THE ART OF STATECRAFT AND INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS IN THE KAUTILYA-ARTHASHASTRA: A CRITICAL STUDY BY - DR.S. KRISHNAN & DR. ANIL BUNDELA
THE ART OF STATECRAFT AND INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS
IN THE KAUTILYA-ARTHASHASTRA: A CRITICAL STUDY
In the Kautilya-Arthashastra,
espionage and other ‘operational’ activities of the secret service—notably
‘active measures’ and ‘covert action’— are addressed often and in detail. In
contrast, Kautilya seems to say very little about intelligence analysis, assessment
and estimates which provide the basis of strategic planning and grand
strategy—and are key components of statecraft. However, the central proposition
of this article is that ‘ideas’ (or meanings) underlying these modern
intelligence terms are very much present in the Arthashastra. Moreover, Kautilya
does submit key methodological and theoretical ideas and concepts for intelligence
analysis, assessment, estimates and strategic planning. Therefore, the Kautilya-Arthashastra
is quite relevant for the history of ideas of the political science sub-discipline,
intelligence studies.
An arrow,
discharged by an archer, may kill one person or may not kill (even one), but
intellect operated by a wise man would kill even children in the womb.1
As Dr.
Mandelbaum would say, he has assembled the information, but where is the
knowledge?2
The ancient
Indian Kautilya-Arthashastra is a classical work of political theory and theorized
statecraft and a foundational text of the theory of international relations.3 And,
one must add, the Arthashastra is also a pioneering text of intelligence studies.
As a work of statecraft, it is ‘cognition-centric’ and features ‘intelligence’
prominently, but the terms ‘intelligence’, ‘intelligence analysis’,
‘intelligence estimate’, ‘strategic planning’ and ‘grand strategy’ are absent
in the text. Before we dig a bit deeper into the text of Arthashastra with
respect to the aforementioned terms, let us first—for the purpose of
terminological clarity—briefly untangle the term ‘intelligence’. A good basic
definition is provided by Adda B. Bozeman:
Intelligence
in its primary or generic sense is everywhere a property of the mind. It stands
for human beings’ inborn capacity to come to terms with life by engaging in thought
and acquiring, developing, and investing knowledge... Intelligence in its derivative
political sense is a component of statecraft that centers upon the need of one
politically unified community to have reliable information, knowledge, or
‘intelligence’ about other societies in its environment. Intelligence ‘2’, then,
is by no means a wayward offspring of intelligence ‘1’. The records suggest
rather that the elementary idea was nowhere and at no time expunged, it was
drafted into the vocabularies of domestic and international politics to serve
the security interests of any given politically independent organism.4
Bozeman’s definitions
of the term intelligence, in both its generic and derivative (political) meaning,
have in common that generating knowledge is the central issue. Intelligence ‘2’
refers to the process of generating knowledge by collecting and analysing open
and secret data/information relevant for ‘national security’. This operational
and cognitive process takes the form of an ‘intelligence cycle’: tasking > collection
> analysis > estimates > dissemination. Intelligence ‘2’ also refers
to the products of these activities: assessments and estimates based on
analysed data information.
In this
article, I will concentrate on the components ‘analysis’, ‘assessment’ and
‘estimates’ of the intelligence cycle.5 The focus is intelligence as the
cognitive activity of sorting out, analysing, co-relating and synthesizing ‘raw’
data or information on capabilities and intentions of foreign actors. The products
of such analytical work are ‘assessments of the situation’ and intelligence
‘estimates’. The latter include inferences derived out of the analysis of
data/information—pointing into the future. Intelligence estimates try to
generate ‘scenarios’ of future developments pertaining to the external security
of the state. The term intelligence is mostly used with respect to inter-state relations;
and that is what I do in this article as well, leaving aside intelligence dealing
with internal security.
I also
leave aside here ‘active measures’ and ‘covert actions’, which are often seen
as an integral part of intelligence.6
INTELLIGENCE IN THE ARTHASHASTRA: METHODOLOGICAL HURDLES AND APPROACHES
Dealing with the question of intelligence analysis
and estimates in the Arthashastra—in the context of political science—means facing daunting
methodological hurdles. We have to rely on Sanskrit philologists translating
the text: R.P. Kangle7 into English and J.J.
Meyer8 into German. Neither scholar is an
intelligence expert, or political scientist, and thus is unfamiliar with the
concepts and vocabulary of the political science sub-discipline of intelligence
studies.
Also, with
regard to questions of intelligence, Kautilya often uses euphemisms and
metaphors. One cannot even exclude the possibility that the intelligence
virtuoso Kautilya might have had no interest to explicitly disclose the cognitive
methodology of intelligence analysis and estimates which are at the heart—or
more precisely, at the ‘brain’—of statecraft. Kautilya might have viewed intelligence
analysis and estimates as exclusive Herrschaftswissen (to use a term of Max
Scheler), that is, restricted knowledge of ruling elites which is not deemed
fit for popular consumption.
In spite of
these serious methodical problems, I believe that it is possible to identify
and reconstruct Kautilya’s core concepts of intelligence analysis and
estimates—even though they are mostly not explicitly stated and elaborated in
the Arthashastra. That means, when we deal with Kautilya’s understanding of
intelligence beyond its dimensions of collection, organization and covert actions,
we mostly cannot rely on ‘self- evident’ quotes from the text of the Arthashastra.
Instead, we have to ‘read between the lines’ in identifying latent ideas and concepts
with respect to intelligence analysis and estimates. Thus, we follow Max
Weber’s approach of the reconstruction of latent meanings and complexes of
meaning with respect to intelligence analysis in the Arthashastra.9
Instead of
a strictly hermeneutic methodology of interpreting the Arthashastra, I use an heuristic
approach oriented on Helmuth Plessner’s concept of ‘covariance’, which assumes
that intrinsically (or genetically) related ideas can be generated in
historically and culturally distant spaces.10 Such ideas are not identical, but
structurally homologous. I, therefore, start from the working assumption that
in regard to intelligence analysis and estimates, there is a ‘structural homology’
between central ideas in the Kautilya-Arthashastra and key concepts in Sherman
Kent’s 1948 study, Strategic Intelligence—the foundational work on intelligence
analysis.11 I think this assumption is reliable because Kautilya and Kent
engaged in the same area of investigation and tackled the same problematic. And
both concentrated on the essentials of this problematic—not secondary
attributes and derivative issues.
Kent's
categories and terminology can help us in the conceptional reconstruction of
latent ideas with respect to intelligence analysis, assessments and estimates in
the Kautilya-Arthashastra. To re-emphasize the crucial methodological point: in
assuming conceptional ‘covariance’ or homology between Kautilya and Kent, I do
not mean projecting modern concepts backwards onto the Arthashastra as a means to
subsume or ‘swallow up’ its original idea contents. I do not intend to present
Kautilyan ideas as ‘inchoate approximations’ to the much later concepts of the
modern, Western author Sherman Kent. The originality and eigenvalue of
Kautilya’s ideas should be obvious as they were generated 2,300 years ahead of
Kent’s homologous categories.
Who is
Sherman Kent? Kent (1903–86) was a Yale Professor of European History. In World
War II, he joined the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which was a first attempt
to centralize the United States’ intelligence capabilities, even though the intelligence
activities of various government departments and the army and navy were
continued. The OSS, under its Chief, ‘Wild Bill’ Donovan, is mostly portrayed
as an ‘action’-oriented intelligence organization, but it also developed an
outstanding analytical capacity by recruiting first-class academics—
historians, economists, political scientists, sociologists and geographers. In
the OSS Research and Analysis branch, Kent served as the head of the
Europe–Africa Division till the end of World War II. After returning to
academia and writing Strategic Intelligence, Kent joined the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1950, where he became the head of the Office of
National Estimates (ONE) from 1952 to 1967.12
‘The Easy Part’: Intelligence Collection, Organization
and
COVERT ACTION IN THE ARTHASHASTRA
In the
(ideal-type) ‘Kautilyan state’ of the Arthashastra, the secret or intelligence
service is a central and indispensable component of state capacity. This
applies to both the internal and external security of the state.13 However, we
must keep in mind that the Kautilyan state is a ‘patrimonial state’ (Max Weber)
in which the ruler and the state still form a symbiosis—albeit one that begins to
loosen up. The government and the state bureaucracy have not yet gained their
(abstract) eigenvalue but are still attached to the ruler's court/household.
Consequently, the Kautilyan secret service has not yet evolved into the
differentiated bureaucratic apparatus which became established in the early
twentieth century. For didactic purposes, the Kautilyan secret service might be
compared with the intelligence services of the Republic of Venice or the
Republic of Ragusa (Dubrovnik) between the twelfth and eighteenth centuries, or
with Sir Francis Walsingham's (1532–90) Secret Intelligence Service in Tudor
England.14
Internally,
the Kautilyan secret service is used for comprehensive surveillance of the
people and the elites, especially within the state apparatus. There is a dense
network of stationary and mobile secret agents and informants collecting
information about treasonous activities, corruption, serious crime and the
popular mood. In addition, the secret service acts as a ‘secret police’ with executive
powers and engages in various forms of ‘active measures’:
1. Tracking down
suspected treasonable individuals and groups, infiltrating and manipulating
them.15
2. Tracing corruption,
embezzlement and abuse of office in the state apparatus, including ‘sting
operations’.16
3. Silent liquidation
of enemies of the state, whose extra-judicial killing is disguised as accident,
normal crime or natural death.17
4. Staging political
public relations (PR) operations to influence public opinion.18
5. Counter-espionage,
including the use of double agents, and operations against foreign subversion
and sabotage.19
The
Kautilyan secret service is also vital and indispensable for the external security
of the state. Again, there are two prime tasks: collecting information about
foreign states—friendly, hostile or neutral; and covert actions against
adversary states. The activities of the Kautilyan intelligence service in
foreign states include:
1. Information
gathering on the political, military and economic situation in order to
identify strengths and weaknesses and political intentions. Of paramount
importance is the identification of political factions, conspiracies and
popular discontent. This is done by secret agents operating in a foreign
country and by the recruitment of local informants.20
2. Diplomatic
personnel in foreign countries must collect information, recruit agents of
influence and participate in subversive operations—independently and in
collaboration with secret agents operating in the host country.21
3. Whenever
political tensions and instability are ascertained, the secret service should
use local agents of influence to exacerbate tensions and give covert support to
treasonous persons and groups as to further weaken and discredit the
established governance. Political figures who stand in the way of one’s own interests
should be targeted for (covert) assassinations.22
4. If an armed
conflict looms, the secret service should weaken the will to fight of the leadership
and people as well as the combat power of the armed forces through sabotage
operations, ‘psychological warfare’ and covert assassinations of key political
and/or military leaders.23
Kautilya’s
remarks about the secret service in the Arthashastra demonstrate that his understanding
of intelligence affairs is profound to an extent that necessitates his personal
and practical experience in this milieu. Thus, the picture drawn of Kautilya
and his intelligence activities in the classical Indian play, Mudrarakshasa, by
Vishakhadatta (ca. sixth century AD) seems quite insightful.24 Kautilya
obviously knows what he talking about when addressing intelligence issues like:
1. what are the
professional requirements for different categories of secret service agents;25
2. which covers
are suitable for secret agents;26
3. what are the
psychological, social and political dispositions to be exploited for the
recruitment of informers and agents of influence;27
4. how can the
secret service be controlled by organizational segmentation and mutual surveillance
within the service;28
5. how are
secret agents rewarded for special achievements and punished for misconduct;29 and
6. what forms of
subversion and covert actions are most suitable for achieving foreign policy
objectives.30
When
reading through the Arthashastra, one gets the impression that the Kautilyan
intelligence service is very much ‘collection-centric’, ‘operator-centric’ and particularly
‘action-centric’—and is to a large degree operating as a secret police. Hence,
the secondary literature on the intelligence dimension of the Arthashastra almost
exclusively focuses on intelligence collection, organization and covert action in
the Kautilyan intelligence service. Such a focus requires only modest
methodological– theoretical efforts in the interpretation of the text. And, on
matters pertaining to intelligence collection, organization and covert action,
Kautilya can be generously quoted and paraphrased.31
In
contrast, the literature pays little or no attention to intelligence analysis,
assessment and estimates in the Arthashastra. That’s not surprising because
Kautilyan intelligence appears not to be ‘cognition- centric’. But by digging
deeper into the Arthashastra, it can be shown that Kautilya has much to offer
on intelligence analysis, assessments and estimates as well as strategic
planning. One may add, it could not be otherwise because intelligence analysis and
estimates are decisive factors in Kautilya’s understanding of statecraft and
grand strategy.
Kautilya: Knowledge is the Foundation of Statecraft
Adda
Bozeman refers to intelligence as a ‘component of statecraft’. The latter she
defines as follows: ‘The term “statecraft”...stands for the sum total of human
dispositions, doctrines, policies, institutions, processes, and operations that
are designed to assure the governance, security, and survival of a politically
unified human group.’32 As mentioned earlier, she sees intelligence as a form
of knowledge and concludes: ‘successful statecraft is always and everywhere
dependent on good intelligence [emphasis added]’.33 As we shall see, the triad,
statecraft–knowledge–intelligence, is a key concept in the Kautilya-Arthashastra.
‘Knowledge
is Power’ is an idea usually attributed to Francis Bacon (1561–1626), and sometimes
to the Persian poet Firdausi (940–1020). However, the idea that knowledge
constitutes power is already a leitmotif of the Arthashastra. In statecraft,
Kautilya sees three forms power at work: the ‘power of knowledge’; the ‘power of
the treasury [economy] and the army’; and the ‘power of [the ruler’s personal]
valor’.34 In Kautilyan statecraft, the power of knowledge takes the first
place. ‘[T]he king with the eyes of intelligence and [political] science’ can
overcome rival kings even if they possess greater economic and military resources
and personal valour.35
Knowledge
has two dimensions of meaning. One is ‘content- oriented’: knowing things as
opposed to not knowing them; acquiring and storing ‘information’ instead of being
ignorant or ill-informed. The other dimension of knowledge is
‘method-oriented’: the way of thinking, the cognitive ‘processing’ of acquired and
stored information, that is, self- reflective or scientific thinking versus the
non-reflective, mere intuitive or magical correlation of things perceived.36
For Kautilya,
the knowledge underpinning statecraft has to be substantive in content and scientific
in method. The fundamental importance of (double-sided) knowledge in statecraft
is emphasized right at the beginning of Book I of the Arthashastra: no ruler is
a ‘born ruler’, but has to acquire the knowledge that will qualify him to be a
ruler.37 Acquiring knowledge is a lifelong task and an integral part of the daily
routine for ruler.38 No ‘power instinct’, no leadership talent, no personal valour
and no religious and/or magical dignity can substitute knowledge in Kautilyan
statecraft.
What kind of
knowledge39 does the ruler have to acquire to gain the necessary competence in
statecraft? Kautilya’s selection criteria are: knowledge—in terms of
‘information content’ and methodology—that will enable the ruler to maintain
and expand (a) the power of the state and (b) the welfare of the people; and
that includes particularly security- relevant knowledge about internal and
external threats to the power of the state (and thus, in Kautilya’s view, also
the welfare of the people). Knowledge so defined is the foundation and essence
of statecraft. The ignorant, ill-informed and uneducated ruler is a danger to himself,
the state and the people.
Kautilya
demands of the ruler a lifelong thirst for knowledge, that is, the ‘desire to learn,
listening (to the teacher), learning, retention, thorough understanding,
reflection, rejection (of false views) and intentness on truth’.40 The ruler should
learn new things and familiarize himself with those already learned, and listen
repeatedly to things not learned. For, from (continuous) study ensues a
(trained) intellect, from the intellect (comes) practical application, (and) from
practical application results self-possession; such is the efficacy of
sciences.41
And, to
repeat what was said earlier: for Kautilya, the knowledge required for
statecraft has to be both substantive in content and scientific in method.
A ruler’s
lack of knowledge is a cardinal sin—and that should be understood quite
literally: ignorance is the breeding ground for defective character formation, which
means the ruler’s policymaking remains dominated by instincts and affective impulses.
‘Lust, anger, greed, pride, arrogance and fool-hardiness’—Kautilya calls them the
ruler’s ‘six enemies’—cannot be controlled and/or sublimated without knowledge:
‘the practice of (this) science (gives such control). For, the whole of this
science means control over the senses.’42 As only ‘science imparts discipline’,
ignorant and uneducated rulers being driven by passion have ruined themselves and
their states.43 ‘These and many other kings, giving themselves up to the group of
six enemies, perished with their kinsmen and kingdoms, being without control
over their senses.’44 Kautilya backs up this conclusion with references to
historical and mythological examples.
Knowledge—in
terms of ‘information content’ and scientific analysis—is the supreme factor in
statecraft. The ruler, after ‘casting out the group of six enemies’, should ‘cultivate
his intellect...[and] keep a watchful eye by means of his spies’ (emphasis
added).45 Therefore, intelligence as the cognitive activity of analysing information
relevant for the state’s external security is necessarily a constitutive
element of the knowledge underlying statecraft. Receiving and cognitively
‘digesting’ security-relevant information takes up a significant part of the
Kautilyan ruler’s daily schedule.46 The information supplied by spies and
diplomats gets analysed by the ruler and his staff and transformed into
intelligence assessments, which, in turn, provide the basis for strategic
planning. So, Kautilya writes about intelligence and statecraft: ‘For, the
king, trained in the sciences...enjoys the earth alone without sharing it with
any other ruler, being devoted to the welfare of all beings.’47 This means that
statecraft based on knowledge which significantly incorporates intelligence can
empower the ruler to become the political unifier—the chakravartin—of the whole
Indian subcontinent. And that is the ultimate—strategic and normative—goal of
Kautilyan statecraft.
Intelligence Means Generating Knowledge
Following
the sketched methodological approach of ‘covariance’ or structural homology, I now
use Sherman Kent's concept of intelligence as heuristics for explicating the cognitive/analytical
dimension of Kautilya's treatment of intelligence. Kent gives us a basal
definition of intelligence:
Intelligence
is a simple and self-evident thing. As an activity it is the pursuit of a certain
kind of knowledge; as an phenomenon it is the resultant knowledge...And
strategic intelligence, we might call knowledge upon which our nation’s foreign
relations, in war and peace, must rest (emphasis added).48
Or as Stephen
Marrin puts it half a century later: ‘Properly understood, the role of intelligence
is to collect information and to analyse it as a way to produce knowledge about
a competitor or adversary (emphasis added).’49 Or, to quote Kent once more:
intelligence ‘can be thought—indeed it often is—as an organisation engaged in
the manufacture of a product (knowledge) out of raw materials (all manner of
data) and labor (highly skilled, but not practical in the business sense of the
word)’ (emphasis added).50
Kent’s definition
of intelligence, I argue, is homologous to Kautilya’s because of the centrality
of knowledge and knowledge generation in both Kautilya’s and Kent’s understanding
of intelligence. For both, knowledge is the key factor in statecraft and this knowledge
is, to a significant extent, generated out of intelligence analysis,
assessments and estimates.
Intelligence
means generating knowledge about what is unknown and not-yet-known in a
principally contingent political environment. At all times, human life and the
existence of states are characterized by a latent but pervasive sense of
looming dangers. Human life and history demonstrate beyond doubt that the
security of individuals as well as political communities is always precarious
and threats are very real. The precariousness of human existence—individually
and collectively—is a fact of life. That is self-evident for the sober realist
Kautilya whose political anthropology rests on two basic assumptions: (a) lust
and affects like striving for domination lead inevitably to conflicts of interests
and power struggles; and (b) man’s political world is one of anarchy and
insecurity within and among political communities, that is, matsya-nyaya.51 In
the world of matsya-nyaya, your security, if not survival, depends on gaining
knowledge through intelligence collection and analysis.
An adequate
understanding of Kautilya’s concept of intelligence— in terms of collection and
analysis—must take into account that it is rooted in his political anthropology.
Kautilya’s linkage of intelligence and political anthropology is quite similar
to what Adda Bozeman observes: ‘[T]he world is divided, conflicted, and
anarchical…Security-conscious governments in all ages and places appear to have
accepted these persistent complexities as standing challenges in their conduct
of foreign affairs by collecting, processing, and institutionalizing their own political
intelligence.’52
Ignorance
about the surrounding world means uncertainty or a sense of ‘false security’. Knowledge
derived from intelligence reduces (political) uncertainty. Thus, intelligence-cum-knowledge
is intrinsically linked to security. Knowledge does not eo ipso create
security, but knowledge enables human beings and communities to do something
about their security. If you lack intelligence-cum-knowledge—that is, ‘groping
in the dark’—you are up for ‘nasty surprises’. If you know ‘what’s going on’, you
have a chance to protect yourself and to exploit the situation to your
advantage. However, simply collecting and storing information won’t tell you ‘what’s
going on’—exceptions merely confirm the rule. The information collected has to
analysed and assessed, that is, turned into intelligence which provides the
knowledge for political action conducive to your security and interests.
Approaching
the question of intelligence analysis and assessment in the Arthashastra necessitates
that we step back from the cliché that intelligence is foremost a matter of spies
and espionage. At all times, most of the intelligence which is vital for the
security of a state has not come from the clandestine collection of secret
information, but from ‘open sources’ of information. You don’t need espionage and
secret agents to find out what is the geography, the climate, the raw
materials, the economy, the language, the religion, the culture, the social
organization, the elites’ mentality or the political tradition of a foreign
country. This information can be obtained by travelling in a foreign country, keeping
your eyes open and talking to people from all walks of life. And Kautilya recommends
that exactly this should be done by diplomats and intelligence informants like
long-distance traders or wandering monks and artists.53 You don’t have to be trained,
skilful spy, but you must be open-minded and curious. Not the paraphernalia of the
spying trade, but brainpower matters. Then, the multifarious impressions and
information collected in a foreign country can be cognitively synthesized. Thus,
you have gained what Kent calls basic descriptive intelligence which is the
foundation of all sound intelligence. Basic descriptive intelligence comes from
‘unromantic open- and-above-board observation and research’.54 Basic
descriptive intelligence provides the indispensable precondition for assessing the
capabilities and the dispositions of other political actors.
Individuals
and states are ‘curious’ because they know or at least feel that—at any given point
of time—their knowledge of the surrounding ‘world’ is inadequate. Collecting
new data/information and generating new knowledge increases political certainty
and self-assuredness. As the political world is ever-changing, new data/information
turned into intelligence/ knowledge are needed all the time, because existing
intelligence/ knowledge becomes outdated or even obsolete. Your knowledge about
the surrounding world has to be constantly ‘up to date’. This type of knowledge
and knowledge generation Kent calls current-reportorial intelligence or simply
‘current intelligence’. The core quality of current- reportorial intelligence
is ‘a high capacity to detect the significant and a high sensitivity to changes
[emphasis added]’.55 That means ‘spotting the unusual, the really unusual’,
identifying ‘the three things per week of the thousands it observes and the
millions that happen which are really of potential moment’.56
As the
reporting element carries out its task it constantly adds freshness to the content
of the basic descriptive element. It does more than this, for in keeping
otherwise static knowledge up-to-date it maintains a bridge between the descriptive
and what I have called the speculative-evaluative elements—a bridge between past
and future.57
Throughout
the Arthashastra, Kautilya tells us that there is no standstill in the political
world. Change is what is constant in politics. States always go into a certain direction:
they may drift towards weakness or march towards strength: ‘decline, stability
and advancement’.58 States may stagnate, but it won’t take long before decline
or ascend becomes discernible. There are no permanent friends, foes or
neutrals. Inter-state relations are fluid: today’s friend is tomorrow’s enemy and
vice versa. Kautilya insists that the ruler must know about the changes in the
political situation, preferably before they have fully manifested themselves.
‘He, who is well versed in the science of politics, should employ all the
means, viz. advancement, decline and stable condition as well as weakening and extermination.’59
Intelligence And Political Science
As noted earlier,
in Kautilya’s view, the knowledge required for statecraft has to be both substantive
in content and scientific in method. As intelligence is an integral and
essential component of the knowledge underpinning statecraft, the question arises
what is the relationship of intelligence—that is, intelligence analysis and
assessment—to science.
Let us
first take an e contrario approach to the relationship between science and
intelligence. The lack of knowledge—both in terms of aggregated
data/information and scientific method—means falling back on ‘gut feelings’,
‘hunches’ or magic when engaging in foreign policy. The uneducated ruler
disinterested in intelligence is inclined to base his assessment of the
situation and strategic planning on some miraculous personal aptitude or magical
powers: astrology, oracles, omen or fatum.
Magical
‘data’ and rituals are apt to take the place of intelligence. The secular
Kautilya takes an indifferent (but also instrumental) attitude towards magic (and
religious issues generally). He who believes in magic might do so, but magic
should not be mixed up with intelligence and strategic planning.60 If we look
at ancient Greece and Rome, we see how closely magic and strategic planning
were interwoven in foreign policy and warfare. So, Kautilya draws a demarcation
line between intelligence and statecraft on the one side, and magic on the
other: ‘The object slips away from the foolish person, who continuously
consults the stars.’61
The very first
step in the intelligence cycle—collecting information— already means a turning
away from magic. For Kautilya, it is of decisive importance to gain reliable
empirical data and reality-based information about the capabilities and
intentions of other political actors. For him, intelligence and statecraft have
to be based on factual data/information. It is intelligence versus magic.
The mere collection
of factual information or data, however, does not tell you ‘what’s going on’. Nor
does an aggregate of such data/information in itself constitute intelligence: ‘Facts
don’t speak for themselves’— rare exceptions merely confirm the rule.62 The
(collected) information has to be analysed, and ‘analysis, by definition, means
going beyond the facts’.63 It is through analysis that ‘raw’ data are turned
into intelligence. In order to generate the knowledge needed for effective
statecraft, information or data have to be cognitively processed according to
certain methodological—at minimum, logical—principals. That is true even for
'common sense' knowledge, albeit with rather lax and semiconscious
methodological standards. Scientifically valid knowledge is generated by
cognitively processing information or data and applying strict and testable
methodological standards as well as verifiable theoretical concepts in a
coherent setting.
Kautilya states that in the realm of
statecraft, there are three types of knowledge:64
1. immediate
knowledge, based on what the ruler himself sees and hears;
2. mediated, indirect
knowledge, based on what the ruler is being told by ministers, spies, diplomats
or other ‘experts’ about occurrences which are distant in space and time, that
is, intelligence respectively the product of intelligence analysis; and
3. knowledge
inferred from immediate and mediated knowledge with respect to future developments
and the ruler’s own intended
actions,
that is, intelligence assessments respectively estimates. ‘Forming an idea of
what has not [yet] been done from what is [has been] done in respect of
undertakings is inferred.’65
This statement
about the three variants of knowledge in statecraft in the Arthashastra is most
significant with respect to the methodology of intelligence analysis,
assessment and estimates as well as strategic planning. First, Kautilya tells us
that the ruler does depend on exogenous sources of knowledge—others collect
information and disseminate intelligence to him. We see here a quite important parallel
between political intelligence and science: neither the ruler (and his
political/intelligence advisers) nor the scientist can be ‘self-sufficient’. In
both fields, there cannot be an autarchy of knowledge: ‘Rulership can be
successfully carried out only with the help of associates. One wheel alone does
not turn. Therefore, he should appoint ministers and listen to their opinion.’66
And: ‘Indra indeed has a council of ministers consisting of a thousand sages.
He has that as his eye. Therefore, they call him “the thousand-eyed one”,
though he is two-eyed.’67 Without intelligence, the ruler—that is, the state—is
blind in terms of statecraft.
Second,
Kautilya emphatically argues that all three types of political knowledge need
to be deliberated by the ruler in conclave with his close advisers. The incoming
information must be reviewed. Is it reliable? Only ‘when there is agreement in the
reports of three spies, credence should be given’.68 But that is only the baseline
criterion of reliability of intelligence reports and, as such, insufficient for
intelligence analysis and assessments. Kautilya insists that adequate analysis of
intelligence reports depends on collective deliberation. And he consistently
and vehemently rejects ‘lonely decisions’ of the ruler. Instead, he should
consult with advisers and ‘should ascertain their different opinions along with
their reasons for holding them’.69 Thus, with respect to intelligence analysis,
assessments, estimates and strategic planning, we see here an exposition that
reminds us of the principle of a Socratic dialogue or Platonic discourse. Or,
the other way round, Kautilya demands with respect to intelligence and
strategic planning, the exact opposite of what Kent calls an actor’s autistic
‘communion with his intuitive self ’.70
For
Kautilya, statecraft is more than a ‘craft’. The ruler’s talent, experience and
intuition do not suffice for assuring the maintenance and expansion of the
power of the state and the welfare of the people. The knowledge on which
statecraft has to be based must have scientific character. This is quite relevant
for Kautilya’s understanding of intelligence as a key component of statecraft. The
knowledge underpinning statecraft is (significantly) derived from intelligence
and more precisely, from intelligence analysis and assessments. Ergo,
intelligence analysis and assessments must apply strict methodological standards
as well as verifiable theoretical concepts. In other words, there is an
intrinsic relation between intelligence analysis/assessment and political
science (and also other science branches). It is through political science that
information gets transformed into intelligence.
I will first
take up the methodological principles of political science set forth by Kautilya
in the Arthashastra and then, in the next section, turn to his theoretical concepts
of political science. Both are of critical importance for Kautilya’s
understanding of intelligence with respect to intelligence analysis.
For
Kautilya, philosophy is the ordering principle of political science. He defines
philosophy as the science of the realistic, logical– rational cognition
articulated in the ancient Indian philosophy schools of samkhya, yoga and lokayata.
‘Philosophy is ever thought of as the lamp of all sciences, as the means of all
actions and as the support of all laws and duties.’71 Structured by philosophy,
political science can empirically verify its validity by facilitating the maintenance
and growth of the power of the state and the welfare of the people.
‘A king knowing
the science of politics, acquiring in this manner an ally, money and land with
men and without men, over-reaches the confederates.’72 But, a ruler ‘deviating
from the science, with his mind firmly fixed on what is contrary to science,
ruins the kingdom and himself’.73
Kautilya views
his Arthashastra as the foundational work of political science, transcending
qualitatively all previous texts of this subject area: ‘Easy to learn and to understand,
precise in doctrine, sense and word, free from prolixity of text, thus has this
(work on the) Science been composed by Kautilya.’74 In Book XV of the Arthashastra,
Kautilya expounds the methodological principles that give his work scientific
quality. In this book, The Methods of the Science, he outlines 32
methodological categories.75 Among these categories, one can distinguish four category
clusters which, I think, have a particular methodological significance:
1.
Category Cluster: The Principle of Causality
i.
proof: explanation of the cause of a thing (5);
ii.
comprehensive explanation: statement of several causes
converging in effecting a thing (6);
iii.
differentiated explanation: statement of the different
factors that are causing a thing (7); and
iv.
e contrario explanation: explaining a thing by its opposite
(16).
2.
Category Cluster:
Preliminary Explanations
i.
point of doubt: conflicting explanations for the cause
of a thing (14);
ii.
analogy: explanation of a thing not yet understood by
a fact of experience (12);
iii.
adoption: accepting the assessment of a thing by another
author (18); and
iv.
restriction: reference to exceptions to a rule (22).
3.
Category Cluster:
Explanations and Conclusions
i.
necessity: logically and factually only possible conclusion
from the data (29);
ii.
alternative: mutually exclusive conclusions from the
data— either/or (30); and
iii.
combination: multiple, coexisting conclusions from the
data—as well as (31).
4.
The Category:
Inference and Prognostics
i.
inferring from empirical data prognostic conclusions (32).
If Kautilyan
statecraft is based on political science and intelligence is a vital component of
statecraft, then the methodological principles of political science are
necessarily applicable to (and mandatory for) intelligence analysis. Between
statecraft, political science and intelligence exists an intrinsic
connectivity. That means that the methodological category clusters of causality,
preliminary explanation and conclusion are to be applied to the discursive
analysis/assessment of incoming intelligence data. And the same goes for the
methodological category of inference. Therefore, the scientific methodology
laid down in Book XV of the Arthashastra must also be applied to intelligence
analysis, assessments, estimates and strategic planning.
However, it
is not only Book XV of the Arthashastra that is methodologically relevant for
intelligence assessment and strategic planning. The methodology of political science
which has to be applied in discursive intelligence analysis and strategic planning
must not be limited to the methodological ‘instruments’ and categories (of Book
XV) but must be oriented on the methodological structure of the
Kautilya-Arthashastra as a whole.
‘Just as a
person not learned in the Veda does not deserve to eat the sraddha-meal of good
persons, so a king who has not learned the teaching of the science of politics is
unfit to listen to counsel.’76 Meyer’s translation is: he who has not studied
‘this shastra’—Kautilya’s Arthashastra—is unfit for the discourse of
statecraft. In other words, intelligence analysis, assessments and estimates
following the methodology of Kautilya’s Arthashastra are the precondition of
strategic planning and effective statecraft.
The
methodological principle with which Kautilya composes and structures the Arthashastra
is a holistic and comprehensive approach: matters of domestic as well as
foreign policy have to be seen in their connectivity with economic, technological,
fiscal, administrative, judicial and military affairs. Kautilya seems intent to
avoid a selective, reductionist approach to the state and statecraft in which there
is a one-sided focus on one or two elements while neglecting the rest.
Consequently, the full- spectrum approach—as typified by the Kautilya-Arthashastra
as the ideal- type textbook of political science—must also be adopted for
intelligence analysis, assessment and estimates. When making an intelligence
assessment of a foreign actor, not just one or two power factors—for example,
military strength alone—must be considered. Both material and non-material factors
need to be taken into account. For example: a state has large peasant
population and much fertile land, but excessive taxation by the state is depressing
agricultural output and impoverishing the farmers. An inefficient and corrupt
state bureaucracy can paralyze the apparent military strength of state.
Therefore, the (intelligence) assessment of the situation must be based on the
'total picture' of a state's resources and capabilities.77
Here, we
come back to the homology between Kautilya’s and Kent’s understanding of
intelligence, particularly its cognitive dimension of analysis and assessment.
Intelligence analysis requires ‘the best professional training, the highest
intellectual integrity and a very large amount of worldly wisdom’.78 Of the
intelligence analyst, Kent says:
The job of
synthesis upon which he is embarking is one which requires of him the very
highest competence in one or more of the sciences of politics, economics,
geography, and the military art. He [the intelligence analyst] should not
undertake it unless he has an easy familiarity with the literature and
techniques of the relevant disciplines (emphasis added).79
And:
In a sense,
intelligence organizations must be not a little like a large university faculty.
They must have the people to whom research and rigorous thought are the breath
of life, and they must accordingly have tolerance for the queer bird and the eccentric
with a unique talent. They must guarantee a sort of academic freedom of inquiry
and must fight off those who derogate such freedom by pointing to its
occasional crackpot findings (emphasis added).80
Like
Kautilya long before him, Kent pays close attention to the question of methodology
in intelligence analysis and assessment: ‘“formulation of the method”, [as] it
would be called in formal terms, is itself an act of intelligence and an essential
part of the whole intelligence process’.81 And:
The knowledge
at issue is produced by the process of research…a certain kind of research must
accompany the surveillance activity. This research is a systematic endeavor to get
firm meaning out of impressions. Surveillance without its accompanying research
will produce spotty and superficial information...[R]esearch is the only
process which we of the liberal tradition are willing to admit is capable of giving
us the truth, or a closer approximation to truth than we now enjoy… truth is to
be approached, if not attained, through research guided by systematic method.
In the social sciences which very largely constitute the subject matter of
strategic intelligence, there is such an method, it is much like the method of
physical sciences. It is not the same method but it is a method none the less
(emphasis added).82
And on the inference
problematic, Kent states: ‘Are so called “estimates” of intelligence of any value?
My answer is Yes, they are of very great value if they are soundly based in
reliable descriptive data, reliable reporting, and processed from careful
analysis.’83 The basic idea underlying this sentence by Kent has been expressed
by Kautilya some 2,300 years earlier. In conclusion, we need to re-emphasize
the fact that Kautilya’s understanding of statecraft and intelligence, while being
methodologically and theoretically based upon political science, is firmly
grounded in empirical experience. Kautilya himself says that he wrote the Arthashastra
‘after going through all the sciences in detail and after observing the
practice’ (emphasis added).84 The Kautilyan state, while being an ideal- type
theoretical construction, is not a utopian construction in the sense of Thomas
Morus or Campanella. Kautilya does know the empirical reality of intelligence and
he analyses and conceptionalizes this reality with scientific methodology.
KAUTILYA’S THEORETICAL INSTRUMENTS FOR INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS: THE SAPTANGA THEORY
I now turn from
the methodological side of intelligence analysis to theoretical concepts in the
Arthashastra that are applicable for intelligence analysis and assessment. One
of the two basic questions in intelligence analysis is about capabilities of states—those
of foreign states, but also one's own. The second key intelligence question is:
what are the intentions of competitors or adversaries? How do we identify state
capabilities and how do we operationalize them in terms of relative strength or
weakness? If we use the terminology of Hans J. Morgenthau, we would say: what
is the ‘national power’—the material and immaterial resources—of a state?
Kautilya had the idea of ‘national power’ 2,300 years ago with the saptanga theory:
the seven ‘state factors (prakriti)’ constitute (state) power: ‘The king and
his rule [state], this is the sum-total of the constituents’.85 The seven ‘constituent
elements of the state’ (Kangle) or seven ‘state factors’ (Meyer) are: ‘1) swamin:
the ruler; 2) amatya: the Minister [government and administration]; 3) janapada:
the people [in the countryside];
4) durga: the
fortress [capital]; 5) kosa: the treasury [economy]; 6) danda: armed might; 7) mitra:
the ally [in foreign policy]’.86
With the saptanga
theory, Kautilya transcends the idea that state power is primarily defined by armed
might. The state is no longer defined solely by its monopoly of the use of force.
Beyond danda, the state has six other power factors at its disposal. How powerful
a state is, is determined by the status (and the development trend) of all the
seven prakritis. This new understanding of state power is one of the
outstanding theoretical achievements in the Arthashastra.
Moreover,
Kautilya’s saptanga theory means that state power is no longer an abstract, relational
magnitude, but an aggregate of material and immaterial variables. Simultaneously,
state power can be operationalized by breaking it down into its seven
components.87 Thus, state power can, if not precisely measured, at least be adequately
evaluated and estimated. That includes assessing the positive or negative development
trends of each of the seven prakritis: decline, rise or stagnation.88
For example,
janapada: how many peasants produce what agricultural output, what is their
surplus product, what tax revenue do they generate; what mines produce, what
output, what type of ore; what is timber production, etc.? Is the trend of
these economic indices positive or negative? The state factor, amatya, can be
evaluated using qualitative criteria: administrative competence, efficiency or level
of corruption of the state bureaucracy. What is the size of the armed forces? In
what condition are weapons systems, equipment, logistics or combat morale? So, Kautilya
provides a substantive concept of state power, which is comprehensive as well as
differentiated in itself. The seven prakritis are logically and practically
interrelated and their sequence constitutes a hierarchy of importance in the
sense that the higher-order state factor determines the performance of
successive factors. This is important to avoid an over-fixation and
overestimation of one or two state factors in assessing state power, that is,
ignoring their quasi-genetic dependency on other state factors.
As
mentioned earlier, Kautilya’s concept of state power as the aggregate of the
seven state factors is homologous with Morgenthau’s concept of ‘national
power’, whose components are population size, raw materials, agriculture, industrial
potential and the armed forces of a state. Morgenthau also includes immaterial
factors to ‘national power’, that is, ‘national character’, ‘national morality’
and the ‘quality’ of government and diplomacy.89
Kautilya’s
concept of state power as an aggregate of seven prakritis provides excellent theoretical
tools for intelligence analysis. The assessment of the situation with respect to
one’s own state and foreign states can rest on objective parameters: the given status
and the development trend of the seven prakritis. Thus, Kautilya rendered possible
not only a theoretical quantum leap in political science, but equally so for intelligence
analysis. The intelligence assessment of state capabilities can be based on substantive,
objective criteria.
The power of
a state is determined by the totality and the connectivity of the seven prakritis.
When we look at the power potential of a particular state, we may find that the
military power factor of this state appears to be very strong: its armed forces
are quantitatively large. But intelligence analysis may uncover that this same
state is rather weak in economic power and financial resources, which
translates into missing pay, low- grade equipment and insufficient supplies, thereby
atrophying the army’s combat power. Conversely, a territorially and demographically
small state with modest armed forces might become a powerful state in a
relatively short time span. That can happen if the state factors, swamin and amatya,
are of excellent quality, which means promoting and expanding the economy in the
countryside (janapada) and in the city (durga), and thus increasing tax revenues
(kosa), allowing the armed forces to be upgraded (danda) and conducting a wise
foreign policy (amatya).
Kautilya is
not only interested in the given status of a state’s prakritis, but the trend of
their development. The status of the prakritis is fluid: they can grow and
improve or they can deteriorate. A state’s power potential might stagnate for a
while, but sooner than later, it will either increase or shrink. Identifying the
trend of a state’s power potential is a central task of intelligence analysis and
assessment. The directionality of five of one’s own state factors can be
determined, or at least influenced, by the ruler and the state administration: janapada,
durga, kosa, danda and mitra. For Kautilya, the optimization of one’s prakriti is
raison d’etat.90 In other words, priority is to be given to ‘internal balancing’
via the strengthening and improvement of the seven state factors.
For an objective
assessment of one’s own prakritis, the secret service is not needed because in the
Kautilyan state, there is a comprehensive census system. The state bureaucracy
collects and documents the demographic, economic, fiscal and other data. Thus, the
state factors, janapanda, durga, Kosa and danda, can be estimated fairly
accurately. For evaluating the quality of the state bureaucracy, however, Kautilya
advises the ruler to use the secret service. Kautilyan statecraft requires that
the ruler must judge soberly and self-critically his own performance,
particularly with respect to foreign policy. Whatever results the assessment of
the given status of one’s own prakritis may yield, Kautilya insists: they must be
strengthened and improved—that is demanded by raison d'etat.
To assess
the capabilities—and intentions of—foreign states, intelligence is
indispensable. Intelligence operatives and diplomatic envoys (which are supposed
to work closely together) are needed. They must collect as much data/information
as possible on the current status and trend of the prakritis of the foreign
state in which they operating. Doing that does not necessarily mean clandestine
intelligence collection. Much information about the political, economic and
even the military situations of a foreign country can collected by diplomats
and intelligence operatives by keeping their eyes open and by talking to both
ordinary people and senior officials. However, collecting secret political and/or
military information necessitates the recruitment of local agents by one’s own
intelligence operatives—the higher their position in the political and social
system, the better will be the intelligence they yield—as well as other methods
of clandestine collection. Kautilya describes rather extensively how secret agents
and diplomats can collect open and secret intelligence in a foreign country.91 Their
intelligence reports then must be analysed and assessed at home with the
methodology sketched earlier and with the theoretical tools provided by the saptanga
theory. Doing that allows a realistic and objective assessment of the status
and the development trend of each prakriti and the aggregated power potential of
foreign states. Thus, an objective assessment of the correlation of forces
between one’s own state and competing states becomes possible.
So, Kautilya
offers not only the methodological but also the theoretical framework for sober
and unbiased intelligence analysis and assessment. Again, science and
intelligence form a symbiosis.
Intelligence Analysis and Grand Strategy
The term
‘grand strategy’ was coined by B.H. Liddell Hart.92 His understanding of grand
strategy can be summarized as follows. Grand strategy is the ‘holistic’ or ‘synoptic’
alignment of strategic thinking on the overall constellation of the political,
social, economic and military resources available to a state directed towards
the realization of fundamental state goals. That is also the approach taken by Kautilya
in the Arthashastra. Grand strategy means that strategic thinking and action is
aimed to bring about a context-adequate, optimal mix of a state’s capabilities for
the realization of ‘strategic’ state interests and goals. Like intelligence, grand
strategy is both a cognitive process and the result of this process—a ‘master
plan’ for state action which is co-relating the ‘estimate of the (strategic) situation’
with state interests and goals.93
The concept
of grand strategy is very close to Kautilya’s holistic and synoptic idea of
statecraft. The components of grand strategy can rather easily be identified in
the Arthashastra:
1. resources and
capabilities in terms of the seven prakritis;
2. power potential
in terms of the aggregated prakritis;
3. the correlation
of forces in terms of prakritis—one's own and that of competitors/adversaries;
4. state
interests derived from: (a) the correlation of forces and (b) the actors’
respective intentions; and
5. ‘strategic’
and normative state goals in accordance with raison d’etat: the maintenance and
expansion of the power of the state, the welfare of the people and the
political unification of the Indian subcontinent.
The necessary
condition of the possibility of designing a grand strategy is intelligence
analysis and estimates. The foundation of grand strategy is the analysis and assessment
of one’s own resources and capabilities on the one side, and the capabilities and
intentions of external actors on the other side. The result is an ‘estimate of the situation’,
the bottom of which is the correlation of forces between states ‘ascertaining
the relative strength or weakness of powers’, as Kautilya puts it.94 The concept of correlation of forces is central in the Arthashastra and
the saptanga theory makes it so expedient by establishing substantive
and objective criteria for intelligence analysis and assessment. Through the
intelligence assessment of the correlation of forces, a reality-based identification of state interests becomes possible.
But that is not all. The correlation of forces between states is linked by
Kautilya with strategic planning:
‘The circle of constituent elements [the seven prakritis] is the basis of the six measures of foreign policy [shadgunya]’.95
Depending, first and foremost,
on the assessment of the correlation
of forces (in terms of the respective prakritis), Kautilya
submits a set of
six action strategies in foreign policy
(shadgunya) for enforcing one’s state interests and realizing one’s state
goals:
1. samdhi,
peace > the rival state is stronger and will remain so in the foreseeable
future;
2. vigraha, war
> the rival is vastly inferior in power;
3. asana, neutrality
> the correlation of forces is balanced;
4. yana, war
preparation, coercive diplomacy > one’s own power is rising vis-à-vis the
rival state;
5. samshraya, alliance
building > the rival state’s power is rising faster than one’s own; and
6. dvaidhibhava,
diplomatic double game > the constellation among rivals and allies is very
fluid.
‘“These are
really six measures, because of differences in the situation”, say[s]
Kautilya.’96 What is of critical importance with respect to the shadgunya theory
is its intrinsic connectivity with the saptanga theory. The saptanga theory
provides the benchmark for the correlation of forces between rival states. And
the correlation of forces preselects, if not determines, which of the six action
strategies is to be chosen in foreign policy: ‘Situated within the circle of
[the seven] constituent elements, he [the ruler] should, in this manner, with
these six methods of [foreign] policy, seek to progress from decline to stable
condition and from stable condition to advancement in his own undertakings.’97
Kautilya wants to eliminate non-reflective, impulsive and arbitrary action in foreign
policy. For him, sober, thorough and objective intelligence analysis,
assessment and estimates are the conditio sine qua non for a foreign policy which
meets his strategic and normative requirements. ‘He who sees the six measures
of policy as being interdependent in this manner, plays, as he pleases, with
the [rival] kings tied by the chains of his intellect.’98
In Kautilya’s
understanding, intelligence analysis, assessment and estimates go hand in hand
with strategic planning and open up the access route that leads to
conceptionalizing a grand strategy which defines the ways and means by which interests
can be enforced and goals can be achieved.
Kautilya may
not be the first author to write about intelligence matters in a scholarly fashion,
but he is certainly the first to do so in a systematic, comprehensive and
in-depth manner. Kautilya views intelligence as an integral part of
statecraft—and not merely as the trade of spying. The Kautilya-Arthashastra is
unquestionably a foundational text of the political science sub-discipline of intelligence
studies—but as such, it has been largely ignored. Kautilya has left a large
reservoir of ideas and concepts with respect to intelligence affairs which has
so far remained untapped for tackling problems and puzzles of contemporary
intelligence studies. I hope that this observation will soon become obsolete.
Notes
1. Kautilya-Arthashastra,
X, 6, 51. The Latin number designates the book within the Arthashastra (15 in
total) and the Arabic number the chapter thereof; when there is an additional
Arabic number, it refers to the sutra number within the respective chapter in Kangle’s
English translation; see Kangle, R.P. (Ed.), The Kautilya Arthashastra, Part II
(English translation), Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2010a/1972.
2. John Le Carré,
Absolute Friends, London: Hodder & Stoughton, 2004, p. 327.
3. Cf. Weber, Max,
Gesammelte Politische Schriften, Tubingen: Mohr/ UTB, 1988a; Weber, Religion
und Gesellschaft—Gesammelte Aufsatze zur Religionssoziologie, Frankfurt am
Main: Zweitausendeins, 2008; Alfred Hillebrandt, Altindische Politik, Jena:
Fischer, 1923; Heinrich Zimmer, Philosophie und Religion Indiens, Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp, 1973; R.P. Kangle, The Kautilya Arthashastra, Part III (Commentary),
Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2010b/1965; N.P. Sil, Kautilya’s Arthashastra—A Comparative
Study, New York: Lang, 1989; Roger Boesche, The First Great Political Realist: Kautilya
and his Arthashastra, Lanham, US: Lexington Books, 2002; Adam Watson, The
Evolution of International Society, London: Routledge, 2009.
4. Bozeman,
Adda B., Strategic Intelligence & Statecraft, Washington: Brassey’s, 1992,
pp. 1f.
5. Cf. Richelson,
Jeffrey T., The U.S. Intelligence Community, Cambridge,
MA: Ballinger
Publishing Company, 1985; Loch K. Johnson, ‘Preface to a Theory of Strategic
Intelligence’, International Journal of Intelligence and counterIntelligence, Vol.
16, No. 4, 2003, pp. 638–63; Stephen Marrin, ‘Intelligence Analysis Theory:
Explaining and Predicting Analytic Responsibilities’, Intelligence and National
Security, Vol. 22, No. 6, 2007, pp. 821–46; William E. Odom, ‘Intelligence
Analysis’, Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 23, No. 3, 2008, pp.
316–22; Bowman H. Miller, ‘Improving All-source Intelligence Analysis: Elevate
Knowledge in the Equation’, International Journal of Intelligence and
CounterIntelligence, Vol. 21, No. 2, 2008, pp. 337–54; Mark M. Lowenthal, ‘A
Disputation on Intelligence Reform and Analysis: My 18 Theses’, International
Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 31–37; and
expert interviews with Dr Hans-Georg Wieck, former Head of the German Foreign
Intelligence Service (BND), Ajit Doval, former Director Intelligence Bureau
(India), and R. Banerji, Special Secretary (retd) in the Cabinet Secretariat (India).
1. In 2012,
P.K. Gautam, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) Research Fellow,
raised the question of intelligence analysis in the Kautilya- Arthashastra inthecontextofthe
IDSAProject, Indigenous Historical Knowledge. Cf. P.K. Gautam, One Hundred
Years of Kautilya’s Arthashastra, Delhi: IDSA Monograph Series, available at http://idsa.in/monograph/One
HundredYearsofKautilyasArthasastra, accessed on 4 September 2013.
2. Kangle, The
Kautilya Arthashastra, Part II.
3. Meyer, Johann
J. (ed.), Das altindische Buch vom Welt—und Staatsleben: Das Arthacastra des
Kautilya, Graz: Akademische Druck- und Verlagsanstalt, 1977/1926.
4. Cf. Weber,
Max, Gesammelte Aufsatze zur Wissenschaftslehre, Tubingen: Mohr/UTB, 1988b.
5. Plessner,
Helmuth, Macht und menschliche Natur, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2003, p.
217. Helmuth Plessner (1892–1985) was a German– Jewish sociologist and social
philosopher. His 1931 study, Macht und menschliche Natur (Power and Human
Nature), has not yet been translated into English.
6. Kent,
Sherman, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy, Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1951.
7. Cf. Davis, Jack,
‘Sherman Kent and the Profession of Intelligence Analysis’, Occasional Papers
1/5, The Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis, 2002, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/kent-center-occasional-
papers/vol1no5.htmKent, accessed on 2 March 2014.
8. Cf.
Scharfe, Hartmut, Untersuchungen zur Staatsrechtslehre des Kautalya, Wiesbaden:
Harrassowitz, 1968, pp. 233–76; Charles Drekmeier, Kingship and Community in
Early India, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962, pp. 208ff.
9. Cf. Deacon,
Richard, A History of the British Secret Service, London: Grafton, 1982; Stevan
Dedijer, ‘Ragusa Intelligence and Security (1301–1806)—A Model for the Twenty-first
Century?’, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Vol.
15, No. 1, 2002, pp. 101–14; Sean P. Winchell, ‘The CDX: The Council of Ten and
Intelligence in the Lion Republic’, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence,
Vol. 19, No. 2, 2006, pp. 335–55.
10. Kautilya-Arthashastra,
I, 10; V, 1.
11. Kautilya-Arthashastra,
I, 10 and 17; IX, 4 and 5.
12. Kautilya-Arthashastra,
V, I.
13. Kautilya-Arthashastra,
I, 12, 18; I, 13, 2.
14. Kautilya-Arthashastra,
I, 12, 19; IX, 6; XIII, 3.
15. Kautilya-Arthashastra,
I, 12, 20; I, 16; XI, 1.
16. Ibid.
17. Kautilya-Arthashastra,
XI, 1; XII, 1–4.
18. Ibid.; XIV.
19. Cf. Fritze,
Ludwig (ed.), Mudrarakschasa oder des Kanzlers Siegelring. Ein indisches Drama
von Visakhadatta, Leipzig: Reclam, 1886.
20. Kautilya-Arthashastra,
I, 11 and 12.
21. Ibid.
22. Kautilya-Arthashastra,
I, 14.
23. Kautilya-Arthashastra,
I, 12 and 13.
24. Kautilya-Arthashastra,
I, 12.
25. Kautilya-Arthashastra,
I, 16; XI, 1; XII, 1–4; XIII, 1–2.
26. Cf. Roy,
Gandhi Jee, Diplomacy in Ancient India, Patna: Janaki Prakashan, 1981; Schwalm,
Hansjörg, Die Rolle des indischen Kriegswesen vor und während der Herrschaft
Chandraguptas und seines Ministers Kautalya, Osnabrück: Biblio-Verlag,1986;
S.D. Trivedi, Secret Services in Ancient India: Techniques and Operation,
Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1987; Gayatri Chakraborty, Espionage in Ancient India
(From the Earliest Time to the 12th Century A.D.), Calcutta: Minerva, 1990;
Boesche, The First Great Political Realist; Rohatgi, Manila, Spy System in Ancient
India, Delhi: Kalpaz Publications, 2007; Friedrich Wilhelm, ‘Königsindisch—eine
Variante im großen Spiel der Geheimdienste’, in Wolfgang Krieger (Hg.), Geheimdienste
in der Weltgeschichte [Intelligence in World History], München: Beck, 2009.
27. Bozeman, Strategic
Intelligence & Statecraft, p. 1.
28. Ibid., p. vii.
29. Kautilya-Arthashastra,
VI, 2, 33.
30. Kautilya-Arthashastra,
IX, 1, 15.
31. Cf. Miller,
‘Improving All-source Intelligence Analysis’, p. 338.
32. Kautilya-Arthashastra,
I, 5.
33. Ibid., 19, 7–17.
34. Kangle uses
alternatively the terms ‘knowledge’, ‘intellect’, ‘science’ and ‘political
science’.
35. Ibid., 5, 5.
36. Ibid., 5, 15–16;
restated almost verbatim in VI, 1, 4.
37. Kautilya-Arthashastra,
I, 6, 2–3.
38. Ibid., 1, 5.
39. Ibid., 5, 11.
40. Ibid., 7, 1.
41. Ibid., 19, 7–14.
42. Ibid., 5, 17.
43. Kent, Strategic
Intelligence for American World Policy, p. vii ff.
44. Marrin, ‘Intelligence
Analysis Theory’, p. 827.
45. Kent, Strategic
Intelligence for American World Policy, p. 76.
46. Kautilya-Arthashastra,
I, 4, 13–14; I, 13, 2–14.
47. Bozeman, Strategic
Intelligence & Statecraft, p. 2.
48. Kautilya-Arthashastra,
I, 16.
49. Kent, Strategic
Intelligence for American World Policy, p. 4.
50. Ibid., p. 70,
e.a.
51. Ibid., p. 161.
52. Ibid., p.
38.
53. Kautilya-Arthashastra,
VI, 2, 4.
54. Kautilya-Arthashastra,
VII, 18, 43.
55. However, magic
can be used as a means of psychological warfare by the ruler possessing
knowledge-cum-intelligence.
56. Kautilya-Arthashastra,
IX, 4, 26.
57. Miller, ‘Improving
All-source Intelligence Analysis’, p. 344.
58. Ibid., p. 345.
59. Kautilya-Arthashastra,
I, 9, 4–8.
60. Ibid., 9, 7.
61. Ibid., 7, 9.
62. Ibid., 15, 55–57.
63. Ibid., 12, 26.
64. Ibid., 15, 35.
65. Kent, Strategic
Intelligence for American World Policy, p. 156.
66. Kautilya-Arthashastra,
I, 2, 12.
67. Kautilya-Arthashastra,
VII, 11, 45.
68. Kautilya-Arthashastra,
VIII, 2, 12.
69. Kautilya-Arthashastra,
I, 1, 19.
70. I follow
J.J. Meyer's German translation which here, I think, is less opaque than
Kangle's; Kautilya-Arthashastra, XV, 1, 3.
71. Kautilya-Arthashastra,
I, 15, 61.
72. The Kautilya-Arthashastra’s
holistic approach to statecraft and intelligence marks a major difference to the
other great ancient work on this subject area; Sun-Tzu’s The Art of War, cf.
K.N. Ramachandran, ‘Sun Zi and Kautilya: Towards a Comparative Analysis’, in
K.N. Ramachandran et al. (eds), Sun Zi and China’s Strategic Culture, IDSA Occasional
Paper Series, New Delhi: IDSA, 1999, pp. S46–78.
73. Kent, Strategic
Intelligence for American World Policy, p. 64.
74. Ibid., p.
48.
75. Ibid., p.
74.
76. Ibid., p.
54.
77. Ibid., pp. 151–56.
78. Ibid, p. 60.
79. Kautilya-Arthashastra,
II, 10, 63; e.a.
80. Kautilya-Arthashastra,
VIII, 2, 1.
81. Kautilya-Arthashastra,
VI, 1, 1.
82. Cf. Liebig,
Michael, ‘Kautilya's Relevance for India Today’, India Quarterly, Vol. 69, No.
2, 2013, pp. 99–116.
83. Kautilya-Arthashastra,
VII, 18, 43.
84. Cf. Morgenthau,
Hans J., Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1978, pp. 107–70.
85. Cf. Liebig,
‘Kautilya's Relevance for India Today’.
86. Kautilya-Arthashastra,
I, 16.
87. Liddell
Hart, B.H., Strategy, Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin Books, 1967, p. 322.
88. Cf. Kovac,
Mitar and Jan Marcek, ‘Konzepte und Methodische Aspekte der Formulierung und
Umsetzung der Staatlichen Strategie’, in Österreichische Militärische
Zeitschrift, Vol. 51, No. 1, 2013, p. 34–47.
89. Kautilya-Arthashastra,
IX, 1, 1.
90. Kautilya-Arthashastra,
VII, 1, 1.
91. Ibid., 1, 5.
92. Ibid., 1, 38.
93. Ibid., 18, 44.