Published Paper
Article Details
INTRISTIC AIDS IN US LAW
AUTHORED BY - TEJAS SINGH
BA LLB (HONS) : Bennett Law School.
LLM (CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAWS):
WBNUJS.
CO-AUTHOR - EDWIN LEPCHA
BA LLB (HONS): National Law
University, Odisha.
LLM (CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAWS):
WBNUJS.
Abstract
Legislative intent can often be
difficult to ascertain from a section's literal meaning, which can put the
judiciary in a challenging position. The internal assistance listed in the Act
take effect at these points. By interpreting the lawmakers' intentions when
they crafted the statute, these tools help the courts understand the true
intent of the law and guarantee that it is applied correctly.
The many types of internal aids have
been studied through case law, with a focus on both their advantages and disadvantages.
It is important to remember that although internal aids are heavily employed in
the interpretation of statutes, the enacting provision would supersede the
former in the event of a conflict. Internal aides do not conflict with the
enacting clause; rather, they are meant to augment it. In the event of a
contradiction, we assume that the enacting clause's literal meaning will
prevail over the others.
Introduction
A statute consists of several parts
including short title, long title, marginal notes, preamble, headings,
punctuations, definitions, provisos, illustrations, exceptions, saving clauses,
explanations and schedules and the list goes on to include every other part of
a statute which assists Courts in interpretation of that particular statute
understanding the intention of the lawmaker.[1]
We often refer to words, phrases,
clauses, provisos and sections and every other part of the statute in order to
get the context or reference of the statute. The Court while interpreting a
statute cannot separate words and give them abstract meaning. In fact it is
crucial that every part of the statute is considered together and the statute
as a whole is given meaning. Some of the distinct US cases have highlighted the
significance of context like in a particular case, the Court in the light of
context of the law found that an employee could not have his pay certified
within the amount sanctioned by the Board of Estimate in the City Budget.[2]
Furthermore, a preamble can be used
for further assistance for interpretation of a statute. A preamble comes in
handy whenever there is confusion with regards to the construction of the body
of statute considering that the preamble usually acts as the Statement of
Purpose of the lawmakers describing the purpose for enactment of the particular
provision.[3]
Similarly, title, chapter, marginal
notes, section headings are used for interpretation of a statute when there is
ambiguity on the language of the enacting clause. Additionally, legislative
definitions aid in the interpretation of statutes but it is also pertinent to
note that the mere legislative definition cannot override the effect of the
entire statute read together in its entirety if both seem to be contradictory
to each other.[4] The
significance of the different parts of a statute has been explained further
through case laws in this research paper.
Use of Context as an Internal Aid to Interpret
Statutes
The phrases, words, clauses,
sub-sections, provisos and every other part of a statute must be interpreted
with reference to context. This implies that Courts while interpreting a
particular statute cannot just isolate words and give them an abstract meaning
or consider a part of the statute separately. It would be imperative for Courts
to consider every part of the statute together and read it as a whole. We can
understand the importance of taking context of the statute through the following
cases.
In the fascinating case of Raynor
v United States,[5] the
history and legislative intent is taken into consideration in order to get a
context. This case runs back to 1936 when the respondents were found in
possession of a paper similar to the distinctive paper adopted by the Secretary
of the Treasury in the year 1928 for carrying out obligations and securities of
the United States. The paper possessed by the respondents was practically of
the same color, thickness, weight and appearance as that of the distinctive
Government paper and was cut to the dimensions of $20 Government obligations.
Though the paper possessed by the respondents rattled like genuine money, it
did not have red and blue silk fibers throughout.
The respondents had been convicted by
the Federal
District Court of US under section 150 of the Criminal Code
which states that “whoever
shall have or retain in his control or possession, after a distinctive paper
has been adopted by the Secretary of the Treasury for the obligations and other
securities of the United States, any similar paper adapted to the making of any
such obligation or other security, except under the authority of the Secretary
of the Treasury or some other proper officer of the United States, shall be
fined not more than $5,000, or imprisoned not more than fifteen years, or both”.
The case however went in appeal
before the Circuit Court of Appeals which reversed the decision of the
District Court upholding that the Criminal Code did not intended to prohibit
the possession of only the distinctive paper and no other paper even if it
resembled the distinctive paper and was well-suited for the purpose of
counterfeiting. The matter has now come up before the Supreme Court and waits
the decision of the highest court of appeal.
The Court delved into the history and
evolution of the Act to understand the legislative intent and get a context on
the same. The Act under which the respondents were convicted stretches way back
to 1837 when the Congress authorized issue of unprecedented amount of treasury
notes to combat the conditions of unemployment and business distress and made
it a criminal offense to make and pass counterfeit money. The original Act also
prohibited the possession of ‘similar’ paper which was either to be forged or
counterfeited. These provisions of the Act were re-enacted later in years in
1847, 1857, 1860, 1861 and 1862 and so on. The Congress later even devised
special funds to detect and punish people guilty of counterfeiting and in 1864
it struck down the part of ‘intent’ from the provision making mere unauthorized
possession of imitation paper a crime. The Apex Court thus failed to find
anything to affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals considering the
legislature always intended to penalize counterfeiting.
The phrase “similar paper adapted to
making such obligations” was interpreted by the Court as any paper suitable for
counterfeiting as “similar” in this context implies ‘somewhat like’ and not
exactly the same thus ruling out the conclusion of the Circuit Court of Appeal
which restricted the prohibition only to distinctive paper.
The Supreme Court further went on to
find out the context of “obligations” as mentioned in the
provision and stated that in this case “obligations” does not just mean
“genuine obligations” but appears relating to offenses against currency which
can be often referred to as “counterfeit” or “spurious” obligations.
Court thereafter, taking into account
the context of the provision pronounced that in this case the similar paper in
possession of the respondents could not be used to cater to the genuine
Government obligations and that the phrase “similar paper adapted to making
government obligations” very clearly refers to counterfeiting. Thus the
decision of the Circuit Court of Appeal was reversed and the conviction of the
respondents was yet again upheld by the Supreme Court. This case thus
highlights the importance of context and how the same can be used to reach
crucial decisions.
In yet another case of Dyer
v Dyer[6] emphasis
was laid on the pertinence of ‘context’ for interpretation of statutes. The
current case relates to the context of the word “alimony” used in the proviso.
The substantial facts of the case are that the plaintiff and defendant were a
married couple who resided in North Carolina. However, after differences arose,
the plaintiff instituted an action against the defendant in 1934 for payment of
reasonable subsistence and counsel fees under section 1667 of the Consolidated
Statutes.
The proviso of the particular
provision states “Provided,
that in all applications for alimony under
this section it shall be competent for the husband to plead adultery of the
wife, . . . and the issue be found against her by the judge, he shall make no
order allowing her any sum whatever as alimony
. . .”
Clement,
Judge of the Superior Court ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff $75 per
month for reasonable subsistence. However, the defendant willfully on several
occasions disobeyed the order of the Court and refused the pay up the amount
owing to which he was charged with contempt. The defendant was later given a
chance to absolve himself from the liability by making payments to the
plaintiff in arrears. In 1936, the defendant appealed for a modification in the
order of 1934 pleading the Court to decrease the amount to be paid. Honorable
Judge Rousseau refused to make any amends following which the defendant refused
to comply with the provisions and stopped payments for the months of April, May
and June of 1937. He then instituted a suit of divorce against the plaintiff
while she was in Kentucky on the ground of separation for two years.
The
suit instituted by the defendant for absolute divorce was not entertained by
the Court and the Court relying on the judgement of April 1934 instead ordered
to keep him in custody for non-compliance with the judgement. The main bone of
contention before the Court was that though the ground sought for divorce was
valid, would it acquit him of the charge of contempt of Court for not paying
subsistence to his wife?
The
Court relying on section 1663 of the Consolidated Statutes which states that “A
decree for absolute divorce upon the ground of separation for ten successive
years as provided in C. S., 1659, shall not impair or destroy the right of the
wife to receive alimony under any judgment or decree of the court rendered
before the commencement of the proceeding for absolute divorce" pronounced
that the defendant would be liable to pay the amount of alimony and non-payment
of the same would lead to contempt of Court. The period of 10 years mentioned
in section 1663 was reduced to 2 years of separation in the landmark judgement
of Howell v Howell.[7]
The
defendant contended that the word “alimony” used in Section 1663 had a narrow
technical meaning which confines the provisions from being applied to
judgements in actions brought by the plaintiff i.e. under section 1667. The
Court in response interpreted the term “alimony” as maintenance for means of
living or for support out of the income of the husband. In other words, it
refers to an allowance received by a wife after divorce or separation in order
to sustain herself. The Court thus citing the Webster’s New International
Dictionary and Chapter 193 of the Public Laws 1871-72 reached the conclusion
that the word “alimony” used had a much broader meaning as opposed to a narrow
or technical meaning as claimed by the defendant imposing an obligation on the
defendant to pay the subsistence considering that the provision of section 1663
would cover even judgements passed under section 1667. The importance of
context of the word is once again realized in this case.
Use of
Provisos as Internal Aid for Interpretation of Statutes
A
proviso is a clause that introduces a condition by the word “provided” which
puts forth an exception to what the provision says in general. Provisos play an equally important role in
interpretation of statutes as they have the potential of overturning the
meaning of the words written in a provision. This can be explained through the
case of Pennington v United States[8].
The
petitioner in this case was a Brigadier General who was in service of the
American military from 1855 to 1899. The Treasury Department accounted the
petitioner’s salary for the entire period of the petitioner’s service except
for his service as a cadet. The Treasury Department also did not count the
additional ration as should have been provided as per section 1262 of the
Revised Statutes of 1838.
The
petitioner thus claimed for the longevity pay and the additional rations on
account of his service as a cadet in the US Military Academy and also used
the instance of a similar case where the US Supreme Court had directed payment
of arrears and additional ration to the petitioner. The Auditor of the War
Department and the Second Auditor in office however refused to look into his
claims and did not bother to look into the case referred to by the petitioner.
The
petitioner furthermore relied on the proviso of a provision of the Sundry
Civil Appropriation Act which stated “Back pay and bounty: For payment of amounts for
arrears of pay of two and three-year volunteers, for bounty to volunteers and
their widows and legal heirs, for bounty under the act of July twenty-eighth,
eighteen hundred and sixty-six, and for amounts for commutation of rations to
prisoners of war in rebel States, and to soldiers on furlough, that may be
certified to be due by the accounting officers of the Treasury during the
fiscal year nineteen hundred and eight, $200,000; Provided, That in all- cases
hereafter so certified the said accounting officers shall, in stating balances,
follow the decisions of the United States Supreme Court or of the Court of
Claims of the United States after the time for appeal has expired, if no appeal
be taken, without regard to former settlements or adjudications by their
predecessors.”
The proviso thus makes it
sufficiently clear that decisions of US Courts can be relied upon to
substantiate cases. The Supreme Court examining the proviso held that cadet
service should be included in term of service considering that the proviso of
the Appropriations Statute functioned as an independent and permanent
legislative enactment applicable to “all cases”. This case thus draws our
attention towards the pertinence of a proviso which helped a military officer
obtain the amount he was entitled to.
Use of
Preamble as an internal aid for interpretation of statutes
The
Preamble is said to play a very important role in case of uncertainty or
ambiguity in the meaning if the statute. However it is pertinent to note that
in case the body of the statute is clear and explicit, its meaning cannot be
affected by the preamble. In some cases there is no better source than the
preamble itself when it comes to ascertainment of the intention of the
legislature. The preamble does not form an essential part of the statute which
is why it cannot be referred to in order to increase the scope of the statute
if its wordings are clear enough. This point pertaining to limitations of a
preamble can be explained through the case of Neumann v City of New York[9].
Here, a petition was filed for the appointment of commissioners in order to
open a street to the ocean considering that the high water-mark of the ocean
had gone several feet south of the southerly street as portrayed in the
commissioner’s map. Opening a street to the ocean had become necessary
considering the shifting nature of the high-water line of land fronting the
ocean. The Legislature in 1869 passed an act for appointment of commissioners
for the purpose of laying out a plan for road and streets in the King’s
Country.
Further,
in 1874 the official map of the streets was filed which showed that the Twenty
Third street extended from Canal Avenue to Surf Avenue and not beyond that.
Later in the year 1885, the Committee on streets, avenues and road proceeded to
adopt a resolution with preamble altering the lines of a large number if
streets especially the twenty third street which was now proposed to be
extended from Canal Avenue to Atlantic Avenue i.e. beyond the Surf Avenue. The
Preamble of the Resolution certified the same and recommended more changes in
various streets of the Coney island.
The
enacting clause of the Resolution of the 1881 Act read as,
“The map filed in the office of the register of the county of Kings, and the
office of the town clerk of the town of Gravesend, by the commissioners
appointed to lay out a plan for roads and streets in the towns of Kings county,
is hereby changed and altered so far as the same relates to * * * West
Twenty-Third street. * * * Said changes and alterations shall conform to the
changes and alterations shown on the accompanying map, entitled, ‘Map showing
the proposed change of lines, etc., of certain streets and avenues on Coney
Island, in the town of Gravesend,’ which map is hereto annexed and forms part
of this resolution.”
The
changed map now showed an alteration in the easterly and westerly lines of
Twenty-third street as the street was seen a further to the east and the lines
continued to the south beyond the Surf Avenue. The Court however was of the
opinion that a preamble or tile of an act can neither control the plain words
nor extend the ambit of the objects mentioned in the act itself if it is
express and clear. Considering the fact that the area of Surf Avenue was not
laid down on the official map in accordance with the 1881 Act, the Court had
no jurisdiction to open the same beyond the Southerly point portrayed on the
map. This implies that the change extension of street beyond Surf Avenue was
mentioned only in the preamble and not in the enacting clause. Thus, it is
quite clear that the usage of preamble is quite limited in interpretation of a
statute and can be invoked only in case of ambiguity in a provision and not
otherwise.
Contrary
to the aforementioned case, the case of Montesquieu v Heil[10]
harps on the importance of a preamble and the pivotal role it can play in the
interpretation of a statute. This case deals with section 7 of the Act of 1808
which was brought into existence to “provide relief to insolvent debtors in
actual custody.” The case progresses as the debtor files a schedule of his
property and debts complying with the provisions of the Act so that his
property and real as well as personal estate can be transferred to the
creditors in lieu of the debt taken. The creditors however, opposed this
transfer or surrender of property claiming that the debt was obtained by
fraudulent means.
The
defendant in this case claimed to be an insolvent debtor and gave an
application to obtain the benefit under insolvent laws trying to evade from
imprisonment. But here the vital question whether the debtor will be entitled
to the benefit of the insolvent laws or not considering the allegations of
fraud against him will depend upon the interpretation of the Act of 1808. The
Preamble of the Act reads as “Whereas humanity, as well as policy, requires
that relief, in certain cases, should be afforded to the honest and unfortunate
debtor, who, from losses or misfortunes in trade, may be unable to pay or
satisfy the debts for which he is confined — -justice equally demands that due
care should be taken to prevent the fraudulent debtor from availing himself of
that relief, and thereby depriving the honest and industrious part of the
community of their property: Be it, therefore enacted.” If we rely solely on
the preamble to identify the intention of the legislator, it is quite clear
that they intended to preclude fraudulent insolvent debtors from availing
benefits under the insolvency laws.
However,
the catch here is that section 17 of the Act which explicitly lists down the
activities that can bar a person from availing benefits under the insolvency
laws does not mention about exclusion of fraudulent debtors. It was thus
contended by the defendant that he should not be deprived of the benefit merely
relying on the wordings of the Preamble when there is no express mention of the
same in the Act. Here we need to analyze the significance and role of the
Preamble. A Preamble in a statute is often referred to as the “key to open the
mind of the makers of law.”[11]
Furthermore, it is imperative to note that every part of a statute plays a very
crucial role but the wordings of the preamble however cannot be used to
restrain the meaning of the words in the enacting clause. The preamble in very
clear context shows that the legislators intended to bar fraudulent debtors
from availing the benefits but section 17 on the other hand cause conflict as
it does not specify fraud or dishonesty in debtors as criteria to preclude the
from the benefit.
It
is a well-accepted principle that in case of conflict between the Preamble and
the enacting clause, the latter will prevail but in this case the Court
emphasized on the Preamble as a reference to the intention of the law makers
and pronounced that the Preamble and the enacting clause are not inconsistent
or contradictory. Therefore, both the Preamble as well as section 17 can be
given force at the same time without having to violate the intention of the law
makers. The two parts of the statute however cannot be considered separately
and can be given force together so that the absurdity in result can be avoided.
The Court finally therefore concluded that evidence regarding the allegations
of fraud can be produced against the debtor and the same can be used to deprive
him of the benefits under insolvency laws.
Use of Punctuations as
an Internal Aid
One of the most famous maxims of the
law “De
minimis non curat Lex” is to the effect that law does not concern
itself with trifles. For the average lawyer punctuation is a “de
minimis matter” a trifle to which he/she gives no concern. Two
important points should be taken into consideration-
1.
Punctuation has considerable importance for the practicing lawyer
and
2.
2. It is possible to offer some practical suggestions as to its
usage
The two main fields of legal work
where questions of punctuations are of prime importance are the drafting of the
legislation which is frequently the job of the practicing lawyer and in
preparation of the important legal documents which are constantly presented to
him/her. It must always be remembered that what is good punctuation in other
writing is usually over punctuation from the lawyer’s perspective.
In 1874, the legislature passed the
Revised laws of Illinois which purported to codify the existing statutes and in
the revision of the sentence just quoted a comma was somehow inserted after the
word “motions”. The complete change in meaning thereby affected is obvious. So
an energetic lawyer saw that the extra comma was an opportunity to get a big
fee by the “shoe string” route. The slang term "shoestring"
often describes a small amount of money which may be an inadequate amount to
fund the intended purpose of its use in full. Out of which grew the famous case
of Hammock
v. Farmers Loan and Trust Co.[12]
in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that the extra comma would
be ignored and that as a result the state court was without jurisdiction and
all its proceedings void. The Supreme Court laid down the rule that punctuation
in statutes had no meaning which the courts were bound to respect. Indeed, the
court said so in so many words, “Punctuation is no part of a Statute.”
In reaching its decision the court relied largely on an earlier case in which
the Supreme Court had said: “Punctuation is a most fallible standard by which
to interpret a writing it may be resorted to when other means fail but the
court will first take the instrument by its four corners in order to ascertain
its true meaning.”
In 1872, the federal government in
the US passed a new tariff act. The government lost around $2 million in a
punctuation mistake in legislation at the time. A former law of tariffs had
indicated that “fruit” plants for the propagation and cultivation of tropical
and semitropical fruit, which was to be retained in the 1872 version should be
excluded from the import tariff. The problem is that in the sentence, a comma
is added. Fruits are also now classified as exempt in the comma between
"fruits" and “plants”. The state, two years after this error, has
promised to refund the duties that have been paying since 1872 that the levy
would not extend to the imported fruit. This collectively resulted in the
government's return of $2 million to fruit importers.
In 1915 The Supreme Court of Illinois
had before it a case involving a dead which had the following clause: “but if
the said John Wilson and Julie Wilson, his wife, should die intestate (with no
children), the above, etc.[13] The
person who prepared the deed testified that he understood that the words
“interstate” and “with no children” to be interchangeable and that he used the
parentheses to show that meaning. The court however refused to be bound by such
evidence and said “the punctuation in the instrument will not be permitted to
change the meaning if reading the instrument altogether the meaning is clear.
Following below are the cases in which
punctuation has played an important role in the final judgement In the case of O’Connor
v Oakhurst Dairy[14], the
plaintiffs worked as delivery drivers for defendant i.e., Oakhurst Dairy. The
drivers lodged in the federal district court a complaint that the additional
time pay under US C.S. §§ 201 and Maine Overtime Law 26 M.R.S.A. § 664 are not
covered by Federal Labour Standards Act (3). The key controversy concerned Me
Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 26 regarding the exception of the Maine overtime laws §
664(3) concerning the treatment in one form or another — of such food items
specifically mentioned. The drivers claimed that they owed an extra time pay
because no commas existed after "shipment" and before
"delivery.” The accused argued on the contrary.
The court
held that §664(3) had skipped a final comma after the word “shipment” and there
was a confusion as to whether it meant two different activities – “packing for
shipment” and “distribution” and the Act’s legislative history did not fix that
obscurity. A restricted careful reading, for example, which was urged by
drivers, supported Maine's standard implementation regulation, which required
compensation and time legislation to be generously interpreted in addition to
its remedial purposes. The judge's reading of § 664(3), relating to the single
packaging and whether packing was for shipping or delivery, was taken by the
court. And if the drivers processed organic food, the drivers didn't
"pack" it. So, exemption F dropped the drivers.
The case of Roger Communications v Bell
Aliant Regional Communications [15]
was over a contract to replace utility poles across the country. The argument
started from a single sentence “thereafter for successive five (5) year terms,
unless and until terminated by one-year prior notice in writing by either
party.” Both sides argued that the comma after “five (5) year terms” meant
different things. Bell Aliant said the one-year termination notice was still extended,
although Rogers said it was only applicable until the first five terms were
complete. The adverbial pointless clause would amend the conditions of the
following five-year-long main sentence alone if the second Comma did not occur
This was significant because, in 2002, when they signed a contract to lease
Bell Aliant's poles, Rogers only paid CAD $9,60 per pole. This was important
for them. The cost almost doubled by 2004.Understood, Bell Aliant requested the
deal to be ended and the current, better price renegotiated but Rogers did not
agree.
The Telecommunications Commission of Canada
correctly found that “on the basis of the laws of punctuation” the second
comma, on a written notice of one year, permits the deal to be terminated at
any time without reason. After one year Rogers provided a copy of the contract
in French, the committee reversed its decision and gave Rogers only one
interpretation,
In the case of Hill v Conway[16] For 365
days after his initial arrest in an offense for incompetent and negligent
operation with death, the defendant Commissioner of Motor vehicles suspended
his licence to the appellant resulting §1091 V.S. 23 A (a). Hill argued that,
given the apart of a semicolon with a one-year fatality, the 30-day sentence on
a first offense should be a cap on his suspension for 30 days. The only
question here is to give the contested Law a correct explanation. In order for
the appeal to be resolved, the sides decided on the oral argument and agreed on
a translation.
The Court of Vermont held not to rule
on suspension. The punctuation of a statute is claimed to be more relevant than
the statutory purpose for interpretation. Leaping to the most general
definition of the statutory objective, the court said that it was intended to
safeguard public security and exclude reckless road users. The State would be
inappropriate, unreasonable and incompatible with the statutory intent, as we
think, to prevent a driver whose first crime ended in a death from a suspension
for longer than thirty days. Summarizing, the law of absurdity was violated by
the court (§ 37) and the concept of lenity was overlooked (§ 49).
Use of Marginal Notes as
Internal Aid
Marginal notes shall be included in
the Act side by side with the sections and shall convey the impact of the
mentioned sections and shall convey the impact of the mentioned sections. In
the past, the marginal notes were also known as building assistance, but are
not perceived to be useful today, as per majority opinion. The explanation is
that, in the majority of cases, drafters and not legislators insert marginal
notes and not always according to legislative orders. In other words, marginal
notes are not enforced and are only added later for a summary of the section
and as such do not contain any legislative power to read.
According to Lord Reid “marginal
notes cannot be used a said to construction. A side note is a poor guide to the
scope of a section for it can do no more than to indicate the main object with
which the section deals.” Lord Upjohn observed that “a side note is a very
brief precis of the section and therefore forms as most unsure guide to
construction of enacting section. “Here are some cases in which marginal notes
are given prior importance.
In the case of Bettencourt v Sheehy[17], an
applicant who runs Watsonville's supermarket and products stores to recoup the
amount owed for goods sold to him for one Kitagawa from an operating account.
The claimant found that $323.10 was owed on the bill, including goods for
$54.30 in wines and whiskey exchanged for Kitigawa to the defendant. None of
the wine or whiskey was sold in the shop to be drank, nor was any drunk in the
shop. It was supplied in quantities of gallons and half gallons, drawn in
half-johns from barrels and all was taken by Kitigawa from the premises in such
a quasi. The trial court being of the
opinion that a recovery for any greater amount than five dollars for said
liquor was prohibited by the act of the legislature entitled: "An act to
prohibit the collection of accounts for liquors sold at retail,”.
The only question involved is whether
the act hereinbefore referred to includes such transactions as those above
detailed. The act is as follows:
"Sec. 1. The purchase of, or the
sale and delivery of any spirituous or malt liquors, wines, or cider, by
retail, or by the drink, is hereby declared to be an invalid consideration for
any promise to pay, or assumpsit of account therefor, when the amount of such
account or demand exceeds five dollars.”
"Sec. 2. No court shall, in any
action at law, render judgment for a greater amount than five dollars, for the
sale at retail, or by the drink, of any spirituous or malt liquors, wine, or
cider, together with costs."
Court said that the act by its terms
is clearly applicable to sales at "retail" and sales "by the
drink," and we can attribute the presence of the latter words only to a
superabundance of caution on the part of the legislators, who may have feared
that some subtle distinction resulting in the exclusion of the vendor by the
drink from the provisions of the act might be found between the two classes.
The next query was what was intended
by the word "retail" in the act.
The Court was convinced that the word
"retail" must be taken to mean so definite and fixed with respect to
the trade of liquors, i.e., that the law should be presumed in its
consideration only to use the term "retail" with regard to
transactions of amounts less than one quarter. It does not help the complainant
to distinguish between the parts concerning licensing fees. In the definition
of pari materia, all laws are. The imposition of a license-tax upon retail
liquor dealers has always been considered a regulation of the business as well
as a provision for revenue, and for that reason the license-tax on such dealers
has always been larger in amount than the tax imposed on the ordinary
merchandise business.
The next case we shall look into is State
v. Brown[18] where the
perpetrator was found to be in possession of 65 grams of cocaine while
completing four-year sentences at the New Jersey State Prison on gun charges.
During a strip search carried out by safety officers at the Jones Farm, a
minimum-security facility in the prison system, this contraband was discovered.
He is accused of having a controlled hazardous drug in excess in N J.S.A.
24:21-20
An accusation brought back by the
Mercer County Grand Board (1). By motion to N.J.S.A. 2C:2-11, the appointee
judge demands an order rejecting the summons on the grounds that the alleged
offense “consists of a de minimis offence.” The Law reads that if the
judge of the appointment considers the essence of the conduct cited with an
offence and the character of the situations in question to be responsible for
the indictment, he points out the conduct of the defendant:
Section c) claimed that “There are
other extenuations that the legislature cannot properly include in banning the
offence. Section c) states that. Without granting the prosecutor notice and the
right to be heard, the judge shall never discharge any case under this clause.
“Any such discharge shall be entitled to be appealed. The marginal notice is
not used in a statute under normal circumstances. Judicial rulings have
established that headnotes are not a “legislative guidance.”
It was held that Section (c) allows
the Court to conclude that the conduct of the defendant “is extenuated to such
an extent that it cannot be considered sufficiently forbidden by the Legislature.”
“The evidence posed as legally extenuating by the complainant are not of the
kind required for discretion to be invoked. There is certainly no reference to
such intent in the headnote. Indeed, it does not strain reason to conclude that
the Legislature changed the word "shall" in the Model Penal Code to
"may," thus eliminating any doubt that discretion was intended, to
insure the constitutionality of the statute.”
The court was of the opinion that it
was appropriate for the accused to be able to provide facts concerning the
crime for a summary judgement process. This seems prohibited by the Law, as it
authorizes the judge of assignment to look at the 'conduct alleged. ‘The law
does not allow an accused to make a statement contrary to the behavior accused
of in a suit or an accusation. The Law shall provide a discretionary power to
abort necessary proceedings which may legally require conviction in the
interest of fundamental justice. It
does not authorize the assignment judge to determine that, as a matter of law,
a defendant is innocent on the basis of evidence other than that heard by the
grand jury.
Conclusion
There
can be cases before the Courts which can put them in a fix considering that at
times it is difficult to fully make out the legislative intent of the law
makers by merely reading the section. These are the times when the Internal
Aids given in the statute come into play. These instruments assist the Courts
in understand the true meaning of the statute deciphering the intent of the
legislators while drafting the statute so that it can be given effect
accordingly.
The
different types of internal aids have been discussed through case laws
emphasizing on their significance and their limitations at the same time. It is
pertinent to note that though Internal Aids play a very important role during
interpretation of a statute, if there is a conflict between them and the
enacting clause, the latter would precede. The role of internal aids is majorly
to assist the enacting clause and not contradict them. In case of
contradiction, we assume that the literal meaning of the enacting clause would
prevail over the rest.
[1] St. Louis, Earl
Crawford, Construction of Statutes:
Including a General Discussion of Certain Foundational Subjects (4th edn,
Thomas Law Book Co.)
[2] Dixon
v La Guardia 166 N. Y. S. (2) 466.
[3] Antonin Scalia, Bryan a Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts (1st
edn, Thomson).
[4] Adler, Matthew D and Kenneth Einar Himma,
The Rule of Recognition and the U.S.
Constitution (N.Y.: OUP 2009).
[5] 302 U.S 540 (1938).
[6] 194 S.E. 278 (1937).
[7] 174 S.E. 921 N.C.( 1934).
[8] 231 U.S. 631 (1914).
[9] 122 N.Y.S. 62, 137 App. Div.55 (1910).
[10] 4 La. 51 (1832).
[11] M Bacon, A new Abridgment of the Law (first
published 1736, Bird Wilson 1842).
[12] 105 U.S. 77 (1881).
[14] 851 F.3d 69 (1st Cir. 2017).
[15] CRTC 45 (2006).
[16] 143 Vt.91 (1983).
Article Information
INTRISTIC AIDS IN US LAW
Authors: TEJAS SINGH, EDWIN LEPCHA
- Journal IJLRA
- ISSN 2582-6433
- Published 2024/04/12
- Issue 7
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International Journal for Legal Research and Analysis
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- ISSN 2582-6433
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