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TREACHERY IN TRADE: ANALYZING AMERICAN CRITICISMS AGAINST THE APPELLATE BODY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
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TREACHERY IN TRADE: ANALYZING
AMERICAN CRITICISMS AGAINST THE APPELLATE BODY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
AUTHORED BY -
RYAN GAURAV
Introduction
For nearly twenty-eight years the
World Trade Organization has been the cornerstone for creating international
trade standards by upkeeping transactional protocols and helping member
countries build up their trade capacities. The ‘Crown-Jewel’ of the World Trade
Organization, however, is the Dispute Settlement System (DSS), a process that
is ideally supposed to adjudicate disputes related to international trade and
commerce between member states. However, recent criticisms by the United States
of America and other member states have effectively paralyzed the functioning
of the entire system by creating an impasse related to the appointment of
members to the Appellate Body, the highest adjudicating body in the
international world of business and trade. American concerns primarily revolve
around objections regarding inconsistencies in procedural matters,
disagreements with allegedly flawed and overwhelmingly ‘liberal’ judgements
passed by the Appellate Body combined with an overall lack of trust in what
current United States Trade Representative (USTR) Katherine Tai calls a “flawed
process that we don’t believe in''. But is the Dispute Settlement System truly
a flawed process? The paper opens up avenues of investigation, questioning the
true motives of the United States in meting out criticism and their subsequent
actions of blocking appointments to the Appellate Body. Could this shadow be
disquieting motives to implement government policies that restrict the free
flow of trade and promote national industrial businesses? Is their ultimate
goal to destabilize the judicial authority of the Dispute Settlement System,
thus allowing them to effectively skirt around unfavorable decisions that
hamper their own economic interests?
It thus becomes crucial to thoroughly
evaluate the credibility of the assertions and criticisms brought forward by
the United States to accurately identify issues and devise a suitable and
appropriate solution. The malfunctioning of the World Trade Organization
signifies a flawed global trade structure requiring urgent rectification to
restore the smooth flow of trade and prompt resolution of trade disputes
between nations.
A History
of American Protectionism
History serves as a
remarkable background for current events, and thus no understanding of current
affairs will ever be complete unless one has some knowledge of the past that
evolved into today’s world. Thus, to accurately analyze and assess the American
dilemma, the authors find it necessary to brief the reader and give them a
quick understanding of the evolution of American trade policies, significantly
those that highlight its tendency towards a protectionist attitude towards
economic affairs[1].
Firstly – we must
primarily define what ‘protectionism’ in this context is - Protectionism is a
political ideology that entails an economic policy of ‘protecting’ domestic and
national industries from foreign competition by involving various barriers to
trade, including tariffs, subsidies, import quotas and boycotts. Indeed, any
strategy that successfully hinders the role of foreign traders and global
markets and promotes business and trade within the country can be considered a
‘protectionist’ trade policy. Protectionism is in stark opposition to free
trade. Despite economists largely agreeing that free trade is mutually
beneficial and leads to a better socio-economic society, some countries may
still choose to implement protectionist trade policies for various reasons[2].
Throughout the course of
modern history, America infamously has held these protectionist attitudes close
to heart. Economic historian Paul Bairoch once termed it as “the
homeland and bastion of modern protectionism”. Great Britain had implemented
extremely repressive economic policies in America, policies that ensured
America would have an extremely insignificant role in the emerging western
economy. Britain wanted to ensure the safety of their economically elite and
keep their position as the dominant nation in global affairs. The American
revolution was, in a sense, a war against these repressive policies – an
attempt to finally industrialize the colonies and improve the newly independent
nation’s economic standing.
It was after the war of
independence was won that we see the beginnings of trade protectionism in the United States.
American elites, including politicians, lawyers and other intellectuals decided
that by allowing America to be isolated from the outside world and implementing
protectionist ideals in their policies, they would be able to build up their
industries and economy without the threat of foreign interference that would
ensure the industrial system they were building would remain self-reliant.
A significant shift
occurred during the American Civil War (1861-1865). While the primary reason
for the secession of the southern states was over the issue of slavery, the
south also reasoned that a protectionist ideology was against their local,
agrarian interests (The south also was a major exporter of cotton to Great Britain,
who strongly believed in free trade). In stark opposition, the northern states
led by Abraham Lincoln strongly opposed the idea of free trade to benefit their
more industry and factory leaning interests. Under Lincoln, tariffs had
increased to nearly 44%, and continued to rise to fund the war against the
secession of the south. In 1847, Lincoln declared “Give us a (protective)
tariff, and we shall have the greatest nation on earth”. Even after the civil
war had ended, tariffs never really fell below 38%, and by the start of the
twentieth century, in 1896, the republican government pledged to “create a
platform that emphasizes and renews our allegiance to the policy of protectionism,
as it remains the bulwark of American industrial independence and the
foundation of the nations development and prosperity.”
The Shift
during the 20th Century
Despite American
economists continuing to criticize protectionist policies, political powers
continued to support these legislations well into the twentieth century. The
trend appears to culminate in the Smoot-Hawley Tariff act of 1930, imposing
restrictive trade practices and tariffs of up to 30%. The restrictions of
the Smoot Hawley Tariffs were so immense that it completely collapsed global
trade, as other countries also began to impose trade restrictions causing a
complete plummet in economic activity. The Smoot Hawley Act is infamously
credited with bringing about the Wall Street Crash of 1929. Which brought about
the Great American Depression, which lasted
for nearly ten years. A radical shift occurred when Franklin D. Roosevelt was
elected President in 1933. His cabinet, especially the Secretary of State,
Cordell Hull were more inclined toward free trade policies, reflecting his
southern heritage. Determined to reverse the restrictive trade policies, the
Congress passed the Reciprocal Tariff Act in 1934. The act provided for a
massive reduction in tariffs and allowed for the negotiation of tariff
agreements between the United States and other countries, with an emphasis on
Latin American States. The bill also gave the power to the President of the United
States to negotiate new, bilateral and reciprocal trade agreements with other
countries across the globe. With this act, Roosevelt had ushered in a new era
of liberalized American trade policy that persisted through much of the
twentieth century. The rise of fascism and the subsequent Second World War
brought bilateral trade negotiations largely to an end. Strict limitations in
inter-state trade were a natural consequence of a global war. The United States
at this point had accumulated a large amount of wealth, primarily from holding
gold bullion that most European countries (including the United Kingdom) had
invested in to safeguard their own economy in case of an invasion. Despite
significant spending during the war, the United States had emerged as the wealthiest
country in the post-war period. Bilateral negotiations however, had not resumed
even after the war. Post-war economic policy was still largely restrictive,
primarily to ensure that no country would feel ‘beggared’ by the United States,
allowing them to instead grow and rebuild their economies together and trade
once they had the capacity too. As already enunciated above, the United Nations
emerged, and subsequently the World Trade Organization. Policies continued to
grow in favor of free trade, most notably with the 1962 Trade Expansion Act.
This gave then President John F. Kennedy had the authority to negotiate tariffs for foreign trade up to 80%, and allowed
for the signing and implementation of new negotiations between countries during
the sixth round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) rounds in
the United Nations[3].
And so, the new world had
entered into a glorious era of free trade. America, rich with natural resources
and highly developed industries now engaged with other states in robust
external trade. Reduction of tariffs aside, the American economy saw immense
growth during this period. In the background, however, backing for re-imposing
restrictive trade policies continued to grow. The late 60’s and 70’s
saw the re-emergence of European and Asian economic activity; just as post-war
rebuilding efforts had concluded. Additionally, during this period, American
industries were disrupted by the oil crises of 1973, high inflation and the
termination of fixed exchange rates in global markets. As a result, American producers in certain labor-intensive industries
demanded more protectionist-oriented policies. These industries were competing
against foreign manufacturers who were able to supply goods faster, cheaper and
more efficiently. Thus, members from these
industries began to lobby for government action against imported goods. Japan,
for example, was able to supply cotton and cotton related goods at a much
faster and more efficient pace compared to the American manufacturers. Hence, the government would often engage in talks with the other
country (By means of the provisions of the GATT) and came to a Voluntary Export
Restraint (VER), that would make Japan voluntarily agree to restrict its cotton
exports, at the risk of being held accountable for charges of unfair trade
practices or to avoid punitive trade practices/restrictions against them. The
imposition of VER led to a drop in Japanese cotton exports amounting to $84
million in 1956 and $69 million in 1961. US textile producers persisted in
advocating for more VERs and import limitations against unchecked competition
from Hong Kong and India, which had taken over the US market due to decreased
Japanese imports. Consequently, the bilateral voluntary export restraint and
the ensuing decline in the US market for Japanese textile goods strained trade
relations between Japan and the United States. The extremely apparent hypocrisy
in the United State’s action of using restrictive, pro-protectionist practices
while publicly claiming to be for free trade showcases that despite
implementing legislations, the egoistic American spirit’s desire is to retain
economic power and maximize its monetary influence in the world. This fact will
become more and more apparent, especially as we evolve our findings into the
present-day scenario.
In the realm of global
trade, few issues are as scrutinized as the balance between principles of free
trade and self-serving protectionist trade practices. The United States, at
this point in history, was at a careful interplay between the two ideologies.
Despite public proclamations in favor of free trade in global markets, the actual
actions of the state shed light on a stark
contradiction between rhetoric and reality. The implementation of these
non-tariff barriers reveals a deep truth about the American economic mentality
– the influence of industrial actors on state policymaking through lobbying
efforts, governmental campaigns and fiduciary contributions that push for protectionist
measures to safeguard their own interests at the expense of broader economic
principles. Moreover, the embrace of protectionism reflects a broader trend
towards economic nationalism—a sentiment that resonates with segments of the
population concerned about job security and the erosion of domestic industries.
However, the pursuit of protectionist policies can have far-reaching
consequences, both domestically and internationally. Domestically,
protectionism risks stifling competitive markets and innovation, despite some
short-term goals and reliefs for the industries being met. Ultimately this
leads to a detriment in consumer interests by reduced choice and increased
price. On an international level, the adoption of protectionist measures can
ignite trade conflicts and strain diplomatic relations with trading partners,
ultimately harming global economic growth and stability. Moreover, they
undermine the rules-based international trading system that has underpinned
economic prosperity for decades, jeopardizing the very principles that both the
GATT and the world trade organization are founded on.
Protectionism
in America today
As the 21st century came about,
protectionist policies in America still existed in some aspects. However
general legislation and public policy leaned toward free trade, especially as
the Republican party gained more prominence. The administration under George W
Bush mostly abandoned protectionist policies and, in accordance with the terms
of the GATT and discussions in the World Trade Organization, came out against
protectionist policies including VER’s and quotas. Bilateral ‘free-trade’
agreements were signed with Canada and that eventually evolved into
the North American Free Trade Agreement that involved Canada, the United States
and Mexico. The act brought the immediate elimination of tariffs on a large
percentage of exports and imports, while also culling a significant number of
barriers to trade that existed between both countries.
The history of trade
policy expounded upon in the preceding pages is critical to understand,
especially if we want to give rationale to the United States’ seemingly
sudden and arbitrary disavowing of the World Trade Organization and the
neutering of its Appellate Body. It reveals the existence of a political
advocacy for protectionist ideals that lies simmering in the heart of American
industry[4].
This delicate balance remained relatively stable, and support for free trade
and anti-protectionist practices reached an ultimate peak during President
Barack Obama’s administration (2009-2017). During his tenure as president,
Obama would represent the peak of the United States and the World Trade
Organization concordance on the same issues. Policies enacted significantly
reduced trade barriers, even expanding focus to the east, with increased
exports and imports being distributed across the Asian continent, particularly
China and India. Even most dispute cases brought about in the Dispute
Settlement System involving the United States more often than not represented
them bringing action to reduce international trade barriers that were set up by
other states. Of particular interest are actions against China in 2017, who had
set up Tariff-Quotas that restricted wheat and corn imports from the United
States. The United States also won action against India in 2015, when the
subcontinent had banned American agricultural exports including meat, eggs and livestock,
claiming these products were not up to food safety regulation and of a lower
quality. The United States challenged this claim, saying that India was using
“unscientific and discriminatory” claims that were “simply a disguise for
protectionism”
Thus, at this point,
there was a complete turn from previous policy. During the Obama
administration, harmony between the principles and ideals of the World Trade
Organization and American economical and industrial interests reached its
highest point. A strong record of trade enforcement that focused and promoted
developing countries and involving them in global trade systems were also noted
by analysts. The Doha rounds of discussions (2001- ongoing) also saw the United
States taking an active effort to expand international trade technologies and
relationships, concluding multiple parts and discussions of the round.
Make
America great again?
Donald Trump was elected
into the Presidential office on the 20th of January, 2017 in an election with a campaign
that ‘defied public norms’ and commanded the attention of the American people.
Trump perhaps represents one of the most controversial Presidents in the
history of America since the end of the Cold War. Representing the Republican
party, his cabinets’ policies were a remarkable turn from the democratic and
progressive ideals of the previous administration. His campaign, as evident by
its name. “Make America Great Again”, was built around the idea of regress – a
return to those ideals that the nation was founded upon – to go back to the
principles of their ancestors, that placed the American nation in the
politically and economically position it is today.
Trump’s approach to
policy, both foreign and at home, involved making major changes to the
systems of democracy set in place (In a poll conducted after his tenure as
President, more than half of American voters said Trump had little to no
respect for democratic values and institutions). He achieved a huge number of
long sought conservative victories, including major tax-cuts for corporate
firms, tough immigration restrictions and the elimination of a significant
number of environmentally beneficial restrictions.
Unsurprisingly, his
policy toward global trade was not too different. A businessman at heart, he
focused on promoting policies that would maximize profit while reducing
economic costs associated with making such decisions. He radically overhauled
Obama’s policy, promoting an ‘America First’ ideology – placing the interests
of the United States over all else, even to the detriment of a functional
global trade system. We will focus on two critical, and interconnected policies
that he set in place – the imposition of protectionist-oriented tariffs and, of
course, his assault on the World Trade Organization.[5]
Trump
Tariffs
As part of his ‘America
First’ policy, Donald Trump imposed a series of trade tariffs dubbed the “Trump
Tariffs'' during his presidency. The idea was to change America's economic
policy to reduce trade deficits – situations where the nation's imports
exceeded the value of its exports. By placing tariffs on goods being brought
into the American nation, Trump promised the growth of the American economy –
more jobs, better housing, greater standards of living, etc. He saw this as a
chance to boost American industry and cull foreign competition, taking
inspiration from historical precedent. In January of 2018, he began following
through on his policy, setting up tariffs on electronic systems and appliances
including solar panels and washing machines ranging from 30% to 50%. A month
later, in march, he imposed global tariffs on steel and aluminum (25% and 10%
respectively), which makes up approximately 4.2% of U.S imports. The tariffs
were imposed upon trading partners in Asia, the European Union as well as in
North America. China was the worst affected, with Trump imposing various trade
barriers and tariffs of up to 3.4 billion dollars. Additionally, during his
election campaign, Trump claimed that China was ‘costing the American economy
billions of dollars’ by using unfair trade practices. China was the second
largest economy, closely catching up to America. Trump believed that China’s
economic power was having a detrimental effect on local industries within the
United States, as China, with its huge population, was able to manufacture and
produce and export goods at a much faster, and more efficient rate. The
imposition of these tariffs led to a de-facto trade war with China, with them
increasing tariff rates on US imports to an equivalent amount (In one of his
speeches, Donald Trump claimed that trade wars are ‘good’ and
easy-to-win’).
However, it wasn’t just
China. Most trading partners during this time were enraged, and imposed their
own retaliatory tariffs. India imposed retaliatory tariffs of up to 250 million
USD, with Canada and countries in the European Union matching that number.
Trump's tariffs on trade from Mexico are of some particular interest, as he
decided to increase the tariff rates on Mexican goods by fiver percent every
three months, until illegal immigration from Mexico came to a complete end.
Trump even claimed issues of national security a justification for imposing
steel and aluminum tariffs on Canada. Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau
said the idea "that Canada could be considered a national security risk to
the United States" was "nonsensical" and
"inconceivable" and called the tariffs ``totally unacceptable."
So, did the tariffs work?
Did these pro-protectionist policies grow the economy of the United States, and
bring back industry and jobs to American shores, just like Trump promised they
would?
No. Economic analyses
conducted by various groups, including the United States’ National Economic
Council have ultimately come to a consensual conclusion that Trump's economic
policy had little to no significant impact to the growth of the American
economy, If anything, most believe that the United States’ economy was
ultimately harmed by Trump's policies, increasing taxes on the American people
and reducing their income. Prices for tariffed goods had increased
dramatically, and a study conducted by Forbes ultimately determined that
America's real GDP growth had reduced by one percentage. Trump's tariffs were
also ultimately a failure in reducing the trade deficit between imported and
exported goods, which was Trump's primary argument for imposing the tariffs.
Ironically, the U.S. trade deficit grew by nearly 119 billion dollars, reaching
the highest it had ever been since 2008.
Trump and
the World Trade Organization
The crux of the issue
lies in ascertaining the rationale behind America's assault against the World
Trade Organization. While it is natural to reason that Trump's conservative
ethos in the realm of international trade was the cause for the repeated
blocking of judicial reappointments to the world trade organization, the actual
beginnings of this practice began in the latter days of the Obama
administration. In 2016, Barack Obama’s cabinet committed a unilateral attack
against Appellate Body Member Seung Wha Chang, an acclaimed South Korean
jurist. The alleged rationale behind this decision according to the Cabinet was
because of her rulings in favor of China in nearly four recent Appellate Body
cases, against the economic interests of the United States. At the DSB Meeting,
the Administration stated clearly that Appellate Body jurists needed to be
"held responsible" and "accountable for the views they have endorsed".
This action against
Justice Chang marked the beginning of the end of a proper-functioning Dispute
Resolution System. The World Trade Organization was already facing some doubts
on its credibility due to its inability to efficiently conclude various issues
in the Doha Round trade talks. The last bulwark of respect was held in its
dispute resolution system, and the United States had just delivered its first
blow to its functioning. The Obama administration created a situation that
endangered the future of the Dispute Resolution System by creating a vacancy in
the Appellate Body, and politicizing the re-appoint process to ensure a
favorable outcome for the United States.
The danger to the WTO
dispute system was immediately grasped by the WTO community. The other six judges
on the Appellate Body sent a joint letter to the DSB Chair in May 2016
observing that "The dispute settlement system depends on WTO Members
trusting the independence and impartiality of Appellate Body Members. Linking
the reappointment of a member to a specific case could affect that trust."
In addition, the body of retired WTO appellate judges voiced sharp criticism.
In another letter written in May 2016, all 13 former Appellate Body members
wrote to the DSB chair to criticize the blocked reappointment. The letter
stated that "all of the accomplishments of the past generation in
establishing the credibility of the WTO dispute system can be put in
jeopardy" by "inappropriate pressures by participants in the WTO
system."
It appears that Donald
Trump and his cabinet immediately perceived the World Trade Organization as a
threat to American economic growth. Trump hysterically claimed numerous times
during his election campaigns and during the tenure of his presidency that the
World Trade Organization had an alleged secret agenda against the United States
and the American people. He claimed that in the past years, the WTO’s Dispute
Resolution System had worked outside its mandate, and consistently ensured that
the United States lost or received unfavorable judgments. These statements
were completely untrue, as even a surface level analysis of past dispute cases
would reveal that the United States had, in reality, won a majority of the
dispute cases prior to 2019. It appears that this fear-mongering campaign (which
appears to be a common strategy Trump used toward various electoral policy) to
demonize the World Trade Organization was the first step in creating Americas
justifications for their assault on the World Trade Organization.
It wasn’t long before
Trump's government found a way to effectively curb the judicial authority of
the World Trade Organization. They targeted the appointment of judges to the
Appellate Body. Why the AB? Primarily the United States had the vested power to
veto the election of members and also perhaps, because It would be easier to
give reason for their actions, as opposed to any strategy that directly
targeted the World Trade Organization. Toward the latter end of 2019. The
United States was successful in its endeavors and had created a complete
impasse with the election of judges to the appellate body, and ultimately
crippled its ability to adjudicate on any matter brought up before it due to a
lack of quorum.
And the rationale given
for such a decision? Trump’s cabinet claimed that the Dispute Settlement System
was an ultimately flawed process, and cited concerns of overwhelmingly
‘liberal’ and ‘biased’ judgements that targeted the United States, perhaps even
implying a conspiracy of sorts. Officially however, answers came on February
11, 2020 when the Office of the United States Trade Representative (at the time
under Robert Lighthizer) published the ‘Report
on the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization’ which accused the
Appellate Body of creating an irrational system, and thus giving justification
for the actions taken by the government to block the appointment of new members
until their alleged concerns were addressed.
Analyzing
the accusations
A deeper dive into the
criticisms made by the United States can only shed light on the nature and
validity of their reasons, and it thus becomes important to do so, to
ultimately assess the rationale of their action against the Appellate Body. As mentioned above, the most
comprehensive publicly released statements are expounded in the “Report...” by the office of the United
States Trade Representative.
The criticisms begin with
the United States claiming that the Appellate Body in the course of its actions
have acted Ultra Vires, that is, beyond the scope of legal authority that they
were vested with, and along with that, have consistently breached the
foundational principles on which the World Trade Organization was created. In
particular, accusations include –
1.
Consistently breaching the mandatory deadline for the completion
of deadlines
2.
Allowing Appellate Body and its Members to continue to participate
in and decide on appeals after their terms have ended
3.
Exceeded its limited authority to review legal issues by reviewing
factual findings of domestic law
4.
Overstepped in its role by rendering ‘unnecessary opinions’ on
unrelated issues in a Dispute Settlement Process
5.
That the AB has asserted that it can give recommendations that are
not explicitly mandated in the Dispute Settlement Understanding, and,
6.
Overstepped its authority by opining on matters that are the
authority of other WTO bodies thus, concluding their first set of allegations
against the Appellate Body.
It becomes almost
comically obvious that these criticisms lack any kind of justification. Almost
every single one of the points put forward by the United States Trade
Representative are extremely shallow criticisms, something that will be pointed
out by various responses to the allegations that we will analyze later. But
even without expert opinion, the weak accusations limply thrown struggle to
stand on their own feet. Most of them do not even constitute a breach in
regulations, but rather are actions conducted out of necessity. The first
point, for example. Claiming disputes are not resolved in time is hardly fair
criticism. Certain cases may take longer than the mandated period, especially
considering the complicated field of international relations as a background
for these disputes. The AB obviously holds no maleficent intent to delay the
process as the United States would have one believe, if anything, jurists would
probably benefit by quickly (and, of course haphazardly) resolving cases as
soon as possible.
It appears that the
United States will remain unsatisfied with any kind of Dispute Resolution System
until it reaches utopian ideals and ultimate, exemplary practices. It’s
nonsensical to expect anything like that, and all things considered, the valid
parts of their criticisms hardly necessitate a complete paralysis of the World
Trade Organization. Minor problems could have easily been fixed, and nothing
the United States put forward as justification necessitated such immediate and
obliterative action against the World Trade Organization.
Disagreements
with Appellate Body rulings
Robert E. Lighthizer, the
United States Trade Representative under Trump's administration claimed that
“The Dispute Settlement Process has, over the years, diminished from what we
bargained for, and imposed obligations we do not believe we agree to”. The
United States has continuously expressed displeasure with AB rulings,
especially as with Trump’s revert to protectionist ideals caused obvious
distress to the free-trade oriented World Trade Organization, leaving them
little choice but to intervene and rule against America in disputes brought up
as a consequence of their policy. The US has indicated that the AB was
responsible for judicial activism, meaning that the tribunal had indulged in
rule-making beyond what the members negotiated and signed up for at the WTO. It’s
made clear that the US is of the view that the AB says more than it has to. The
US feels that the AB needs to be more conservative in its interpretation and
interfere in domestic affairs than what it currently is doing.
World Trade Organizations
dispute settlement panels had ruled against the United States on four separate
cases involving the US imposition of tariffs on steel imports and duties on
imports of aluminum. China, Turkey, Norway and Switzerland and even India had
brought the cases against the United States. These cases are interesting
because the United States claimed that these imports constituted a threat to
the national security of the United States.
This too, is hardly a
satisfactory reason. If anything, it puts forward a clear clash in ideology
that would better explain why the United States has such a harsh outlook on the
World Trade Organization. Trade officials note that, not unlike a few members,
the EU and other countries have also made their displeasure known when they do
lose dispute cases, but they do not “kick up a fuss” nor try to take the system hostage and crumble it. This
was echoed by a developing country trade official in Geneva, “We are not happy
with some of the rulings of the Appellate Body, but that does not mean we will
call for an abolition of the court” – a far more rational and ultimately,
justifiable response than the apparent overreaction of the United States.
[1] Feenstra, R.C., 1992. How costly
is protectionism? Journal of Economic Perspectives, 6(3),
pp.159-178.
[3] Wraight, T., 2019. From Reagan
to Trump: The origins of US neoliberal protectionism. The Political Quarterly, 90(4),
pp.735-742.
[4] Takacs, W.E., 1981. Pressures
for protectionism: An empirical analysis. Economic Inquiry, 19(4),
p.687.
[5] Irwin, D.A., 2017. The false
promise of protectionism: Why Trump's trade policy could backfire. Foreign
Aff., 96, p.45.
Article Information
TREACHERY IN TRADE: ANALYZING AMERICAN CRITICISMS AGAINST THE APPELLATE BODY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
Authors: RYAN GAURAV
- Journal IJLRA
- ISSN 2582-6433
- Published 2025/03/08
- Issue 7
About Journal
International Journal for Legal Research and Analysis
- Abbreviation IJLRA
- ISSN 2582-6433
- Access Open Access
- License CC 4.0
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