Open Access Research Article
SILHOUETTE OF BIOLOGICAL WARFARE CONVENTION: LEGAL PAUCITY AND DIFFERENT ASPECTS IN THE LIGHT OF COVID-19
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SILHOUETTE OF BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
CONVENTION: LEGAL PAUCITY AND DIFFERENT ASPECTS IN THE LIGHT OF COVID-19
AUTHORED BY - PRAGATI SHREYA
Abstract
Weapons of mass destruction that can
inflict a variety of harm are known as biological weapons. Worldwide, the use
of biological weapons has a significant negative impact on a sizable
population. The necessity of creating a convention that forbids the creation
and use of such weapons has become increasingly pressing because of
technological advancements. Around the world, efforts have been made to stop
the threat of biological weapons use. One of the most effective measures in
this regard to date has been the implementation of the Biological Weapon
Convention, which forbids the development, use, and spread of biological
weapons.
One of the examples that will be
dealt with in this paper is that, during the pandemic of COVID-19, in China and
the West, respectively, there were two widely accepted explanations regarding
the origins of COVID-19. One places the blame on the United States, while the
other points to a top-tier biocontainment lab in Wuhan, which was the
pandemic's original epicenter. There have been reports of biological warfare
attempts under both ideas. Based on the current body of scientific knowledge,
these assertions are unfounded. China was found to have violated the BWC by
manufacturing the virus that caused the COVID-19 pandemic.
However, the rise of these modern
conspiracy theories mirrors several long-standing and detrimental trends in the
global scene, such as deep mistrust, animosities, the power of ideologies like
nationalism, and the sacrifice of truth in propaganda campaigns, much like the
biological warfare episodes of the mid-20th century. Furthermore, there are
genuine and growing risks from biological warfare, bioterrorism, and
unintentional lab viral leaks. Therefore, in the larger context of an impending
Cold War II, the international community must urgently build a better global
governance of biosafety and biosecurity than what exists at the moment. The
author will critically evaluate and analyze the current global position on the
matter, emphasizing the necessity of specific amendments to ensure the
effective operation of the BWC. They will also go into detail about the key
components, operation, implementation, and shortcomings of the Convention.
Key words: Biological
weapons Biological Weapon Convention (BWC) COVID-19 pandemic origins Global
governance of biosafety and biosecurity
Introduction
The Biological Weapons Convention
(BWC), originating from historical instances of biological weapon usage dating
back to the 12th century, represents a pivotal global effort for disarmament.
Its roots in the Geneva Protocol of 1925 were a response to the dangers posed
by chemical and biological weapons during World War I[1].
However, the inadequacies of the Geneva Protocol persisted through subsequent
conflicts, necessitating the evolution of the comprehensive Biological Weapons
Convention.
Enforced during the modern era, the
BWC strives to prevent the storage, development, and usage of biological
weapons for hostile purposes. It envisions a world free of these weapons,
emphasizing cooperation among member states and due diligence[2]. Despite
its noble objectives, the convention grapples with legal gaps and challenges
highlighted by recent allegations, especially the controversial theories
surrounding the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic.
This article delves into the legal
lacunae and loopholes of the BWC, exploring the complexities surrounding
definitions, verification mechanisms, accountability, and financial
sustainability. Additionally, it scrutinizes historical cases of
non-compliance, shedding light on the difficulties in enforcing the convention
effectively. Recognizing these challenges, the article proposes enhancements,
ranging from a refined verification mechanism to an accountability framework,
aiming to fortify the BWC's role in preventing the development and use of
biological weapons. In an era marked by geopolitical tensions and evolving
biological threats, more robust global governance of biosafety and biosecurity
becomes not only a necessity but an urgent imperative.
The usage of biology in weapons dates
to the 12th century, with historical instances of biological toxins being
employed in conflicts. In the modern era, during World War I, countries
initiated the development of biological weapons, leading to allegations of
Germany using anthrax or glanders against horses shipped to the Allied powers.
Recognizing the dangers, the League of Nations introduced the Geneva Protocol
in 1925[3],
prohibiting the use of chemical and biological weapons in warfare. However, the
Protocol had shortcomings, allowing major powers to reserve the right to use
such weapons in retaliation, and neglecting the production and storage aspects.
The inadequacies of the Geneva
Protocol persisted in World War II and the Vietnam War, prompting the need for
a more definitive convention. The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) emerged,
building upon the Geneva Protocol's principles. It prohibits the storage,
development, or usage of biological weapons and toxins for hostile purposes,
emphasizing due diligence and cooperation among member states. The BWC
envisions a world free of biological weapons, requiring the destruction or
diversion of existing weapons within nine months of enforcement.
Notably, the BWC's prohibition is not
absolute, allowing for prophylactic, peaceful, or protective purposes, and
encouraging member states to exchange research and knowledge. Disputes related
to convention breaches can be addressed to the UN Security Council for
investigation. The BWC relies on state cooperation, holding review conferences
every five years to discuss implementation and plans. Despite challenges and
minimal consensus in recent conferences, the BWC gained renewed relevance amid
allegations of its violation by China, particularly regarding the intentional
manufacturing of the coronavirus. Whether these allegations hold true or not,
they underscore legal gaps within the BWC, raising questions about its
effectiveness and enforcement mechanisms.
Research Methodology
This empirical research adopts a
multi-faceted methodology encompassing diverse analytical approaches to
investigate the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and biosafety/biosecurity
governance. The research design incorporates the following key elements:
Literature Review: A comprehensive literature review forms the foundation of the research,
examining existing scholarship on the history and status of the BWC, legal
gaps, allegations of non-compliance, and suggested improvements. Scholarly
articles, books, official documents, and reputable news sources are systematically
reviewed to establish a robust understanding of the subject matter.
Case Studies:
Utilizing a qualitative approach, the research integrates case studies such as
the Sverdlovsk case, the "Yellow Rain" case, the Cuban allegation,
and the Iraq accusation. These cases are examined to elucidate instances of
alleged non-compliance with the BWC, providing nuanced insights into the
real-world challenges and deficiencies associated with convention enforcement.
Content Analysis of Conspiracy Theories: To capture the contemporary context, the study
conducts a content analysis of conspiracy theories related to the origins of
the novel coronavirus. This involves a systematic examination of claims,
sources, and international reactions, aiming to discern the impact of these
narratives on global perceptions and their potential influence on biosafety/biosecurity
governance.
Proposal Analysis: The research methodology includes a rigorous analysis of proposed
alterations and additions to the BWC. This analysis assesses the feasibility,
implications, and potential effectiveness of suggested changes in fortifying
the convention. By critically evaluating proposals, the study contributes
valuable insights into enhancing the governance framework surrounding
biological weapons.
Research Gap
Despite the comprehensive coverage of
the article, some potential research gaps are apparent:
Limited Primary Source Analysis: The reliance on secondary sources, such as scholarly
articles and news reports, may limit the depth of primary source analysis.
Original documents and statements from key stakeholders could provide
additional insights.
Geographical Bias: The focus on cases
involving major powers (e.g., the United States, the Soviet Union, China) may
create a geographical bias. A more diversified analysis of alleged
non-compliance cases involving different regions could offer a broader
perspective.
Conspiracy Theories' Impact: While
the article discusses conspiracy theories, a more in-depth exploration of their
impact on public perceptions, international relations, and biosafety governance
would be valuable.
Insufficient Exploration of Alternative Views: The article predominantly presents a
critical perspective on the BWC's effectiveness and gaps. Exploring alternative
views or counter arguments could contribute to a more balanced analysis.
Limited Comparative Analysis: The research could benefit from a more extensive comparative
analysis of biosafety and biosecurity governance mechanisms across different
countries and regions.
In addressing these research gaps,
future studies could provide a more nuanced understanding of the complexities
surrounding biological weapons governance and contribute to the ongoing
discourse on global biosafety and biosecurity.
Research Utility
1. Holistic Exploration: The analysis provides a comprehensive overview of the
Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), covering its historical evolution, legal
deficiencies, and contemporary challenges.
2. Relevance to Global Biosecurity: By addressing conspiracy theories related to COVID-19's
origins, the article contributes to the broader discourse on global
biosecurity, making it a valuable resource for policymakers and scholars.
3. Critical Evaluation of Legal Shortcomings: The examination of legal issues
within the BWC highlights the need for reforms, offering essential insights for
policymakers aiming to strengthen the convention and address inherent limitations.
4. Actionable Recommendations: The proposed improvements section outlines practical steps,
including verification mechanisms and accountability frameworks, providing
policymakers and advocates with actionable insights for enhancing global governance
of biosafety and biosecurity.
Research objective
- Evaluate the
historical context and evolution of the Biological Weapons Convention
(BWC), examining its origins, developments, and inadequacies in addressing
biological weapons throughout history.
- Investigate and
analyze the allegations of non-compliance with the BWC, focusing on
specific cases such as the Sverdlovsk case, the "Yellow Rain"
case, the Cuban allegation, and the Iraq accusation. Identify patterns,
challenges, and lessons learned from these instances.
- Examine the legal
lacunae and loopholes within the BWC, critically evaluating its articles
and provisions. Highlight areas of ambiguity, contradictions, and
practical challenges that impede the convention's effectiveness in
preventing the development and use of biological weapons.
- Propose comprehensive
and feasible adjustments and additions to the BWC, addressing its
shortcomings and enhancing its implementation and efficiency. Explore
solutions related to definitions, verification mechanisms, accountability
frameworks, confidence-building measures, complaint mechanisms, and
financial sustainability to strengthen global governance of biosafety and
biosecurity.
Review of Literature
Jing-Bao Nie in his research delves
into the potential consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, exploring its impact
on individuals, families, and nations, while drawing attention to the alarming
notion that microbes could pose a threat comparable to nuclear weapons.
Focusing on two conspiracy theories surrounding the origins of COVID-19, one
involving a Wuhan lab and the other implicating the United States, the article
underscores the urgent need for enhanced global governance in biosafety and
biosecurity. It emphasizes transparency, trust, and trustworthiness as key
ethical values and advocates for a framework rooted in the common good of
humanity. The review also delves into historical instances of biological
warfare and calls for coordinated international efforts to prevent future
pandemics by addressing biosafety concerns in laboratories worldwide.
Samavi Srivastava and Rounak Doshi in
their research emphasize the crucial role of Conventions and Protocols,
specifically focusing on the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), in
maintaining global peace and stability. It highlights the potential threat of
biological weapons and suggests that the BWC serves as a vital barrier against
such risks.
The discussion then shifts to
allegations against China, stating that if true, they would constitute a
violation of the BWC. However, it acknowledges the challenges in conclusively
determining such violations due to the BWC's shortcomings, including secrecy,
lack of evidence, and a need for a verification mechanism.
The text concludes by emphasizing the
need for improvements to the BWC, particularly the implementation of a
verification mechanism to enhance accountability. It stresses collective
efforts by states to build trust, address suspicions, and responsibly finance
the BWC. The goal is to prevent the misuse of loopholes in the Convention and
ensure global security in the face of evolving technology and intelligence.
In summary, the literature
underscores the significance of international agreements like the BWC,
acknowledges challenges in enforcement, and advocates for necessary
improvements to enhance the Convention's effectiveness in safeguarding global
security
MAIN BODY
Wuhan's Alleged P4 Laboratory Conspiracy
With a biosafety level-4 (BSL-4) lab,
the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) in China was met with international
skepticism about its necessity and safety.[4]
Pathogen leakage and the possible creation of biological weapons were among the
worries. Conspiracy theories linking China's purported covert biological
weapons program to the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 surfaced.[5]
This was proposed by an Israeli expert, and Indian researchers subsequently
withdrew a preprint paper they had published that claimed the virus had been
genetically engineered.
Suspicion continued to grow both
abroad and even within China, leading virologist Shi Zhengli to refute any
laboratory connection. Though emotionally charged, this response lacked
objective proof, and her affiliation with the WIV sparked questions about
potential conflicts of interest.
Independent studies are necessary
because mainstream scientific research has ruled out the possibility of a
genetically altered virus or bioweapon, but it has left open the possibility of
an unintentional lab escape.[6]
The official responses from China
stoked mistrust; in February 2020, biological weapons specialist Major General
Chen Wei took command of WIV.[7] New
regulations that went into effect in April gave COVID-19 origin studies extra
scrutiny and approval. The proposal by President Xi Jinping for a biosecurity
law and its integration into national security sparked conjecture. While some
in the West interpreted it as an implicit acknowledgment of lab origins, others
conjectured that it was intended to thwart potential biological warfare attacks
by foreign countries.
As a result, the Wuhan lab
controversy includes worries about security, allegations of a clandestine
program, and conjecture that SARS-CoV-2 originated in a lab.[8] Even
though genetic engineering claims have been refuted by science, there is still
a chance of an unintentional lab escape that needs to be investigated
independently. The matter remains unresolved because of China's official
responses and actions, which have stoked more doubts and interpretations
throughout the world.
The United States: Conspiracy Theory Redux
There is a conspiracy theory in China
that the Seventh World Military Games in Wuhan, where almost ten thousand
athletes from more than a hundred countries competed, is the source of the new
coronavirus. The theory holds that the virus was purposefully introduced during
the games by the United States, which is alleged to be conducting biological
warfare against China. The story, which has its roots in historical grievances,
capitalizes on xenophobia and anti-Western feelings to revive a previous
conspiracy theory about the 2003 SARS outbreak.[9]
The disinformation campaign gained momentum
on the Chinese social media platform WeChat, where it spread a message
highlighting the parallels between the ongoing trade war between the US and
China, the timing of the military drills, and the virus outbreak.[10] According
to the message, the US government is planning to use the virus as a biological
weapon against the people, politics, and economy of China.
The theory fits China's official
narrative, abdicating accountability for the pandemic's origins even in the
absence of scientific proof. Interestingly, the Chinese government appears to
have orchestrated disinformation based on its endorsement and promotion of the
theory on WeChat, a platform that it closely monitors. The theory is also
central to a propaganda campaign that aims to change the way the world views
China's response to COVID-19 by highlighting its achievements in contrast to
perceived shortcomings in the West. Globally, the theory gained traction on
Twitter when Zhao Lijian, a spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry,
proposed that the virus may have been brought to Wuhan by US army personnel.
Concurrently, the United States, spearheaded by President Trump, labeled the
virus as the "China virus," exacerbating tensions and worsening
bilateral ties between the two countries, alluding to a "New Cold
War" situation.
Strengthening International Oversight of Biosafety and Biosecurity: An
Imperative Task
The potential misuse of biological
agents in the twenty-first century highlights the need for a more robust global
governance of biosafety and biosecurity. The current frameworks, like the
Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Geneva Protocol of 1925, are not
sufficiently effective in monitoring and verifying their provisions, leaving
the international community ill-prepared to regulate the development of
biological weapons.[11]
In the past, to develop biological
weapons, major powers like Japan, the US, the UK, France, and the USSR
participated in covert state-sponsored virology and bacteriology research
projects.[12] Even
though biological weapons have not shown to be as successful as nuclear bombs,
recent developments in biology have increased their potential. Because of their
high potency, low visibility, accessibility, and ease of delivery, biological
weapons pose a serious threat.
Safety problems in high-level
biocontainment labs have increased worries about biosafety and biosecurity.
Events such as the 2019 closure of the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of
Infectious Diseases at Fort Detrick and localized outbreaks brought on by
pathogen escapes highlight the dangers connected to these kinds of
establishments. The urgency is increased by the absence of an international
body in charge of biosafety and biosecurity worldwide.
International cooperation in
addressing these challenges is threatened by political and ideological forces,
particularly considering the impending "Cold War II" between the
United States and China. Paradoxically, a higher form of global governance for
biosafety and biosecurity becomes urgently necessary precisely because of these
destabilizing factors. International cooperation is needed to stop man-made
pandemics and make sure that biological research is used responsibly,
especially in high-security labs that handle dangerous pathogens like the
coronavirus and the Ebola virus.
Gaps and Ambiguities in the Biological Weapons Convention
Based on the ideas of the Geneva
Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) is a major step towards
international disarmament. However, several innate flaws prevent it from
reaching its full potential.
One of the primary obstacles to the
effective implementation of the BWC is the absence of a precise definition for
"weapons, equipment, or means of delivery" in Article I of the
convention. The uncertainty is highlighted by Switzerland's unilateral reservation
regarding the definition of a biological weapon.[13]
The "dual-use dilemma" adds to the complexity of an already complex
world by making it harder to discern between applications that are harmful or
beneficial.
The second restriction is found in
Article I, which only forbids the use of biological weapons in hostile contexts
while permitting the use of poisons or other agents for defensive,
preventative, or peaceful purposes[14].
Distinguishing between research intentions is controversial, particularly when dealing
with biological toxins that are required for the development of vaccines,
protective gear, and antidotes. Verification measures such as those suggested
by VEREX and the Ad-Hoc group were not successful in addressing this[15]. As a
result, there is no legally-binding verification process in place to guarantee
compliance.
The third disadvantage has to do with
responsibility. The government has started an accountability framework, but
reports on national compliance are voluntary and inconsistent. The BWC does not
require disclosure of the possession of prohibited weapons, biological agent
research, or the use of toxins in non-prohibited activities.[16] The BWC
depends on voluntary submissions and cooperation since it lacks external
organizations with the legal authority to verify information.
Fourth, there is a dilemma brought
about by the conflict between Articles 3 and 10. These articles contradict each
other because "hostile purpose" is not universally understood. In
addition, the technological divide between developed and developing countries
has been exacerbated by Article 10's encouragement of cooperation in technology
exchange. In contrast to the objectives of the convention, this has impeded
economic growth in developing nations.
The fifth problem stems from nations'
unwillingness to divulge details about their military installations.
International politics prevent meaningful cooperation, which breeds suspicion
and charges of violations that could lead to the development of offensive or
defensive weaponry programs.
The last and sixth issue relates to
member state negligence and the scarcity of funds. The BWC's ability to operate
has been impacted by financial difficulties brought on by persistent
non-payment and delayed contributions. Debt accumulation as of 2018 surpassed
$130,000, jeopardizing the convening of meetings and the Implementation Support
Unit (ISU).[17]
Therefore, the BWC has obvious flaws
even though it is a commendable attempt towards global disarmament. Its
efficacy is hampered by ambiguous definitions, the "dual-use
dilemma," the lack of a legally binding verification mechanism, articles
that contradict one another, hesitation in disclosing information, and
financial difficulties. For the BWC to effectively prevent the development and
use of biological weapons, these issues must be addressed.
Accusations of Non-Compliance
Since the Biological Weapons
Convention (BWC) was put into effect, there have been many claims of
non-compliance, which has resulted in notable cases that show the difficulties
in enforcing the Convention.[18] In the
1980 Sverdlovsk case, an anthrax outbreak connected to a Soviet facility led to
American accusations that the Soviet Union was engaged in an aggressive
biological weapons program.[19] The
Soviet account was initially dismissed despite extensive international
meetings, and Russian authorities did not acknowledge violating the BWC until
the Soviet Union's dissolution in 1992.
Based on the claimed use of
Trichothecene Mycotoxins, the Soviet Union was accused in the 1981 "Yellow
Rain" case of violating the BWC and the Geneva Protocol.[20] However,
because of discrepancies in laboratory results, the validity of the evidence
was called into doubt, and the case was viewed with suspicion.
In 1997, the United States faced
accusations of biological aggression from Cuba following the release of an
unidentified mist by a crop-spraying plane. Following investigations, most of
the States Parties rejected the claims because there was insufficient evidence
to substantiate Cuba's claims.[21]
Iraq was accused by the United States
and the United Kingdom in 2002 of not adhering to the BWC, stating that it had
a biological weapons program even though it had stopped in 1991. Suspicion
arose from Iraq's lack of cooperation and refusal to provide details, prompting
the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to act and pass resolutions
requesting greater transparency[22].
The fact that the BWC's complaint procedure
has never been used despite these instances indicates difficulties in
effectively enforcing the Convention's prohibitions against violations. These
incidents highlight the BWC's need for reforms and improvements to increase its
efficacy in accomplishing the objective of total disarmament.
IMPROVISATION OF THE BWC
To improve the effectiveness and
efficiency of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), several changes and
additions are suggested to address its shortcomings. One of the main obstacles
is the inability to distinguish between the benign and harmful uses of
biological agents or poisons. Establishing a verification mechanism akin to the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) can help resolve this ambiguity.[23] The
purpose of this agency would be to promote compliance and foster confidence
among member states by carrying out safeguard activities like report
verification, on-site inspections, and research nature monitoring.
The Canadian proposal of an
Accountability Framework brings attention to the accountability issue and
proposes holding yearly meetings at which State Parties report on their
activities related to biological research to promote consistency and openness.
Concerns about Articles 3 and 10's compatibility can be discussed concurrently
in these meetings, where major exchanges of biological research supplies,
tools, or poisons and agents are declared and supported by reports on their
nature and non-lethal applications.
It is advised to use
confidence-building measures (CBMs) to promote openness and the development of
trust. Prenotifications of biological equipment tests, cooperative training
programs, exchange initiatives for sharing research, and on-site visits are all
included in these measures.[24] The goal
of CBMs is to lessen mistrust among member states by differentiating between
routine developmental activities and possible threats.
The main objective of reducing the
use of biological weapons is found to be threatened by the convoluted complaint
process. A revised version of the IAEA's methodology is suggested as a solution
to this.The investigation of non-compliance matters would be handled by a new
representative body of state parties, which would then report violations to the
UN Security Council (UNSC). Notably, to preserve the idea of natural justice,
permanent UNSC members would relinquish their right to veto power on matters
about investigations.
One major concern is the lack of
specific penalties for violating the BWC. A different approach that is in line
with the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts calls for
reparations in the forms of restitution, compensation, and satisfaction. Issues
with financial sustainability that are frequently disregarded in BWC review
conferences need to be addressed immediately. Prompt payment of previously
assessed contributions, the establishment of a reserve fund funded by voluntary
contributions, a contingency fund, and careful budget planning that takes
arrears into account before electing citizens to office are some of the
measures.
To put it briefly, the changes that
have been suggested take a holistic approach that includes financial
sustainability measures, accountability frameworks, assurance-building steps,
updated complaint mechanisms, and verification mechanisms to enhance the BWC's
capacity to stop the spread of biological weapons.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, fortifying the Biological
Weapons Convention (BWC) requires a multifaceted approach. Establishing a
robust verification mechanism akin to the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) is pivotal for ensuring compliance, conducting on-site inspections, and
fostering confidence among member states. The proposed Accountability
Framework, involving annual meetings, enhances transparency in reporting
biological research actions, addressing concerns about Articles 3 and 10
compatibilities.
Confidence Building Measures (CBMs)
further contribute to transparency, distinguishing benign activities from potential
threats. Revamping the complaint mechanism by adopting an IAEA-inspired
representative body for non-compliance investigations, free from UNSC veto
constraints, strengthens the BWC's enforcement.
Addressing the lacuna of specified
punishments, the proposal suggests reparations aligned with international law.
Urgent attention to financial sustainability, with measures like prompt
contributions, contingency funds, and meticulous budget planning, ensures the
BWC's operational efficacy.
In essence, these proposed
enhancements navigate the complex landscape of biological weapons governance,
offering a comprehensive strategy to fortify the BWC's role in preventing the
development and use of biological weapons, fostering global security and
cooperation.
[1] Jing-Bao Nie, In the Shadow of Biological
Warfare: Conspiracy Theories on the Origins of COVID-19 and Enhancing Global
Governance of Biosafety as a Matter of Urgency, (NOV 26, 2023, 1:39 PM) https://doi.org/10.1007/s11673-020-10025-8.
[2] Samavi Srivastava and Rounak Doshi, THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION: LEGAL
LACUNAE AND THE WAY FORWARD IN LIGHT OF COVID-19, http://www.scconline.com.
[3] Jing-Bao Nie, In the Shadow of Biological
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Governance of Biosafety as a Matter of Urgency, (NOV 26, 2023, 3:56 PM) https://doi.org/10.1007/s11673-020-10025-8.
[4] Rogin, J. 2020. State Department cables
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[5] Myers, S.L. 2020. China spins tale that
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/world/asia/coronavirus-china-conspiracy-theory.html. (NOV 23, 2024, 11:45 PM)
[6] Rogin, J. 2020. State Department cables
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[9] Jing-Bao Nie, In the Shadow of Biological
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[10] Jenni Rissanen, The Biological Weapons
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[11]
Robert Lee Hotz, Anthrax Deaths Tied to Soviet Lab : Biological warfare
: Finding by U.S., Russian researchers
raises
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killed 68 people, the los angeles
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[12] Samavi Srivastava and Rounak Doshi, THE
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION: LEGAL LACUNAE AND THE WAY FORWARD IN LIGHT OF
COVID-19, (DEC 11, 2023, 1:56 PM)
[13] Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and
Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Art. 1 (1972), 1015 U.N.T.S. 163.
[15] Convention on the Prohibition of the
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Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Art. 1 (1972), 1015 U.N.T.S. 163.
[16] Samavi Srivastava and Rounak Doshi, THE
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COVID-19, (DEC 19, 2023, 2:00 PM)
[17]U.N. BWC, Elements of a Decision on
Measures to address the Financial Predictability and Sustainability of the
Convention, U.N. Doc. BWC/MSP/2018/CRP. 1 (DEC 22, 2023, 11:00 AM).
[18]
Robert Lee Hotz, Anthrax Deaths Tied to Soviet Lab : Biological warfare
: Finding by U.S., Russian researchers
raises
possibility that international treaty was broken in 1979 outbreak that killed
68 people, the los angeles
times, (DEC
22, 2023, 11:30 AM), https :
//www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1994-11-18-mn-64333-
story.html.
[19] Keeping an eye on Russia, the new york
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keeping-an-eye-on-russia.html.
[20] Samavi Srivastava and Rounak Doshi, THE
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION: LEGAL LACUNAE AND THE WAY FORWARD IN LIGHT OF
COVID-19, (DEC 23, 2023, 12:40 PM)
[21] Jenni Rissanen, The Biological Weapons
Convention, nuclear threat initiative (DEC 24, 2023, 09:00 AM),
https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/biological-weapons-convention/.
[22] John Pike, Biological Weapons Program:
History, webmaster (DEC 24, 2023, 11:00 AM),
https://fas.org/nuke/guide/iraq/bw/program.htm.
[23] IAEA Safeguards Overview : Comprehensive
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Article Information
SILHOUETTE OF BIOLOGICAL WARFARE CONVENTION: LEGAL PAUCITY AND DIFFERENT ASPECTS IN THE LIGHT OF COVID-19
Authors: PRAGATI SHREYA
- Journal IJLRA
- ISSN 2582-6433
- Published 2024/01/30
- Issue 7
About Journal
International Journal for Legal Research and Analysis
- Abbreviation IJLRA
- ISSN 2582-6433
- Access Open Access
- License CC 4.0
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