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CRITICAL ANALYSIS ON THE GAP IN SEBI DISGORGEMENT ORDERS: SAFEGUARDING THE INTERESTS OF AFFECTED INVESTORS AND SHAREHOLDERS
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CRITICAL ANALYSIS ON THE GAP IN
SEBI DISGORGEMENT ORDERS: SAFEGUARDING THE INTERESTS OF AFFECTED INVESTORS AND
SHAREHOLDERS
ABSTARCT
Disgorgement is a kind of equitable
monetary compensation intended to stop wrongdoers from unfairly benefiting
financially from their illicit activities. Since 2003, the Securities and
Exchange Board of India has been issuing disgorgement orders, prompted by the practice
in the United States of America. As a
result, the SEBI Investor Protection and Education Fund is credited with the
illicit funds that the SEBI was able to collect through disgorgement orders.
The preservation of investor
interests and the advancement of investor education in compliance with the
relevant legislation are the two main goals of the funds held in the SEBI
Investor preservation and Education Fund, as explained in this article. According to the author, the Indian Contract
Act of 1872's fundamental principles against undue enrichment are being broken
by the SEBI through this kind of retention.
Therefore, this article argues that
in order to better fulfil the SEBI's mandate, a specific clause stating that
the disgorged funds credited to the fund should be used to compensate injured
investors upon identification should be added to the SEBI (Investor Protection
and Education Fund) Regulations, 2009.
INTRODUCTION
Disgorgement serves as a deterrent.
It is equivalent to taking away any financial gain that comes from breaking the
law. The goal is to deprive the perpetrator of their actual profits.
Disgorgement is a pecuniary penalty imposed and enforced by the State, for a
crime or offences against its laws, according to the Supreme Court of the
United States of America (hereinafter referred to as the "USA") in
the well-known case of Huntington v. Attrill. It is imposed as a result of
violating public laws[1],
i.e., a violation committed against the State rather than an enraged individual.
If those who violate securities legislation were exempt from having to disgorge
their illicit profits[2],
the deterrent effect of enforcement action by the securities regulatory
agencies would be severely undercut. Moreover, American courts have determined
that disgorgement is frequently not compensatory.
The Securities Exchange Commission
(henceforth referred to as the "SEC") was not expressly granted
disgorgement powers under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (henceforth
referred to as the "SEC Act"). Prior to the Securities Enforcement
Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, the SEC lacked explicit
jurisdiction to amass and disburse money to investors who had been duped
through legal or administrative channels.
Disgorgement was acknowledged as a
remedy for the first time by an appeal court with the decision in SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co.[3] The
disgorgement clause originated with the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, sometimes known as the "SOX Act."[4]
The Act was passed in the wake of the Enron scandal and specifically gave the
SEC permission to gather money under Section 308 to reimburse injured investors
for their losses. Similar to the SEC Act, the Securities and Exchange Board of
India Act of 1992 (hereinafter “SEBI Act”) granted broad authority for “any
equitable relief that may be appropriate or necessary for investors”[5]
and similarly lacked any specific provisions regarding the regulator’s
disgorgement powers.
Nonetheless, the SEBI Act[6]
did not explicitly grant authority to impose punitive or preventive measures.
Supported by the SOX Act's implementation, which established disgorgement as a
fair remedy, the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI)[7]
likewise started imposing disgorgement orders in 2003. But this quickly turned
into a divisive matter in Indian courts. In the matter of Rakesh Agrawal v.
SEBI[8],
the Securities Appellate Tribunal (henceforth referred to as "SAT")
overturned the directives of the SEBI on November 3, 2003. According to the
SAT's ruling, courts alone have the authority to use equitable powers;
quasi-judicial entities or tribunals are not permitted to do so.[9]
Disgorgement of any purported gains
cannot be ordered by SEBI. Disgorgement of purported gains is always intended
as a preventative action rather than as payment. Any financial burden that the
legislature wishes to place on the people must be specifically mentioned in the
relevant Act or Regulation. The Supreme Court noted in Ritesh Agarwal v. SEBI[10]
that "Section 11B is more action oriented, in a sense, it is a functional
tool in the hands of the Board." Directions of disgorgement are therefore
penal in nature and cannot be passed pursuant to Section 11 B of the said Act,
under which only remedial directions may be passed.
In actuality, Section 11B is one of
the executive tools at the respondent's (SEBI) disposal to uphold its primary
responsibility of safeguarding investors. Interestingly, in the case of IPO
irregularities - dealings by Ms. Roopalben N. Panchal, the SEBI held that "disgorgement
is not a penalty, but a monetary equitable remedy"[11]
while citing the decisions of the SAT in a number of cases. The section
identifies the persons to whom and the purposes for which directions can be
issued. Due to uncertainty surrounding the equitable powers of the SEBI, the
Securities Laws (Amendment) Act 3 of 2014 inserted an "explanation"
to Section 11B in the SEBI Act in accordance with international precedents of
legislative empowerment to the regulator for issuing disgorgement orders.[12]
This was in response to the SAT's decision in
Dushyant N. Dalal v. SEBI[13],
which noted that "there need be no specific provision in the [SEBI] Act in
this regard and this power to order disgorgement is inherent in the
Board." [14]The
power to issue directions under Section 11B was made clearer. It states[15]
that the power to direct someone who engaged in any activity or transaction
that violated the terms of this Act or its regulations and made profit or
avoided loss must disgorge an amount equal to the wrongful gain they made or
the loss they avoided. This power was put into effect on July 18, 2013.
Therefore, the modification would not
violate the fundamental rights violations and the cardinal principles crystallized
against ex facto law. Disgorgement of unjustly obtained advantages is a fair
remedy, not a punishment. This article examines the background that led to the
evolution of the disgorgement of ill-gotten gains in the Indian securities
market. The SAT recently upheld the jurisprudence on disgorgement in Ram
Kishori Gupta v. SEBI (commonly known as the Vital Communications case)[16],
holding that "disgorgement without restitution does not serve any
purpose." [17]
The author aims to evaluate the
effectiveness of the disgorgement orders issued by the SEBI by looking at a
number of decisions. The purpose is to investigate whether the SEBI is
protecting investors as required by law by limiting its authority to issuing
disgorgement orders. Given that the regulator has just gathered substantial
sums, this is really important. The author tries to highlight the provisions of
the SOX Act and the corresponding practices followed by the SEC in the USA to
protect the interests of the harmed investors in light of the SAT's ruling that
"disgorgement without restitution" does not serve the purpose of
investor protection in the securities market.
It is arguable that very little money
is spent in India on investor education, and the interest earned on the money
left in the Investor Protection and Education Fund is starting to provide
income for the SEBI. Given this, the author contends that the SEBI has engaged
in "undue enrichment" through the current procedure of collecting and
holding onto the disgorged funds of unjust gain. Therefore, it is against the
fundamental values outlined in the Indian Contract Act of 1872.
This article argues that equity
requires the disgorged funds to be reimbursed to investors or restored to them
in order to make up for the money they lost as a result of the unscrupulous
actions of a small number of market players. This money cannot be held by the
SEBI, especially if it is not being used. This article aims to offer a
compensation method for investors who have been harmed in the domestic
securities market, based on the SEC's Rules of Practice and Rules on Fair Fund
and Disgorgement Plans.
In order to achieve the goal of
safeguarding investors, the author suggests modifying the SEBI Act. The journey
of the enforcement regime under the SEBI Act is described in Part I of this
article. In Part II, the jurisprudence that has been created is discussed from
several angles regarding the SEBI's disgorgement powers. Part III identifies
the gap in the investor protection procedure that the SEBI implements after
issuing disgorgement orders. There will also be supporting evidence presented
to support this main point. This article attempts to suggest the addition of a
suitable clause to the SEBI Act, taking a cue from Section 308 of the SOX Act
(Fair Funds for Investors). A comparable process involving court intervention
is also present in the Indian Companies Act, 2013.
THE
ENFORCEMENT REGIME IN THE SEBI ACT
A jurisdiction's legal and regulatory
environment, eco-political framework, case merits, type of conduct to be
discouraged, and, most importantly, the social, cultural, and economic milieu
all have a significant impact on the enforcement ecosystem.[18]
The Supreme Court in N. Narayanan v. SEBI[19]
highlighted the importance of the SEBI's deterrent measures against those who
commit economic offences in India.[20]
The message should be that we live by
the "Rule of Law" and that "market abuse" will not be
tolerated in our nation. "Market security" is our credo, and SEBI
should guarantee that there is no room for fraud, dishonesty, or artificiality
in the nation's securities market.
The enforcement metrics and
penalty-setting framework in India have evolved gradually and have been
impacted by numerous externalities. There has been a learning curve for Indian
securities rules. The legislators who drafted the SEBI Act lacked market
experience and a forward-thinking outlook. The Act did not include provisions
for the application of sanctions because it was unable to completely appreciate
the designs and colours of market infractions. "In the light of experience
gained with the working of the SEBI Act, 1992, it was considered desirable to
expand the jurisdiction of SEBI, enhance its autonomy and empower it to take a
variety of punitive actions in case of violations of the Act,"[21]
writes Sahoo in the article titled "Historical Perspective of Securities
Law." India was admitted as a member of the International Organization of
Securities Commissions (hereinafter “IOSCO”).
Since Principle 9 of the 30
Principles of Securities Regulations at the time called for a strict
enforcement mechanism within its membership, the SEBI's ability to carry out
the Principles effectively was essential.[22] Penalties
and Adjudication, or Chapter VI-A[23],
was therefore added to the SEBI Act through the Securities Laws (Amendment) Act
of 1995. The Amendment Act gave the SEBI enforcement authority the much-needed
teeth of monetary penalties as a substitute instrument to address capital
market abuse and misuse.
Once more, a regulatory gap was
created by inexperience and regulatory hurry. The SEBI Act's Section 14(1)(aa)
stated that "all sums realized by way of Penalties under this Act shall be
credited to Securities and Exchange Board of India General Fund,"[24]
however in other significant jurisdictions, the penalty payments were credited
to the government treasury. This anomaly was fixed by the SEBI (Amendment) Act,
2002.[25]
The penalties are placed in the
Consolidated Fund of India as a result of the amendment. It seemed that
regulators in India, including the SEBI (as defined by this article), had not
complied with the modification. The SEBI and other regulators were accused by
the Comptroller and Auditor General of India of "contravention of
constitutional provision" for the fiscal year (hereinafter "FY")
that ended in March 2010 of keeping their excess funds, which totaled more than
INR2, 142 crores from fees and penalties, outside of government accounts.[26]
Coincidentally, the SEBI's Annual Accounts for the months of March 2016 and
March 2017 indicated that fines were being paid into the Consolidated Fund of
India.
Even while "gain-based"
remedies[27] are
covered by the Indian Contract Act of 1872, their broader application is
relatively new in the regulatory enforcement ecology of the Indian securities
industry (applied only in the IPO scandal). The goal of this remedy is to make
up for the plaintiff's loss, meaning that the investor(s) will receive
compensation to the degree that it is possible to replace the money they lost.
The two main categories of gain-based remedies are disgorgement and restitution
(a and b, respectively). The law of gains-based recovery is the law of
restitution, which is an equitable remedy. It offers the restoration of
something wrongfully taken from someone else. It's not recompense. Nonetheless,
the cash or property that the defendant has unlawfully obtained must be
traceable, meaning that they can be connected to specific funds or assets.
Restitution in this situation takes the shape of an equitable lien or a
constructive trust.[28]
THE SCOPE
AND OBJECTIVES OF THE SEBI'S DISGORGEMENT POWERS:
In Karvy Stock Broking Ltd. v. SEBI[29], the
Supreme Appellate Tribunal (SAT) expounded on the purpose and meaning of the
agency's disgorgement powers[30],
stating that the remedy's goal is to stop an offender from unfairly benefiting
from their illegal actions. It is not intended to be a form of punishment nor
to address the losses incurred by those who were harmed by the illegal
activity. If someone violates securities rules or regulations, disgorgement of
ill-gotten earnings may be required, but not all violators will face this
penalty. Only those wrongdoers who have benefited financially from their
illegal conduct or acts may be requested to do so. It would follow that the
disgorgement sum should not exceed the overall profits realized as a result of
the unlawful action since the main goal of imposing disgorgement is to ensure
that the wrongdoers do not profit from their wrongdoing. The onus of proving
that the amount sought to be disgorged fairly approximates the amount of unjust
enrichment in a disgorgement action rests with the Board.
The SAT quashed the SEBI's orders in
the aforementioned case, noting that "the impugned order was passed
without affording an opportunity of hearing to the appellant and other entities
which have been ordered to disgorge a sum of Rs. 115.82 crores."[31]
The SAT upheld that natural justice principles shall prevail even while the
SEBI issues disgorgement orders. The Board should have at the very least
demanded that the appellant provide justification for why it shouldn't be
forced to return the money that was decided in the contested decision. The
natural justice principles have been blatantly broken by not doing so.
Therefore, the contested order ought to be overturned only on this basis.
The SAT clarified the goals and
authority of the SEBI's enforcement in Karvy Stock Broking Ltd. v. SEBI.[32]
The essential center and essence of the Act is found in Section 11. This clause
was created in 1992, but it has since undergone numerous amendments, and it is
now significantly different from what it was then. The authority's purview has
been significantly expanded. The legislative intent is demonstrated by the
addition of Subsection (4) to Section 11 and by the inclusion of several other
provisions, such as Section 11B. These provisions are designed to give the
Board the power it needs to carry out its stated goals and successfully
exercise its authority.
The SEBI has been directing the
disgorgement of funds in various matters on the pretext that "the interest
of the market and of investors requires that such entities are not allowed to
participate in the market and unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of
investors." It is evident that a common thread runs through the various
provisions of the Act, and that is to empower the Board to take preventive as
well as punitive measures so as to protect the investor and to promote the
securities market.[33]
The market's orderly development and integrity are threatened by such major
irregularities, which necessitate regulatory involvement to safeguard
investors' interests.
The ruling in Sumeet Industries v.
SEBI established that the calculation of illicit gains must adhere to specific
criteria. If this is not the case, it will be reversed, and the SEBI might be
asked to recalculate the amount of illegal earnings that the appellants must
disgorge.[34]
Furthermore, in the Palred Technologies case,
the regulatory body stated that "the stock exchange, as a first level
regulator, has a fiduciary duty to the entire ecosystem" and that
"the securities lying in the demat account of these persons shall be
frozen to the extent of the remaining value"[35]
if the impounded funds subject to disgorgement "are found to be
insufficient to meet the figure of unlawful gains."[36]
Furthermore, it said that "an
order for disgorgement of a portion of the profits derived from the TBT [Tick
by Tick][37] data
dissemination activity during the relevant period, for being transferred to the
Investor Protection and Education Fund, created by SEBI under section 11 of the
SEBI Act, would be an appropriate direction, commensurate with the
violations."[38]
As a temporary measure, the SEBI may also
impound the unlawful gains in case there is a possibility of diversion of such
monies. Market participants' confidence in the trading system is based on the
assumption that the rules of trading are completely uniform and transparent. "It
is possible that the notices may divert the unlawful gains (subject to the
adjudication of the allegation on the merits in the final order), which may
result in defeating the effective implementation of the direction of
disgorgement, if any, to be passed after adjudication on merits," the SEBI
directed in the ICICI Bank Ltd., In re, matter.[39]
Further, interest on the disgorged
funds may be granted from the date the cause of action began until the date the
procedures to collect such interest in equity were started.[40]
This is subject to the regulator's non-interference at this time. It is also
possible to award interest that will be paid until the actual payment date.
These instructions must be precise, though. Nevertheless, no further interest
is due if the SEBI order does not state "along with further interest till
actual payment is made."[41]
In the April 30, 2013, ruling in
Ramkishori Gupta v. SEBI[42],
SAT, it was decided that the SEBI was not authorized to reimburse the
complainants for their losses. It added, "For the simple reason that SEBI
lacks the infrastructure and experience for this purpose, this issue needs to
be looked into by a civil court of competent jurisdiction in a trial and not by
SEBI under the SEBI Act. There is no legal requirement for SEBI to take such
action in the event that an investor loses money while trading shares or other
securities.”
It is important to note that the SEBI
Act does not, in its whole, provide for such authority. As previously
mentioned, the SAT directed SEBI to "look into the part of the complaint
of the Appellants which relates to the alleged misleading and fraudulent
advertisements issued by Vital Communications Limited, along with the
investigation, understandably, being carried on in respect of VCL or
separately, as it may be advised and considered fit and proper in the
circumstances of this case as per law."
It is sometimes difficult to
precisely quantify the damages because of the complex nature of transactions
and the fact that the investigation report does not dwell on the extent of the
specific gains made by the clients or the brokers.[43]
Under Section 28A of the SEBI Act[44],
the SEBI is entitled to start the recovery process if the unlawful gains and
directed interest are not paid within the allotted time.
THE SEBI'S
MISSING PIECE IN ITS
DISGORGEMENT
ORDERS:
In the securities market, investor safety is
essential. By their actions, wrongdoers expropriate money, especially earnings
that were obtained unfairly. The financial markets' ability to function is
threatened by such behaviour. Disgorgement of funds is in the greater public
interest and has been upheld by the US Supreme Court.[45]
As a result, there needs to be a deterrent enforcement ecosystem in the
securities market that "holds individuals and entities accountable and
deters misconduct, promote public confidence in financial services, creates an
environment in which fair and efficient markets can thrive (sic)." [46]
In the securities market, the SEBI
has been granted "public interest" jurisdiction. In Bihar Public
Service Commission v. Saiyed Hussain Abbas Rizwi[47],
the Supreme Court of India provided an explanation of the phrase, ruling that
"the expression 'public interest' has to be understood in its true
connotation so as to give complete meaning to the relevant provisions of the
Act." The goal of the SEBI Act is to safeguard the interests of securities
investors and to encourage the orderly, healthy growth of the securities market
through regulation and increased investor confidence.[48]
It is flexible, takes its colour from
the statute in which it appears, and changes with time and the needs of
society. It is a well-established canon of statutory construction that the
Court must assist Parliament in achieving its goal of offering a remedy for the
wrong that the law is intended to prevent. Consequently, the Court ought to
favour a construction that promotes this goal over one that looks for a way
around it.[49] Using
the justification of the aforementioned court rulings, it can be claimed that
the SEBI's crediting of the fines to the Consolidated Fund of India represents
the SEBI Act's legislative mandate that these funds are public funds that the
government may use for such purposes.[50]
Continuing this line of reasoning
with regard to the disgorged funds, it is contended that since the funds are to
be credited to the Investor Protection and Education Fund, the legislation's
fundamental intention is unequivocally to protect and educate investors in the
securities market, and that is the only use for this particular fund. It will
be shown, therefore, that the SEBI is not protecting investors with the
money; rather, it is utilizing it for investor education. The lone
exception to this rule were the IPO scams. As a result, there is an
administrative and regulatory gap caused by the way things are now working.
CONCLUSION
This article starts out by outlining
how legislation has evolved to give market regulators the authority to require
the disgorgement of money obtained illegally from different market
players. Disgorgement is a more recent
invention used as a deterrent in the securities market. The Securities and Exchange Commission lacked
explicit jurisdiction to issue disgorgement orders prior to the Securities
Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reforms Act 1991. The SEC has express jurisdiction to order the
disgorgement of money obtained through fraudulent means thanks to the SOX Act,
which was passed in the wake of the Enron scandal. For investors, it is placed in the Fair
Funds. The SEBI Act, which was similar
to the SEC Act and was passed in 1992, likewise prohibited the SEBI from
issuing orders for disgorgement. Nonetheless, the SEBI began granting
disgorgement orders in 2003 using its equitable powers. This was overturned by a SAT decision that
held that the Act or Regulation must specifically grant the authority to impose
disgorgement orders. Finally, SEBI received the much-needed empowerment
under the Securities Laws (Amendment) Act, 2014. The Investor Protection and Education Fund is
to be credited with the funds received in accordance with the aforementioned
orders. The arguments in this article are further strengthened by the
jurisprudence that has emerged on the SEBI's authority to make orders for the
disgorgement of ill-gotten money by various courts and quasi-judicial
authorities in India, which are covered in Part II.
The author concludes by arguing that
since disgorgement must be followed by restitution, special provisions should
be included in the SEBI (Investor Protection and Education Fund) Regulations,
2009, stating that the funds credited to the fund after disgorgement should be
used to compensate the affected investors after identification. The author has also suggested a method to
make up for the investors who have been wronged, based on the best worldwide practice
that the SEC has accepted. Without a
doubt, this will raise investor morale, especially among individual investors
who are staying out of the market for various reasons. The regulatory environment, rather than the
courts, is more important to the expansion of the Indian financial market.
[1] Huntington
v. Attrill, 1892 SCC OnLine US SC 245 : 36 L Ed 1123 : 146 US 657 (1892), 667.
[2] Kokesh
v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2017 SCC OnLine US SC 58 : 581 US ___
(2017).
[3] SEC
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F 2d 833 (1968).
[4] Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
[5] Barbara Black,
Should the SEC Be a Collection Agency for Defrauded Investors? 63
THE BUSINESS LAWYER, 317-346 (Feb.,
2008). Barbara Black, Should the SEC Be a Collection Agency for
Defrauded Investors? 63 THE BUSINESS
LAWYER, 317-346 (Feb., 2008).
[6] The
Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992, No. 15, Acts of Parliament,
1992
[7] Rakesh
Agrawal v. SEBI, 2003 SCC OnLine SAT 38 : (2004) 49 SCL 351.
[8] Id. at
¶77 (Quoting Securities and
Exchange Commission v. Maurice Rind, 991
F 2d 1486
(9th Cir 1993));
see Videocon International Ltd.
v. SEBI, (2015) 4 SCC 33.
[9] SAT followed
the earlier cases
of SEC v.
Maurice Rind, 991
F 2d 1486
(9th Cir 1993);
SEC v. Manor
Nursing Centers Inc.,
458 F 2d
1082 (2nd Cir
1972); Sterlite Industries
(India) Ltd. v.
SEBI, 2001 SCC
OnLine SAT 28; BPL Ltd. v. SEBI, 2001 SCC OnLine SAT 40;
Videocon International Ltd. v. SEBI, Id.
[10] Ritesh
Agarwal v. SEBI, (2008) 8 SCC 205, at ¶27.
[11] Roopalben
N. Panchal, In re, 2011 SCC OnLine SEBI 33, at ¶9d.
[12]
Dushyant N. Dalal v. SEBI, (2017) 9 SCC 660.
[13] Roopalben
N. Panchal, In re, supra note 11.
[14] The
Securities and Exchange Board of India (Amendment) Act, 2014, No. 27, Acts of
Parliament, 2014.
[15] Id.
[16] Ram
Kishori Gupta v. SEBI, 2019 SCC OnLine SAT 149.
[17] Id.
at ¶6.
[18] THE BOARDOFTHE
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONOF
SECURITIES COMMISSIONS, PRINCIPLESFOR
FINANCIAL BENCHMARKS(2013).
[19] N.
Narayanan v. SEBI, (2013) 12 SCC 152.
[20] Id.
at ¶170.
[21] M.S.
Sahoo, Historical Perspective of Securities Laws. CHARTERED SEC'Y (2000).
[22] INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONOF SECURITIES
COMMISSIONS, OBJECTIVESAND PRINCIPLESOF
SECURITIES REGULATION(2003).
[23] The
Securities and Exchange Board of India (Amendment) Act, 1995, No. 5, Acts of
Parliament, 1995.
[24] §14(1)(aa),
SEBI Act, 1992.
[25]The
Securities and Exchange Board of India (Amendment) Act, 2002, No. 59, Acts of
Parliament, 2002
[26] ET Bureau,
CAG pulls up
5 watchdogs for
keeping fee out of govt
accounts, THE ECONOMIC TIMES (Mar.
19, 2011, 12:49
AM).
[27] Indian
Contract Act, 1872, No. 9, Acts of Parliament, 1872.
[28] ANNA
PAYNE & MONIQUE LEAHY, RESTITUTIONAND IMPLIED CONTRACTS, 66AM. JUR.2D §6
(Thomson Reuters, 2001).
[29]
Karvy Stock Broking Ltd. v. SEBI, 2008 SCC OnLine SAT 74, at ¶5.
[30]
§15J, inserted by the 1995 amendment.
[31] Karvy
Stock Broking Ltd. v. SEBI, supra note 32, at ¶7.
[32] Karvy
Stock Broking Ltd. v. SEBI, 2007 SCC OnLine SAT 2, at ¶18.
[33] IPO Irregularities-Dealings by
Mr. Deepak Kumar
Shantilal Jain in
The Initial Public
Offering of Infrastructure Development Finance Co. Ltd., In re, 2008 SCC
OnLine SEBI 176, at ¶13.
[34] Sumeet
Industries Ltd. v. SEBI, 2016 SCC OnLine SAT 289.
[35] Palem
Srikanth Reddy, In re, 2016 SCC OnLine SEBI 42, at ¶12.
[36] National
Stock Exchange of India Ltd., In re, 2019 SCC OnLine SEBI 120, at ¶8.3.3.9.
[37] OPG
Securities (P) Ltd., In re, 2019 SCC
OnLine SEBI 116.
[38] In
National Stock Exchange of India Ltd., In re, supra note 38, at ¶10.2.
[39] In
ICICI Bank Ltd., In re, 2016 SCC OnLine SEBI 19, at ¶24.
[40] Trojan
and Co. v. N.N. Nagappa Chettiar, AIR 1953 SC 235 : 1953 SCR 789.
[41] Dushyant
N. Dalal v. SEBI, supra note 12.
[42] Ramkishori
Gupta v. SEBI, 2013 SCC OnLine SAT 17 : [2013] SAT 52.
[43] In re
Jay Bharat Fabrics Mills
Ltd., SEBI Order
No.AS/AO-03/2014 (2014), https://www.sebi.gov.in/sebi_data/attachdocs/1393913697715.pdf
(last visited May 18, 2020).
[44] Sumeet
Industries Ltd., In re, 2014 SCC OnLine SEBI 278.
[45]
Kokesh v. SEC, supra note 2.
[46]
OSCO, supra note 22
[47] Bihar
Public Service Commission v. Saiyed Hussain Abbas Rizwi, (2012) 13 SCC 61, at
¶22.
[48] N.
Narayanan v. Adjudicating Officer, supra note 19.
[49] R.K.
Agarwal v. SEBI, 2001 SCC OnLine SAT 15 : 2001 SAT 15.
Article Information
CRITICAL ANALYSIS ON THE GAP IN SEBI DISGORGEMENT ORDERS: SAFEGUARDING THE INTERESTS OF AFFECTED INVESTORS AND SHAREHOLDERS
Authors: AYUSH PATIDAR
- Journal IJLRA
- ISSN 2582-6433
- Published 2024/05/22
- Issue 7
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International Journal for Legal Research and Analysis
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