HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ANALYSIS ON CONFESSION IN UNITED STATES, UNITED KINGDOM, AND INDIA BY - ANBUSELVI S, ATHIMADHURA R & SUBHA KAVINITHA R
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ANALYSIS ON CONFESSION IN UNITED STATES,
UNITED KINGDOM, AND INDIA
AUTHORED BY - ANBUSELVI S,
ATHIMADHURA R & SUBHA
KAVINITHA R
ABSTRACT
“Confession is an
admission made at any time by a person charged with a crime stating or
suggesting the inference that he committed that crime.”
– Justice Stephen (Digest
of the Law of Evidence)[1]
The concept of confession
in legal systems has evolved over centuries, reflecting shifting views on
justice, evidence, and individual rights. In ancient civilizations such as
Mesopotamia and Egypt, confessions were often obtained through divine rituals
or coercion, regarded as direct admissions of guilt essential for resolving
disputes. In Roman law, confession was recognized as potent evidence, sometimes
obtained through torture to ensure compliance and truthfulness. During the
medieval period in Europe, confessions were central to inquisitorial legal
systems, where ecclesiastical courts heavily relied on them to prosecute heresy
and other crimes. The use of coercive methods, however, often raised ethical
and reliability concerns. With the Enlightenment era and the rise of human
rights philosophies, the legal approach to confession shifted toward protecting
individuals from self-incrimination, as seen in legal principles such as the
Miranda rights[2] in
the United States and the privilege against self-incrimination in common law.
Modern legal systems emphasize the voluntary nature of confessions, considering
them valid only if obtained without coercion, deception, or undue influence.
This historical evolution underscores the delicate balance between securing
justice and safeguarding individual rights, highlighting confession's complex
role in legal processes.
Keywords: Confession, Miranda rights, Self-Incrimination, Voluntary,
Coercion, inducement.
1. Introduction
When the court of the Star
Chamber was abolished later on, During the mid-Seventeenth Century, the beliefs
that a defendant ought to be subjected On Oath and that no evidence should be
obtained from him had been established in England. The concept of the passage
of time evolved into a right of a Testify against self-incrimination. The
concept was brought into the American Legal framework and integrated into her
common Law.
2. Historical Growth in United States of
America
As a British colony,
American legal systems inherited English common law principles. This included
the admissibility of confessions in criminal trials, provided they were given
voluntarily. Forced confessions were often viewed with skepticism.
Post-Revolutionary Era
(1776-1789): After independence, the U.S. began developing its own legal framework.
The Constitution and the Bill of Rights (ratified in 1791) laid the foundation
for how confessions were treated under the law.
2.1 Fifth Amendment
The right to silence
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment greatly affects the case’s outcome. Whether a
suspect says so or not. Because one must explicitly invoke their Fifth
Amendment rights verbally, Salinas v. Texas (2013) found that silence in a
noncustodial context amounts to an admission of guilt. As a result, this ruling
is in favor of the prosecution using silence as a confession to strengthen
their case. When a suspect exercises their right to remain silent, it can help
them avoid implicating themselves and work with their legal counsel to develop
their plan. A suspect runs the danger of admitting law enforcement add
information to their confession if they don't verbally assert their right to
remain silent, which also introduces flaws into the process (Griffin, 2016).
When a suspect does not expressly claim silence as a right, the prosecution may
use it as proof of guilt in court. Then, it can be used Against a suspect at
trial to “impeach [their] excuse, explanation, or alibi” (Griffin, 2016, p.
708). Additionally, according to Griffin (2016), p. 708, being silent in
response to a statement may “qualify as a defendant’s adoption of that
Statement for purposes of the exemption of a party’s own admissions from the
hearsay Prohibition.” Suspects do, then, have the right to silence, but they
must first establish this privilege and then maintain complete silence until
they have had a chance to speak with legal counsel. This will reduce the
possibility of false confessions. This will minimize false confession risk.
With effect from December
15, 1791, the V amendment to the US Constitution included the prohibition
against self-incrimination. The pertinent section reads as follows: "No person shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself…”
2.2 Sixth Amendment
According to the Sixth
Amendment, every suspect has the right to legal representation prior to being
questioned. In addition to protecting a suspect’s rights, the chance to speak
with legal counsel enables the team to consider feasible strategies they can
use during the interrogation and, if necessary, during the subsequent legal
proceedings. Developing a plan early on can assist defendants in sticking to it
throughout their legal proceedings, whether that approach involves defending
themselves or claiming innocence. Because the lawyer can help the defendant
prepare and know what to expect during questioning, it can also help prevent
false confessions.
Following that, the court
determined that “the aim of the requirement of due process is not to keep out
false evidence but also to save basic fundamental unfairness in the use of
evidence” in the other case of Lisenba v. California[3]
2.3 Prerequisites
for Confessions to Be Inadmissible
In the decision of Brown
v. Mississippi[4],
decided in 1936, the US Supreme Court set some rules. Because the court lacks a
mechanism to assess whether the confession was offered voluntarily or not,
confessional statements obtained by investigative authorities that disobey
these principles will not be allowed as evidence in any criminal proceeding.
This development reached its prime in 1966, starting with the previously
described instance. A confession would not be accepted as evidence under the
following circumstances, according to the Supreme Court:
Chambers v. Florida[5] was a landmark ruling by
the U.S. Supreme Court that reversed the convictions of four African American
men accused of murder. The Court held that their confessions, obtained after
days of prolonged detention and coercion without access to legal counsel, were
inadmissible as they violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The decision emphasized the Importance of fair legal procedures and
set a precedent for the protection of individuals against coerced confessions,
advancing civil rights and reinforcing the principles of due process.
Ashcraft v. Tennessee[6], the U.S. Supreme Court overturned the
conviction of the defendant, Ashcraft, on the grounds that his confession was
coerced and violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
Court determined that Ashcraft's confession, obtained after 36 hours of
continuous interrogation without rest, was inadmissible as it was not
voluntary. This case set a significant precedent for protecting individuals
from coerced confessions and ensuring that due process rights are upheld during
interrogations.
McNabb v. United States[7],the U.S. Supreme Court
held that confessions obtained during an unnecessary delay between arrest and
arraignment were inadmissible in federal court. The Court ruled in favor of the
defendants, emphasizing that federal authorities must adhere to procedural
safeguards and promptly bring arrested individuals before a magistrate. This
decision established what is known as the “McNabb-Mallory Rule”, which
prohibits the admission of confessions obtained during periods of illegal
detention. The case underscored the importance of procedural fairness and compliance
with federal rules governing arrest and detention.
Miranda v. Arizona[8], The outcome of Miranda
v. Arizona (1966) was a landmark decision by the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court
ruled in a 5-4 decision that the Fifth Amendment requires law enforcement
officials to inform a suspect of their rights to silence and legal counsel
before interrogation. This decision established the Miranda Rights, which
include:
1.
The right to remain silent.
2.
Anything said can be used against the individual in a court
of law.
3.
The right to an attorney.
4.
If the individual cannot afford an attorney, one will be
provided.
The ruling overturned
Ernesto Miranda’s conviction because he had not been informed of his rights
during his interrogation. This case significantly impacted U.S. police
procedures and continues to influence the criminal justice system.
2.4 Additional Issues with
Confession Admission in the U.S.A
In Rogers v. Richmound[9],
The validity of the defendant's confessions was found to be unquestionably true
despite independent corroborating evidence, but "in a number of the cases
in which the authority of the Due Processes has bound us to reverse state
Convictions linking the use of confessions obtained by the non-permissible
Methods, confessions were found to be the creation of constitutionally
non-permissible methods in their encouragement." The many unique features
of U.S.A. law pertaining to prison confessions are recognized by all common law
countries, including the United Kingdom and India. One notable aspect is the
elimination of self-harming remarks made while in police custody.
In Lynumn v. Illinois[10],
“The accused was acquitted, but the narcotics substance was really found from
her custody because the court ruled that a confession made by someone else
prior to the recovery of the drug from her custody was inadmissible.”
2.5 Dickersons case
summary
Dickerson v. United States[11]
is a landmark decision by the United States Supreme Court that upheld the
requirement for law enforcement officers to inform suspects of their Miranda
rights before questioning them. Charles Dickerson was arrested for a bank
robbery. During his arrest, he was not immediately informed of his Miranda
rights, but was later given the warning. He made a statement confessing to the
crime, which was used against him in court. Dickerson argued that his
confession should be excluded because the warning came too late, violating the
Miranda decision. The main legal question was whether the federal law
(specifically, 18 U.S.C. 3501), which allowed confessions to be admitted if
made voluntarily, could override the Miranda decision, which requires a warning
before questioning a suspect in custody. In a 7-2 ruling, the Supreme Court
held that Miranda rights are a constitutional requirement based on the Fifth
Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination. The Court ruled that the
federal law could not supersede the Miranda decision, reaffirming that the
Miranda warnings are a necessary safeguard in criminal cases. The decision
reinforced the importance of Miranda rights, ensuring that suspects are aware
of their right to remain silent and their right to an attorney during custodial
interrogations. Despite some legislative attempts to modify or override
Miranda, this case solidified its place as a fundamental safeguard in the
criminal justice system.
3. Historical Growth in England
The idea against compelled
self-incrimination was formed in England at the start of the 19th
century. We can clearly observe the development of the right against
self-incrimination in England. This was place in relation to the contentious
priest courts, the Star Chamber, and the High Commission, which were viewed as
irrational due to their authority over political and religious opponents.
Judges have the authority to cross-examine a defendant who had made a pledge.
Refusing to testify might result in punishment for the suspect, and it was said
that these courts permitted the use of torture during questioning. Furthermore,
it is common for interrogations to occur prior to the filing of accusations and
without the accused person’s knowledge of the alleged actions. The Star Chamber
was disbanded in 1640 by Oliver Cromwell’s Parliamentary government, and the
judiciary subsequently revised its stance on the accused and the exclusion of forced
confessions from the evidence. The history of the law pertaining to confession
was broken down into four phases by the renowned American jurist John Henry
Wigmore[12].
During the Tudar and Stuart eras, there was initially no control over
inclusion. It was discovered after 1750 that several confessions had been
disregarded due to their unreliability. The third stage saw the development of
the exclusionary rule, which states that irrational confessions are not
admissible in court. However, this rule has several exceptions, so not all
confessions are discarded.
Used as evidence
against the accused in criminal proceedings. Baren Parke states, "A
confession must be completely voluntary to be admissible in evidence under the
Law of England, and there is no doubt that any inducement in the form of a
promise or threat held out by a person in authority invalidates a
confession."[13]
The law's growth was
essentially steady by the end of the 19th century. A basic concept was to
exclude involuntary confessions. With "involuntary confessions," we
mean implies "a confession brought on by coercion or fear from a higher
authority." The Privy Council explained in Abriham v. King,[14]
that "No statement made by an accused person can be used against him in
court unless the prosecution can demonstrate that the statement was made
voluntarily in the sense that it has not been obtained from him either by
apprehension of injustice or hope of advantage exercised or held out by the
authority." This rule of evidence was acknowledged as a positive rule in
English criminal law.
3.1 Judges Rules in England
The practice standards
established by Lord Parker C.J. in Callis v. Gunn[15]
in 1964 were crucial for judges in their day-to-day work. Extorting confessions
must be eliminated from substantial evidence in a case, as was explicitly
stated in this instance. These regulations were created for judges, who can
exercise some control over police operations during an investigation by
exercising the authority granted to them. These regulations were based only on
the presiding officer of the court's judgment and without any legal support.
These regulations state that every citizen has an obligation to assist law
enforcement in identifying and apprehending offenders; nevertheless, they also
grant several rights to the accused who is being held by the authorities
(Police authority). The person in custody was entitled to speak with an
advocate. No comment made by a person may be entered into evidence. individual
throughout the inquiry if such declarations were made under duress or with the
assurance of authority. It has been shown that this rule is applicable in every
situation and is superseding. This procedure for accepting confessions was
created in order to ascertain the truth or to ensure a fair trial. Police
officers have the right to question anyone, whether or not they are in jail and
whether or not they are facing criminal charges. When police officers question
someone and gather information that raises questions in their minds, they
remind the person that he has the right to remain silent. If the person decides
to confess after receiving this warning, the confession will be used against him.
The warning that was provided to the accused is explicit and must be spoken to
him. Additionally stipulated was the format for recording the accused person's
confessional statements.
4. Legislative provision regarding
Confession
The Police and Criminal
Evidence Act of 1984 was enacted to give the Judges' Rules legal authority. The
Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984's Sections 76 and 82(1) address the
provisions pertaining to the confessional statements' inclusion or exclusion.
Section 76[16]
(1) n any proceedings a
confession made by an accused person may be given in evidence against him in so
far as it is relevant to any matter in issue in the proceedings and is not
excluded by the court in pursuance of this section.
(2) If, in any proceedings where the prosecution
proposes to give in evidence a confession made by an accused person, it is
represented to the court that the confession was or may have been obtained—
(a) by oppression of the
person who made it; or
(b) in consequence of
anything said or done which was likely, in the circumstances existing at the
time, to render unreliable any confession which might be made by him in
consequence thereof,
the court shall not allow
the confession to be given in evidence against him except in so far as the prosecution
proves to the court beyond reasonable doubt that the confession
(notwithstanding that it may be true) was not obtained as aforesaid.
(3) In any proceedings
where the prosecution proposes to give in evidence a confession made by an
accused person, the court may of its own motion require the prosecution, as a
condition of allowing it to do so, to prove that the confession was not
obtained as mentioned in subsection (2) above.
(4) The fact that a
confession is wholly or partly excluded in pursuance of this section shall not
affect the admissibility in evidence—
(a) of any facts
discovered as a result of the confession; or
(b) where the confession
is relevant as showing that the accused speaks, writes or expresses himself in
a particular way, of so much of the confession as is necessary to show that he
does so.
(5) Evidence that a fact
to which this subsection applies was discovered as a result of a statement made
by an accused person shall not be admissible unless evidence of how it was discovered
is given by him or on his behalf.
(6) Subsection (5) above
applies—
(a)to any fact discovered
as a result of a confession which is wholly excluded in pursuance of this
section; and
(b) to any fact discovered
as a result of a confession which is partly so excluded, if the fact is
discovered as a result of the excluded part of the confession.
(7) Nothing in Part VII of
this Act shall prejudice the admissibility of a confession made by an accused
person.
(8) In this section
“oppression” includes torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, and the use or
threat of violence (whether or not amounting to torture).
Section 82(1)[17]
“confession”, includes any
statement wholly or partly adverse to the person who made it, whether made to a
person in authority or not and whether made in words or otherwise;
The complete exclusion
policy began to give way to the English courts' discretionary authority at the
start of the 19th century. The court in King v. Best[18] unquestionably rejected a
stringent exclusionary rule, which marked the beginning of a new period of
inconsistent rulings. The rulings established a process for recording
confessions, and the brutality of this process excludes confessional
statements.
5. Historical Growth in INDIA
The law was first
codified in India in the latter part of the 1800s. Before then, people lived in
presidential towns, which were subject to local regulations. For the first
time, several English legal provisions were introduced by the Royal Charter.
Sir J.F. Stephens105 created the current Indian Evidence Act in 1872. However,
There was no Act that applied English law to India on any topic whatsoever. The
Indian legislature approved many acts in the first half of the eighteenth
century that included the same changes that Lords Denman and Brougham had
already implemented in England. Some rules related to evidence are found in the
code enacted in 1861 and in the Criminal Procedure Regulation of 1817.
The statute that
prohibited confessions from being used as evidence had peaked in England at this
time. Every time they handed down convictions, the courts were willingly
discarding custodial confessions and faith in favor of other independent
evidence. However, their insertion was not prohibited by law. The Fifth
Amendment, which was enacted at the time in the United States of America,
states that no one is required to make self-incriminating or remarks that might
be used against them. However, a century later, the point of complete exclusion
was attained.
Apparently,
"influenced by the opinion in the U.K. with an additional factor of the
eroding integrity of the police, particularly the level of the police at which
inquiry of offences was carried out," Indian lawmakers took the bold
decision to formally ban all confessions made to the police, regardless of
whether they are
1.
Whether true or not,
2.
either voluntarily or involuntarily,
3.
not compulsion or torture, and
4.
threat or incentive,
but just the
presence of a police officer or even the accused's detention by the police was
seen to be sufficient to elicit an opinion—and an involuntariness view that
could be challenged.
5.1 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1861
Section 146 of the
Criminal Procedure Code of 1861 has other relevant prohibitions, including the
prohibition of "a police officer or any other person offering any
encouragement by threat or promise or otherwise to any accused person to make
any discovery or confession." Section 147 states that a police officer is
not allowed to record any admissions, confessions, or declarations made by
someone who is suspected of a crime unless it is for his own knowledge,
information, or direction. Only administrative restrictions that applied to
police personnel were contained in these two sections. However, Section 148
explicitly states that "no confession or admission of a guilty person made
to a police officer might be used as evidence against a person accused of any
offense." In Section 149, the rule's scope was further expanded by
prohibiting "any confessions or admissions of guilt made by an accused
person to anybody at the same time as he was in the custody of police apart
from when made in the immediate presence of a magistrate from being admitted as
evidence."
Section 150, however,
"fixed out an exception to both of these rules in cases where any fact is
shown to be revealed by the police as a result of an information received from
the accused person. In such cases, a part of the information that is definitely
related to the facts supported was made admissible whether or not it amounted
to confession."
Therefore, "all
confessions made to the police or in police custody were not admissible in
evidence," according to the fundamental rule. However, a simple confession
that revealed a pertinent truth was only allowed to be admitted to the point that
it was connected to the discovery, most likely because the finding validates
its veracity. However, a confession would need to be documented before any
information could be gleaned from it. The taped confession would be duplicated
in court and used as evidence in the event that a discovery was made.
It is difficult to
reconcile this clause with Section 147, which forbade police personnel from
recording confessions. Recording all confessions under the guise of "for
his own benefit" is the only workable solution. Information and advice
clause, and then to provide evidence for it later on. These confessional
portions were made admissible as evidence by Section 150 of the aforementioned
Act; however, this rule did not exempt the clauses outlined in Section 146. The
voluntariness principle remained unwavering. It was decided that even if a
confession led to the discovery of facts, it could not be used as evidence
since it was acquired by a police officer from a prisoner using coercion and
assurances of safety in violation of Section 146 of the 1861 Code.
5.2 The India Evidence Act 1872
The Indian Evidence Act
was prepared by Sir J.F. Stephen, although it wasn't the first bill; the Indian
Law Commission had already drafted one in 1868. Due to its numerous flaws and
unsuitability for India, the measure was never enacted into law. Thus, in 1872,
J.F. Stephen's legislation became India's First Evidence Law.
Sections 25, 26, and 27 of
the Indian Evidence Act and sections 23, 23(1), 23(2) of BSA, which are
comparable to Sections 148, 149, and 150 of the Code of 1861, respectively,
carried over the general "elimination of custodial confessions from
evidence as well as the exemption made in case of confessions primary to
discovery of any fact." The basic procedural regulations pertaining to
criminal analysis, such as Sections 146 and 147 of the Code of 1861, were not
included in the Act since it was created to establish the body of laws
governing evidence. However, Section 24 of evidence act and section 22(1) of
BNS, declared that any confessions made by an accused individual under duress
from a threat or promise from a higher authority were irrelevant in a criminal
prosecution. The restriction applies regardless of whether the individual
making the threat or promise is a police officer or not, as well as whether the
accused was being held by the police when the confession was made.
5.3 Code of Criminal Procedure 1898
The first version of the
Code of Criminal Procedure was passed in 1861, After the Indian Penal Code was
passed in 1860, Act 10 of 1882 replaced the Code, which was then replaced again
in 1898 by the Code of Criminal Procedure Amendment Act of 1923.
The First Law Commission
made important recommendations for criminal justice reform in its 14th Report
(1958), and the Code was altered after the committee's recommendations were
taken into account.
In response to the Fifth
Law Commission's Forty-First Report, Parliament passed the 1973 Code of
Criminal Process.
Section 162 0f CrPC and
Section 181 of BNSS Statements to police and use thereof
1.
No statement made by any person to a police officer in the
course of an investigation under this Chapter, shall, if reduced to writing, be
signed by the person making it; nor shall any such statement or any record
thereof, whether in a police diary or otherwise, or any part of such statement
or record, be used for any purpose, save as hereinafter provided, at any
inquiry or trial in respect of any offence under investigation at the time when
such statement was made;
Provided that
when any witness is called for the prosecution in such inquiry or trial whose
statement has been reduced into writing as aforesaid, any part of his
statement, if duly proved, may be used by the accused, and with the permission
of the Court, by the prosecution, to contradict such witness in the manner
provided by section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872); and when any
part of such statement is so used, any part thereof may also be used in the
re-examination of such witness, but for the purpose only of explaining any
matter referred to in his cross-examination.
- Nothing in this section shall be deemed to apply to any
statement falling within the provisions of clause (1) of section 32 of the
Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), or to affect the provisions of
section 27 of that Act. And section 23 of BSA
After an analytical study
of the provisions of the sections 24 to 27 of the Indian Evidence Act and
section 22, 23 of BSA section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code and section
181 of BNSS various important propositions appear:
1.
Whether a person made a confession when “he is in the custody
of a police officer to a person other than a police officer is not prove
against him in a 47 trial in which he is charged with an offence except it is
made in the instant presence of a Magistrate”.
2.
Whether person is “in custody of police or outside, a
confessional statement made by him to a police officer the making of which is
get hold of encouragement threat or promise, having reference to the charge
against him and proceeding from police is not able to prove against him in any
proceeding in which he is charged with the commission of an offence”.
3.
A statement made by a accused person to other another person
not being a police officer when he is not in custody whether it amounts to a
confession or not, if it is otherwise relevant.
4.
Any part of the information given by a person when “he is in
police custody whether the information is confessional or else which clearly
relates to the fact in this manner discovered but no more is verifiable in
proceeding in which he is charged with an offence.
5.
In State of UP v. Deomani Upadhaya[19]
it was held that “a declaration made by a person to a police officer throughout
of an investigation of an offence under chapter fourteen of the Criminal
Procedure Code cannot excluding to the extent permitted by Section 27 of the
Indian Evidence Act be used for any reason at any inquiry or trial in respect
of any offence under investigation at the time when such declaration was made
in which he is concerned as a person accused of an offence”.
6. Conclusion
According to the
historical background of the law pertaining to confession, the idea has
progressively changed throughout different nations. When evaluating the
admissibility and relevance of confessions, the courts are taking a very
careful approach. "No one shall be coerced into confessing against
themselves in any criminal case." Over time, the regulation evolved into a
witness's protection from self-incrimination. The idea was adopted by the
American legal system and incorporated into common law.
According to the
aforementioned, if the confession is given voluntarily and without compulsion,
it appears that it can serve as the only foundation for the accused's
conviction. If the involuntary confession serves as the foundation for the
conviction or the assent was requested out of concern that the conviction would
be viewed badly by the law.
REFERENCE
Bibliography
·
Law Of Evidence By Dr. V. Krishnamachari
·
The Code of Criminal Procedure by Ratanlal and Dhirajlal
Webliography
·
CONFESSIONS UNDER THE INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT, 1872: AN ANALYSIS
OF PRECEDENT BY MR. AMRIT PAL SINGH & MR. KARAN DEEP SINGH.
·
The psychology of confessions - A review of the literature
and issues
·
Compulsion, Confession and Article 20(3)
Website referred
·
Shodhganga
·
Research Gate
·
Google Scholar
[1] Arya & Shivshankar,
Study on Confession under Indian Evidence Act, 1872, INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL OF PURE AND APPLIED MATHEMATICS ISSN: 1314-3395, Volume 120, No. 5,
2018.
[2] 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
[3] 314 U.S. 219 (1914).
[4] 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
[5] 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
[6] 322 U.S. 143(1944).
[7] 318 U.S.322 (1943).
[8] 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
[9] 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
[10] 372 U.S. 528 (1963).
[11] 530 US 428 (2000).
[12] John Henry Wigmore,
“Treaties on Anglo American system of evidence in Trials”
[13] R. v. Baldry (1852) 2
Den. 430.
[14] AIR 1914, PC 155
[15] (1964) 1 QB 495
[16] See Section 76 of the
Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984.
[17] Section 82(1) of the police
and criminal act 1984
[18] (1909) 1 KB, 692 (CCA).
[19] AIR 1960 SC 1125