TRIBUNALS AS SOLUTION FOR JUDICIAL ARREARS: VIABLE OR QUESTIONABLE? BY - PROF. (DR.) ANUPAMA GOEL, SOMIYA JOSHI & PADMAJA DUBEY
AUTHORED BY - PROF. (DR.) ANUPAMA
GOEL,
SOMIYA JOSHI & PADMAJA DUBEY
Abstract
The Indian judicial system has always
strived to ensure speedy and equal access to justice. At the same time, it
desires to secure justice to all without affecting the cardinal principle of
just and fair resolution of disputes and disposal of cases. However, pendency
of proceedings and arrears in court cases has turned out to be in clear
violation of this globally realised right. Tribunals were introduced with an
underlying purpose to reduce the burden of pendency of cases in the judicial
courts of India, as one of the many measures resorted to. These quasi-judicial
bodies were introduced as specialist courts for expeditious resolution of
cases, which delineates decentralisation of the monolithic system of
administration of justice.
Keywords: administration of justice, judicial reform, pendency, tribunals, high
courts
I.
INTRODUCTION
The Indian judicial system promises
an apparatus that ensures easy access to justice on an equal basis for all,
without any bias, prejudice or discrimination. It adheres to the cardinal
principle of just and fair disposal of cases, by due application of
constitutional and legal principles. The right to get speedy justice is found
in various legal instruments pertaining to domestic[1]
or international legal rights.[2]
The Preamble of the Indian
Constitution embodies the trinity of justice- social, political and economic,
thereby affirming right to justice in all forms and spheres of the society. The
right to speedy disposal of cases and fair trial have been interpreted to be
implicit in the Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, as a subset of the
‘right to life and personal liberty’ enshrined therein.[3] Equal, fair and speedy justice dispensation
has been recognized as an inalienable right by the courts in various judgements
over the years. The Supreme Court, in the case of Hussainara Khatoon v. Home
Secretary, State of Bihar[4],
upheld the “constitutional obligation of this Court as the guardian of the
fundamental rights of the people”, which implicitly contains the right to
speedy trial. The State is under a constitutional mandate to ensure speedy
trial and it cannot avoid it by pleading financial or administrative inability.
Speedy justice is an edict of equal justice implicit in Article 14 and the right to life and liberty conferred by Article 21. It is also the
constitutional directive embodied in Article
39A, which entrusts the state with the duty to facilitate free legal aid to
ensure access to justice for all citizens.[5]
Quoting Justice Krishna Iyer, “Our
justice framework even in grave cases, experiences slow motion syndrome which
is deadly to ‘fair trial’, whatever the ultimate decision”.[6]
He emphasised the dire need to ascertain speedy justice as an important
component of social justice, which is required ‘for the bi-focal interests of
justice-for the individual involved and the society affected.’[7]
However, the glaring pendency and arrears
in court cases highlights the violation of the globally acknowledged rights to
free, fair and speedy justice. The pending cases in the courts increase the
social and economic burden on the country, as has been insinuated via multiple
reports, both national and international.[8]
The policy makers have tried to identify various solutions to meet the
challenges of delayed justice. Several reports of the Law Commission of India[9] have, from
time to time, illuminated the policy makers and the government with data of
pendency in both higher and subordinate judiciary[10],
followed by recommendations to deal with the rising number of pending cases.
One of the major revolutions in the
framework of legal institutions innovated to deal with judicial delays and
pendency has been the introduction of ‘tribunals’. The present paper attempts
to study and analyse the emergence of tribunals, their role in arresting the
judicial delays and impact on the system of administration of justice in India.
II.
TRIBUNALS:
A BRIEF HISTORY
Tribunals are quasi-judicial
institutions that provide quick and specialised resolution of disputes with the
help of proven expertise of the technical members as part of these bodies.
There are several tribunals in the present set up which are working to provide
quick resolution of disputes on varied subject matters throughout the country,
with their branches in various zones as well as at appellate levels.
A.
Era of tribunalisation and alternative mechanisms for dispute resolution
The Law Commission of India in its 14th Report (as discussed
above) recommended several judicial and legislative reforms and highlighted two
main causes for the delays in High Courts- firstly,
the increasing volume of ordinary litigation due to economic and industrial
development and secondly, the
expansion of the special jurisdiction of High Courts due to a variety of fiscal
enactments and provisions for appeals from Election Tribunals etc.[11] The 58th Report of the Commission
had suggested that ‘litigation’ should be the last option. It reasoned that
there is an imperative need to reduce the institution of civil cases in the
higher courts. It recommended that commissions or tribunals must be constituted
to deal with service matters on a separate basis.[12]
The Law Commission recommended
numerous solutions for dealing with service disputes of public servants and
authorising different tribunals to deal with matters relating to specific
subjects such as taxation, labour, land reforms, etc., that evolve from accumulated
public services.
The Swaran Singh Committee suggested that administrative tribunals
could be established for issues pertaining to public servants in government
services. Eventually, the administrative tribunals were given the
constitutional colour in form of Central and State Administrative Tribunals.[13]
The report of the Arrears Committee (1989-1990) was yet
another report that elaborated various causes for judicial pendency including
population and litigation explosion, gradual shift in the litigation pattern,
increase in legislative enactments, indiscriminate
resort to writ jurisdiction, lack of expert judges, inadequate court staff and
insufficient infrastructure etc.[14] The
Committee reiterated several recommendations given in the past by many reports
of the Law Commission of India including employing the alternative modes and
forums for dispute resolution which included tribunalisation of justice.[15]
In its 124th Report in 1988[16]
LCI emphasised again on the recommendations given by the High Court Arrears Committee in 1969 and opined the need of a
specialist court and tribunals to eliminate the jurisdiction of High Courts,
hinting at reduced inflow of work into the High Court by nearly 45%.
In the 221st Report of LCI, speedy justice being a fundamental
requirement of good judicial administration was reiterated. It was acknowledged
that the administration of justice will become very slow and inefficient due to
the current equation between the rate of institution of cases and the
corresponding reduced rate of disposal. The Commission had suggested that
filing of frivolous, vexatious and luxurious litigation must be controlled. It
proposed amendments in Civil and Criminal Procedure Codes, which would provide
speedy and cost effective justice.[17]
LCI also suggested that there is an urgent need to employ and utilise
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms for quick and speedy justice
dispensation.[18]
The 222nd report of the Law Commission said that the courts
should only proceed with the suits if the parties are unable to settle the
dispute through ADR, as the last resort. The methods such as mediation and
local dispute resolution prevailed in the ancient Indian system and the need
for their revival was being strongly felt.
In its 230th Report, LCI again addressed the issue of judicial
pendency.[19]
Considering the staggering arrears, it stated that the vacations and holidays
in the higher judiciary must be reconsidered. Judgments must be delivered
within a reasonable time period and the use of technology and clubbing of
similar cases for hearing can make the process more expeditious. Suggestions for
strictly guided grant of adjournments and allowing lawyers to make brief oral
arguments were also aired.
The present status of cases pending
in all the courts throughout India calls for innovative ways of looking at the
issue. The establishment of ‘tribunals’ as a parallel mechanism to judicial
courts has been one of the most discussed solutions, with an underlying
objective to reduce the burden of cases, especially in the High Courts.
B.
Evolution of Tribunals
Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) was the first tribunal set-up in 1941. It was
considered as an impartial and fair tribunal. After independence, on the
pattern of ITAT, the Sales Tax tribunals
were established in many States.[20]
Under the Administrative Tribunals Act of 1985, Central and State
Administrative Tribunals were set up to deal with service disputes of public
servants under the Article 323A of
the Indian Constitution which empowers the Parliament to establish
administrative tribunals for adjudicating disputes and complaints of certain
nature. The Central Administrative
Tribunal (CAT) has one principal bench in New Delhi, 18 Benches in the
country along with 21 Circuit Benches.[21]
Tribunals for certain specified subjects such as taxation, labour, land reforms
etc. were also established through various legislations by the Parliament and
State legislatures.[22]
The Company Law Board (CLB) was created in 1988 and started functioning
in 1991. Initially these tribunals were responsible for deciding matters
between citizens and government departments while the judicial courts were
meant to decide all kinds of private disputes. However, most private disputes
between shareholders or with the company were also transferred to these
quasi-judicial bodies and various tribunals were set-up for effective
resolution of distinct private disputes.[23]
To ascertain the liability of the
railways for loss, destruction, damage or non-delivery of goods or for death or
injuries to passengers in a railway accident etc., Railway Claims Tribunal (RCT) was established under the Railways Act 1989 with a Principal
Bench at New Delhi and twenty other benches across the country. For
facilitating speedy and effective recovery of loans given by banks and other
financial institutions, and to avoid defaults etc. on the repayment, the Debt Recovery Tribunals (DRT) were
established under the authority of the Recovery
of Debts and Bankruptcy Act in 1993.
In 2013, the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) and National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) were established
for transparent and efficient resolution of insolvency cases under the
Companies Act. The Consumer Disputes
Redressal Commissions were formed in 1986 to ensure quick and accessible
remedies and redressal of consumer disputes along with promoting consumer
awareness, and were revamped in 2019 to increase efficiency.[24]
The arrears of cases in judicial
courts have always been a key area of concern and it has been explicitly
acknowledged that the delayed cases are a crucial social challenge which would
further dissatisfaction amongst the citizens, and subsequently affect the
social and economic milieu of the nation.[25]
The steps were taken and the numerous tribunals set up over the years.
III.
Role of
Tribunals and Statistical Analysis
The establishment of tribunals was
one of the major structural reforms carried out in the legal and judicial
system of India. Tribunals have always connoted a responsive system in the
legal milieu of any civilised nation throughout the History.
In India, the tribunal system is a
corresponding mechanism to the traditional court system. To reduce the
procedural formalism and time taken in the adversarial system of adjudication,
tribunals were established.[26] This is
evident from the language used in the legislative enactments relating to
Tribunals– “The Tribunal and the
Appellate Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedure lay down by the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), but shall be guided by the principles of
natural justice...”[27] It is imperative to note that the tribunals
aren’t totally independent of procedures; rather, they have limited regulations
to conduct adjudication given the limited scope of their subject matter
jurisdiction. They have been freed from the shackles of the rules of Evidence
Act and Civil Procedure code and have been vested with the powers of the Civil
Courts including the power to review their decisions. Various similar
provisions can be found in the other legislations governing specialised
tribunals as well.
In Jaswant Sugar Mills v. Laxmi Chand[28], Supreme Court observed that a
tribunal is a body or authority invested with the judicial power of the
state. These administrative bodies or
authorities are required to act fairly in lines with principles of natural
justice. The decisions reached by such administrative bodies are clearly
distinct and separate in character from the judicial decisions pronounced by
the courts.[29] The Apex
Court reiterated the above position in a Constitution Bench judgement.[30]
Therefore, the tribunals primarily
are meant to provide expert adjudication without getting involved in legal
technicalities or procedural hassles in certain cases which require expertise
to be determined judiciously. But with the passage of time, two key issues have
surfaced- firstly, whether the
tribunals could achieve the degree of success in ensuring speedy disposal of
cases as anticipated or not and secondly,
whether there is sufficient independence from the executive, essential for
effective working of tribunals or not. These two issues have surfaced as a
cause of concern and need deliberations to resolve.
A.
Tribunals vis-à-vis Constitutional
courts
In 1987, in the case of S.P. Sampath Kumar[31],
the Apex Court upheld the constitutional validity of various statutes for
formation of tribunals. It recognized the power of the Parliament to establish
the effective, alternative institutional arrangements for judicial review,
without violating the basic structure of the Constitution.[32]
With the above judgement, the tribunals became concurrent to High Courts with
an underlying idea to reduce the case burden on High Courts and bring about
judicial efficiency.
However, in the case of L. Chandra Kumar[33],
a seven Judges bench of the Supreme Court opined that the jurisdiction conferred
upon the High Courts under Articles 226
and 227 and upon the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution are parts of the essential features
of our Constitution.
Post L. Chandra Kumar[34]
decision, it became a trend that every decision of the administrative tribunals
was appealed to the High Court before going to the Supreme Court, irrespective
of the substantial legal question involved or not.
Therefore, each case will achieve
finality, only after final adjudication by the High Court and then by the
Supreme Court of India, which usually takes years and has frustrated the whole
idea of establishment of tribunals.
B.
The Principle of finality: Need of
the hour
The tribunals primarily were introduced
as specialist courts, which delineated decentralisation of the monolithic
system of administration of justice to enhance its efficiency. These
quasi-judicial bodies were intended to resolve matters expeditiously and
effectively. As judicial review is an indispensable feature of the Indian
Constitution and cannot be taken away, therefore, any decision of tribunals
involving ‘substantial questions of law’ has to go to the concerned High Court,
only then can it attain finality. However, Parliament may set up an alternative
and effective mechanism such as tribunals and vest the power of judicial review
in it.[35] The
tribunals may be constituted in a way to resemble judicial courts in their
composition, powers and functioning, so as to effectively settle and decide
cases similarly to ‘judicial courts’, avoiding legal formalism and time taking
procedures.
Finality of judgments and decisions
is a basic principle of law based upon public policy and on the maxim “interest
republicae ut sit finis litium”. The maxim emphasises that it is for
the public good that there be an end to the litigation after a long hierarchy
of appeals. To put a quietus to litigation at some point of time, it is
important to provide conclusive remedies to avail justice. In the adversarial
system, one or more litigants may remain unsatisfied despite the best efforts
of the judges, but continuing with litigation ad-infinitum is not justifiable and right.[36]
Moreover, ensuring reconciliation and
achieving normalcy between the parties must be one of the priorities of the
State. By quick settlements and resolutions of disputes, resources of the
society and of the State can be saved. Allowing litigants to file applications
or appeals endlessly in different courts or forums also aggravates acrimony
amongst the parties, and is clearly an abuse of legal process and can have
far-reaching adverse impact on the administration of justice. Any dispute filed
in any court of law must come to an end at some stage quickly. The verdict of
the court must acquire finality at some point of time. Finality and closure to
litigation is absolutely imperative to any nation governed by rule of law.[37]
IV.
STATUS OF
TRIBUNALS IN INDIA AND RATIONALISATION
With the passage of time, the
efficiency of tribunals in India got significantly reduced due to
administrative issues. The heightened executive interference and control over
tribunals has affected them badly.[38]
Recently, LCI has also highlighted the high level of pendency before tribunals.
According to the report of Vidhi Centre, the lack of independence in the tribunals is one of the key issues in
India.[39] Many
tribunals have lost the faith and confidence of the public due to purported
lack of competence, objectivity, transparency and judicial approach. Lack of
independence and uniformity in regulation further aggravated the whole
situation.
Even a recent report of LCI has
cautioned that the selection, appointment and the terms and conditions of
service in tribunals must be uniform and such as to utilise best of their expertise
and experience.[40] Multiple
times, and in various cases, the Supreme Court has reiterated the opinion that
if tribunals are established in substitution of courts, they must possess the
same capacity, security and independence.[41]
In Supreme Courts Advocates-on-Record
Association v. Union of India[42], it was
held that there is a need for compulsory exclusion of control of executive over
quasi-judicial bodies discharging responsibilities akin to Courts.
In order to rectify the ambiguity of
the Finance Act, 2017, the legislature introduced the Tribunals Reforms Act (Rationalization and Conditions of Services)
Ordinance 2021, which later became Tribunals
Reforms Act, 2021. Its statement of objects and reasons stipulates that the
presence of tribunals in certain sectors has not led to faster adjudication and
they add to the cost of exchequer.[43]
It dissolved certain existing appellate bodies such as Film Certification
Appellate Board, Intellectual Property Appellate Board, Appellate Authority for
Advanced Ruling (Customs), National Highways Appellate Board and Plant Variety
Protection Appellate Board etc., and transferred their functions to other
existing judicial bodies. It further standardised the qualifications,
appointments and other conditions of service of the chairperson and members of
a tribunal.[44]
The constitutionality of this
Ordinance/Act was challenged in the Supreme Court. In Madras Bar Association v. Union of India[45],
the petitioners, i.e., Madras Bar Association argued that the above
Ordinance/Act and Rules 2020 enacted are unconstitutional and will hinder
judicial efficiency and effective administration of justice. The standards of
appointment, qualifications and conditions of service for members of tribunals
must be similar to that of the courts, ensuring their capacity to handle
diverse legal and technical issues and security of tenure. The Court also
directed to constitute a National
Tribunal Commission (NTC) which shall act as an independent body to
supervise the appointment and functioning of tribunals to conduct
disciplinary proceedings against the members which could be empowered to
take care of administrative and infrastructural needs of tribunals in an
appropriate manner.
All in all, the functioning of
tribunals must be effective so that its judgements are equally accepted and
trusted as those of general courts. However, apprehensions such as control
exercised by government, manner and methods of appointment of presiding
officers and members have raised questions upon the efficiency of the role of
tribunals in dealing with pendency of cases. The above journey canvassed by the
tribunals reflects an ambiguous status of the most important quasi-judicial
bodies entertaining lakhs of cases.
V.
SUGGESTIONS
AND CONCLUSION
According to H.W.R Wade:
“The social legislation of the
twentieth century demanded tribunals for purely administrative reasons; they
could offer speedier, cheaper and more accessible justice, essential for the
administration of welfare schemes involving large numbers of small claims. The
process of Courts of law is elaborate, slow and costly….”[46]
In view of the above lines, the
intention behind idealising the ecosystem of tribunals has been recognized in
India as well in other nations. The Law Commission Reports mentioned above explicitly
highlight the grave situation of pendency in High Courts. In fact, the high
arrear of cases is an issue prevalent at every level of the hierarchy in the
Indian judicial system and the Tribunals were introduced as a solution. They
grew sporadically and the legislature provided heterogeneous statutory
provisions facilitating the functioning of these tribunals.[47]
Surprisingly, the pendency in tribunals itself has evolved as yet another issue
in pendency of cases, as aforementioned. Moreover, the recent reforms in the
tribunal system have enabled the appellate powers of the High Courts which have
raised concerns regarding burden on the High Courts itself.[48]
Thus, the acute congestion of cases since times prior to independence has today
transpired to have become one of the weariest affairs in the current judicial
system.
The act of extending the jurisdiction
of Judicial Review to High Courts in the L.
Chandra Kumar case (1997) (supra) and judicial reforms of 2021 abolishing
nine tribunals and reinstating the jurisdiction of the abolished tribunals to
High Courts, has transferred the burden back to High Courts, already unable to
function efficiently.[49] Moreover,
the pendency of cases in Tribunals itself also raises a red flag towards its
efficiency. The policy makers must initiate strategies to regulate and optimise
the functions of tribunals, instead of evading it out. This calls for further
reforms in the tribunal system in India. Few of them could be:
1. The exclusion of jurisdiction of High
Courts in instances of appeals must be respected.[50] The statistics regarding pending
cases, increasing population and limited resources (manpower and institutional)
makes the system of tribunals as an indispensable solution. The establishment
of tribunals with similar powers of High Courts will reduce the arrears in High
Courts related to specific subject matters in civil cases such as income tax,
environment and insurance if regulated per requirement.
2. The decisions of tribunals must be
considered as final, except only in cases where the appeal is required to
interpret a substantial question of law by the constitutional courts. The aim
and intent of establishing tribunals must be understood in its letter and
spirit. The tribunals are established as means to provide speedy disposal of
cases relating to specific subject matters, which must be manned by judges or
legal experts having legal or judicial expertise and experience, along with the
persons having specialised knowledge of the case at hand.
3. Inadvertent entertainment of petitions
and cases in the Apex Court must be checked and dissuaded. Expansion of the jurisdiction
of judicial institutions, specifically the High Court has increased the backlog
of cases tremendously and has resulted in dilution of the right to access
justice.[51] Only the cases requiring
interpretation or re-formulation of substantial questions of law should be
considered and taken up by the Constitutional Courts and strict ‘no’ must be
conveyed to unnecessary and vexatious filing of appeals so that ‘finality’ to
the litigation may be achieved at the earliest.
4. To ensure uniformity in
administration of tribunals throughout the country, a separate and
comprehensive mechanism or an Apex
Tribunal Council should be set up for supervision. The regulation of all
the tribunals in India including managing the appointments, tenures and
conditions of service etc. of presiding officers, members and staff etc. of all
the tribunals must be entrusted with such body.
5. To improve the efficiency and smooth
working, the tribunals must be digitised at the earliest. Provisions for
necessary training to the tribunal members and staff along with required
assistance for the parties filing cases before tribunals are must, so as to get
quick and desired results.
Digitalization of tribunals in India will help citizens to have an equal
and easy access to justice.
6. The tribunals must be established at
the grass root levels as an effective alternative mechanism. An effective and
robust system of tribunals can be shaped by the policy makers– a system that is
not subordinate to the other judicial institutions and has concurrent powers
and resources.
The citizens and non-citizens of
India derive right to justice from various nuances in the Indian Constitution
and the social and economic development of the nation gets affected by the
delay in dispensation of justice. Moreover, globalisation and liberalisation
have opened the gates of trade and development for all, the continuity and
requisite pace of which cannot be maintained and sustained without the
effective participation and role of the third wing of governance i.e. the
judiciary. Thus, there is a need for ensuring efficient and quick disposal of
cases, may it be through the formal judicial courts or quasi-judicial bodies or
any other system in sync with the fundamental constitutional requirements.
[1] The Constitution of India 1950, arts 21,
32, 37-38, 39-A, 226
[2] Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
1948 s.10; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 s 14;
International Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights, 1966 s 26; Sustainable
Development Goals, 2015 Goal 16
[4] 1980 (1) SCC 98
[5] Ibid.
at 4
[6] Babu Singh v
State of UP, AIR 1978 SC 527.
[7] Ibid. at 6
[9] 14th Report 1958, 27th Report 1964, 58th Report 1974,
77th Report 1978 and 121st Report 1987
[10] National Law School of India University Scholarship
Repository, “Decision Time: Illuminating Performance in India’s District Courts”,
Varsha Aithala et. al.,
30-08-2024. https://repository.nls.ac.in/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1101&context=nls_articles
[11] The Law Commission of India, 14th Report,
‘Reform of Judicial Administration’ (1958)
[12] The Law Commission of India, 58th Report,
‘The Structure and Jurisdiction of Higher Judiciary’ (1974).
[13] The Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976-
Part XIV-A (Articles 323A and 323B) was inserted.
[14] Report of the Arrears Committee, 1989-90, pp.130-131
(under the leadership of V.S. Malimath,
the then Chief Justice of High Court of Kerala)
[15] Ibid. at p. 145
[16] The Law Commission of India, 124th Report,
‘The High Court Arrears-A Fresh Look’, 1988
[17] The Law Commission of India, 221st Report,
‘Need for Speedy Justice-Some Suggestions’ (2009)
[18] The Law Commission of India, 222nd Report,
‘Need for Justice Dispensation Through ADR etc.’ (2009) p. 40
[19] The Law Commission of India, 230th Report,
‘Reforms in the Judiciary-Some Suggestions’
(2009)
[20] Ministry of Law and Justice, Income Tax
Appellate Tribunal, Government of India < Income Tax Appellate tribunal (itat.gov.in)>
[22] The Constitution
(Forty-second Amendment) Act 1976, Articles
323A & 323B.
[23] Ministry of Corporate
Affairs, Company Law Board, Government of India < MinistryOf Corporate Affairs - clb (mca.gov.in)>
[24] The Consumer Protection Act
2019
[25] The Law Commission of
India, 14th Report, ‘Reform of Judicial Administration’ (1958); Law Commission of India, 58th
Report, ‘Structure and Jurisdiction of Higher Judiciary’ (1974)
[26] Regy, Prasanth and Roy Shubho, ‘Understanding
Judicial Delays in Debt Tribunals’ (2017) National Institute of Public Finance
and Policy < https://ssrn.com/abstract=2996409 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2996409>
[27] The Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial
Institutions Act, 1993, section 22
[28] AIR 1963 SC 677
[29] Associated
Cement Companies Ltd. v. P. N. Sharma, AIR 1965 SC 1595
[30] Kihoto Hollohan
v. Zachillhu, AIR 1993 SC 412
[31] (1987) 1 SCC 124
[32] S.P. Sampath
Kumar v. Union of India AIR 1987 SC 386
[33] L. Chandra
Kumar v. Union of India AIR 1997 SC 1125
[34] Ibid. at 51
[35] The Law Commission of India, 124th Report,
‘High Courts Arrears-A Fresh Look’ (1988).
[38] The Law Commission of India, 272nd Report,
‘Assessment of Statutory Frameworks of Tribunals in India’ (2017), Government
of India
[39] Arijeet Ghosh, Diksha Sanyal and others, ‘Reforming
the Tribunals Framework in India: An Interim Report’ (2018) Vidhi Centre for
Legal Policy <8thJuneFinalDraft.pdf>
last accessed on August 6, 2024
[40] The Law Commission of India, 232nd Report,
‘Retirement Age of Chairpersons and Members of Tribunals-Need for Uniformity’
(2009)
[41] Union of India
v. Madras Bar Association, (2010) 11 SCC 1; Madras Bar Association v. Union of India, (2014) 10 SCC 1
[42] (2016) 5 SCC 1
[43] The Tribunals Reforms (Rationalisation and Conditions
of Service) Bill, 2021, Ministry of Finance
[44] The Tribunals
Reforms Act, 2021, secs.3, 7.
[45] (2021) 7 SCC 369.
[46] Wade, H.W.R & Forsyth, C.F.,
‘Administrative Law’ (2009) 10 Oxford University Press United Kingdom, 773.
[47] Law Commission of India, ‘Assessment of
Statutory Framework of Tribunals in India’ Law Commission Reports (272nd)
2017.
[48] Government of India, ‘National Judicial
Data Grid’ National Judicial Data Grid-s High Courts (2024) Welcome to NJDG - National Judicial Data
Grid for High Courts of India (ecourts.gov.in) (last accessed on March 26, 2024)
[49] PRS, ‘The Tribunals Reforms
(Rationalization and Conditions of Service) Bill, 2021’ PRS Legislative
Research The Tribunals Reforms (Rationalisation and
Conditions of Service) Ordinance, 2021 (prsindia.org) (last accessed on March 26th,
2024).
[51]
Ghosh, Y. ‘Indian Judiciary: An Analysis of the Cyclic Syndrome of Delay,
Arrears and Pendency’ (2018) 5(1) Asian Journal of Legal
Education, 21-39. https://doi.org/10.1177/2322005817733566