Open Access Research Article
PEACE KEEPING OPERATIONS: A COMAPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE BETWEEN AFRICAN UNION AND UNITED NATIONS
Published Paper
Article Details
PEACE KEEPING OPERATIONS: A
COMAPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE BETWEEN AFRICAN UNION AND UNITED NATIONS
AUTHORED BY
- ANWESHA PATI
Abstract
Peacekeeping operations are a viable
mechanism to counter instability and establish peace and security in nations
ravaged by war and internal conflict. However such operations are never an easy
task to accomplish as they are dependent on a multitude of factors like a
strong mandate, adequate resources, proper funding and effective coordination
between nations. Although the United Nations has always been the torchbearer
for such operations, its stint in the African continent has been more of a
failure than success – partly because of the regional factors at play.
Fortunately these debacles have paved the way for a new partnership between the
UN and African Union, where both the organizations are jointly involved in
restoring international peace and security. It has also become clear that
regional bodies are more adept in handling their internal conflicts, but at the
same time plagued by their own shortcomings. This article analyses the nature
of peacekeeping operations under the UN and AU. It sheds light on the
challenges that affect the effective implementation of such operations and
finally discussing what should be the way forward in making these peace keeping
operations a success and helping the AU emerge as a key player in the resolving
regional disputes.
I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of peacekeeping has been
a mechanism for the United Nations to maintain international peace and security
for years since its establishment, although it does not have a direct mention
in the Charter. Peacekeeping operations( herein after PKOs) have been defined
as “the coordinated presence of military, police and civilian personnel
responsible for a wider range of task such as humanitarian assistance,
policing, human rights and electoral monitoring, social and economic
rehabilitation and reconstruction.”[1]In
the beginning, peacekeeping operations followed a traditional model which
involved deploying of military forces in conflict- torn countries tasked to
bring about a ceasefire and enable the culmination of a settlement between the
warring parties. The United Nations paper on Peacekeeping Operations Guidelines
and Principles states that the main objectives of such operations was –
a)
Observation,
monitoring and reporting – using static posts, patrols, over- flights or other
technical means, with the agreement of the parties[2]
b)
Supervision
of ceasefire and support to verification mechanisms[3]
c)
Interposition
as buffer and confidence- building mechanism.[4]
These supervision tasks were carried
out to observe at the ground level that the cease fire is respected and
strictly adhered to, which would in turn ensure that the warring parties did
not get involved in further conflict. However gradually after the Cold War
these peacekeeping operations have evolved considerably and taken the shape of
multidimensional peacekeeping wherein military forces are greatly involved in
bringing about lasting peace in countries facing violent internal armed
conflict and to stabilise the situation. Multidimensional peacekeeping involves
- (a) creating a secure and stable environment while strengthening the state’s
ability to provide security[5] (b) facilitating the political process by
promoting dialogue and reconciliation and supporting the establishment of
legitimate and effective institution of governance[6]
(c) providing a framework for ensuring that all United Nations and other
international actors pursue their activities at the country level in a coherent
and coordinated manner.[7]
Multidimensional peacekeeping is
particularly more difficult than the traditional model because it not only
caters to observation and supervision but also entails the successful
establishment of a legitimate government which can take over the administration
of the country. In most situations where such operations are deployed, there
are cases of displacement, human rights violations, discrimination on the
grounds of religion, ethnicity. Hence such operations are tasked with the
responsibility to provide assistance to the various organisations working side
by side the United Nations in establishing peace in such countries and also the
bodies at the national level, help in rebuilding the infrastructure for
governance and protect the rights and interests of the people. In doing so, the
peace keeping operations are given the power to assume the governance of the
country temporarily, until a stable administrative framework is established
which can take over the governance. In addition, as the chief sufferers of such
conflicts are mainly civilians, peacekeeping operations have to devolve a
strategic agenda between the military, police and the other organisations
involved in such operations so as to resolve conflict and at the same time
enable the rehabilitation of civilians into their normal life.
II. THE NATURE OF UN PKOs
The legitimacy of peace keeping
operations under the United Nations can be found under Chapter VI of the UN
Charter. The troops for such operation are deployed after the Security Council
has adopted a resolution to that effect and the budget for the PKO is
sanctioned by the UN General Assembly. These PKOs are built on the principle of
trinity:
1. Consent of
the parties to the conflict
2. Impartiality
3. Non- use of
force except in defence.
Consent means that the parties to the
conflict agree to the presence of troops to give effect to the peacekeeping
operations and help them achieve stability. This is necessary because lack of
consent can end up defeating the purpose for which the PKO was deployed and the
PKO can itself become embroiled with parties which can lead to use of
enforcement action.[8] Further,
it is also important that the consent of the parties is present throughout the
peace keeping operation and any revocation of such consent is again likely to
jeopardise the main objective of the mandate.[9]
For this reason, it is important to gain the trust of the local population and
“have a thorough understanding of the history and prevailing customs and
culture as well as the capacity to assess the evolving interests and motivation
of the parties.”[10]Sometimes
it may happen that consent for peacekeeping is not given freely or involves
subjugating to pressure at the international level, in such cases there is a
clear possibility of withdrawal of consent later on. Also it may happen that
lack of unity among the main parties to the conflict due to their internal
differences or presence of belligerent groups makes the consensual process more
difficult. Thus a peacekeeping operation must have the adequate resources to
ensure that consent is maintained and try to mitigate situations which may
arise in the course so that mandate can be fulfilled.
The second aspect of a PKO involves
impartiality. Impartiality means that the peace keepers should treat both the
parties to the conflict with equality and without bias. It has always been
emphasized that the term impartiality should not be confused with neutrality.[11]
Impartiality does not mean that any action that is contrary to the objectives
of the mandate shall be allowed and peace keepers should not stop themselves
from taking measures against those that try to violate the cause of the
mandate. Also in the process of maintaining impartiality care should be taken
to ensure that even if any action is taken for violation of the mandate, such
action should entail transparency and the basis for such action should be
explained. This will help reduce any kind of misunderstanding that may arise
which can in turn effect the consent of the parties.
Lastly, peace keeping should be
without use of force. However it allows use of force for defence purposes or in
situations where it is evident that the mandate will be vitiated due to the
activities of various armed groups who often operate to impede the peace
keeping process.[12] The use
of force can be applied only when it is authorized by the Security Council. The
Security Council calls for the use of “robust mandate” and the “use of all
necessary means” in order to combat a violent situation and to provide
protection to civilians.[13]
However such use of force should be made only in situations of urgency, where
other methods of suppressing the conflict have failed. Also while exercising
such force it is very important that it is reasonable and not in excess of what
is required so as to ensure that the consent of the parties remain uniform. Further
the use of force must always be made after good amount of deliberations because
it has a multidimensional impact on the mission.
III.
PEACEKEEPING
UNDER THE AFRICAN UNION
The Organisation of African Unity was
established in 1963 which conducted small scale peacekeeping due to inadequate
institutional capacity and the failure of the UN in combating the situation in
Rwanda necessitated that a robust organisational structure should be built
which can solve that problems of the African continent. Thus the African Unity
was born in 2002. The African Peace and Security Architecture was envisaged as
a mechanism to deal with the various ongoing conflicts in different parts of
the continent. The APSA consists of five organs namely the Peace and Security Council
(PSC), the Panel of the Wise, The Continental Early Warning System, The African
Stand by Force and the Peace Fund.
The PSC is the main
decision making body with regard to the peacekeeping operations and is assisted
by the other organs. It consists of 15 members who are elected on regional
basis by the AU Executive Council.[14]
The PSC is responsible for “mounting and deployment of peace support operations
and undertake preventive measures and support peace building and peace –making
activities.”[15]The Continental
Early Warning System has the task of observing and analysing situations to
determine the possibility of future conflicts and reporting the same to the
Africa Commission. It has a Situation Room which acts as a centre for
monitoring and relevant information gathered is communicated to the UN ad other
international organisations and the PSC to contemplate the recourse to be taken
to prevent conflict. The Panel of the Wise consists of 5 members who are “highly
respected African personalities from various segments of society who have made
outstanding contributions to the cause of peace, security and development on
the continent” with a task “to support the efforts of the Peace and Security
Council and those of the Chairperson of the Commission, particularly in the
area of conflict prevention.”[16]The
African Stand by Force is given the task of carrying out the operations of the
peacekeeping as stipulated by the PSC. Article 11 of the African Constitutive
Act from which the AU and its organs derive their power, states that “such
force shall be composed of standby multidisciplinary contingents, with civilian
and military components in their countries of origin and ready for rapid
deployment at appropriate notice. For that purpose, the Member States shall
take steps to establish standby contingents for participation in peace support
missions decided on by the Peace and Security Council or intervention
authorized by the Assembly.”[17]
Lastly, the Peace Fund as is evident from the name, has been designed to
provide necessary financial support to the peacekeeping operations. In addition
to this, there are several regional economic communities and mechanisms who are
involved in assisting the PSC in achieving its mandate.
IV.
AN ANALYSIS
OF AFRICAN UNION- LED PKOs
One of the first peacekeeping
missions embarked upon by the AU was in Burundi where there had been a long
standing dispute between the majority Hutu population and the minority
population of the Tutsis. The failure of the Arusha Accord to bring about peace
in the region triggered the AU to launch a peacekeeping operation which
involved “protection, demobilization, reintegration of combatants.”[18]
The operations in Burundi have been considered to be one of the biggest
successes of the AU. AU troops played a significant role in stabilizing the
situation, providing a safe environment for return of expatriate leaders who
could take part in the establishment of new government and ensuring that
ceasefire was brought about which would be adhered to. Even though the AU mission
in Burundi is lauded for its success, it also helped in gathering experiences
about the problems that the AU has to struggle through like delay in decision
making regarding deployment of troops, lack of essential medicines and food and
also the poor administrative capabilities of the AU which impacted the mission
to a large extent.
The Democratic Republic
Congo has been at the heart of conflict for a long time with dispute mainly
between the government and the rebel groups which had ended up dragging the
neighbouring countries like Uganda, Rwanda, Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe into
their matters.[19] Thus in
order to achieve a resolution of these conflicts the Lushaka Agreement was
signed. This ensured that armed forces from these neighbouring countries receded
making way for the UN peacekeepers to take over the operations of establishing
ceasefire and ultimately promoting peace. The objectives of the UN mission in
DRC was mainly to observe that the Lushaka Agreement was given effect and to take
action for any act that was contrary to the provisions of the Agreement, to
make the situations conducive for the conduct of transitional elections and
also “to facilitate the process of disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation,
resettlement and reintegration (DDRRR) of armed militants.”[20]The
role of the AU in assisting the UN in achieving its mandate is commendable. The
efforts of AU to bring the countries together and using its negotiation skills
to reach an agreement between the parties has helped immensely in restoring
their trust and confidence and establish peace.
However the AU’s mission
in Darfur and Somalia has not proved to be fruitful to a large extent as these
countries continue to be entrapped in civil war. Since the Cold War, Somalia
remains deeply involved in conflict and even though substantial efforts have
been made both by the UN and AU alike, the situation has not improved.
Peacekeeping missions in Somalia began in 1992 under the auspices of the UN.
But it was forced to abandon the mission as it became uncontrollable. A second
attempt was made by the AU forces to drive out the Islamic Courts Union, a
militant group who are primarily responsible for all the conflict in Somalia.[21]
However till date the militant groups continue to operate and have not been
completely eradicated. There is no certainty as to when the situations would
stabilize and until then AU forces must be present to ensure safety and
security of the civilians.
V. LIMITATIONS OF PKOs
Scholars have tried to discern the
causes of success and failure of the UN peacekeeping operations and there is
difference of opinion amongst them. By evaluating a number of peacekeeping
operations, they have been able to identify certain common factors which account
for the failure of such PKOs. Some of them are at the operational level and
some at the strategic level.[22]
Factors like delay in the deployment of troops, inefficiency of the mandates,
withdrawal of troop contributing countries, failure to manage the conflict at
the root level seriously affects the efficacy of such operations. One of the
most commonly cited factors for failure of PKOs is the delay in deployment of
troops. For example, the conflict in Somalia which began in 1991, the UN had
sanctioned a mandate to put into action a ceasefire in April 1992, but the
troop deployment began not until August. Hence there can be seen a gross
inadequacy in terms of the countries who are mainly responsible for contributing
their troops to counter the immediateness of the situation.[23]
This particularly puts the mandate at stake because more the delay in
deployment of troops, the more time the belligerents get to escalate the
conflict. Sometimes it can have a snowballing effect on the conflict leading to
a larger conflagration. The reason for delay is often placed on the slothful
bureaucratic procedures which slow down deployment. Hence it is important that
deployments should take place with immediate effect without the hesitation and
diplomacy of the troop contributing countries who are often engrossed on
determining what would serve their best interests.
Sometimes a weak mandate also leads
to failure of the PKOs. A strong mandate is supposed to achieve the necessary
ceasefire and establish peace between the conflicting parties. But a mandate
which is weak makes such goals unachievable because it lacks the proper
sanctions to enable the troops to manage the situation at the ground level.
Hence proper care must be taken to ensure that a mandate which is robust enough
to tackle the conflict is designed, otherwise it can vitiate the objective of
the PKO. It is required that the mandate must clearly spell out the powers to
be exercised by the troops and other authorities who are to remain involved in
the peacekeeping so that there cannot be any room for discrepancy or
arbitrariness.
Shortage of sufficient manpower to
carry forward the mandate is also one of the reasons for failure of the PKOs.
An analysis of a number of peacekeeping operations have demonstrated that
despite the mandate having provisions of deploying certain number of troops to
the conflict torn country, the actual number is significantly less thus
accounting for the inadequacy to give full effect to the objectives of the
mandate. Often the shortage in the manpower leads to non-fulfilment of the
mandate like assisting the local administration with the governance,
maintaining the ceasefire, catering to the interests of the civilians,
demobilizing the belligerent groups and seizing the weapons. The tendency of the
belligerent groups to back out from the peace accords is also one the cause for
the peacekeeping operations failing to achieve success. As is evident that
establishing a ceasefire through negotiations between the conflicting groups
and making sure that the peace is observed is a potentially difficult task.
Thus these belligerent groups often violate the provisions of the accord or
give effect to only a part of it which impairs the peacekeeping and ultimately
leads to withdrawal of the troops, which deteriorates the situation as the
local population is left to struggle with the chaotic state the country is
pushed into.
Failure to determine the cause of the
conflict which is at the root is also one of the major causes which effect a
peacekeeping operation.[24]
It is very necessary to analyse the reason for all the conflict and this
involves looking more deeply into the actual causes, which are present at the
subterranean level. A superficial determination of the causes often leads to
dissatisfaction of the conflicting parties as it never results in satisfying
the interests of both parties. Most of the times the causes are mainly
religious factors, ethnical, cultural, longstanding boundary or land disputes.
In addition to understanding the cause of the conflict it is equally important
that steps to solve the conflict is taken or at least the mandate should have
provisions to address the problem. Closely related to this issue is the problem
that the troops who are involved with the peacekeeping operations have very
little knowledge of the distinct culture and traditions of the African people
which is fiercely guarded by them. An insensitive attitude to their culture
only makes them more hostile towards these personnel. So it is very important
the troops who are supposed to work at the ground level are prepped with
adequate information about the sentimentalities of the population which help
them to establish trust amongst the people which in turn will help in acquiring
their cooperation. Lastly the reluctance of the developed countries in
providing troops for the peacekeeping operations to some extent affects the
mandate.[25] In
several peacekeeping operations when the TCCs see that there is a threat to
their personnel or they have faced attack from the belligerent groups, they are
likely to withdraw their forces which creates a setback to the operation.[26]
The African Union has
been successful in bringing about peace in a number of operations undertaken by
it. In many cases it has paved the way for establishing peace in many regions
of Africa enabling the UN to take over these operations where the initial
negotiations and ceasefire is brought about with the help of AU. However the AU suffers from a number of
shortcomings too. The most predominant issue with the AU has been its financial
instability. There is a serious dearth of funding from its member states which
makes it extremely challenging for the AU to carry the operations effectively.
The AU for these reasons has to heavily depend on the international community
for the necessary financial support.[27]
This drawback has the potential to affect the autonomy of the organisation as
being financially dependent on other international organisation is likely that
the AU will have difficulty in exercising its powers and functions
independently in matters of strategy and the actual operation of these
missions. Thus it will be likely that due to improper planning and a tug of war
between the organisations regarding decision making related to the operations,
there will be an impact on the mandate. Another major issue is that a majority
of the African nations are embroiled in war against each other which gives them
very little scope to contribute in the peace making process. According to Issac
Albert- “African Union will find it difficult to implement its peace programmes
because African leaders are involved in the sponsoring of rebel activities
against neighbour states.”[28]
The persistent rivalry between the states itself is a blotch on the African
community as it can never focus on making efforts to resolve the conflict, they
are always busy pitting one against the other. One such example is the
accusations brought up by Chad against Sudan that it has been harbouring
militias and was helping them to disrupt the governance in their country.
Similarly Sudan has also claimed that Chad has been using its territory to build
an army with the intention to overthrow the government and cripple it. The
Human Rights Watch has reported that close to 4,700 boys have been abducted from
the refugee camps under United Nations in Chad by the Sudanese Liberation Army
to be employed in the rebel groups who are working against the Chadian
government.[29] It is also
reported that Sudan has time and again supported the Chadian rebel groups in overthrowing
the government.[30]Despite
peace accords being signed between the countries that there shall be no
interference in the internal affairs, they have openly violated them and refused
to comply with the provisions thereby making peace keeping a distant reality.
Another issue that is
questioned is the efficacy of the PSC in handling the peacekeeping operations.
The complicated nature of the peace and security architecture is highly
criticised by the fact that a continent which is ravaged by poverty should have
gone for a simpler setup for the organisation. A part of the inefficiency of
the AU arises from its offices which are still in the developmental stages and
do not have operational means to ensure that peacekeeping is effectively
carried out.
VI.
NECESSARY
REFORMS
In the wake of the problems faced by
the AU while conducting the peacekeeping operations it is necessary to bring
strategic changes in the way it functions and conducts the PKOs. It is
important that the AU must upgrade its peace and security architecture which
will help in better implementation of the mandate. Not only that, the AU must
collect the past experiences from the various peacekeeping operations conducted
by it and reassess its policy framework and at the same time its working which
will enable it to successfully carry out peacekeeping. It is equally important
that the complex relationship between the Regional Economic Communities (REC)
and the AU must be revisited to ensure clarity.[31]
This is particularly required in light of the fact that the subsidiary regional
building block may not be the effective method to establish peace and security
under every circumstances because each case of conflict requires a kind of
approach that is suitable to that purpose.[32]Often
situations arise where the conflict has erupted on the border of two states and
it becomes difficult for the REC to supplant the situation as the key
stakeholders involved in the dispute are not party to the REC. In such situations
it is incumbent upon the AU to step up and bring the matter under control.
Therefore, it will be highly effective if the relationship shared between the
AU and the REC is revised and to come up with a solid scheme where these two
institutions can work hand in hand, as joint venture maintaining a synchrony in
their working which will ultimately lead to better conflict management. Another
important reform that the AU must focus is building its financial capacity. As
it has been elaborated earlier, the AU suffers from serious financial crisis
due to the member states not meeting their regular contributions to the
institution. This requires that a robust mechanism to ensure that the member
states fulfil their financial obligations should be built so that AU does not
have to depend on the international community for its resources as this is
likely to affect its autonomy in decision making. Further depending on other
institutions for shouldering financial incapacity also entails that
negotiations and deliberations need to be made a priori.[33] Hence
only those organisations would extend their support where they find their
interests are being served. In order to tackle this situation it should be
necessary that the member states of the AU take their responsibilities
seriously and contribute to the budget which will enable the AU to function
more efficiently and at the same time it can be a partner at the global level
in combating conflict.
The African continent has been a
quagmire of various global issues like counterinsurgency, terrorism,
transnational organised crimes,[34]
exploitation of mineral resources by multinational companies[35]
etc. The strategic relationship between the UN and AU has proved to be
immensely fruitful in resolving such conflicts. The UN has to a great extent
helped the AU in overcoming its shortcomings by assisting it in peacekeeping
through financial and operational support. A close analysis of the operations
undertaken shows that the UN strategy is more suited and useful in strategizing
the mandate whereas the AU is more suited to bring about the ceasefire and
enforcement.[36] Thus
both the organisations are capable of overcoming each other’s flaw. This calls
for a synergy between their strategies so that lasting peace can be established
in these conflict torn countries. Hence the need of the hour is to design a
framework to govern the relationship between the UN and AU so as to achieve the
highest form of coordination and cooperation. It is required that each step of
the strategy is clearly laid out and the functions of both UN and AU are
assessed at the operational and
strategic level by holding periodic meetings, discussing the guidelines, making
assessments, developing goals to be achieved by each of them. Also it is
important the specific approach to the transition period where AU forces
withdraw and the mission is handed over to the UN troops must be developed in a
systematic manner.
VII. CONCLUSION
After the rechristening of the OAU to
AU, there can be seen a remarkable progress in its working and it is emerging
as an effective organisation to resolve regional conflicts at the global level.
The AU peacekeeping operations have been crucial since it acts as an enabler
where the international community is made aware of the problems that are
ensuing in the African Continent. Statistics show that the AU has emerged as
one of the chief contributors of troops in various peacekeeping operations
undertaken by the UN. As far as its shortcomings are concerned which mainly
involves shortage of staff and ineffective planning, these issues can be
overcome by carrying forward the partnership with the UN. The AU has become
UN’s preferred partner in settling disputes at the regional level and with the
progress of time it has to capacity emerge as an independent organisation to
further international peace and security.
[1] Solomn Agada, The Challenges of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in Africa: A
Case study of Somalia(2008), https://media.peaceopstraining.org/thesis/agada.pdf&vex.
[2] . United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines
(2008) https://peacekeeping.in.org/en/what-is-peacekeeping.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Supra note 2.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Supra note 2.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Research Report Working Together
for Peace and Security in Africa(2011), https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/research-report/lookup-c-glkwlemtisg-b-6769467.php.
[15] Africa’s Role in Nation- Building
– An Examination of African led Peace Operations (2019), https://www.rand.org>pubsPDF.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Professor Chika Njideka Oguonu, African
Union and Conflict Resolution in Africa, 5:27 MEDITERRANEAN JOURNAL OF
SOCIAL SCIENCE, 325(2014).
[19]Ibid.
[20] Ogunrotifa Ayodeji Bayo, The Factors Behind Successes and Failures of
United Nations Peacekeeping Missions: A Case of the Democratic Republic of
Congo, 3:4 JOURNAL OF ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES IN SOCIAL SCIENCES,
914(2012).
[21] Supra note 15.
[22] A.K. Bardalai , United
Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Causes for Failure and Continuing Relevance, 12:4 JOURNAL OF DEFENCE
STUDIES, 5(2018)
[23]Ibid.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Arinze Ngwube, The African union and its Conflict
Resolution Apparatus, 2:8 ARABIAN JOURNAL OF BUSINESS AND MANAGEMENT REVIEW,
33(2013).
[28] Isaac Albert, The
Africa Union and Conflict Management, XXX11 (1) COUNCIL FOR THE DEVELOPMENT
FOR SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH IN AFRICA, 57 (2007).
[29] Ibid.
[30] Ibid.
[31]C. De Coning & M Peter, United Nations Peace Operations in a
Changing Global Order, 213-229, 2018.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Supra note 31.
[35] Ibid.
Article Information
PEACE KEEPING OPERATIONS: A COMAPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE BETWEEN AFRICAN UNION AND UNITED NATIONS
Authors: ANWESHA PATI
- Journal IJLRA
- ISSN 2582-6433
- Published 2024/01/23
- Issue 7
About Journal
International Journal for Legal Research and Analysis
- Abbreviation IJLRA
- ISSN 2582-6433
- Access Open Access
- License CC 4.0
All research articles published in International Journal for Legal Research and Analysis are open access and available to read, download and share, subject to proper citation of the original work.
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of International Journal for Legal Research and Analysis.