WHITHER THE LOOK EAST POLICY BY - RISHABH VYAS
WHITHER THE LOOK EAST POLICY
AUTHORED BY - RISHABH VYAS
India and Southeast Asia 331 Whither the Look East
Policy:
India and Southeast Asia G.V.C. Naidu
Abstract India’s policy with Southeast Asia, which took a distinctive shape
since the early 1990s in the form of the Look East policy, has been a
multipronged approach encompassing political, strategic and economic aspects.
Apart from establishing institutional linkages with ASEAN and strengthening
bilateral relations with its member states, especially in the field of defence,
India has been an enthusiastic participant and supporter of multilateralism in
Asia-Pacific. While this policy has so far been reasonably successful, a new
phase has begun with the ASEAN Plus One Summit meetings underscoring the
growing importance of India to Southeast Asia and vice versa. The other major
aspects is that India has become a vital part of the larger Asia-Pacific
strategic landscape. — * — A prominent foreign policy initiative that India has
undertaken in the postCold War period is the so-called Look East policy.
Initiated in the early 1990s against the backdrop of a struggling economy and
the sudden disappearance of the Cold War framework, it is a diplomatic success
story by any yardstick. A clutch of new agreements to counter terrorism and to
create a Free Trade region between India and ASEAN and accession to the Treaty
of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) has occured during the ASEAN Bali Summit Meeting
in October 2003. The Look East policy appears now to be poised for a major take
off. Defence cooperation agreements with a number of countries and regular
joint military exercises have taken place. Also, regular top-level political
exchanges. Further, bilateral free trade agreements are to be finalised soon
with Singapore and Thailand. India appears to be well poised to acquire a key
place in AsiaPacific affairs. Revised paper received on April 26, 2004
Strategic Analysis, Vol. 28, No. 2, Apr-Jun 2004 © Institute for Defence
Studies and Analyses 332 Strategic Analysis/Apr-Jun 2004 In the Cold War days
most of the then ASEAN countries perceived India to be in the camp of the
former Soviet Union. Apart from Vietnam to an extent, there was very little
political interaction of consequence except normal and ‘correct’ relations.
Strategic links were virtually non-existent and economic bonds were of low
importance. Against this background, the progress that India has made in
cultivating multifaceted relationships with ASEAN and its member states is
remarkable. Though policy-makers in the Ministry of External Affairs claim that
the Look East policy encompasses the entire Asia-Pacific, the primary focus
undoubtedly has been on Southeast Asia. The fact that the Indian Prime Minister
Atal Bihari Vajpayee has made the largest number of visits to this region –
five in about three years to seven out of the ten countries1 — is the clearest
political signal that India has sent that its relations with Southeast Asia are
very important. To emphasise the economic aspects, India has signed a framework
agreement during the Bali summit in 2003 to create a Free Trade and Investments
Area with ASEAN by 2016 and an apex body, the Federation of Indian Chamber of
Commerce and Industry, has begun to hold India-ASEAN Business Summit meetings
since 2002 to encourage greater private sector participation. Relations with
Myanmar too have taken off, overcoming the earlier problems. At a time when the
ASEAN leadership wishes to look beyond ASEAN, India is perceived as an economic
and strategic partner for regional peace, stability and prosperity. Since there
is no tangible evidence to suggest that India has factored in the developments
at the Asia-Pacific level to formulate its policy, it appears the Look East
policy, as it has been followed since its initiation in the early 1990s, is
primarily focused on Southeast Asia. The objectives appear to be three-fold:
One, to institutionalise linkages with ASEAN and its affiliates (Dialogue
Partnership, ASEAN Plus One Summit Meetings and membership on the ARF); two, to
strengthen bilateral relationships with member states of ASEAN; and three, to
carve a suitable place for itself so that Southeast Asia will not come under
the influence any one major power, especially China. At the same time, it needs
to be emphasized that New Delhi wants to project the image that its Look East
policy is not related to China’s growing involvement in Southeast Asia. In any
case, it can be said that the Look East policy has played a vital role in
enabling India to become one of the major powers of the Asia Pacific. Today no
discussion on political or strategic or economic aspect is complete without
mentioning India. Whither the Look East Policy: India and Southeast Asia 333
Backdrop India has geographical proximity to Southeast Asia, sharing its
maritime boundary with at least three countries — India’s second longest border
(land and maritime together) is with Myanmar — the closeness of Andaman and
Nicobar Islands in the Bay of Bengal to Southeast Asia than to mainland India
and the fact that southern Indian tip is astride some of the most important sea
lanes of communication in the Indian Ocean, connecting Southeast Asia (and East
Asia) with West Asia and Europe through which nearly 40 per cent of the world’s
trade passes through. However, Southeast Asia was hardly a high foreign policy
priority to India till recently. India’s association with Southeast Asia can be
traced back to ancient times. No other country has influenced the region as
much as India by way of religion, language, culture and civilisation. There is
also enormous historical evidence to suggest that there were flourishing
economic and cultural relations between India and the countries of Southeast
Asia in the pre-colonial era. While these links were disrupted during the
colonial interlude, the freedom struggles in India and many countries of
Southeast Asia have led to the rediscovery of each other. Much before India
attained independence in August 1947, the leadership envisioned the future
importance of Southeast Asia and India’s involvement. Even the strategic significance
of Southeast Asia caught the attention of a leading Indian strategic thinker
who argued that the “Gulf of Malacca is like the mouth of a crocodile, the
Peninsula of Malaya being the upper and the jutting end of Sumatra the lower
jaw. The entry to the Gulf can be controlled by the Nicobars and the narrow end
is dominated by the island of Singapore.”2 Indian nationalist leaders convened
the Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi in March 1947 primarily to express
solidarity with the freedom struggles all across Southeast Asia. Equally
important was the Special Conference on Indonesia that was held in January 1949
which was attended by 15 nations and expressed support to the Sukarno-led armed
struggle against the Dutch colonial rule. In fact, it has been argued that
freedom struggles, especially in Indonesia and Vietnam, provided major inputs
in shaping the nascent Indian foreign policy in the late 1940s.3 Interestingly,
the Indian military trained the armed forces of Indonesia after it became
independent and Indonesia was the only country outside the Commonwealth with
which the Indian Navy held joint exercises. India’s neutralist/non-aligned
policy had considerable appeal in Southeast Asia even as the Cold War rivalry
began having an impact on the region. Due recognition 334 Strategic
Analysis/Apr-Jun 2004 was accorded to India’s stature as a regional power when
it was made the Chairman of the International Control Commission that was set
up under the 1954 Geneva Accord on Vietnam. The Afro-Asian Conference (also
called the Bandung Conference) in April 1955 was co-sponsored by India and was
a major turning point. But India’s interest in Southeast Asia dwindled with the
wars that India had to fight with China in 1962 and with Pakistan in 1965 and
1971.4 The war with China diluted Nehru’s vision of an alternative framework of
reference in world politics — the non-aligned movement. That policy, with minor
changes now and then, continued for the next two decades till the end of the
Cold War. Security concerns over-rode foreign policy. The distinct prospect of
facing simultaneous threats from Pakistan and China led India to move closer to
the Soviet Union. India’s credibility dented with the signing of the Treaty of
Friendship with the Soviet Union and in 1971. While India was trying to come to
terms with reality in South Asia and elsewhere, Southeast Asia was also
undergoing radical changes. The founding of ASEAN consisting of anti-communist
regimes and the intensification of US involvement in Indo-China led to polarisation
within Southeast Asia. In the aftermath of the oil shocks in the early 1970s,
India’s main concern was to secure uninterrupted oil supplies. Flush with
petrodollars, the economic opportunities in the West-Asian region also drew
India away from Southeast Asia. In the late 1970s and the early 1980s, India’s
attention was drawn again towards Southeast Asia. The February 1979 Chinese
attack on Vietnam to ‘teach a lesson’ for the latter’s military intervention in
Cambodia and overthrow of the pro-Beijing Pol Pot regime brought India and
Vietnam closer. India was the only non-communist country that recognised the
Heng Samrin government. The ASEAN offer of a ‘dialogue partnership’ in the
mid-1980s to dissuade India from extending diplomatic recognition to Cambodia
was seen to be strategically less advantageous and, hence, was not accepted.
Thus, much of India’s policy toward Southeast Asia in the 1980s appears to be
China-centric. Despite its best intentions and some half-hearted attempts to
find a solution to the fears of the Cambodian impasse, India could not shed its
pro-Soviet image. There was little that India could do to allay the fears of
the non-communist ASEAN nations about Indian intentions in Southeast Asia. It
was amidst these developments, that the expansion of the Indian Navy came under
focus because of perceptions Whither the Look East Policy: India and Southeast
Asia 335 that India along with the Soviet Union and Vietnam might make
concerted moves to check the growing Chinese influence in Southeast Asia,
particularly after the Soviets gained a foothold in the Cam Ranh Bay naval base
in Vietnam.5 This coincided with Indias acquisition of certain high profile
naval ships and systems. Although the first reaction came as far back as
mid-1986 when Indonesia protested against reported Indian moves to build a new
naval base in the Andaman and Great Nicobar Islands, 6 criticism of the Indian
Navy reached its peak in the late 1980s and early 1990s. From an ASEAN point of
view, a possible Indian naval role in the waterways connecting the Bay of
Bengal with East Asia appears to be of concern. These straits are important
international sea lanes of communication that form the main link between the
Indian and Pacific Oceans. Because of its close links with the Soviet Union and
Vietnam, it was feared that this trio could undermine the Chinese role, and to
a lesser extent, even the American role in Southeast Asia.7 ASEAN’s second
worry was a possible clash of maritime spheres of influence between India and China.
Perceptions of India as a fast growing military power interested in extending
influence beyond South Asia remained even after the end of the Cold War by the
early 1990s. Acquisition of the second aircraft carrier from the UK, a TU-142
MR long-range maritime reconnaissance aircraft, modern Kilo-class conventional
submarines from the Soviet Union, and the expansion of naval facilities at the
Andamans in the Bay of Bengal, was seen to be an attempt to acquire power
projection capabilities and an ability to control Malacca and other crucial
straits in the region. Different concerns also began emerging in Southeast Asia
due to the Soviet withdrawal from Vietnam and US intent to downsize its
presence in the Philippines. Once again, possible Indian motives and its
military potential to extend its reach into Southeast Asia became a subject of
considerable debate. These were the circumstances that prompted policy-makers
in New Delhi to make concerted moves to allay the fears in Southeast Asia. The
new government under the leadership of P.V. Narasimha Rao, and opening up of
the economy, helped to put in place a new policy framework. Although Rao has
been credited with the Look East policy, one can trace its roots to the
initiatives tken by the Indian Navy in the late 1980s. Economics and politics
were added to these incentives. 336 Strategic Analysis/Apr-Jun 2004 Post-Cold
War Period Probably, India never felt more isolated in its neighbourhood since
independence than during the mid-to-late 1980s at the regional and global
level.8 It is important to note a few significant changes that were made to
adjust the foreign policy orientation to suit the changed circumstances. Apart
from re-tuning the non-alignment-centred policy, serious attempts were made to
mesh foreign policy priorities with security concerns. Second, in order to give
a greater economic orientation to the foreign policy, a separate cell, called
the Economic Division, was created, headed by a senior bureaucrat in the
Ministry of External Affairs. Third, special efforts were initiated aimed at
assuaging the concerns of the smaller neighbours in South Asia.9 Last but not
the least, the Look East policy aimed at greater economic alignment with, and
political role in, the dynamic Asia-Pacific region in general and Southeast
Asia in particular, was put in place. It became apparent that, outside South
Asia, India saw Southeast Asia as the only region where politico-strategic and
economic conditions offered an opportunity to play a role for itself. It was
against this background that one could see a dramatic transformation in India’s
approach and policies toward Southeast Asia. Refurbishing India’s image as a
responsible power and convincing ASEAN that it had greater stake in peace and
stability rather than merely extending its influence to fill the so-called
power vacuum in Southeast Asia, became important. The emergence of ASEAN as an
autonomous regional influence and the phenomenal economic success the
memberstates achieved, further added to the urgency. By then, ASEAN too was
responsive to Indian initiatives particularly since the organisation faced the
trauma of an uncertain future in the post-Cold War atmosphere of political
flux. The earlier Cold War image of ASEAN and India belonging to different
political camps in the global bipolar system dissipated removing major
obstacles. The strategic divide that segregated India from the ASEAN bloc of
nations also disappeared so that ASEAN could appreciate, understand and
positively respond to India’s overtures. Many ASEAN countries were also
attracted by the economic opportunities that a huge market like India offered.
The China factor too started weighing heavily in several ASEAN quarters
particularly after the closure of the US bases in the Philippines in 1992 and
the emergence of the South China Sea dispute, even as Beijing started asserting
its claims vociferously. Although India overtly loathed the idea of becoming a
counterbalancing power vis-à-vis China, it did not seem to be averse to the
idea of using Southeast Asian worries to advance its political and Whither the
Look East Policy: India and Southeast Asia 337 strategic interests. India was
particularly worried about the growing nexus between China and the
strategically located Myanmar. The Look East Policy A close scrutiny of India’s
Look East policy reveals that it was not simply meant to improve relations with
Southeast Asia but there were a number of other dimensions too. What started as
an attempt to assuage negative reaction to the Navy, the post-Cold War political
atmosphere offered an opportunity to include aspects political as well as
economic. The Look East policy was a multi-faceted and multi-pronged approach
to establish strategic links with many individual countries, evolve closer
political links with ASEAN, and develop strong economic bonds with the region.
Second, it was an attempt to carve a place for India in the larger Asia-
Pacific. Third, the Look East policy was also meant to showcase India’s
economic potential for investments and trade. In a way, this policy also
started influencing India’s foreign policy significantly. India, which had all
along been wary of regional multilateralism, was willing to actively
participate. Other interesting dimensions of this policy are exhibition of
greater sensitivity towards a large number of smaller countries of Southeast
Asia and a total volte-face with regard to its attitude toward Myanmar. Last
but not the least, the feeling of getting left out in the Asia Pacific, whether
it was the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) or the ASEAN
Post-Ministerial Conferences (ASEAN-PMC) with the Dialogue Partners of ASEAN,
which had emerged as the only forum to discuss regional issues. Although both
India and ASEAN refused to admit openly, the rise of China also played an
important role in the evolution of the Look East policy. The Look East policy
began with a lot of fanfare but it was not smooth sailing. One can discern
three distinct phases of this policy. The first phase marked enormous
enthusiasm and a flurry of activity and exchanges.10 By mid-1990s, there was
considerable cooling down of earlier zeal on both sides, which got further
dampened by the 1997-98 financial crisis. The third and the latest phase is the
revival of interest once again. The multi-dimensional approach and the progress
that India’s Look East policy has achieved are briefly explained below.
Political Relations The diplomatic strategy that was adopted appears two-fold.
First, after having realised that ASEAN is the focal point around which it would
have to rebuild its relationship, India’s primary objective was to become a
Dialogue Partner of ASEAN. Through intense diplomatic efforts, India was made a
Sectoral Dialogue 338 Strategic Analysis/Apr-Jun 2004 Partner of ASEAN in 1992
which got elevated to the status of Dialogue Partner during the Fifth ASEAN
Summit Meeting of 1995 “reflecting the growing ties between the two sides that
have developed in recent years.”11 Second, to target select ASEAN
member-nations for closer bilateral relations. Singapore has emerged by far as
the most important bilateral partner of India. Singapore was instrumental in
strongly supporting India’s case for Dialogue Partnership, membership in the
ARF and in the ASEAN Plus One summit meeting. Malaysia and Thailand were the other
countries. Malaysia was quite upbeat to begin with but lost interest gradually,
probably because of the lack of progress on the economic front. Thailand
preoccupied with Indochina and Myanmar, did not show much enthusiasm although
it was not averse to a greater Indian role in Southeast Asia. Strategic
Interaction Interestingly, it was on the defence and strategic front that India
has made impressive progress. In the Post-Cold War it became imperative for
India to dispel fears about its military expansion in an otherwise
traditionally nonhostile ASEAN region. Also, Southeast Asia itself witnessed a
sea change in the political atmosphere. The Cambodian issue was no longer
contentious and Vietnam was perceived as a potential ally rather than an enemy
by ASEAN. Nor could India’s military might in the emergent Asian balance of
power be ignored any longer. Contrary to the previous perception, the Southeast
Asian nations began to look upon India as a power that could play a kind of
‘balancing role’. It was in India’s interest to ensure that Southeast Asia
would not be dominated especially by China once it became obvious that the
superpowers would reduce their presence, which coincided with a similar
thinking within Southeast Asia. The upshot of the convergence of interests of
India and Southeast Asia was the genesis of a new strategic interaction with
several ASEAN nations. Criticism requiring the Indian navy’s ambitions were
replaced by many instances of defence cooperation between India and Southeast
Asia. A number of confidence building measures (CBMs) that India undertook and
greater appreciation of Indian maritime threats by the Southeast Asian
countries created a new era of cooperation which began to transcend the naval
contours. Perhaps, the most important were the joint naval exercises India
started holding periodically with Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore since 1991
near the Andamans. The Chief of the Naval Staff claimed that the ships visit
and communication exercises should dispel the apprehensions about any Indian
ulterior motives in Southeast Asia. Equally significant were the defence ties
that were being forged between India and many Southeast Asian Whither the Look
East Policy: India and Southeast Asia 339 countries. It was reported that
during the visit by the Malaysian Defence Minister, Najib Tun Abdul Razak in
March 1992, a wide range of defence ties was discussed. Prime Minister Mahathir
Mohammad indicated in an interview that the level of cooperation between
Malaysia and India would be upgraded with the Malaysian decision to buy the
Russian MiG-29 fighter aircraft. He explained that India could extend service
and training facilities and supply spare parts. India and Malaysia signed a
Memorandum of Understanding on defence cooperation in February 1993, which,
though primarily meant to train Malaysian air force personnel, was fairly broad
ranging to include joint development of certain defence systems of common
interest. India expanded facilities at the MiG-29 assembly factory to meet the
Malaysian demand and at least 100 pilots and ground supporting staff were
trained as part of this MoU, although not much progress could take place with
regard to joint development. Malaysia was keen to train its marine commando
forces and service its naval boats in India, and have regular exchanges between
the navies.12 Similarly, Kuala Lumpur also expressed interest in the Indian
HALbuilt Dornier 228 Maritime Patrol Craft and HAL-built Chetak helicopters for
search and rescue and Cheetah light utility helicopters. India’s cooperation
with Singapore that began in 1993 is deep and longstanding. A Singaporean
proposal for an agreement for the training of its navy and for other areas of
defence cooperation, which had been pending since 1994, was reportedly cleared
by the Indian Defence Minister in 1998. 13 Singapore’s interest has been to
train its naval personnel in India. Singapore is the only country that has the
rare distinction of gaining access to the training facilities at the Southern
Naval Command in Kochy, in addition to other training facilities. More
significant are the antisubmarine warfare exercises India and Singapore have
started to hold since 1996 at India’s Eastern Naval Command.14 Apart from joint
naval exercises between the two, Singapore has already made use of India’s
missile testing range at Chandipur to test out its guns and some missiles in
its inventory.15 Singapore also faces problems regarding the training of its
air force crew that earlier used to use the US facilities in the Philippines.
Singapore has already been using the facility in Australia, but the Indian
option is also being pursued. India has also imported a few patrol boats from
Singapore. The close defence links between the two countries culminated in the
signing of a defence cooperation agreement during the first-ever visit by the
Singapore Defence Minister, Teo Chee Hean in October 2003.16 Thailand too has
recently expressed interest in holding joint naval exercises with the Indian
Navy. After acquiring the aircraft carrier, Thailand has turned to India to
train its naval personnel, as the Indian Navy is the only Asian navy that has
340 Strategic Analysis/Apr-Jun 2004 long experience of operating carriers. Thai
pilots have been trained to operate Sea Harriers in India. Though strictly not
in the realm of defence, Thailand has been keen on developing nuclear energy
and has, in fact, broached the idea during the Indian Prime Minister’s visit in
April 1993 for the supply of a nuclear research reactor. India had signed a
defence cooperation agreement with Vietnam in 1994 in an attempt to upgrade the
strategic dialogue between the two countries. Although Vietnam has been
downsizing its military quantitatively, its equipment was almost entirely
supplied by the former Soviet Union, which urgently needs upgradation or
replacement. Recently, Vietnam has contracted to acquire a squadron of SU27
Flankers from Russia, but upgradation of large a number of MiG-21 fighters has
been on the cards. India would be in a position to help Vietnam in this regard
once its own MiG-21 fighters are upgraded by Russia (which India is expected to
do under Russian licence). Similarly, there are indications that Vietnam is
interested to upgrade its navy with Indian help in the coming years. So far
there is no evidence of any concrete cooperation in defence hardware. Joint
naval exercises and visits by senior officers of the Indonesian Navy to the
Andaman and Nicobar Islands naval sites, which were Indonesia’s major concern,
have dispelled earlier fears. Beyond the usual exchange of visits of senior
officers, there was very little substantive cooperation till an agreement was
signed during the Indian Prime Minister’s visit in January 2001. As part of the
‘Agreement on Cooperative Activities in the field of Defence’17, an Indian
defence company, Bharat Electronics Limited, was supposed to supply spare parts
for a radar systems and other equipment for the Indonesian armed forces, but
failed to do so because of some technical-legal complications. It certainly is
a major setback as far as India’s strategic relations with Indonesia are
concerned especially in view of the fact that after more than five decades
defence level contacts were established.18 Similarly, the earlier anticipated
cooperation in the aerospace industry also failed to materialise. More
recently, for the first time the navies of India and Indonesia have begun to
undertake joint patrolling in the Malacca Straits primarily aimed at curbing
piracy. As part of the defence cooperation agreement, India is involved in
training the Laotian Army. Even the Philippines have expressed interest to
cooperate with India in the defence sector. Both Defence Minister and the Under
Secretary of Defence of the Philippines visited Indian naval ships, two
destroyers and a missile corvette, during a port call at Manila. Quoting
observers conversant with the Filipino naval needs, a newspaper report
commented, “India had already figured in the calculations of Whither the Look
East Policy: India and Southeast Asia 341 the Philippines as a possible source
for the procurement of naval vessels… there is a possibility of the Philippines
now looking at India, among others, for the purchase of patrol boats and
missile corvettes.”19 Yet another facet of Indian naval diplomacy is the annual
congregation of Bay of Bengal navies — of India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand, near the Andamans, called the
Milan. It was a unique initiative India started in early 1995 involving so many
navies of the neighbouring countries.20 Apart from naval exercises, this event
includes coordination of search and rescue operations at sea and establishment
of inter-operability with other navies. This is followed by seminars at Port
Blair on marine environmental protection and pollution control, disaster relief
operations and protection of exclusive economic zones.21 In the recent past,
much of the activity was centred around exchange of personnel for training
purposes and periodic naval exercises, especially with Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia
and even Myanmar. An interesting feature after the 9/11 incidents is the Indian
Navy’s presence and participation in escort and joint patrolling activities in
the Andaman Sea. Apart from escorting US ships carrying supplies to Afghanistan
for counter-terrorism effort, the navies of India and Indonesia have started
bilateral joint patrolling along the Malacca and other Straits of Southeast
Asia. The Indian Navy is also actively involved in the protection of sea lanes
of communication.22 Thailand too showed considerable interest to forge defence
links with India. The most important of all is the training of Thai pilots on
Sea Harriers to operate carrier aircrafts. Economic Engagement The Look East
policy also gave a tremendous boost to economic ties between India and
Southeast Asia. A number of institutional mechanisms have been put in place to
promote economic exchanges. The earlier Joint Trade Committees with the ASEAN
countries were upgraded as Joint Business Commissions and the India-ASEAN
Business Council and ASEAN-India Joint Management Committee were formed.
Consequent to India’s elevation to Dialogue Partner status, the ASEAN-India
Joint Cooperation Committee and the ASEAN-India Working Group on Trade and
Investment were set up. An ASEAN-India Fund was created to promote trade,
tourism, science and technology, and other economic activity. From virtually
little or no investment from Southeast Asia in the early 1990s, Malaysia and
Singapore have emerged as the tenth and eleventh largest in terms of approved
investments respectively by 2002. Thailand is in the 18th and Indonesia and the
342 Strategic Analysis/Apr-Jun 2004 Philippines are in 33rd and 35th position
respectively. Cumulatively, these five countries constitute nearly 5 per cent
of the total approved investments in India.23 The progress with regard to
bilateral trade is also equally impressive. The growth in India’s trade was the
fastest with Southeast Asia as compared to any other region between 1991 and
1997. While ASEAN exports kept the momentum, imports decreased commendably as a
result of the financial crisis in 1997-98. The exports grew from about US $1.4
billion in 1993 to over 6.2 billion in 2000. Imports by ASEAN on the other hand
increased from US $1.4 billion to US $4.4 billion in 1997 but nose-dived to US
$1.71 billion in 1998 but have since picked up to reach about US $3 billion in
2000.24 Not to be left out of the free trade area bandwagon that is sweeping
Southeast Asia, India too has put across concrete plans to increase the economic
interaction and integration through institutional arrangements. In the
first-ever meeting of India and ASEAN economic ministers in Brunei in September
2002, the Indian trade and industry minister expressed the desire to enter into
a formal agreement with ASEAN as a Regional Trade and Investment Agreement
(RTIA) or a Free Trade Area (FTA) in the coming years.25 The Indian initiative
has come close on the heels of a similar meeting between Japan and ASEAN in
September 2002, where it was decided to establish an FTA between Japan and
ASEAN.26 China has already entered into an agreement on FTA with ASEAN to be
realised by 2010. These moves are being complemented by the private sector’s
own initiative to hold annual India-ASEAN Business Summit Meetings. India and
Asia-Pacific Multilateralism An interesting dimension of India’s Look East
policy is the new-found interest in regional multilateralism. Although India
has been a member of the Commonwealth and more recently of the South Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and the Indian Ocean Region
Association for Regional Cooperation (IOCARC), it has always been wary of
political/security issues becoming part of the agenda of these fora. Surely, it
was not a founding member, but India lobbied hard to get into the new security
forum that came up in 1993, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and became its
member in 1996. As part of the ARF’s CBM agenda, India has for the first time
presented a fairly detailed Security Outlook Paper to the Forum in 2001. The earlier
reticence has given way to active participation in a variety of the ARF’s
activities both at the official as well as unofficial CSCAP levels. India also
came up with a number of new multilateral initiatives involving Southeast Asian
countries. Prominent among these are the Whither the Look East Policy: India
and Southeast Asia 343 BIMSTEC (Bangladesh-India-Myanmar-Sri Lanka-Thailand
Economic Cooperation) in 1997 and Ganga-Mekong Swarnabhumi (India, Myanmar,
Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam) in 2000. These are purported to be for
facilitating greater economic and cultural cooperation, but the security angle
cannot be ignored. Prospects for the Future In the current look East policy
phase, importance to security aspects is clearly discernible. Whether with
regard to the US, Japan or Southeast Asia, policymakers appear to be convinced
that an enduring bilateral relationship cannot be built unless underpinned by
strategic ties. Hence, one can expect security dialogues and defence ties to
remain major priorities of the Look East policy. India’s status as the largest
navy in the Indian Ocean littoral is unlikely to be challenged and the
development of a new command at the Andamans is indicative of India’s eastward
emphasis. As far as economic links are concerned, the investment climate is far
better today than in the early 1990s and figures indicate that trade is doing
very well. India has certain advantages as well. Unlike China and Japan, there
is no historical baggage to worry about either in terms of invasion or
interference. India is not involved in any border or maritime boundary disputes
with its Southeast Asian neighbours.27 In fact, India is uniquely placed to
play a kind of balancing role so that Southeast Asia does not come under the
influence of any one great power. Despite certain problems with regard to
decision-making mechanisms and bureaucratic apathy, many projects started by
Southeast Asians are doing very well. After successfully building a technology
park in Bangalore, Singapore is planning to build another one. Malaysia is
involved in building Asia’s largest natural gas container project in
collaboration with a public sector company and in the construction of highways.
Interestingly, Singapore and Malaysia, in particular, appear to have established
good rapport with the leadership in investor-friendly states of South India.
There is a growing realisation in Southeast Asia that, despite China’s greater
attraction, India is an expanding economy whose size is more than double that
of all of Southeast Asian countries put together in PPP terms, and it is one of
the largest emerging markets for products and services in the world. India’s
open political system and an independent judiciary are additional plus points.
Singapore’s current policy of engaging India and simultaneously avoiding
excessive dependence on China28 is likely to be the path others will follow in
the coming years, which means further deepening of India-Southeast Asia
relations. There is 344 Strategic Analysis/Apr-Jun 2004 one area that can
provide immense avenues for cooperation, that is, the maritime security in the
region, which includes security of sea lanes, the problem of piracy,
trafficking in narcotics and small arms, search and rescue, pollution at sea,
disaster management, etc., where a joint multilateral effort can perhaps be
undertaken along with some of the Northeast Asian countries. Conclusion
Undoubtedly, the Look East policy has once again emerged as a major thrust area
of India’s foreign policy after some hiccups in the mid-1990s. Although it is
claimed that this policy encompasses the whole Asia-Pacific region, it is
apparent that much of the emphasis has been on Southeast Asia. Despite enormous
progress made since the enunciation of the policy in the early 1990s, India
lags behind other great powers in terms of geopolitical or economic importance.
The Look East policy is responsible in making India an inalienable part of the
Asia-Pacific’s strategic discourse. The current phase marks the beginning of a
vibrant relationship on the economic, political and strategic fronts. A number
of institutional mechanisms have been put in place so that there is a regular
interaction at all levels and simultaneously bilateral linkages with individual
member-states have also been strengthened. Now that India has become a Summit
Partner of ASEAN, it provides an opportunity for the top leadership to visit
Southeast Asia every year for political interaction. Unlike in the past, it
appears the current phase of the Look East policy is much more substantial.
While developing links with ASEAN and other ASEANled multilateral institutions,
India is also pursuing to qualitatively improve bilateral links with
member-states. Three distinct features of the Look East policy emerge: These
are: one, India has managed to develop a multi-faceted relationship; two, a
successful defence diplomacy has been put in place; and three, unlike in the
past, India is not averse to participate in regional multilateralism — security
or economic. References/ End Notes 1 The most recent one was in November 2002
in connection with the ASEAN-India Summit meeting In Cambodia. Though it is
inexplicable why ASEAN wants to hold a separate meeting with India than expand
the existing ASEAN+3. 2 Panikkar, K.M., India and the Indian Ocean: An Essay on
the Influence of Sea Power on Indian History. 1945. George Allen and Unwin;
London. p. 21. 3 See for instance, Mohammed Ayoob, India and Southeast Asia: A
Study of Indian Perceptions and Policies. 1990. Routledge; London. pp. 7-8. Whither
the Look East Policy: India and Southeast Asia 345 4 India was sorely
disappointed when North Vietnam came out in support of China during the 1962
war, and more so when Sukarno offered to open another front and take over the
Andaman and Nicobar Islands located close to Indonesia in the Bay of Bengal
during the 1965 war with Pakistan. Malaysia was one of the very countries that
not only condemned the Chinese attack but also offered its help to India. 5 The
expansion of the Indian Navy in the 1980s with the Soviet help and the
reactions that it elicited especially from Southeast Asia have been dealt with
in detail in G.V.C. Naidu, Indian Navy and Southeast Asia. 2002. Sage; New
Delhi. 6 Far Eastern Economic Review. May 16, 1996. 7 For a fairly objective
analysis of India’s naval concerns and the role of FORTAN, See Christie,
India’s Naval Strategy and the Role of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Working
Paper No. 291, 1995, Canberra Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian
National University, p. 18. 8 A series of developments in that period had
considerably raised tensions with Pakistan and China on the borders; the Indian
military adventure in Sri Lanka was a disaster; its policy toward was widely
perceived to be strong arm tactics when restrictions were imposed on entry
points; and Bangladesh was sore because of what it considered New Delhi’s
obstinacy over sharing of Ganges waters. 9 It later came to be known as the
‘Gujral Doctrine’. Its main aspects included: Unilateral concessions with no ostensible
reciprocity, except in the case of Pakistan; forging friendly relations with
Pakistan while continuing high-level talks to resolve the differences; and
making economics as the basis for building South Asian regional cooperation and
solidarity. 10 For instance, Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong of Singapore in his
national address in August 1993 made a special mention about creating a ‘mild
India fever’ in Singapore. 11 Communiqué issued at the end of the Fifth ASEAN
Summit Meeting, December 1995. 12 For a detailed discussion, see G.V.C. Naidu,
India’s Strategic Relations with Southeast Asia. In Baladas Ghoshal, Ed., India
and Southeast Asia. 1996. Konark Publishers; New Delhi. pp. 28-40. 13 Maritime
International. September 1998. p. 7. 14 The Hindu. March 14, 1996. 15 The Times
of India. May 13, 1992. 16 Suryanarayana, P. S., “Singapore to Sign Defence
Pact with India.” The Hindu. October 13, 2003 at
http://www.thehindu.com/2003/10/13/stories/2003101 304441100.htm 17 Annual
Report 2001-2002. 2001. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India; New
Delhi. p. 19. 18 It may be remembered that it was India that was deeply
involved in training the Indonesian armed forces soon after independence.
Moreover, Indonesia was the 346 Strategic Analysis/Apr-Jun 2004 only country
with which the Indian Navy held exercises outside the Commonwealth in the
1950s. 19 The Hindu. October 26, 1998. 20 Maritime International. March 1995.
p. 7. 21 Maritime International, June 1998. p. 8. Most recent exercises of this
type were held in early April 1999. As part of its policy to raise its profile
in the Asia Pacific, a flotilla of the Indian Naval ships (comprising Delhi
destroyer, Rajput frigate, Khanjar corvette and Jyoti tanker) for the first
time participated in the International Fleet Review in South Korea in October
1998. India was also accorded an observer status at the Sixth Western Pacific
Naval Symposium held at Seoul. These ships also made port calls at Singapore,
Ho Chi Minh City and Manila on the way. The Hindu. September 27, 1998. 22 Japan
has shown a lot of interest in this field to collaborate with India. 23 Based
on the data published by the Indian Ministry of Industry’s SIA Newsletter. Of
the total foreign direct investments of Rs 2,805,372 million between 1991 and
May 2002, the share of five ASEAN nations is Rs 1,41,703 million. In dollar
terms, the data would considerably vary because of exchange rate changes.
http:// indmin.nic.in/vsindmin/publicat/default.htm 24 Data derived from ASEAN
Secretariat website. 25 India Keen on FTA with ASEAN. The Hindu. September 16,
2002. 26 It was China first took the lead in proposing to ASEAN the FTA idea
whereas Japan was very hesitant but round lest Beijing will steal a march over
Southeast Asia. 27 India has signed maritime boundary and border agreements
with Indonesia, Thailand and Myanmar. 28 Day, Philip, “Singapore: Dancing with
Giants”. Far Eastern Economic Review. April 18, 2004 at
http://www.feer.com/articles/2004/0404_08/p044money.html Dr G.V.C. Naidu is a
Research Fellow at IDSA. His research interests include regional
political/security affairs of the Asia-Pacific region in general and Southeast
Asia and Japan in particular. He has contributed extensively to publications
such as Contemporary Southeast Asia, in India as well as of the East-West
Center, and the Japan Institute of International Studies.