JUDICIAL REVIEW OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS BY - UDIT MISHRA
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF DISCIPLINARY
PROCEEDINGS
AUTHORED BY - UDIT MISHRA
ABSTRACT
‘Judicial review of disciplinary proceedings’ can be
undertaken by a competent court when it is satisfied that basic principles of
natural justice or procedure as per relevant service rules, is not adhered to. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under
Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into re-appreciation
of the evidence. The power of judicial review is meant to ensure that
individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which
authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of court. The judicial
review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the
decision is made. The Court is to examine as to whether the enquiry was held by
a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Disciplinary enquiries have to abide by the rules of
natural justice. But they are not governed by strict rules of evidence which
apply to judicial proceedings. The standard of proof is hence not the strict
standard which governs a criminal trial, of proof beyond reasonable doubt, but
a civil standard governed by a preponderance of probabilities. To determine
whether the finding in a disciplinary enquiry is based on some evidence an
initial or threshold level of scrutiny is undertaken. That is to satisfy the
conscience of the court that there is some evidence to support the charge of
misconduct and to guard against perversity. But this does not allow the court
to re-appreciate evidentiary findings in a disciplinary enquiry or to
substitute a view which appears to the Judge to be more appropriate.
Limited judicial review is available to interfere with the punishment imposed
by disciplinary authority, only in cases where such penalty is found to be
shocking to conscience of the court.
I.
INTRODUCTION
A.
Judicial Review
‘Judicial Review’ is the power of the courts of a
country to examine the actions of the legislative, executive, and
administrative arms of the government and to determine whether such actions are
consistent with the constitution. Actions judged inconsistent are declared
unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void.[1]
The extent and depth of judicial review will depend
upon and vary with reference to the matter under review. As observed by Lord
Steyn in Daly [2], in
law, context is everything, and intensity of review will depend on the
subject-matter of review. For example, judicial review is permissible in regard
to administrative action, legislations and constitutional amendments. But the
extent or scope of judicial review for one will be different from the scope of
judicial review for the other. Mala fides may be a ground for judicial review
of administrative action but is not a ground for judicial review of
legislations or constitutional amendments.[3]
B.
Departmental Enquiry
‘Departmental Enquiry’ means an enquiry held
into allegations or charges levelled against an employee.
As per sub-section (a) of Section 3 of the Departmental Inquiries
(Enforcement of Witnesses and Production
of Documents) Act, 1972, “departmental
inquiry” means an inquiry held under and in accordance with—
(i) any law made by Parliament or any rule
made thereunder, or
(ii) any rule made under the proviso to
article 309, or continued under article 313, of the Constitution of India, into
any allegation of lack of integrity against any person to whom this Act
applies;
The procedure to be
followed in disciplinary proceedings is generally laid down in Service Rules
and Standing Orders made there under. However, the procedure, so laid down, is
subordinated to the provisions of the Constitution of India i.e. any rule cannot
be ultra-vires the provisions of the Constitution, e.g. Article 310, 311 etc.
Although the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, do not apply to the
departmental proceedings but the principal of natural justice has to be
followed. Thus, reasonable opportunity to defend him-self must be given to the
person against whom departmental proceedings have been initiated. It is also to
note that acquittal in criminal proceedings on the same set of charges, per se,
does not entitle the delinquent to claim immunity from disciplinary
proceedings.[4]
II.
JUDICIAL
REVIEW OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
Judicial review is not akin to adjudication of the
case on merits, and adequacy or inadequacy of evidence, unless the court finds
that the findings recorded are based on no evidence, perverse or are legally
untenable in the sense that it fails to pass the muster of the Wednesbury principles.[5] Power
of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India
enables exercise of judicial review to correct errors of law, including
procedural law, leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of
fairness, without normally venturing into re-appreciation of evidence. The writ
court, when disciplinary action is challenged, is primarily concerned with
examination of the decision making process, which requires satisfaction that
the competent authorities have held inquiry as per the prescribed procedure,
and have duly applied their mind to the evidence and material placed on record,
without extraneous matters being given undue consideration, and the relevant
factors have been cogitated. The conclusions of fact, which are based upon
evaluation and appreciation of evidence, when meticulously reached by the
authorities, should not be interfered with merely because the court may have
reached at a different conclusion.
The Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and Others v. Dalbir Singh,[6]
has dealt with the issue of the
extent to which a Court can interfere in the findings of disciplinary
proceedings. The relevant paragraphs thereof are reproduced hereinafter:
“21. This Court in Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran[7] had
laid down the broad parameters for the exercise of jurisdiction of judicial
review. The Court held as under : (SCC pp. 616-17, paras 12-13)
“12.
Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the
High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings,
reappreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on
Charge I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by
the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High
Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court,
in exercise of its powers under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India,
shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only
see whether:
(a)
the enquiry is held by a competent authority;
(b)
the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf;
(c)
there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the
proceedings;
(d)
the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by
some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case;
(e)
the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or
extraneous considerations;
(f)
the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious
that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion;
(g)
the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and
material evidence;
(h)
the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which
influenced the finding;
(i)
the finding of fact is based on no evidence.
13. Under
Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not:
(i)
reappreciate the evidence;
(ii)
interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been
conducted in accordance with law;
(iii)
go into the adequacy of the evidence;
(iv)
go into the reliability of the evidence;
(v)
interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based;
(vi)
correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be;
(vii)
go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.”
22. In another judgment reported
as B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India [8],
it was held that the power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the
individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which
the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. The
judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in
which the decision is made. The Court is to examine as to whether the enquiry
was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are
complied with. This Court held as under : (SCC pp. 759-60, paras 12-13)
“12.
Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in
which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that
the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion
which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court.
When an enquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the
Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the enquiry was held by a
competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with.
Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority
entrusted with the power to hold enquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority
to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on
some evidence. Neither the technical rules of the Evidence Act nor of proof of
fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the
authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the
disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is
guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does
not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at
its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere
where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a
manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of
statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the conclusion or
finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the
conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached,
the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould
the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case.
13. The
disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented,
the appellate authority has coextensive power to reappreciate the evidence or
the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary enquiry, the strict proof of legal
evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence
or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the
Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel[9] this
Court held at p. 728 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence
reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error
on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari
could be issued.”
23. This Court in T.N. State Transport Corpn. (Coimbatore)
Ltd. v. M.
Chandrasekaran[10] held that
in exercise of power of judicial review, the Labour Commissioner exceeded his
jurisdiction in reappreciating the evidence adduced before the enquiry officer
and in substituting his own judgment to that of the disciplinary authority. It
was not a case of no legal evidence. The question as to decision of the
disciplinary authority of dismissing the respondent is just and proper could be
assailed by the respondent in appropriate proceedings. Considering the fact
that there was adequate material produced in the departmental enquiry
evidencing that fatal accident was caused by the respondent while driving the
vehicle on duty, the burden to prove that the accident happened due to some
other cause than his own negligence was on the respondent. The doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur squarely
applies to the fact situation. The Court held as under : (SCC p. 21, para 11)
“11.
The respondent on the other hand contends that the Commissioner has applied the
well-settled legal position that there can be no presumption of misconduct by
the employees. That, charge must be proved by the Department during the
enquiry. Non-examination of the material witnesses such as eyewitnesses present
on the spot, conductor and passengers, travelling on the same bus was fatal.
For, it entails in not substantiating the charges against the respondent and
failure to discharge the initial onus resting on the Department to prove the
charge as framed. According to the respondent, no fault can be found with the
tangible reasons recorded by the Commissioner as noticed by the Single Judge
(reproduced above); and resultantly, the conclusion of the Commissioner of not
according approval to the order of dismissal is just and proper. It is
submitted that the Single Judge was justified in allowing the writ petition
preferred by the respondent and issuing direction to the appellant to reinstate
him with back wages and continuity of service and all attendant benefits
accrued to him.”
24. This Court in Ajit Kumar Nag v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd.[11]
held that the degree of proof which is necessary to order a conviction is
different from the degree of proof necessary to record the commission of
delinquency. In criminal law, burden of proof is on the prosecution and unless
the prosecution is able to prove the guilt of the accused “beyond reasonable
doubt”, he cannot be convicted by a court of law. In a departmental enquiry, on
the other hand, penalty can be imposed on the delinquent officer on a finding
recorded on the basis of “preponderance of probability”. It was held as under :
(SCC p. 776, para 11)
“11. As far as acquittal of the
appellant by a criminal court is concerned, in our opinion, the said order does
not preclude the Corporation from taking an action if it is otherwise
permissible. In our judgment, the law is fairly well settled. Acquittal by a
criminal court would not debar an employer from exercising power in accordance
with the Rules and Regulations in force. The two proceedings, criminal and
departmental, are entirely different. They operate in different fields and have
different objectives. Whereas the object of criminal trial is to inflict
appropriate punishment on the offender, the purpose of enquiry proceedings is
to deal with the delinquent departmentally and to impose penalty in accordance
with the service rules. In a criminal trial, incriminating statement made by
the accused in certain circumstances or before certain officers is totally
inadmissible in evidence. Such strict rules of evidence and procedure would not
apply to departmental proceedings. The
degree of proof which is necessary to order a conviction is different from the
degree of proof necessary to record the commission of delinquency. The rule
relating to appreciation of evidence in the two proceedings is also not
similar. In criminal law, burden of proof is on the prosecution and unless the
prosecution is able to prove the guilt of the accused “beyond reasonable
doubt”, he cannot be convicted by a court of law. In a departmental enquiry, on
the other hand, penalty can be imposed on the delinquent officer on a finding
recorded on the basis of “preponderance of probability”. Acquittal of
the appellant by a Judicial Magistrate, therefore, does not ipso facto absolve
him from the liability under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Corporation.
We are, therefore, unable to uphold the contention of the appellant that since
he was acquitted by a criminal court, the impugned order dismissing him from
service deserves to be quashed and set aside.”
III.
STANDARD OF PROOF IN DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
The
purpose of enquiry proceedings is to deal with the delinquent departmentally
and to impose penalty in accordance with the service rules. In a departmental enquirypenalty can be
imposed on the delinquent officer on a finding recorded on the basis of
“preponderance of probabilities”.
The Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan and Others v. Heem Singh,
[12]
has dealt with the
issue of standard of proof as required in
case of disciplinary proceedings and explained the concept of
‘preponderance of probabilities’. The relevant paragraphs thereof are
reproduced hereinafter:
“32. In M. Siddiq (Ram Janmabhumi Temple-5 J.) v. Suresh Das,[13]
a Constitution Bench of this Court has described the standard of “preponderance
of probabilities” in the following terms : (SCC pp. 540-41, paras 720-21)
“720.
The court in a civil trial applies a standard of proof governed by a preponderance
of probabilities. This standard is also described sometimes as a balance of
probability or the preponderance of the evidence. Phipson on Evidence formulates the standard succinctly : If
therefore, the evidence is such that the court can say ‘we think it more
probable than not’, the burden is discharged, but if the probabilities are
equal, it is not. [ Phipson on Evidence] In Miller v. Minister
of Pensions[14] , Lord
Denning, J. (as the Master of Rolls then was) defined the doctrine of the
balance or preponderance of probabilities in the following terms : (All ER p.
373 H)
‘(1) … It need not reach certainty, but it must carry a high degree of
probability. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond the
shadow of doubt. The law would fail to protect the community if it admitted
fanciful possibilities to deflect the course of justice. If the evidence
is so strong against a man as to leave only a remote possibility in his favour
which can be dismissed with the sentence, “of course it is possible, but not in
the least probable” the case is proved beyond reasonable doubt, but nothing
short of that will suffice.’
721. The
law recognises that within the standard of preponderance of probabilities,
there could be different degrees of probability. This was succinctly summarised
by Denning, L.J. in Bater v. Bater, [15]
where he formulated the principle
thus : (p. 37)
“… So also in civil cases, the case must be
proved by a preponderance of probability, but there may be degrees of
probability within that standard. The
degree depends on the subject-matter.” ”
34. We have to now assess as
to whether in arriving at its findings the High Court has transgressed the
limitations on its power of judicial review. In Moni Shankar v. Union
of India[16] ,
a two-Judge Bench of this Court had to assess whether the Central
Administrative Tribunal had exceeded its power of judicial review by
overturning the findings of a departmental enquiry by reappreciating the
evidence. In regard to the scope of judicial review, the Court held thus : (SCC
p. 492, para 17)
“17.
The departmental proceeding is a quasi-judicial one. Although the provisions of
the Evidence Act are not applicable in the said proceeding, principles of
natural justice are required to be complied with. The courts exercising power of judicial review are entitled to consider
as to whether while inferring commission of misconduct on the part of a
delinquent officer relevant piece of evidence has been taken into consideration
and irrelevant facts have been excluded therefrom. Inference on facts must be
based on evidence which meet the requirements of legal principles. The
Tribunal was, thus, entitled to arrive at its own conclusion on the premise
that the evidence adduced by the Department, even if it is taken on its face
value to be correct in its entirety, meet the requirements of burden of proof,
namely, preponderance of probability. If on such evidence, the test of the
doctrine of proportionality has not been satisfied, the Tribunal was within its
domain to interfere. We must place on record that the doctrine of
unreasonableness is giving way to the doctrine of proportionality. (See State of U.P. v. Sheo Shanker Lal Srivastava[17] and Coimbatore District Central Coop. Bank v. Employees Assn[18].)”
37. In exercising judicial review in disciplinary matters,
there are two ends of the spectrum. The first embodies a rule of restraint. The
second defines when interference is permissible. The rule of restraint
constricts the ambit of judicial review. This is for a valid reason. The
determination of whether a misconduct has been committed lies primarily within
the domain of the disciplinary authority. The Judge does not assume the mantle
of the disciplinary authority. Nor does the Judge wear the hat of an employer.
Deference to a finding of fact by the disciplinary authority is a recognition
of the idea that it is the employer who is responsible for the efficient
conduct of their service. Disciplinary enquiries have to abide by the rules of
natural justice. But they are not governed by strict rules of evidence which
apply to judicial proceedings. The standard of proof is hence not the strict
standard which governs a criminal trial, of proof beyond reasonable doubt, but
a civil standard governed by a preponderance of probabilities. Within the rule
of preponderance, there are varying approaches based on context and subject.
The first end of the spectrum is founded on deference and autonomy — deference
to the position of the disciplinary authority as a fact-finding authority and
autonomy of the employer in maintaining discipline and efficiency of the
service. At the other end of the spectrum is the principle that the court has
the jurisdiction to interfere when the findings in the enquiry are based on no
evidence or when they suffer from perversity. A failure to consider vital
evidence is an incident of what the law regards as a perverse determination of
fact. Proportionality is an entrenched feature of our jurisprudence. Service
jurisprudence has recognised it for long years in allowing for the authority of
the court to interfere when the finding or the penalty are disproportionate to
the weight of the evidence or misconduct. Judicial craft lies in maintaining a
steady sail between the banks of these two shores which have been termed as the
two ends of the spectrum. Judges do not rest with a mere recitation of the
hands-off mantra when they exercise judicial review. To determine whether the
finding in a disciplinary enquiry is based on some evidence an initial or threshold
level of scrutiny is undertaken. That is to satisfy the conscience of the court
that there is some evidence to support the charge of misconduct and to guard
against perversity. But this does not allow the court to reappreciate
evidentiary findings in a disciplinary enquiry or to substitute a view which
appears to the Judge to be more appropriate. To do so would offend the first
principle which has been outlined above. The ultimate guide is the exercise of
robust common sense without which the Judges' craft is in vain.”
IV.
COURT’S
INTERFERENCE IN QUANTUM OF PUNISHMENT
If it is
found that all the procedural requirements have been complied with, the courts
would not ordinarily interfere with the quantum of punishment imposed upon a
delinquent employee. The superior courts only in some cases may invoke the
doctrine of proportionality. If the decision of an employer is found to be
within the legal parameters, the jurisdiction would ordinarily not be invoked when
the misconduct stands proved.
Once the
Court set aside an order of punishment on the ground that the enquiry was not
properly conducted, the Court should not preclude the employer from holding the
inquiry in accordance with law. It must remit the case concerned to the
disciplinary authority to conduct the enquiry from the point that it stood
vitiated, and to conclude the same in accordance with law.
The Supreme Court in case
of Anil Kumar Upadhyay v. The Director General, SSB and Others,[19] has dealt with the issue of interference
by court in quantum of punishment in case
of disciplinary proceedings. The relevant paragraphs thereof reproduced
hereinafter:
“22. On the
judicial review and interference of the courts in the matter of disciplinary
proceedings and on the test of proportionality, few decisions of this Court are
required to be referred to:
i) In
the case of Om Kumar (supra),[20]
this Court, after considering the Wednesbury principles and the
doctrine of proportionality, has observed and held that the question of quantum
of punishment in disciplinary matters is primarily for the disciplinary
authority and the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226 of the
Constitution or of the Administrative Tribunals is limited and is confined to
the applicability of one or other of the well-known principles known as ‘Wednesbury
principles’.
In
the Wednesbury case,[21]
it was observed that when a statute gave discretion to an administrator to take
a decision, the scope of judicial review would remain limited. Lord Greene further
said that interference was not permissible unless one or the other of the
following conditions was satisfied, namely, the order was contrary to law, or
relevant factors were not considered, or irrelevant factors were considered, or
the decision was one which no reasonable person could have taken.
ii) In
the case of B.C. Chaturvedi (supra),[22]
in paragraph 18, this Court observed and held as under:
“18. A review of the above legal position would
establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate
authority, being fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the
evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the
discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or
gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power
of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty
and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary
authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High
Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the
disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to
shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose
appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof.”
iii) In
the case of Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank (supra),[23]
in paragraph 19, it is observed and held as under:
“19. The principles discussed above can be
summed up and summarised as follows:
19.1. When charge(s) of misconduct is proved in
an enquiry the quantum of punishment to be imposed in a particular case is
essentially the domain of the departmental authorities.
19.2. The courts cannot assume the function of
disciplinary/departmental authorities and to decide the quantum of punishment
and nature of penalty to be awarded, as this function is exclusively within the
jurisdiction of the competent authority.
19.3. Limited judicial review is available to
interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, only in
cases where such penalty is found to be shocking to the conscience of the
court.
19.4. Even in such a case when the punishment is
set aside as shockingly disproportionate to the nature of charges framed
against the delinquent employee, the appropriate course of action is to remit
the matter back to the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority with
direction to pass appropriate order of penalty. The court by itself cannot
mandate as to what should be the penalty in such a case.
19.5. The only exception to the principle stated
in para 19.4 above, would be in those cases where the co-delinquent is awarded
lesser punishment by the disciplinary authority even when the charges of
misconduct were identical or the co-delinquent was foisted with more serious
charges. This would be on the doctrine of equality when it is found that the
employee concerned and the co-delinquent are equally placed. However, there has
to be a complete parity between the two, not only in respect of nature of
charge but subsequent conduct as well after the service of charge-sheet in the
two cases. If the co-delinquent accepts the charges, indicating remorse with
unqualified apology, lesser punishment to him would be justifiable.”
V.
CONCLUSION
Thus, form the above discussion it
can be deduced that the Court exercising jurisdiction of judicial review with
respect to disciplinary proceedings must be cautious that they are not
appellate authority and have a very limited scope of review and should not
delve into re-appreciation of evidence, and if enquiry procedure is found to be
vitiated for want of reasonable opportunity to a delinquent employee to defend
himself, or even if enquiry procedure is found to be sound and reasonable then
also it can deal with the proportionality of the punishment imposed, if ex-facie
it shocks the conscience of the Court. Even in such a case when the punishment
is set aside as shockingly disproportionate to the nature of charges framed
against the delinquent employee, the appropriate course of action is to remit
the matter back to the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority with
direction to pass appropriate order of penalty. The court by itself cannot
mandate as to what should be the penalty in such a case.
***********
[1] https://www.britannica.com/topic/judicial-review
[2] R. Daly v. Secy.
of State for the Home Department, (2001) 2 AC 532: (2001) 2 WLR 1622:
(2001) 3 All ER 433 (HL)]
[3] B.P. Singhal v. Union of India, (2010) 6 SCC 331
[4]
https://www.legalservicesindia.com/article/1927/Disciplinary-Proceedings-against-a-Govt.-Servant.html
[5] [1948] 1 K.B. 223
[6] Union of India and Others v.
Dalbir Singh, (2021) 11 SCC 321
[7] Union of India v. P.
Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610 : (2015) 1 SCC (L&S) 554
[8] B.C.
Chaturvedi v. Union of India,
(1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80
[9] Union
of India v. H.C. Goel,
(1964) 4 SCR 718 : AIR 1964 SC 364
[10] T.N.
State Transport Corpn. (Coimbatore) Ltd. v. M.
Chandrasekaran, (2016) 16 SCC 16 : (2017) 4 SCC (Civ) 190 : (2016) 4 SCC
(Cri) 793 : (2018) 1 SCC (L&S) 514
[11] Ajit Kumar Nag v. Indian
Oil Corpn. Ltd., (2005) 7 SCC 764 : 2005 SCC (L&S) 1020
[12] State of Rajasthan and Others v.
Heem Singh, (2021) 12 SCC 569
[13] M.
Siddiq (Ram Janmabhumi Temple-5 J.) v. Suresh
Das, (2020) 1 SCC 1
[14] Miller v. Minister of Pensions, (1947) 2 All ER
372
[15] Bater v. Bater, 1951 P 35 (CA)
[16] Moni
Shankar v. Union of India,
(2008) 3 SCC 484 : (2008) 1 SCC (L&S) 819
[17] State
of U.P. v. Sheo Shanker Lal
Srivastava, (2006) 3 SCC 276 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 521
[18] Coimbatore
District Central Coop. Bank v. Employees
Assn., (2007) 4 SCC 669 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 68
[19] Anil Kumar Upadhyay v. The
Director General, SSB and Others, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 478
[20] Om Kumar v. Union
of India, (2001) 2 SCC 386;
[21] [1948] 1
K.B. 223
[22] B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union
of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749
[23] Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank (Now Allahabd, Uttar Pradesh
Gramin Bank) v. Rajendra
Singh, (2013) 12 SCC 372