Open Access Research Article
INDIA’S STRATEGY AT THE G20: THE PUSH TO REPLACE CHINA
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Article Details
INDIA’S
STRATEGY AT THE G20: THE PUSH TO REPLACE CHINA
AUTHORED BY
- AISHANI PACHAURI &
ARNAV SADHU
I
-
INTRODUCTION -
The G20, or the
Group of 20, is one of the most influential international forums in the world
comprising of 19 countries and the European Union, which are representative of
the world’s major economies. The G20 nations collectively account for
two-thirds of the global population, 75% of global trade and commerce, and make
up 80% of the world’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP)[1].
India’s inclusion in the G20 is reflective of its growing global economic
significance and its meteoric ascent to the status of a global superpower. The
G20 provides India a platform to showcase its economic achievements, advance
its interests, and forge alliances with other member nations. India would hold
the Presidency of the Summit from December 1, 2022, to November 30,2023 which
marks a watershed moment in India’s status in world politics. The presidency
would bestow upon India the power to shape the priorities and focus of the G20
agenda, direct the course of discourse between member nations on global
economic and financial issues. The presidency represents that the Nation States
are making an effort to move away from the neo-colonial environment and is also
an opportunity for India to influence international policy decisions and
promote its interests on the global stage. However, India’s assumption of the
presidency comes at a tumultuous time when the entire world is recovering from
the onslaught of the global pandemic with rising interest rates and inflation
being reported across nations signifying an imminent recession. Coupled with
this, the continuing US-China Trade War and the conflict between Russia and
Ukraine have also contributed to the breakdown of diplomatic ties and
discontent amongst several G20 nations. Amid this diplomatic chaos, the manner
in which India responds to the pressing externalities and the unprecedented
opportunities it faces would determine the future prospects of India amidst the
world and impact the security and prosperity of millions of Indians for
generations to come. Utilizing its presidency in the G20, India should seize
the opportunity to advance India’s vital interests, position itself to
outmaneuver its geopolitical competitors particularly China and tackle shared
challenges. However, it needs to be kept in mind that the G20 alone would not
serve India all the required ammo in its arsenal to overtake China in the
global market, and separate efforts need to be made in order to identify and
overcome the setbacks we are currently facing. India has an enormous
agriculture and service industry and its software services are marketed all
over the world. The next step is to develop its manufacturing sectors. It
further needs to be acknowledged that given the huge economical gap between the
two countries, it is not possible for India to position itself as a perfect
substitute for China. Instead the paper aims to identify ways through which
India can take huge steps towards that direction.
In furtherance
of this proposition, the following are the trade strategies that can be
inculcated and adopted by India in positioning itself in the global market as
an alternative to China.
II
- Renewal
of India’s GSP Status -
India’s
diplomatic relations with the Unites States of America have been crucial to
India’s international trade policy over the years. India has been one of the
top exporters to the US, with a wide range of goods and services valuing
approximately $52.4 Billion being exported in 2021 alone and have been steadily
increasing ever since making the US one of its top sources of trade revenue. One
of the primary reasons that contributed to the overall growth in US-India trade
was the fact that India was the largest beneficiary of the US’s GSP programme
since 1975. The Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) are WTO recognized
programmes that are introduced by developed countries granting preferential
tariffs to imports from developing countries to aid the promotion of economic
development and exports. These preferences are mostly in the form of duty-free
tariffs or concessional tariffs extended to certain products imported into the
U.S market from developing countries. GSPs form a permanent exception to the Most
Favoured Nation (MFN) clause and provides for non-reciprocal and
non-conditional trade preferences to certain products from designated
beneficiary developing countries (BDC).
Under the US GSP
Trade Programme, India was able to export around 2000 products amounting to
approximately $6.3 Billion to the United States duty-free in 2018, which was
12.1% of its total export to the country that year.[2]
The GSP Program covered certain exports like textiles, jewellery, machinery and
mechanical parts, auto parts, plastics and chemicals, but excluded products
such as automobiles, iron and steel, and agricultural goods. However, in 2019,
the US revoked India’s designation as a beneficiary developing country under
the GSP Programme upon conducting a review of India’s eligibility on the
grounds of insufficient “equitable and reasonable” market access for U.S. goods
especially in the agricultural and dairy market and discriminatory policies and
high tariffs introduced by India on certain U.S goods. In addition, the US unilaterally declared that India, along with China
and Brazil, has emerged above the rest of the developing nations and should no
longer derive benefits from policies designated exclusively for developing
nations. Consequent to the revocation, India implemented retaliatory
tariffs on 29 US products, thereby further raising diplomatic tension between
the two countries and affecting their trade. However, it was the small and
medium sized businesses and MSME’s in India that faced the brunt of the sudden
withdrawal of the GSP Beneficiary Status. Many of these businesses that relied
on the benefits under GSP faced increased tariffs on their exports to the US
and found it difficult to survive price-based competition owing to the supply
of similar products from other developing countries to American markets at
cheaper prices thereby making their products less competitive in the U.S.
market and affecting the profitability of such businesses. As a result, many of
these businesses had to wind up as they were unable to adjust their business
strategies or find new markets to mitigate the impact of the GSP revocation
thereby also rendering millions unemployed.
The renewal of
the GSP Programme must be at the heart of India’s strategic trade policy as
this would create a conducive business environment for industries to increase
domestic production and exports in order to derive optimal benefits from the
GSP. This would also provide impetus for the establishment of new businesses in
the Indian market. To this avail, addressing the specific concerns raised by
the U.S. government would be crucial for India to regain its GSP beneficiary
status. In order to address the concerns raised over trade barriers and market
access, India could eliminate or reduce existing trade tariffs on certain U.S.
goods and services (especially the retaliatory tariffs) and promote greater
openness in its trade policies. The existence of the high trade tariffs on US
goods make them more expensive and thereby less competitive thereby affecting
their access to the Indian Market. Hence, in order to provide greater access to
US goods, India should implement trade policies favourable to the US that would
reduce or eliminate high tariffs on the importation of their goods. In
addition, to ensure better facilitation of US imports, India could streamline
its customs procedure through the simplification of customs documentation,
reduction in procession time and improving transparency. Thus, this paper
posits that in order to woo the US, a trade policy that is favourable to the US
would have to be implemented by India in order to seek a reciprocal
reinstatement of its GSP Beneficiary status.
However, the
favourable trade policies that this paper envisages India to enter with the US,
might face challenge at the World Trade Organisation on the grounds of
violation of the Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) Principle. The MFN Principle is
essentially a non-discriminatory principle enshrined under Article I.1[3]of
the GATT that ensures that a country granting or according a favourable tariff
and regulatory treatment to the product of one trading partner nation must also
extend the same treatment to the like products exported by all other member
nations of the WTO. The implication of this principle to our posited trade
policy would mean that by eliminating or reducing tariff on a particular good
or product imported from the US, India would be obligated under the GATT’s MFN
clause to extend the same treatment or concession to all other nations who are
members of the WTO and dealing with such like products. This would gravely
affect India’s revenue from trade and possibly widen the country’s trade
deficit. Nonetheless, in order to circumvent the MFN Principle, a Free Trade
Agreement (FTA) could be entered into between India and USA. FTAs are basically
agreements between specific nations that eliminate or reduce tariffs, quotas,
and trade barriers on goods and services traded between them. Enshrined under
Article XXIV[4] of the
GATT, FTAs are envisaged as an exception to the MFN principle. Such agreements
must substantially cover all trade among the participating countries and
subsequently not lead to the increase in trade barriers with non-participating
countries which would otherwise violate Article XXIV. Thus, India needs to
strive to engage in bilateral discourse with the US over areas of disagreement
and seek to explore potential trade-offs which would materialise into the
formation of a Free Trade Agreement which would ultimately lead to India
achieving its trade policy objective of retaining its GSP Beneficiary status.
III
- Filling
Supply Chain Gaps Through Increased Domestic Production -
The Trade War
between USA & China is an ongoing economic conflict which could potentially
pose grave economic implications on the world’s economies. The US-China trade
war began in 2018, when the US accused China of engaging in unfair trade
practises that extended to intellectual property theft, forced technology
transfers and subsidies for state-owned enterprises in violation of the
National Treatment Principle, leading to the imposition of tariffs on Chinese
imports. China, on the other hand, accused the US of violating international
trade rules and protectionism and responded by imposing retaliatory tariffs on
US imports which subsequently led to the continued escalation of the trade
conflict until this day. The trade war has undoubtedly resulted in significant
economic losses for both countries resulting in the decline of economic growth,
diversion of trade flows away from both US and China and the formation of
supply chain gaps for certain goods and services. Nonetheless, the ongoing
trade war poses an opportunity for India to potentially benefit from the trade
war.
One of the
direct implications of the imposition of retaliatory tariffs on goods and
services is the decline in imports and exports between both countries. Chinese
imports from the U.S dropped 12.5% while US imports from China declined to
11.8% in 2019[5]. This
advertently led to supply chain shortages in certain goods and services which
could potentially be fulfilled by India by increasing its exports to both
countries thereby also reducing its trade deficit. These goods include
textiles, pharmaceuticals, furniture, agricultural products, chemicals, electronics,
electrical machinery, semiconductors, leather products etc. While India could
potentially leverage its skilled workforce and natural resources towards
increased manufacturing of goods to meet the supply chain gaps, there is a
paramount need for investment in manufacturing infrastructure, technology, and
innovation and India’s trade policy ought to reflect the same. In order to
boost domestic production/exports to meet the supply chain demands, the Indian
government could implement a trade policy that would invest in domestic
manufacturing infrastructure such as transportation and logistics and provide
financial incentives such as subsidies and grants to domestic manufacturers to
encourage exports. India could also implement export promotion policies to
further bolster production and exports of domestic firms through the
introduction of export credit facilities, export insurance and financing
schemes. This would help foster a business environment that is conducive to
domestic manufacturers to expand production and exportation of their goods.
However, this
prospective trade policy that favours domestic manufacturers to boost
production and exportation of goods to meet supply chain gaps, could be
challenged at the WTO on the grounds of violation of the rule of National
Treatment. The National Treatment principle enshrined under Article III[6] of
the GATT, works complementary to the MFN Principle, in the sense that it
envisages non-discriminatory treatment of foreign businesses and products when
compared to domestic businesses and products. Essentially, this international
trade law principle ensures that once a foreign business or product enters a
country’s market, it should receive the same treatment as domestic businesses
and products, in terms of any concessions, protections, or regulations. By
providing financial incentives in the form of subsidies and grants to domestic
businesses to bolster exports, India could potentially violate the National
Treatment principle as similar subsidies/grants are not provided for foreign
businesses that operate in India. However, the subsidies that are envisioned to
be provided to domestic manufacturers would not be in violation of the SCM
Agreement as these subsidies would not entail the recipient
manufacturers/exports to meet certain export targets or the usage of domestic
goods over imported goods as under Article 3[7] of
the SCM. The subsidies granted could be proved to not be an actionable subsidy
either having an adverse effect or serious prejudice to the interests of a
country as under Article 5[8].
The subsidies granted under India’s trade policy would not entail any of these
stipulations on the recipient manufacturers and would instead be solely used as
a means to promote manufacture and exportation of goods to meet supply chain
gaps caused due to the Trade War.
IV
- Expansion of Article 23 of TRIPS -
Another strategy
that India can use is take benefit of their G20 Presidency this year as we will
get the opportunity to set the agenda for the discussion. A long-standing
unresolved issue, last brought up in the Doha Rounds, was regarding the
expansion of Article 23[9] of
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Right (TRIPS). Article 23
provides special or higher protection to wines and spirits[10]
on account of them being multilaterally acknowledged as Geographical Indicators
(GIs), while other products with the GI tags come under Article 22 which merely
provides for standard or minimum level of protection[11].
Under IP Law, Geographical Indicators are used when a particular product
originating from a country or a region holds characteristic traits or reputation
attributable to that country or region, such as Champagne, Tequila, Cognac,
etc. However, India has great capacity to support multiple GI especially in the
fields of Agriculture and Handicrafts. Darjeeling tea, Kashmir Pashmina,
Lucknow Chikan Craft, Kancheepuram Silk, etc. are some of the prime examples[12]
of products originating in India which have a GI under Article 22 but not
Article 23. These Indian products, among many others, have a huge demand in
other countries, and hence susceptible to violation. India can push for the
inclusion of products, other than wines and spirits, under Article 23, as the
same can benefit Indian export. Since WTO is claimed to be an equitable
organization, it can be argued that since TRIPS was brought in by the Global
North, developing nations should also get a say in the agreement for more
flexibility. Other members of G20 such as EU and Turkey supported this
proposition in the Doha Rounds[13]
and will hopefully continue to do so if India brings it up in the upcoming summit.
V
- Make
India more Investor Friendly -
China's dominant
position in worldwide manufacturing has been slowly declining since it reached
its peak in 2015[14]. This
is because of several structural changes in the Chinese economy, such as moving
away from low-skill manufacturing, reduced significance of China as a final
assembly location, and a shift towards consumption and services, which are less
trade-dependent. The US-China trade war and the COVID-19 pandemic have further
accelerated these trends by prompting supply chain shifts. Over the past few
years, there has been a noticeable trend of foreign manufacturers shifting
their operations out of China due to rising labor costs and other
production-related expenses, which has made it increasingly difficult for
businesses to maintain profitability, as well as geopolitical tensions and
concerns about intellectual property protection in China. Many investors are now
considering alternative destinations for their investments, such as India,
Vietnam, and other Southeast Asian countries, which offer favorable business
environments and lower costs of production. For example, India supports a
skilled workforce with low labor cost, along with an expanding consumer market.
Due to India's abundant land and labor resources, as well as its strong
software skills, many global manufacturers that have been established in China
for a long time are seeking to expand their manufacturing operations to India.
For example, Samsung as well as Chinese company Vivo has set up a manufacturing
unit in Uttar Pradesh. Even Suzuki Corporation is set to finish setting up an
electric car manufacturing unit in Gujarat[15].
A list of industries has been identified in India as potential areas for
shifting global supply chains away from China. These industries encompass a
wide range of sectors, such as energy, automobiles, steel, pharmaceuticals,
textiles and clothing, marine products, financial services, IT services,
tourism, etc.
In order to
prevent interruptions in manufacturing and the supply chain, global companies
are seeking to diversify their strategies, and India could benefit from this
shift, which would also help to break up the concentrated supply chain in
China. India initiated the 'Make in India' program, and the government has
taken several measures, such as product-linked incentive (PLI), to encourage
foreign investment and ease the process of doing business in the country. PLI’s
main objective is to boost the competitiveness of the manufacturers to create
economies of scale and increase exports, and INR 1.97 Lakh Crores were
announced to be the outlay for the scheme across 14 sectors[16].
India is gradually increasing the capacity of its local sourcing and
distribution networks while offering essential incentives and regulatory
relaxations to foreign investors. This approach is helping India reshape the
global supply chain and emerge as a viable alternative to China. Additionally,
India's large population and fast-growing middle class offer significant
potential for foreign companies to tap into a vast consumer market, making it
an attractive destination for foreign investment. As a result, many foreign
manufacturers are now looking to establish their presence in India and leverage
the country's growing economy.
In 2021, the
commerce and economy ministry of India, Japan, and Australia introduced the
Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI) with the objective of strengthening
the durability of supply chains in the Indo-Pacific region[17].
The initiative aims to establish reliable supply sources and draw in
investment. Furthermore, Japan agreed to invest Yen 3.5 trillion in India
becoming our biggest partner in development. There are over 1400 Japanese
companies in India and more than 10 Japan industrial townships establishes
across the country such as Neemrana in Rajasthan and Sri City in Andhra Pradesh[18].
However, it must
be kept in mind, that if India manages to become a manufacturing hub, the same
might lead to questions being raised regarding India’s obligations under the
Paris Agreement. India pledged to “reduce Emissions Intensity of its GDP by
45 percent by 2030, from 2005 level[19]”
as well as “achieve about 50 percent cumulative electric power installed
capacity from non-fossil fuel-based energy resources by 2030[20]”.
If cheap labor and readily available resources such as coal and land are some
of India’s most investor attractive factors, and if we are aiming to boost the
level of manufacturing in India, the same may result in India failing to meet
its commitments and acting counterproductive. There are existing global
concerns regarding India not taking enough action towards abiding by Paris
Agreement as we are heavily dependent on coal. Hence, when India has to
transparently show their NDC in the COP, multiple fingers can be pointed
towards India prioritizing trade by neglecting and further harming the climate.
Furthermore,
even keeping the Paris Agreement aside, despite the Government’s efforts to
improve the ease of business, India faces many hurdles, primarily due to lack
of growth in infrastructure and shaky policies. While the former is a major
requirement an investor looks for, the latter makes them nervous about setting
up in India as well raises questions of protectionism. As a result, countries
like Vietnam, that are more open to trade, become a more attractive option for
the manufacturers[21].
Improvements in India's infrastructure sector are crucial for the country's
economic growth. Delayed railway freight movement, inefficient port turnaround
times, and a highly concentrated airport sector with fast growth, congested
road transportation are among the factors that contribute to capacity
constraints in India[22].
These constraints may impede economic growth if left unaddressed. Inadequate
regulatory frameworks and inefficiency in project approval processes often
cause delays in completing infrastructure projects. Despite this, India has
ambitious plans, with a focus on inland waterways, airports, and intermodal
logistics to enhance first and last-mile connectivity[23].
The country plans to execute these initiatives through public-private
partnerships, with a significant portion of its recent annual budgets allocated
to infrastructure development. However, executing projects within budget and on
time remains a challenge. Additionally, exporters and investors frequently face
obscure regulatory and tariff policies in India. Furthermore, India imposes the
highest average applied tariff among G20 nations, and its bound tariff rates
are among the highest in the WTO[24].
To tackle such issues, the Department of Commerce needs to work towards
formulating a new FTP and concentrate on improving the coherence of their
domestic and international trade policy. This could be achieved by bringing in
significant reforms in two essential areas[25] –
i)
Promoting consistency and harmony between our policy
objectives and their implementation. This necessitates a well-planned
engagement in international trade arrangements. India's position at the WTO and
in FTAs should be based on domestic priorities that are vital for growth,
employment, and poverty reduction. Hence, India must actively participate in
upcoming international as well as regional trade negotiations that align with
our strong economic interests or may impact India’s domestic regulatory
policies.
ii)
Encourage the involvement of trade and affiliated
organizations in policymaking and negotiations. To achieve this, the State
needs to take action to ensure that the promotion councils, trade regulatory
bodies, and the standards-related institutions get to collaborate and construct
a dynamic database of imports and exports. By gathering information at the
product and market level, well-informed trade decisions can be made. This will
undoubtedly assist trade policymakers in utilizing the advantages of global
trade to enhance our competitiveness, firm-level productivity, and employment
opportunities.
VI
- ALTASIA -
When we consider
how India can position itself as a substitute to China in the global market,
the reality of the situation stands, that India is incapable to of making this
huge leap as of now or even in the next few years. The above suggestions are
directed towards how India can take steps towards such a goal, but none of them
will directly lead to attainment of this objective as China is $14.69 Trillion[26]
economy and too powerful to overtake.
However, there
is a new concept, currently referred to as ALTASIA by many journalists, which
describes 14 different nation states in Asia which can collectively be an
alternative to China in the sphere of International Trade. These 14 countries
are India, Bangladesh, Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, Malaysia, Brunei,
Singapore, Indonesia, Philippines, Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan. In the light
of manufacturers shifting from China to other South East Asian countries,
ALTASIA not only matches but exceeds China’s productivity level. These
countries can look into forming a custom union where they can benefit from
their comparative advantage. Japan has the finance and high skill available,
whereas India supports low cost labour and a huge IT sector. Malaysia already
exports 10% of the global chips[27]
and Vietnam boomed their export to US alone by $2.6 billion in furniture and
communication equipment[28].
ALTASIA’s
combined workforce stands 1.4 billion encompassing of 155 million college
graduates, compared to China’s 950 million including 145 million graduates[29].
Moreover, China is facing a spike in wages, with a $8.31 per hour in
manufacturing, whereas the hourly wages in manufacturing sector in India,
Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Thailand are less than $3[30].
In 2022, ALTASIA recorded an aggregate of US $63.4 billion to the USA compared
to China’s US $61.4 billion[31].
However, with increase in China’s old age population combined with exit of
manufacturers, ALTASIA is at the benefitting end. Sony is shifting its camera
production to Thailand, Foxconn, Pegatron and Wistron who handle Apple’s
assembling, are planning to move to India, Google is shifting production of
Pixel smartphones to Vietnam and Japan has brought down their companies in
China from 13,600 to 12,700 between 2020 to 2022[32].
Keeping the statistic in mind, it can be speculated that ALTASIA is set to
overtake China in the coming years.
Moreover, for
decades South Korean and Japanese companies have been outsourcing and building
supply chains all over South East Asia[33].
Hence, the seeds of the structure are already planted and require initiative
from stronger nations such as Japan, India and South Korea to bring such a
union forward. This step can lead to reshaping the current geoeconomics
structure in place and even provide these developing nations a better
bargaining power in the global context.
Another existing
platform to further this is the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
(RCEP) which already included most of the ALTASIA members other than India,
Taiwan and Bangladesh, and instead included Australia, China, Myanmar and New
Zealand. India, despite being a founding members, stepped off as providing the
required tariff incentives to China was harmful to its economy[34].
Moreover, the extremely diverse economy of the ALTASIA countries may also pose
many hurdles in their attempt to function as one single entity. India stepping off
from RCEP also creates a huge barrier as it cuts off their access to one of the
biggest existing market. In such a scenario, India can initiate talks with
stronger nations such as Japan and make use their existing harmonious
relationship to create a separate union other than RCEP with the ALTASION
nations. Given the benefits these countries are enjoying on account of China’s
global losses, such a union will be beneficiary to all as the stronger nations
get cheaper labour and the developing ones get financial and technical
assistance. With the recent talks regarding switching to a common currency from
US Doller[35],
ALTASIA can successfully reduce trade barriers and smoothen out the disparities
in order to form a more uniform system of trading between them. Moreover,
countries like India and Taiwan can refuse imports from China and instead
solely make use of comparative advantage to help other ALTASIA members. This
might again raise questions of MFN, however, under Article XXI of GATT[36],
exempts security reasons. Furthermore Article XXIV of GATT[37]
allows for custom unions to be an exception to GATT.
VII
- Conclusion
-
To say that
India can overtake China or be an alternative to it in the Global Market is,
for the better part of it, a utopian concept. The famous economist Karl Polanyi
warned, that if the policies are framed around utopian assumptions, the same
would lead to dystopian consequences. Therefore, we need to analyse India’s
position against China in a realistic manner, and then proceed to formulate
what strategies will aid the country to attain the goal of stepping in the
direction which will reduce the gap between the two nation states. With the G20
presidency, India can use this opportunity to clear the confusion regarding its
developing status, which keeps coming up as a hurdle. Moreover, India can also
push for expansion of Article 23 of TRIPS to bring it’s GI products under the
umbrella of special protection. The paper focused on the vital areas identified
where development will lead to India taking a major step towards it’s goal,
even outside the discussion surrounding G20. These include- renewal of India’s
GSP beneficiary status to reap duty free import of goods into USA, make India
more investment friendly by restructuring FTP and policy-making process,
improve infrastructure, bolstering domestic manufacturer and exports to meet
the supply chain gaps created due to the trade war, and finally look into a
custom union with ALTASIA to together combat China as doing the same alone is
not possible. India might face retaliation from other members of WTO on account
of violating anti-discriminatory principle of GATT or its obligations under the
Paris Agreement. However, India can defend themselves before the WTO in ways
explained above and while it might face some backlash in regards to the Paris
Agreement, but the reality of the situation is such, that even the developed
nations are facing a tough time to meet their obligations, and hence might not
be a huge setback for India.
[2] Shriya Chauhan, Understanding the Impact of GSP
Withdrawal on India’s Top Exports to the US, ORF Issue Brief No. 392,
August 2020.
[3] GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. art. I:1.
[4] GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 art XXIV.
[6] GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 art III.
[7] SCM, Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures, 1867 U.N.T.S. 14. [hereinafter
SCM]. art 3.
[9] TRIPS, General Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS] art 23.
[10] TRIPS, General Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, art 23.
[11] TRIPS, General Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, art 22.
[12] Official website of Intellectual
Property India, https://ipindia.gov.in/ (last visited Apr 3, 2023).
[15] Sentinel Digital Desk, India emerging as an
alternative to China for relocating industries - sentinelassam The Sentinel
Assam (2022),
(last visited Apr 3, 2023).
[16] Iea, Self-reliant india scheme - production-linked
incentive (PLI) scheme – policies IEA,
https://www.iea.org/policies/12948-self-reliant-india-scheme-production-linked-incentive-pli-scheme
(last visited Apr 3, 2023).
[17] Supra 16
[18] ibid
[19] UNFCC, India’s Updated First Nationally Determined
Contribution Under Paris Agreement (2021-2030) August 2020
[21]Bloomberg, Global markets: How India can become an
alternative to China in 2023 mint (2022),
https://www.livemint.com/market/stock-market-news/global-markets-how-india-can-become-an-alternative-to-china-in-2023-11672099728662.html
(last visited Apr 3, 2023).
[22] India - market challenges International Trade
Administration | Trade.gov, https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/india-market-challenges
(last visited Apr 3, 2023).
[23] ibid
[24] ibid
[25] Suranjan Gupta / Surendar Singh, India's trade policy
should address both domestic, foreign challenges The Hindu BusinessLine (2019),
https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/indias-new-trade-policy-should-address-both-domestic-foreign-challenges/article29766694.ece
(last visited Apr 3, 2023).
[26] India's GDP growth outpaced
China Last Quarter, World Economic Forum, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2023/03/indias-gdp-growth-outpaced-china-economy/
(last visited Apr 3, 2023).
[27] The Economist, The growing
alternatives to 'made in China' Australian Financial Review (2023), https://www.afr.com/world/asia/the-growing-alternatives-to-made-in-china-20230302-p5coyz
(last visited Apr 3, 2023).
[28] Trade War leaves both US and
China worse off, UNCTAD (2019),
https://unctad.org/news/trade-war-leaves-both-us-and-china-worse (last visited
Apr 3, 2023).
[29] Govind Bhattacharjee, The
'altasian' alternative to China The Pioneer (2023),
https://www.dailypioneer.com/2023/columnists/the----altasian----alternative-to-china.html
(last visited Apr 3, 2023).
[30] Telewizja Polska S.A,
"Altasia" countries are ready provide alternatives to China's supply
chain: The economist TVP World,
https://tvpworld.com/68290813/altasia-countries-are-ready-provide-alternatives-to-chinas-supply-chain-the-economist
(last visited Apr 3, 2023).
[31] The Standard, 'Altasia' making
moves to replace 'made in China' The Standard,
https://www.thestandard.com.hk/section-news/section/2/250385/%27Altasia%27-making-moves-to-replace-%27Made-in-China%27
(last visited Apr 3, 2023).
[32] Supra 30
[33] ibid
[34] New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and Trade, India and RCEP New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade,
https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements-in-force/regional-comprehensive-economic-partnership-rcep/india-and-rcep/
(last visited Apr 3, 2023).
[35] Pti, Government, RBI in
discussion with South Asian countries for cross-border Rupee Trade: Shaktikanta
Das The Hindu (2023),
https://www.thehindu.com/business/Economy/government-rbi-in-discussion-with-south-asian-countries-for-cross-border-rupee-trade-shaktikanta-das/article66345606.ece
(last visited Apr 3, 2023).
[36] GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 art XXI.
[37] GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 art XXIV.
Article Information
INDIA’S STRATEGY AT THE G20: THE PUSH TO REPLACE CHINA
Authors: AISHANI PACHAURI, ARNAV SADHU
- Journal IJLRA
- ISSN 2582-6433
- Published 2023/09/19
About Journal
International Journal for Legal Research and Analysis
- Abbreviation IJLRA
- ISSN 2582-6433
- Access Open Access
- License CC 4.0
All research articles published in International Journal for Legal Research and Analysis are open access and available to read, download and share, subject to proper citation of the original work.
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of International Journal for Legal Research and Analysis.