Open Access Research Article
THE JUDICIARY ROLE IN SHAPING CONSTITUTIONAL MORALITY AND PUBLIC MORALITY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
Published Paper
Article Details
THE JUDICIARY'S ROLE IN SHAPING
CONSTITUTIONAL MORALITY AND PUBLIC MORALITY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
AUTHORED BY - TARUNA NAYYAR
ABSTRACT
The interplay between constitutional morality and public
morality is a complex and critical issue in contemporary societies.
Constitutional morality, rooted in the principles and values enshrined in a
nation's constitution, serves as the foundation of a just and democratic
society. On the other hand, public morality represents the collective moral
beliefs and ethical standards of individuals within society. Balancing these
two moral frameworks poses challenges when constitutional provisions clash with
societal values or when evolving moral landscapes challenge established legal
frameworks. This paper explores the intricate relationship between
constitutional morality and public morality, examining their philosophical
foundations and implications for governance, social cohesion, and individual
rights. Through an analysis of relevant examples and cases, it sheds light on
the complexities of navigating the intersection between constitutional and
public morality, highlighting the challenges and opportunities presented by
this interplay. The paper also delves into the historical background of
constitutional morality, focusing on the contributions of scholars like George
Grote and Dr. B.R. Ambedkar. Moreover, it discusses judicial interpretations of
constitutional morality in landmark cases, such as Naz Foundation v. State of
Delhi, Navtej Singh Johar v. UOI, and Shayra Bano v. UOI, offering insights
into the role of constitutional morality in shaping legal decisions. By
exploring these dimensions, this paper aims to enhance our understanding of the
dynamics between constitutional morality and public morality, and the
significance of upholding constitutional principles in a changing society.
Keywords – Constitution, Morality, Constitutional Morality, Public Morality,
Judiciary
INTRODUCTION
In contemporary societies, the interplay between
constitutional morality and public morality has emerged as a critical and
complex issue, necessitating an in-depth exploration of their dynamics and
implications. Constitutional morality, rooted in the principles and values
enshrined in a nation's constitution, serves as the bedrock of a just and
democratic society. It upholds fundamental rights, guarantees the rule of law,
and provides a framework for governance that ensures the equitable treatment of
all citizens. On the other hand, public morality represents the collective
moral beliefs, norms, and ethical standards that shape the behavior and actions
of individuals within society.
The tension between constitutional morality and public
morality often gives rise to intricate dilemmas, where individuals and
institutions are confronted with difficult choices that test the boundaries of
constitutional principles and societal expectations. These conflicts may arise
when constitutional provisions clash with deeply held societal values or when
the evolving moral landscape challenges established legal frameworks. Balancing
the competing interests and aspirations of constitutional morality and public
morality is a complex endeavor, requiring careful consideration of individual
rights, societal needs, and the broader context in which moral choices are
made.
This paper aims to delve into the intricate relationship
between constitutional morality and public morality, offering insights into
their underlying philosophical foundations, examining their implications for
governance, social cohesion, and individual rights. By analyzing relevant
examples and cases, we seek to shed light on the complexities of navigating the
intersection between constitutional and public morality, as well as the
challenges and opportunities presented by this interplay.
In understanding constitutional morality, we recognize its
pivotal role in safeguarding individual rights and ensuring the rule of law.
The principles enshrined in a constitution provide a framework for governance
that transcends the transient whims of public sentiment, creating a solid
foundation upon which societal progress and justice can be built. However, the
evolving nature of public morality, shaped by societal changes, cultural
shifts, and public opinion, can pose challenges to the implementation and
interpretation of constitutional provisions. Balancing the rigidity of
constitutional morality with the dynamic nature of public morality is crucial
to maintain the relevance and effectiveness of constitutional principles in a
changing society.
Public morality, while integral to shaping societal values
and norms, is not immune to scrutiny and critique. It must grapple with
questions of inclusivity, tolerance, and the rights of minority groups. The
clash between constitutional morality and public morality becomes particularly
pronounced when societal norms conflict with constitutional guarantees, raising
questions about the limits of majority rule and the protection of individual
liberties. Balancing the interests and perspectives of diverse segments of
society within the framework of constitutional principles is a delicate task
that requires nuanced judgment and a commitment to upholding justice and
equality.
CONSTITUTIONAL
MORALITY: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Scholars attribute the intellectual origins of constitutional
morality to George Grote, a 19th-century British historian. Grote's work on
ancient Greece aimed to rescue Athenian democracy from elitist critics like
Plato and Thucydides. Grote's analysis of the period following the rule of
Hippias highlights Cleisthenes' role in enacting constitutional reforms and
establishing a democratic order in Athens. Grote describes the challenges Cleisthenes
faced, including the weakness of Greek city governments and the ambitions of
the Athenian nobles. Cleisthenes took steps to protect the constitution from
the undemocratic ambitions of the nobles, similar to the concept of Militant
Democracy today. However, weak state capacity and a lack of commitment to
democracy posed challenges. Grote argues that democracy requires a constitution
that elicits passionate attachment and unanimous support from citizens, forming
the basis of constitutional morality. Constitutional morality is characterized
by reverence for the constitution, obedience to authority, free speech, legal
control, public critique, and confidence in the sanctity of the constitution
shared by all citizens. It creates an environment where citizens and leaders
respect constitutional institutions and abandon ambitions that threaten
democracy. Grote cites the aristocracy of England and the democracy of the
United States as examples of societies with prevalent constitutional morality.
While Grote's conceptualization of constitutional morality has influenced
contemporary American scholarship to some extent, it has also evoked
comparisons with constitutional patriotism, as citizens deliberate on
constitutional principles and foster a collective identity.
Today, the meaning and connotation of the phrase have
acquired newer interpretations. But essentially, constitutional morality is a
sentiment among the common masses necessary for establishing a peaceful and
stable government. It is supposed to be a perfect balance between freedom and
restrictions to those freedoms.
In the Indian context, this word was first used by Dr Bhim
Rao Ambedkar during the Constituent Assembly Debate.
B.R. Ambedkar played a significant role in shaping the
concept of constitutional morality in India. As the Chairperson of the
Constitution Drafting Committee, he introduced the idea of constitutional
morality during the Constituent Assembly debates in 1948.
Ambedkar recognized the importance of constitutional morality
in ensuring the success and stability of the newly independent Indian
democracy. He believed that constitutional morality was essential for the
functioning of a peaceful and just government. Ambedkar's emphasis on
constitutional morality stemmed from his concerns about the powers of the
legislature and the need to establish a culture of democratic values in Indian
society.
According to Dr Ambedkar, the concept of constitutional
morality implied the harmonious interaction between the governing and governed,
including the peaceful settlement of dissent faced from the latter and conflict
of interests arising between them without indulging in any major confrontations
or resorting to violent revolutions. He pinned the onus of resolving the then
(and still) existing disparity and inequity in the society not merely on the
government or the Constitution but also on this belief system or principle of
constitutional morality. He believed that this principle can help get rid of
the bridge and gap between the form of administration and that of the
constitution in the country. Bhimrao Ambedkar had this belief that the Indian
society was largely undemocratic in nature and constitutional morality holds
significance in this nation where democracy is merely a ‘top-dressing’ on the
soil.
One of the key aspects of Ambedkar's understanding of
constitutional morality was the idea that it should be ingrained in the minds
of the people. He argued that for a constitution to be effective, citizens
needed to possess a deep reverence for its principles and institutions. This
sentiment would foster a commitment to upholding the constitution and
respecting the rule of law.
Ambedkar also highlighted the need for self-restraint and
adherence to democratic processes as crucial elements of constitutional
morality. He believed that citizens should exercise restraint and refrain from
resorting to revolutionary or unlawful means to bring about change. Instead,
they should engage in the democratic process and work within the established
legal framework to achieve their objectives.
Ambedkar's views on constitutional morality extended beyond
the Constituent Assembly debates. He emphasized that it was necessary to
cultivate this sentiment among the Indian population, as he felt that it was
not yet deeply rooted in Indian society at the time of independence.
Overall, Ambedkar's contributions to the concept of
constitutional morality in India were instrumental in shaping the understanding
of its importance in a democratic system. His ideas continue to influence
discussions on the subject and serve as a guiding principle for upholding the
values of the Indian Constitution.
JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATION ON CONSTITUTIONAL MORALITY
Constitutional morality can be described as a mechanism to
standby the ideals and the notions propagated by the Constitution in order to
uphold the soul of democracy. The constitutional morality herein doesn’t, in
any way, reflect the morality as perceived by the society but instead, it
consists of values that endeavour to preserve the spirit and fundamentals of
the Constitution. Constitutional morality consists of certain elements that
include but are not limited to ideals of the preamble, rule of law, procedure
established by law, freedom, equality, etc. This concept builds a foundation to
dig deep into identifying the rationale and the values imbibed while applying a
provision of the Constitution instead of applying it in the literal sense.
Though the word was first used by Dr. Ambedkar in a
Constituent Assembly Debate, the application of it is very recent and new. If
constitutional morality is to be considered in every matter, there will always
be conflict, when the matter of fundamental rights, duties or DPSPs arises.
In recent times, the courts began to use this doctrine for
repealing the age-old laws and delivering the polished rights to the citizens
by interpreting the spirit carried by certain provisions. Hence, we can deduce
that this doctrine is being availed by the higher courts for refining the
established laws as per the requirements arising out of a dynamic society.
However, this has also resulted in the contradicting
viewpoints of the judges either in the same cases or cases involving same or
similar issues.
The biggest example of the Indian Judiciary applying this
concept is the case of Naz Foundation v.
State of Delhi (2009), where, the Delhi High Court decriminalised Section
377 and preferred Constitutional Morality. Delhi High Court observed that The
Constitution of India recognises, protects and celebrates diversity. To
stigmatise or to criminalise homosexuals only on account of their sexual
orientation would be against the constitutional morality. Constitutional
morality must outweigh the argument of public morality, even if it be the
majoritarian view. The judgement of the Delhi High Court basically concluded
that when Constitutional Morality and Public Morality are not in line with each
other, Constitutional Morality would prevail over Public Morality.
But, this judgment was it was overturned by the division
bench of Supreme Court in Suresh Kaushal
v. Naz Foundation, (2013). The Supreme Court in this case did not consider
the aspect of constitutional morality, but rather favoured the public morality
and set aside the decision of Delhi High Court and observed that Indian society
is yet to demonstrate readiness or willingness to show greater tolerance to
practices of homosexuality.
However, recently in 2018 in the landmark Judgment of Navtej Singh Johar v. UOI, The
Constitution bench of Supreme court struck down Section 377 partially, and
hence finally preferred Constitutional Morality This is a well-known case
around the world as it provided a mechanism to partially allow homosexuality in
the largest democracy in the world. In this case, the Supreme Court struck down
Section 377 of IPC which was used to punish those who participated in Carnal
intercourse against nature’s order. In this case, CJI Dipak Mishra observed
that popular opinion must not matter in the court while deciding a case.
Instead, constitutional morality must play a significant role. Moreover, he
also held that the notion of transforming society into an inclusive and
pluralistic one is the aim of constitutional morality instead of containing the
literal text of the provisions. This case was decided on various other grounds
such as privacy, human dignity, and liberty showered by the Constitution.
In Manoj Narula v Union
of India, (2014) Justice Mishra commented that, “The Constitution of India
is said to be a living document in which changes can be easily made. The
constitution is made for the future society as we can imagine the future
through it. For the performance of the constitution there should be presence of
suitable conditions and atmosphere.” He further observed that, “The government
won’t be mandatory if humans were angels. Neither we need to govern or control
the government. We have system that humans are governed by humans so it has two
difficulties first to govern the citizens and second to govern the people
itself in the government. It would not be incorrect to say with keeping in mind
the above said concept that there would be always inclusion of regard for the
structure of constitution with the appropriate respect and taking of proper
precautions for the preservence of the constitutional values. At this point it
is not wrong to remember the famous line of Laurence H. Tribe that a
Constitution is written in blood, rather than ink.”
Question of constitutional morality also arose during the
case of Shayra Bano v. UOI, (2017) (Triple Talaq case). The prevalence of
constitutional morality as to religious beliefs was one of the major questions
that needed to be answered by the Supreme Court. In this case, they ruled the
case in favour of the petitioner, striking down the practice of Triple Talaq as
being unconstitutional and in August, 2019 the Triple Talaq bill was also
passed by the Parliament. The view taken by the court, considering
constitutional morality, in lieu of Article 14 and Article 21, was in favour of
the petitioner and against the religious beliefs of the Muslim community. So,
the question, was regarding the parameters of constitutional morality and its
application with respect to different cases.
In Indian Young Lawyers
Association v. State of Kerala, (2018) (Sabarimala
Case) Court further defined the principle of constitutional morality, J.
Deepak Mishra observed: - “The term ‘morality’ occurring in Article 25 (1) of
the Constitution cannot be viewed with a narrow lens so as to confine the
sphere of definition of morality to what an individual, a section or religious
sect may perceive the term to mean. We must remember that when there is a
violation of the fundamental rights, the term morality naturally implies
constitutional morality and any view that is ultimately taken by the
Constitutional Courts must be in conformity with the principles and basic
tenets of the concept of this constitutional morality that gets support from
the Constitution.” Concurring with the majority opinion Justice Chandrachud has
observed that between over reaching sense of religion and morality it is
Constitution morality which must prevail. “Constitutional morality must have a
value of permanence which is not subject to the fleeting fancies of every time
and age. If the vision which the founders if the Constitution adopted has to
survive, constitutional morality must have a content which is firmly rooted in
the fundamental postulates of human liberty, equality, fraternity and dignity.
These are the means to secure justice in all its dimensions to the individual
citizen. Once these postulates are accepted, the necessary consequences is that
the freedom of religion and, like wise, the freedom to manage the affairs of a
religious denomination is subject to and must yield to these fundamental
notions of constitutional morality. In the public law conversations between
religion and morality, it is the overarching sense of constitutional morality
which has to prevail.”
The much celebrated recent case of Joseph Shine V. Union of India (2018) played a significant role in
the development of the doctrine of constitutional morality. In the light of
gender equality, Section 497 of IPC was struck down by the Supreme Court as
there is punishment only for men in case of adultery. This case is a clear
example of how the apex court is inclined towards the concept of constitutional
morality by ignoring public morality. This judgment made it loud and clear that
the woman is not a commodity owned by a man and shattered the concept that the
husband is master of a woman that had been portrayed in this law for a very
long time. The bench in this case considered that the right to privacy also
included sexual privacy and also held that non-prosecution of women for
adultery is violative of certain fundamental rights. The arguments of
respondents representing the popular morality that consensual relationships
outside the institution of marriage are detrimental to the institution itself
were not taken into consideration as the court felt that constitutional
morality is much required than popular morality.
Though there is a division between the judges and the
luminary advocates on the usage of the doctrine of constitutional morality,
this has been a significant tool in deciding the considerable amount of cases
as this doctrine intends to uphold the constitutional values, which would be
functional in the ages to come. But, the point of conflict arises only with
respect to its usage and not the principles imbibed in itself. As the scope for
misusing this doctrine cannot be avoided with the existing mechanism, there is
a need for a uniform definition and structured mechanism regarding
constitutional morality.
JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATION ON PUBLIC MORALITY
The legitimacy of any criminal law rests on the conception of
public morality that a society regards as justly enforceable. Since the origin
of this theory, public morality has two components: a theory of morally wrong
acts and a theory of culpability attributing blame for such acts.
It also defines a corresponding theory of the moral virtues
that the society praises and the moral vices that it condemns, because moral
virtue is, at least in part, the effective desire and capacity to be free of
culpable wrongdoing, and moral vice is something which leads to be guilty of
such wrongdoing.
Societies differ in their conceptions of public morality,
defining the moral universe of wrongdoing, culpability, and vice in
correspondingly different ways.
The larger interests of the community require the formulation
of policies and regulations to combat dishonesty, corruption, gambling, vice
and other things of immoral tendency and things which affect the security of
the State and the preservation of public order and tranquillity.
In State of Bombay v.
R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala (1957), the Supreme Court was confronted with an
argument that the right to carry out gambling transactions forms part of the
fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. The argument of
the petitioners was that the words ‘trade or business’ in Article 19(1)(g) had
to be read to be of widest amplitude. The Apex Court, however, rejected the
argument. It relied on the ancient deprecation of gambling as a vice, and its
unfavoured treatment in different foreign jurisdictions to hold that gambling
activities were res extra commercium and did not fall within the ambit of the
term ‘trade or business’. In the ultimate analysis, it was the widespread
public and legal opinion classifying gambling as a vice that led to this
conclusion.
In K.A. Abbas v. Union
of India (1970), the Supreme Court was asked to rule on the
constitutionality of pre-censorship of films, etc. the Hon’ble Court held that:
“Censorship of films, their classification according to age groups and their
suitability for unrestricted exhibition with or without excisions is regarded
as a valid exercise of power in the interests of public morality, decency etc.
This is not to be construed as necessarily offending the freedom of speech and
expression. This is because the social interest of the people overrides
individual freedom. Whether we regard the state as the parens patriae or as
guardian and promoter of general welfare, we have to concede, that these
restraints on liberty may be justified by their absolute necessity and clear
purpose. Social interests take in not only the interests of the community but
also individual interests which cannot be ignored.”
In Gobind v. State of
M.P. (1975), Supreme Court held that “fundamental rights explicitly
guaranteed to a citizen have penumbral zones” and that “fundamental right must be
subject to restriction on the basis of compelling public interest.” However,
this contention was rejected in the Naz
Foundation v Union of India (2009) and further distinguished Public
morality and Constitutional Morality. Public disapproval of certain acts is not
a valid justification for restriction of the fundamental rights under Article
21. Popular morality, as distinct from a constitutional morality derived from
constitutional values, is based on shifting and subjective notions of right and
wrong. If there is any type of ‘morality’ that can pass the test of compelling
state interest, it must be ‘constitutional’ morality and not public morality.”
The complete rejection of ‘public morality’ as a possible justification on the
ground that it is based on shifting and subjective notions of right and wrong
is the most significant aspect of this Judgment, as it seemingly marks a
divergence from the prior line of reasoning on the importance of public
morality. But, this judgment was it was
overturned by the division bench of Supreme Court in Suresh Kaushal v. Naz Foundation, (2013). The Supreme Court in this
case did not consider the aspect of constitutional morality, but rather
favoured the public morality and set aside the decision of Delhi High Court and
observed that Indian society is yet to demonstrate readiness or willingness to
show greater tolerance to practices of homosexuality. However it is also
pertinent to mention that, recently in 2018 in Navtej Singh Johar v Union of India, Constitution Bench of Supreme
Court, over rules the 2013 Judgment, and partially decriminalized Sec 377 IPC.
However, this writer contends that Naz Foundation does not
reject the concept of public morality per se, but rather, it fine-tunes it to
develop a constitutional morality.
Mr. ‘X’ v. Hospital
‘Z’(1998) , ‘public morality’ was given
preference over constitutional morality. Right to privacy and the right to
health are both fundamental rights under Article 21 and both are subject to
public interest and morality. The court was correct to note that in a scenario
where there is a clash of two fundamental rights, one that advances public
morality and public interest must be advanced. One’s right to privacy cannot
come at the cost of another person’s health. It came to the conclusion that
contrary to a doctor’s obligation to not divulge information about his patient,
a doctor may feel the need to inform any sexual partners of such medical
condition, if the circumstances require so. The court clarified that public
interest and morality would override the duty to maintain confidentiality,
especially when there is an immediate risk to another person. The spouse of any
person suffering from a disease capable of being transmitted has the right to
be fully aware of the risks and hence, such disclosure does not amount to a
violation of privacy. It is significant to note that the instant judgment,
though pronounced much before the landmark Justice K.S Puttaswamy verdict,
recognized the right to privacy as a fundamental right falling within the ambit
of Article 21.
The judgement was also heavily criticized after the court
observed that HIV patients did not have the right to marry. A person’s right to
marry is very much a fundamental right under his right to life or Article 21.
However, the court went on to say that a failure to disclose such information
might attract criminal sanctions upon such patients, and therefore, a duty was
created upon such people ‘not to marry.’ Here, even though court over stepped
in its decision by taking away the fundamental right of an HIV positive patient
to marry, but favoured public morality over constitutional morality.
The point of delving into these decisions is to highlight the
central role that ‘public morality’ has played in defining the content of
fundamental rights.
CONCLUSION:
Constitutional morality and public morality are two
interconnected but distinct concepts that play a significant role in shaping a
nation's governance and legal framework. While constitutional morality refers
to the adherence to the principles and values enshrined in a constitution,
public morality pertains to the collective beliefs, values, and ethical
standards prevalent in a society. Both concepts have a profound impact on
lawmaking, policy decisions, and the overall functioning of a democratic
society.
The relationship between constitutional
morality and public morality is a multifaceted and intricate dynamic that
shapes the functioning of modern societies. While constitutional morality
provides the foundation for a just and equitable system, public morality
reflects the collective conscience and values of the people. The tensions and
conflicts that arise between these moral frameworks present significant
challenges for decision-makers, courts, and society as a whole. Balancing the
two requires thoughtful deliberation, incorporating constitutional principles
while also recognizing the evolving societal context. A nuanced understanding
of the interplay between constitutional and public morality is crucial to
safeguarding individual rights, maintaining social cohesion, and upholding the
principles of justice in a democratic society. By critically analyzing this
complex relationship, we can strive for a harmonious coexistence between
constitutional morality and public morality, thereby fostering a more inclusive
and morally conscious society.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BOOKS:
1) Ambedkar, B.R. "The Essential
Writings of B.R. Ambedkar." Edited by Valerian Rodrigues. Oxford
University Press, 2002.
2) Grote, George. "A History of
Greece." Routledge, 2013.
3) Basu, Sudhir. "Constitutional
Morality and the Rise of Quasi-Law." Cambridge University Press, 2019.
4) Shylashri Shankar and Arvind
Sivaramakrishnan (eds.). "Democratic Dynasties: State, Party and Family in
Contemporary Indian Politics." Cambridge University Press, 2016.
5) Upendra Baxi. "Constitutionalism
in India: A Study of the Basic Structure Doctrine." Oxford University
Press, 2008.
ARTICLES/ JOURNALS
1) Dhamija, R.K. "Constitutional
Morality: Its Relevance and Applicability in Indian Context." Journal of
Legal Studies, vol. 4, no. 2, 2021, pp. 58-71.
2) Iqbal, M.A. "Constitutional
Morality: A Comparative Analysis of Indian and American Perspectives."
Nirma University Law Journal, vol. 7, no. 1, 2017, pp. 43-57.
3) Setalvad, C. "The Morality of
the Indian Constitution." The Indian Journal of Political Science, vol. 62,
no. 2, 2001, pp. 213-221.
4) Jadhav, Narendra. "The Concept
of Constitutional Morality." Indian Journal of Constitutional Law, vol. 6,
no. 2, 2014, pp. 133-146.
5) Datar, Arghya. "Constitutional
Morality and Judicial Legitimacy." Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 53,
no. 29, 2018, pp. 26-29.
6) Sen, Amartya. "Democracy as
Public Reason." Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research, vol.
34, no. 3, 2017, pp. 509-522.
7) Jain, Bhawani Shankar.
"Constitutional Morality in India." Journal of Indian Law and
Society, vol. 4, no. 2, 2013, pp. 135-146.
8) Sathe, Shripad. "Public Morality
and the Constitution." Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 34, no. 7,
1999, pp. 407-412.
CASE LAWS
1) Naz Foundation v. State of Delhi
(2009): AIR 2009 Del 89
2) Suresh Kaushal v. Naz Foundation
(2013): (2014) 1 SCC 1
3) Navtej Singh Johar v. UOI: (2018) 10
SCC 1
4) Manoj Narula v Union of India (2014):
(2014) 9 SCC 1
5) Shayra Bano v. UOI: (2017) 9 SCC 1
6) Sabarimala Case: Indian Young Lawyers
Association v. State of Kerala, (2018) 11 SCC 1
7) Shine V. Union of India (2018):
(2018) 3 SCC 52
8) State of Bombay v. R.M.D.
Chamarbaugwala (1957): AIR 1957 SC 699
9) K.A. Abbas v. Union of India (1970):
AIR 1971 SC 481
10) Gobind v. State of M.P. (1975):
(1975) 2 SCC 148
11) Suresh Kaushal v. Naz Foundation
(2013): (2014) 1 SCC 1
12) Mr. 'X' v. Hospital 'Z' (1998): AIR
1999 SC 495
Article Information
THE JUDICIARY ROLE IN SHAPING CONSTITUTIONAL MORALITY AND PUBLIC MORALITY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
Authors: TARUNA NAYYAR
- Journal IJLRA
- ISSN 2582-6433
- Published 2023/07/03
- Issue 7
About Journal
International Journal for Legal Research and Analysis
- Abbreviation IJLRA
- ISSN 2582-6433
- Access Open Access
- License CC 4.0
All research articles published in International Journal for Legal Research and Analysis are open access and available to read, download and share, subject to proper citation of the original work.
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of International Journal for Legal Research and Analysis.