
In
Javed Habibi v. State (National Capital Territory of Delhi),[23] the publisher and editors
of a newspaper were charged for publishing an article in which the author
alleged that former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and Atal Bihari Vajpayee had
conspired against Muslims and that Muslims were being treated unfairly. The
High Court ruled that opposing the Prime Minister or his activities or
criticising the government's conduct cannot be constituted sedition under
section 124-A of the Indian Penal Code. Critique of the government is the
defining characteristic of democracy.
Additionally,
courts have repeatedly determined that criminal schemes and terrorist
activities do not constitute sedition.
In
Mohd. Yaqub v. State of West Bengal (1992),[24]
the Calcutta High Court noted the element of sedition decided in the Kedar Nath
case and concluded that criminal plots and acts of terrorism did not constitute
sedition. The high evidence requirements were therefore not fulfilled, and the
offender was not found guilty.
The
Supreme Court applied the Court's judgement in Kedar Nath and ruled that the
prosecution must provide adequate evidence to establish that the defendant
committed a seditious act. In addition, the court acquitted the accused of
sedition on the grounds that the prosecution had failed to provide sufficient
evidence to show that they had done a seditious conduct.
State
of Chhattisgarh v. Asit Kumar Sen Gupta,[25]
Asit Kumar belonged to the proscribed communist party of India (Maoist). He was
accused under section 124-A of the Indian Penal Code for encouraging and urging
others to join a proscribed organisation. He intended to foment armed
insurrection against the present "capitalist" government. In reaching
its determination, the High Court referenced the Supreme Court's ruling in
Raghubir Singh v. State of Bihar,[26] in which the Supreme Court
declared that the accused need not be the originator of seditious material in
order to be charged with sedition. Under section 124A of the Indian Penal Code,
just disseminating or distributing seditious materials may render a person
guilty.
Conclusion:
The
goal of this research is to address the current pervasive abuse of the
legislation of sedition in the country and around the world. Freedom of Speech
and Expression has been elevated to the highest level, as it is recognised as
the most important right in the process of an individual's self-development.
It's like a never-ending asset that no one wants to give up. The conflict
between the law of sedition and freedom of speech and expression is escalating
to the point where our governments are being pressed to reconsider the law of
sedition in the twenty-first century.
Free
speech is the exchange of an essential commodity, namely ideas. Hocking has
said that if a guy had an idea, it was not a capital asset. He feels the want
to give it out and spread it everywhere, knowing that whatever he gives, he
retains. According to Hocking, "the destiny of private thinking is to
acquire influence and power through influencing public conduct or public
action." Nothing exemplifies human failure more than a guy who is
physically productive but whose thoughts are worthless to his group or time.
The most severe result of speech repression would be the mental sterilisation
of the citizens and not permitting free expression of their ideologies and
perspectives. The social interest in free speech and expression is predicated
on the notion that without expression, there would be no society, as
communication is the core of social activity.
[1] Section 124-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
[2] A.I.R 1962 S C 955.
[3]India Today web desk, “Indian Sedition Law: What is it
and what does it say”, February 16, 2016, available at: https://www.indiatoday.in/education-today/gk-current-affairs/story/indian-sedition-law309015-2016-02-16( last visited on 18th March, 2018 at 4:21PM).
[4] John Locke, Locke's Theory of Revolutionary Action,
The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Sep., 1963), pp. 548-568 (21
pages).
[5] Queen Empress v. Bal Ganga Dhar Tilak (1897) 22 BOM
112.
[7] ILR (1897) 20
All 55.
[8] Janaki Bakhle, Savarkar (1883–1966), Sedition and
Surveillance: the rule of law in a colonial situation, Pages 51-75 | Published
online: 12 Feb 2010.
[9] AIR 1950 SC 124
[10] 1951 Cri LJ 449
[11] AIR 1959 All 101
[12] Supra note 2 at 12.
[13] Arun Jaitely v. State of Uttar Pradesh, Application
s/s 482 No. 32703 of 2015.
[14] 2011 (266) ELT 193 (Chhattisgarh).
[15] 2015 Cri.LJ 3561.
[16] AIR 2000 SC 464.
[17] AIR 1993 SC 298.
[18] (2009) 3SCR (Cri) 224.
[19] (1997) Supreme Today 127.
[20] (2003) 8 SCC
461.
[22] Cri. Misc App. 7536 of 2008 (Guj) (unreported).
[23] (2007) 6 DRJ 693.
[24] (2004) 4CH 406.
[25] Cri. App No. 86 of 2011.
[26] (1986) 4 SCC 481.
Article Information
An analysis on Law of Sedition & the ambiguity of its jurisdiction along with juxtaposition of Article 19(1)(a).
Authors: K. Sumanth
- Journal IJLRA
- ISSN 2582-6433
- Published 2023/04/04
- Volume 2
- Issue 7
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International Journal for Legal Research and Analysis
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