CRITICAL ANALYSIS FOR LIABILITY FOR ANIMALS

AND CHATTELS

Authored By- Saisha Chitkara

 

 

 

SCHOOL OF LAW, NARSEE MONJEE INSTITUTE OF MANAGEMENT STUDIES, BENGALURU

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

LAW OF TORTS BATCH - 2022-2027

SUBMITTED TO:                                                   SUBMITTED BY:

 

Prof. Alisha Thomas                                                SAISHA CHITKARA

 

Assistant Professor of Law                                     SAP ID-81012200016

 

NMIMS (SOL), Bengaluru                                     BA. L.L.B. 1^ST Year

INDEX

 

SR. NO.	TOPIC	Pg. No.
1.	ABSTRACT	6
2.	INTRODUCTION	6
3.	LITERATURE RIVIEW	7
4.	STATEMENT OF PROBLEM	9
5.	RATIONALE OF STUDY	9
6.	RESEARCH OBJECTIVES	9
7.	RESEARCH QUESTIONS	10
8.	RESEARCH METHODOLOGY	10
9.	CHAPTER 1: MEANING NATURE AND SCOPE OF LIABILITY FOR ANIMALS AND CHATTELS	10
10.	CHAPTER 2: JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS	25
11.	CHAPTER 3: JUDICIAL VIEW IN 21ST CENTURY	28
12.	CHAPTER 4: CHALLENGES THAT ARE NOT COVERED IN THE ACT	31
13.	CHAPTER 5: CRITICAL ANALYSIS	32
14.	CHAPTER 6: SUGGESTIONS AND CONCLUSION	33
15.	BIBLIOGRAPHY	35

ABSTRACT

The term "Liability of animals and chattels" covers a wide range of subtopics, such as the two types of animals in tort law, the strict liability of the person who domesticates or keeps any animal for commercial purposes or any other purpose, and "An Act to make provision with respect to civil liability for damage done by animals and with respect to the protection of livestock from dogs; and." Topic of this investigation is the "Animal Act 1971," which entered into force on 1^st October of that year.

It also talks about old doctrines such as scienter rule, and judicial precedents.

Several examples were investigated in the course of my research for this paper, and I will use one of them as an example to offer a thorough analysis of responsibility in a variety of contexts.

Keywords: Liability, Animal Act 1971, Scienter rule, feare naturae, mansuetae naturae.

 

 

INTRODUCTION

In 1971, the United Kingdom passed an Act and in response to which a research was conducted on civil liability for animals conducted by the English Law Commission¹. The study's stated goal was to "offer proposals for modernising and simplifying the common law."

 

When someone keeps an animal with the full knowledge that it may hurt others, should the animal ever go free, that person assumes full responsibility for any harm the animal does. This person has a legal responsibility to domesticate the animal and keep it under control at all times so that it does not cause damage to anybody else. The general public agrees wholeheartedly that wild or untamed animals are more likely to have this tendency than domesticated ones. Since it is already known that these creatures have this tendency, the scientist's theory does not need to be verified in this situation. In other words, if this phenomenon can be shown, it demonstrates scienter and moves the animal from the natural class to the feare naturae class. All animals of the second category, mansuetae naturae, are considered to be benign until they show symptoms of having a wild or evil propensity, at which point the presence of such indicators is considered to constitute proof of scienter.

 

This part of the law is in an intolerable mess, with rules being applied and distinctions being made that make little sense in light of modern realities, is a fact that is commonly accepted. This is due to the fact

¹ Civil Liability for Animals (Rep 13, 1967) [29]–[59].

https://s3-eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/lawcom-prod-storage-11jsxou24uy7q/uploads/2016/08/LC.-013-CIVIL- LIABILITY-FOR-ANIMALS.pdf

that disagreements in this area of the law persist despite the fact that they make no sense under the present set of conditions. And this, despite the fact that plenty of others have looked into this before.

The Commission believes that modernising and standardising the industry is vital despite the fact that there is opposition to change in the sector.

 

The topic of law being examined here is complicated and has far-reaching effects on people's daily lives. Individuals whose livelihoods or hobbies depend on animal care, those who are particularly vulnerable to animal cruelty, and those whose jobs (such as highway maintenance or insurance provision) may oblige them to participate in animal practises.

 

LITERATURE REVIEW

 

Ø     JOURNAL ARTICLES

o  ‘Liability in Anglo-American Law for Damage done by Chattels’²

 

Regarding the law of the land, two generalizations appear to be justified when the author discusses the culpability under Anglo-American law for injury caused by chattels, i.e.

1.‘The governing principle in all cases is strict liability or liability without fault’

2.‘The general principle of strict liability is properly regarded as liability ex delicto’

 

 

o  ‘Pit Bull Bans: The State of Breed-Specific Legislation’³

The author in this journal article talks about the topic of ‘breed’ bans, which is also known as “pit bull bans” or “breed-specific legislation”. Who Has Passed BSL? Hundreds of municipalities of all sizes and geographic locations throughout the country have adopted BSL.

² Fowler V. Harper, Liability in Anglo-American Law for Damage done by Chattels, The University of Toronto Law Journal , 1938, Vol. 2, No. 2 (1938), pp. 280-297, ISSN:1710-1174

https://www.jstor.org/stable/23673613

³ Dana M. Campbell, Pit Bull Bans: The State of Breed-Specific Legislation, American Bar Association, GP Solo , JULY/AUGUST 2009, Vol. 26, No. 5, Animal Law (JULY/AUGUST 2009), pp. 36-41. ISSN:0747-0088

https://www.jstor.org/stable/824011?seq=1&cid=pdf-reference#references_

o  ‘The Animals Act’⁴

The author in this article states the various liability and defenses under The Animal Act 1971⁵. Author mentions about animals straying onto the highway, liability for dangerous animals, harmless species, defenses, cattle trespass, detention and scale of trespassing livestock, damage done by dogs to livestock, and finally he mentions shooting dogs worrying sheep.

 

Ø     BOOKS

 

o  ‘The Law of Torts’ by Ratanlal & Dhirajlal⁶

There are three methods in which a person may be held legally responsible for damage caused by their dangerous animals, as discussed by the author.

(a) Tort law and responsibility for injuries

b) Always at-fault liability when the animal's destructive character is at issue.

(c)               Cattle trespass may be at fault if the defendant knows that an animal that is not normally dangerous is there.

 

o  ‘Law of Torts’ by B.M. Gandhi⁷

The term "animal" is used to describe any kind of life other than humans. In common law, there were restrictions regarding animal culpability, and these regulations may be roughly categorised into two broad classes: (i) the general criteria for determining negligence when it comes to animals, and (ii) responsibility under specific rules called scienter rules.

 

o
‘Law of tort: Including Compensation Under the Consumer Protection Act’ S.P. Singh⁸

⁴Alec Samuels, The Animals Act 1971, The Modern Law Review , Sep., 1971, Vol. 34, No. 5 (Sep., 1971), pp. 550-556. ISSN: 1468-2230

https://www.jstor.org/stable/1094534?seq=1&cid=pdf-reference#references_

⁵ 1971 c. 22

⁶ Ratanlal and Dhirajlal, The law of Torts, 27^th edition, pg. 557, published by: Lexis Nexis, 2016. ISBN: 978-93-5035-741-5.

⁷ B.M Gandhi, Law of Torts, 4^th edition, pg- 377, published by: Eastern Book Company, 2016. ISBN:9789388206402

⁸ S.P Singh, Law of Tort: Including Compensation Under the Consumer Protection Act, pg. 299-302, published by: Universal Law Publishing, ISBN: 9788175349438, 8175349433

According to the author, an animal's keeper is strictly liable for any harm caused by an animal belonging to a dangerous species, i.e. ferae naturae, or by an animal belonging to a non- dangerous species, such as a dog, horse, cow, rams, etc., if the keeper is aware of the animal's vicious nature.

 

STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

According to the law, an animal is liable for the following types of injuries: Even while the law has created specific strict responsibility guidelines for some animal-related damages, these guidelines are by no means the only ones that apply; the general tort liability guidelines also apply to animal-related harm.

When the particular rules of animal culpability apply, the defendant is often subject to strict liability, in contrast to the standard rules of tort liability, which sometimes demand the plaintiff to establish the defendant's negligence. It makes sense therefore why plaintiffs would first try to have the unique rules applied to their cases.

 

RATIONALE OF STUDY

As per common law, the owner of an animal is fully responsible for any harm his animal produces. The Animals Act, 1971⁹ says that, damage caused by a caretaker's animal in England is subject to strict responsibility. The custodian of such creatures bears a duty of care to the general public, which is why stringent responsibility has been imposed on them. The obligation of care is to prevent others from being harmed by the animal in any way. This obligation often includes the care of other people's belongings and animals.

 

RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

1.                    To understand how are animals classified under the law of torts.

2.                     To know about the different kinds of compensation awarded for vicious propensities of animals.

3.                    To learn about the liability of animals and chattels.

4.                    To analyse what is the rationale of imposing liability on the keeper of the animal.

5.                    To know about the current position of this law in India.

 

⁹ Supra note 5

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1.                    How are animals classified under Law of Torts?

2.                    What are vicious propensities of animals?

3.                    What is Liability of animals and chattels?

4.                      What is the rationale of imposing liability on the keeper?

5.                    How is liability of Animals and Chattels interpreted with respect to current scenario?

 

 

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The methodology that would be applied for carrying out this research is a doctrinal research. Primary resources of this research paper are The animal act 1971¹⁰, Journal articles in the Literature review, textbooks like Ratanlal & Dhirajlal, S.P Singh, and B.M Gandhi. Secondary resources such as textbooks, journal articles, and online resources has been used.

Descriptive Legal Research, efforts to stick to the facts of the cases cited issues involved rather very much judgmental about it. The author has not given too many personal opinions on the issues involved.

Analytical Legal Research, with the help of available facts and information, has critically analyzed the whole range of facts and information.

Applied Legal Research, an attempt has been made to find the solution to the issues and problems with the available facts and information. Basing the practical problem, the author aimed to find the solution through action research in a practical context.

 

 

CHAPTER 1:

MEANING NATURE AND SCOPE OF LIABILITY FOR ANIMALS AND CHATTELS

 

Ø IMPOSITION OF LIABILITY ON THE KEEPER OF DANGEROUS ANIMALS

 

¹⁰ 1971 c. 22

o    DUTY OF CARE

It is important to understand what is meant by the term "Duty of Care" before we can completely grasp the duty that rests on the shoulders of the person in charge of any potentially harmful animal. To further grasp this idea, let's consider a hypothetical situation in which "A," the animal's owner or caretaker, is obligated to pay "B," a victim of A’s animal's actions, monetary damages.¹¹

 

o BREACH OF DUTY

In the case of Whippey v. Jones¹², Mr. Jones, popularly known as C, was out for a run in Kirstall, Leeds, beside the River Aire when Hector, a fully grown 12.5-stone Great Dane puppy, leaped out from behind a bush. A gung-ho Hector smashed into C, stumbled, and fell down a steep hill to the river, seriously injuring his ankle. Hector's owner was Mr. Whippey, D, an inspector for the RSPCA. C filed a lawsuit against D, claiming that on that day, D had negligently handled Hector while walking him in the garden by the river, causing C to suffer damages. For C, it was D's treatment of Hector that caused his wounds.

 

Held: D wasn't negligent. The closest Hector has ever been near somebody was barking at them from a distance; he has never shown any tendency to jump at anyone. D, an experienced dog trainer, had no reason to suspect that Hector, off leash, would approach an unsuspecting human, bite him, and do further serious harm. D's failure to exercise the kind of care that would be expected of a reliable keeper puts her in violation of the aforementioned condition. D must have opted against what a prudent keeper would do in order for them to be below average.¹³

 

As long as D managed, watched, and treated the animal that contributed to the event correctly, there will be no evidence of negligence. This is because they are all actions that are generally regarded as standards for managing cattle or other animals.

 

 

¹¹ Liability for Animals, Cambridge university press,

https://www.cambridge.org/gb/files/3214/7610/6092/Liability_for_Animals_Mulheron.pdf

 ¹² Whippey v. Jones [2009] EWCA Civ 452, [13]

¹³ Ibid

o PROVING THE BREACH

The defendant must act justly and reasonably for such standards and expectations to absolve him of guilt. The physical facilities used to keep the animal captive have been accused of unethical behaviour.¹⁴

 

When Mirvahedy v. Henley ¹⁵ was pitched, C ran into D's horse as it bolted over a double highway through Torquay and Exeter on his journey home from work in Devon. The collision resulted in serious head and facial injuries for C as well as the death of the horse and the destruction of the top of his vehicle. One of the three horses who fled from Dr. Henley's ranch, this specific horse's departure was caused by its anxiety at an unknown object. The distance between D's residence and the incident location was 1.5 km. By leaping over an electrical wire fence and a wooden barrier, trampling through a patch of thick bracken and foliage, climbing a 300-yard stretch of track, and eventually galloping for over a mile down a side road before approaching the busy dual highway, the horses were able to flee the field. Therefore, it may be said that D's acts were not careless. D fenced the whole area where the horses were kept in anticipation of the transfer.

 

o CAUSATION

It is the responsibility of the defendant (B) to prove that the claimant's (A) damages resulted from B's negligent monitoring, treatment, or constant monitoring of the animals when A alleges that they had been injured by animals.

 

In Hole v Ross-Skinner¹⁶, Mr. Hole, 28, was harmed after he t-boned a horse on a two-lane road's shoulder. Mr. Ross-Skinner, (D), had a sizable piece of land and a house in the country. On his land were horse stable. Due to the absence of a stock-proof rail, hedges, or gates along the fields' boundaries, particularly close to the road, C alleges that D was negligent. D's lack of accountability rendered his acts inappropriate, according to C's other argument. The horses had been placed in a ground in Middle Park the previous evening, but it was found the next morning that the barbwire fence enclosing the field had already

been broken, a gate that had been shut the evening beforehand was open, and the horses had across a chalk pit and walked onto the road. The horses have spent the night in a pasture in Middle Park. Poachers

¹⁴ Supra note 11

15 Mirvahedy v. Henley,[2003] UKHL 16, [2003] 2 AC 491.

16 Hole v Ross-Skinner [2003] EWCA Civ 774.

who intended to hunt deer on D's land in the past broke in, destroyed fences, and unlocked gates. D was determined to have shown no negligence. It was not his fault that the invaders got in, even though the entrance had been left open and the fencing had been cut. The fences enclosing the fields on each end of the road were solid, as far as anybody could determine. The poachers' activities were the sole reason the animals were able to escape. Even if D had taken additional precautions by installing more locks on the gate, there was no guarantee that the burglars could have been kept out. The probability that a third party stopped the offender animal from fleeing or from being released, however, does not alter the fact that D's breach caused C's damage.

 

In a situation involving irresponsible behaviour, C must demonstrate that the loss or harm was not too remote from the perspective of the law in order to be entitled to compensation.

 

o  REMOTENESS

Assuming C was injured by the animal's actions, it is not necessary that C's specific manner of damage or the severity of that injury have been reasonably foreseeable, in accordance with the general standards of remoteness. This is because C was injured in a way that could not have been caused by the animal's actions. Needed damage must be of a kind that can be anticipated with some degree of certainty.¹⁷

In Draper v Hodder¹⁸, It was conceivable that the Jack Russell terriers may cause minor injuries to a baby or toddler, like scratches, for example. Although it was not fairly predictable, being bit more than 100 times was an injury that may have happened. Similar to this, the court ruled that it was more likely that a kid would be trampled than bitten if D had carelessly permitted plenty many horses to approach a tiny field where a school picnic was being held. However, being bitten would fall under the category of foreseeable personal harm.

 

o  DEFENCES TO NEGLIGENCE

Contributory negligence, among other defences, may be used in situations involving injuries caused by animals.

 

By disregarding his own safety and putting himself in risk by coming into contact with the animal, C may be accused of contributing to the accident.

 

¹⁷ Supra note 11

¹⁸ Draper v Hodder, [1972] 2 QB 556 (CA) 573 (Edmund Davies LJ).

In Bodey v Hall¹⁹, Mrs. Bodey (C) and her passenger, Mrs. Hall (D), were riding in a pony and trap on a rural road not far from Newbury, Berkshire. Mrs. Bodey was making use of the road so that she might be transported to Newbury. Mrs. Hall's horse, Pepper, developed nerves not long after turning off the farm road into the railroad's side. Due to the trap's forward tilt as it followed the attack, both were propelled out of it and onto the land. Both C and D were taken off guard. C had a brain damage as a result of the vehicle accident. C, an experienced horsewoman, knew without a doubt that the horse in question was the one in question since she had driven with D six to eight times before.

 

She had decided against wearing a riding cap on the day of the accident, which proved to be a fatal error. C's lack of riding helmet use was ruled to not be contributory negligence. Evidence suggested that wearing a riding cap while managing a pony or a trap would have been suitable, but this was not the common practise. When it came to whether or not riders should wear hats while operating carriages, "clearly distinct schools of thought" existed, with the final decision coming down to individual preference. If driving a carriage need a riding cap, yes or no? Although ther1e were no regulations or suggestions for carriage driving, it was advised that one not wear a hat.²⁰

 

o  PROBLEM OF STRAYING ANIMALS

 

Straying onto the highway-

 

When D's animals wandered into a public roadway, the previous common law protection for D in irresponsible situations was eliminated by section 8(1)²¹ of the Animals Act 1971²². Therefore, if animals strayed onto a road, the typical rules of negligence would apply. If the animals strayed due to D's inability to exercise reasonable protection and C was hurt as a consequence, D will be held responsible.²³

As Lord Denning MR stated in Davies v Davies²⁴, The common law principle still holds true today: "The owner of an animal was not accountable if it strayed onto a highway."²⁵

 

¹⁹ Bodey v Hall, 3 [2011] EWHC 2162 (QB) [43]–[44].

²⁰ Supra note 11

²¹ Animals straying on to highway, sec.8 Duty to take care to prevent damage from animals straying on to the highway.

²² Supra note 5

²³ Supra note 11

²⁴ Davies v Davies, [1975] QB 172 (CA) 175.

²⁵ Supra note 5

In the case of Searle v. Wallbank,²⁶ which took place in 1971, he was not required to exercise any duty of care to make repairs to the hedges or to keep the animal in the field. As a consequence of the Animals Act 1971²⁷, section 8(1)²⁸, the general rule is that the keeper of an animal has an obligation to take such care as is reasonable to ensure that it does not wander on to a roadway and cause damage. This duty comes as a result of the fact that the Animals Act 1971²⁹ was passed.

 

o STATUTORY CAUSES OF ACTION UNDER THE ANIMALS ACT 1971

 

Animal owners may be held liable for any damage their pets cause under the "Act," which is short for the Animals Act of 1971³⁰. This law is meant to augment others that establish civil culpability (via things like fines, jail time, or confiscation) for harm caused by hazardous animals. It is supplementary to laws that compel animal caretakers to have insurance and get licences. In most cases, insurance programmes are relied upon more than legal proceedings to compensate accident victims.³¹

 

o PRE-REQUISITES³²

 

·                  Precondition-1

Who can sue and who can be sued under the Act?

 

Subject to subsection (4) of section 6³³, a person is a keeper of an animal if:

(a)               he owns the animal or has it in his possession; or

(b)              he is the head of a household of which a member under the age of sixteen owns the animal or has it in his possession;

²⁶ Searle v Wallbank [1947] AC 341, [1947] 1 All ER 12, (1947) 176 LT 104, (1947) 63 TLR 24, [1947] LJR

258

²⁷ Supra note 5

²⁸ Ibid 1

²⁹ Supra note 5

³⁰ Supra note 5

³¹ Supra note 11

32Mulheron, Principles of Tort Law, Cambridge University Press,

https://www.cambridge.org/gb/files/3214/7610/6092/Liability_for_Animals_Mulheron.pdf

Until another person becomes the animal's keeper in line with the rules that come before paragraph, the person who was the keeper immediately prior to that time under that paragraph remains the keeper of the animal. Any person who has maintained an animal in line with the preceding clauses in this paragraph is still maintaining the animal even though the animal is no longer possessed or in the possession of that person.

 

The Act does not specify who is eligible to bring a claim, thus anybody who has suffered losses due to animal behaviour is allowed to do so. The wounded party may have been a client at D's equestrian centre, but they could just as well have been an employee, a friend, or even someone D has never met. A keeper may sue another keeper for breach of contract under the Act. An admissible suffering under the Act is an injury sustained by a keeper as a direct consequence of the animal's actions. The Act does not mandate that an eligible C ought to be a "stranger" to the keeper in order to qualify.³⁴

 

·                                Precondition-2³⁵

 

 

Type of animal which caused injury

 

 

Notably, the term "animal" is not defined either in the Animals Act of 1971³⁶. Consequently, the Act's potential scope is not entirely clear.

For the purposes of the statutory foundation for action under the Act, it is required to ascertain whether or not the creature that caused him damage was of a purported "dangerous" species, as various criteria for establishing culpability apply to each sort of animal. This is because the animal in issue has to fall into one of these two classes for the statutory cause of action to be applicable.

In order to evaluate D's obligation, all animals are categorised as either dangerous or non- dangerous under section 2³⁷ of the Act. Animals fall into one of these two classes depending on whether or not people regard them to be a threat to human safety. This division does not quite reflect the old common law scienter notion, which distinguished between injury caused by wild animals (ferae naturea) and harm

 

³³ Interpretaion of certain expressions used in section 2-5, (4), Animal Act,1971

³⁴ Supra note 11

³⁵ Supra note 21

³⁶ Supra note 5

³⁷ Liability for damages done by dangerous animals, section2, animal act,1971

 

caused by domesticated animals (mansuetae naturae). But the legislative breakdown is what we have today, and how things are divided up is a question of interpretation. Any animal of a dangerous species is included by the law's provision in section 2(1)³⁸. All animals of a species that "is not commonly domesticated in the British Islands" and "fully-grown animals of the species normally have such characteristics that are likely, unless restrained, to cause severe damage or that any damage they may cause is likely to be severe" are considered dangerous wild animals under Section 6(2)³⁹. Any animal seeking protection under this provision must satisfy both of these conditions. Obviously, subsection (1) of section 2⁴⁰ only applies in certain cases.⁴¹

 

·  Precondition-3⁴²

 

The legal theory under which compensation may be sought.

 

Specifically, section 11⁴³ of the Act defines "damage" as "the death of, or injury to, any person (including any disease and any impairment of body or mental condition). This term encompasses every possible meaning. Case law demonstrates that the Act may be used to seek compensation for a wide range of injuries, regardless of whether liability is alleged under Section 2(1)⁴⁴ or Section 2(2)⁴⁵, for example:

 

•   physical injury to plaintiff caused by the animal directly (for example, plaintiff being thrown off a horse or being bitten by a dog);

•   physical injury to C because a horse or livestock got onto a roadway and collided with C's car;

•   injury to plaintiff caused by the spread of infection from D's animals;

•   physical injury to plaintiff caused by a horse or livestock getting onto a roadway and colliding with C's car;

•   property damage to plaintiff's chattels caused by the animal (e.g., where his car collided with an animal);

•   physical injury to plaintiff's livestock (e.g., Defendant's dog killing plaintiff's sheep, or defendant's cat killing plaintiff's birds);

³⁸ Ibid

³⁹ Supra note 33

⁴⁰ Ibid

⁴¹ Supra note 11

⁴² Supra note 21

⁴³ General interpretation, Animal act,1971

⁴⁴ Supra act 37

⁴⁵ Supra act37

•   property damage to his fixtures (e.g., damage to crops or gardens caused by straying animals);

 

•   consequential economic loss flowing from property damage (e.g., arising from plaintiff's inability to sell his crops in the example above); or

 

•   loss of amenity damages, compensating for intangible inconveniences to him, arising from the smell or noise of defendant's animals.

 

 

o ANIMALS BELONGING TO A DANGEROUS SPECIES

 

Damages produced by animals of a dangerous species may result in a person being held liable for such damages regardless of whether or not they were negligent or knew what they were getting into. Section 2(1)⁴⁶ of the act states: Where any damage is caused by an animal which belongs to a dangerous species, any person who is a keeper of the animal is liable for the damage, except as otherwise provided by this Act.⁴⁷

 

The offender is held severely accountable regardless of whether or not he knew the animal presented a harm to people or took every reasonable precaution to prevent the escape of the dangerous animal. Responsibility is thus not an absolute idea, even when the animal in issue is a member of a dangerous species, due to the statutory defences available under the Act, which will be explored below. According to common sense, the 'damage' mentioned in subsection 2(1)⁴⁸ might include either personal harm or property loss. This was the conclusion reached by the English Law Commission⁴⁹: ‘although there is no direct authority on the point, statements of principle in a number of cases suggest that, provided an animal is a danger to mankind, there is strict liability for any damage which it may cause to property’.⁵⁰ So far as the author can ascertain, this provision has never been litigated in English law to date.⁵¹

 

⁴⁶ Supra act 37

⁴⁷ 1971 c. 22

⁴⁸ Supra act 37

⁴⁹ Supra note 1

⁵⁰ EWLC, Civil Liability for Animals (Rep 13, 1967), ch 1, [5], referring to, e.g., Behrens v Bertram Mills Circus Ltd [1957] 2 QB 1 (CA) 13–14.

⁵¹ Supra note 11

 

 

o ANIMALS BELONGING TO A NON-DANGEROUS SPECIES

 

 

A person may be held accountable for injuries caused by a non-dangerous (harmless) animal that acted abnormally in some regard, even though the owner took all the steps that might reasonably be anticipated to prevent the animal from escaping or harming another person. It makes no difference who caused the accident; the owner must pay for repairs.

 

Section 2(2)⁵² of the act states: Where damage is caused by an animal which does not belong to a dangerous species, a keeper of the animal is liable for the damage.

 

Unfortunately, the drafting of this provision is extremely convoluted. That is unfortunate, given that it operates far more widely than s 2(1)⁵³ does – far more accidents involve ‘harmless’ animals than ‘dangerous’ ones. ⁵⁴

 

-                                   Element#1: Satisfying the opening words S 2(2)⁵⁵- The damage to plaintiff must have been caused by owner’s animal. In Bodey v Hall,⁵⁶ facts previously, held: plaintiff’s head injury was caused by the actions of the horse, and him being thrown out of the trap onto her head when the horse unexpectedly shot forward, tipping the trap over.

 

-                                   Element#2: Satisfying condition S (2)(a)⁵⁷- As Lord Hobhouse put it in Mirvahedy v Henley,⁵⁸ this condition deals with the animal's ‘dangerousness’.⁵⁹ This requirement corresponds broadly with what had been called, under the scienter doctrine at common law, proof of a ‘vicious propensity’ on the part of the animal

 

⁵² Supra note 37

⁵³ Supra note 37

⁵⁴ Supra note 11

⁵⁵ Supra note 37

⁵⁶ Bodey v Hall [2011] EWHC 2162 (QB), [2012] PIQR P1, [29].

⁵⁷ Supra note 37

⁵⁸ [2003] UKHL 16, [2003] 2 AC 491, [16]

⁵⁹ [2003] UKHL 16, [2003] 2 AC 491, [16].

-                                   Element#3: Satisfying condition S 2(2)(b)⁶⁰- This condition refers to ‘ the source of the animal's dangerousness’ (per Lord Nicholls in Mirvahedy v Henley⁶¹). The provision is obfuscatory, and had been described judicially as being ‘opaque’ and ‘tortuous’.⁶²

 

-                                   Element#4: Satisfying condition 2(2)(c)⁶³- To satisfy the third legal requirement, the keeper or those associated with the keeper must be familiar with the animal's relevant traits.

 

 

Ø DAMAGE DONE BY AN INDIVIDUAL’S STRAYING LIVESTOCK

 

 

o     Straying onto plaintiff’s land

 

 

Under section 4⁶⁴ of the Act, a defendant is held strictly liable for damages and expenses caused by trespassing livestock if the defendant is in possession of livestock (other than horses) and the livestock trespasses onto land owned or occupied by the plaintiff and either damages the land or the property of the plaintiff. There is no need to prove that he was careless. Any horse that is "on any land in England without legal authorisation" is also in violation of section 4A⁶⁵ of the Act. Horses "on any land in England without legal authorization" are within the purview of this clause.

 

The cattle trespass doctrine of common law has been replaced by these guidelines, although the common law principle of strict liability has been maintained. We believe that a fresh explanation of the principles

 

⁶⁰ Supra note 37

⁶¹Supra note 23

⁶² Turnbull v Warrener [2012] EWCA Civ 412, [17] (Maurice Kay LJ).

⁶³ Supra note 37

⁶⁴ Liabilty for damage and expenses due to trespassing livestock, Animal act,1971

⁶⁵ Ibid

of strict responsibility for wandering animals is preferable to attempts to patch up elements of the current legislation dealing to cattle trespass, since there can be no doubt that this area of the law is burdened by outdated and questionable standards.⁶⁶

 

o  Straying onto a highway

 

 

Plaintiff, who is wounded when travelling along a road while meeting D's animal, is required to establish that D did not exercise reasonable care as the keeper of that animal, which resulted in C's injuries. This is necessary in order to win the case. Because of the decision in Searle v. Wallbank⁶⁷, cases such as Mirvahedy v. Henley⁶⁸ were allowed to be litigated based on the theory of negligence.

 

o  Combining the scenarios

 

 

The provisions of the Animals Act 1971⁶⁹ and the case law covered previously do not do as well a job as the graphic on the preceding page does of conveying the subtleties, nuances, and complexity of this area of tortious duty for animals. Seeing as how the figure is superimposed on the prior page, this makes sense. Graphically, this goes against what the English Law Commission, which claims that the new theory would "provide a very clear norm" in lieu of the antiquated cattle trespass idea, has to say.⁷⁰

 

Ø     REMOTENESS

 

 

Whether C's damage or loss must have been fairly foreseeable in order for there to be a chance of recovery in an action based on strict liability brought under Section 2, Section 3, or Section 4⁷¹ of the Act is currently up for debate. Prior to this report's publication in 1967, the English Law Commission⁷² did not

 

⁶⁶ Supra note 11

⁶⁷ Supra note 18

⁶⁸ Supra note 23

⁶⁹ Supra note 5

70 Civil Liability for Animals (Rep 13, 1967) [65].

⁷¹ Supra note 5

⁷² Supra note 1

discuss the prospect of irreparable injury in cases involving the Animals Act of 1971⁷³.⁷⁴

 

Ø STATUTORY DEFENCES FOR DEFENDANT’S LIABILITY UNDER S 2

There are three statutory defences available to a defendant under the Act if the defendant is prima facie culpable under section 2⁷⁵. Whether the animal in question belongs to a potentially dangerous group, the defendant is always entitled to raise these defences.

Here are the three ways in which he might seek legal protection from potential harm thanks to

the Animals Act,1971⁷⁶: in the event that he is found liable under section 2⁷⁷:

1.                the plaintiff was entirely to blame for the injury that was sustained.

2.                The plaintiff knowingly and willingly accepted the possibility of suffering damages.

3.                The plaintiff illegally entered the premises. The lenient way in which these defences have been interpreted has helped to restore some equilibrium in the defendant's favour, despite the fact that it is relatively simple for him to satisfy the requirements outlined in section 2(2)⁷⁸, despite this, the conditions outlined in section 2(2)⁷⁹ have been interpreted.⁸⁰

 

o    DAMAGE WHOLLY DUE TO THE FAULT OF PLAINTIFF

Defendant is not responsible for damages if the plaintiff is found to be "wholly at fault" for them. It is hard to onclude that the claimant was "wholly at blame" after it is shown that the defendant, as the animal's caretaker, is responsible for some "fault," whether in carelessness or otherwise. Defendant's negligence or other kind of culpability renders the defence moot. This defence is provided by s 5(1)⁸¹. It applies to liability arising under S 2, 3, 4 and 4A⁸².

⁷³ Supra note 5

⁷⁴ Supra note 11

⁷⁵ Supra note 37

⁷⁶ Supra note 5

⁷⁷ Supra note 37

⁷⁸ Supra note 37

⁷⁹ Supra note 37

⁸⁰ Supra note 11

⁸¹ Exceptions from liability under sec 2, Animal act 1971.

⁸² Supra note 5

o  VOLUNTARY ACCEPTANCE OF RISK

 

 

If the plaintiff can show that he or she "voluntarily accepted the hazard" of being injured by the defendant's animal, the defendant will have a difficult time proving liability. Although it is a complete defence, the defence of volenti in common law is not entirely analogous to the defence of volenti under statute. Section 5(2)⁸³ provides the applicable defence, and it applies only to the duty stated in Section 2⁸⁴.

The plaintiff has the burden of (1) showing that he was aware of the risk and (2) showing that he knowingly and willingly put himself in harm's way.⁸⁵

 

o TRESPASSERS

 

If the plaintiff is injured by a defendant's animal while trespassing on property where the defendant's animal was kept, the defendant is completely protected from liability if either (1) he did not keep the animal there to protect persons or property, or (2) he kept the animal there to protect persons or property, and it was reasonable for the defendant to keep the animal for that purpose.

 

o     STATUTORY DEFENCES FOR DEFENDANT’S LIABILITY UNDER S 3

 

Under subsection 3⁸⁶, the plaintiff is strictly liable to the defendant (the owner of the livestock) for the damage that was caused by the defendant's dog (the keeper of the dog responsible for the death or injury), subject to three statutory defences.⁸⁷

 

If any of the following circumstances is true, the defendant will have a defence to any obligation imposed by section 3⁸⁸:

 

⁸³ Supra note 81

⁸⁴ Supra note 37

⁸⁵ Supra note 11

⁸⁶ Liability for injury done by dogs to livestock, Animal act,1971

⁸⁷ Supra note 11

⁸⁸ Ibid

•   the plaintiff's livestock strayed onto land, where the offending dog either belonged to the occupier of that land, or the dog's presence on the land was authorised by that occupier, per s 5(4)⁸⁹; • the common law defence of contributory negligence applies, per s 10⁹⁰; or

•   the damage to the plaintiff's livestock that was caused by the defendant's offending dog was "due wholly to the fault of the plaintiff."

 

Ø  OLD COMMON LAW DOCTRINES: Scienter Rule and Cattle Trespass

 

If a "wild animal" caused harm, its owner had all responsibility under the scienter theory (ferae naturae). The custodian had complete and whole understanding of the feral animal's potentially lethal tendencies, therefore this was the case. If the animal in question was a "domesticated animal" or "tame animal" (mansueta naturae), and its keeper knew that it had a horrible propensity to do the type of injury that was committed to C, then the keeper would be held harshly accountable regardless of guilt. The idea could only work if the keeper was aware of the animal's bad tendencies; in the case of wild animals, this knowledge might be assumed without evidence, but in the situation of domesticated animals, evidence would be required.

 

According to McQuaker v Goddard⁹¹, Because they were not tamed, wild animals were considered to be hazardous to humans, in contrast to domesticated animals, which were thought to be secure. The scienter hypothesis protects domesticated animals including cats, dogs, cattle, horses, pheasants and partridge, bees, as well as camels.

 

There were many other kinds of wild creatures that might be discovered, including elephants, bears, zebras, lions, tigers, and monkeys, to mention a few. However, "there is substantial dispute as to the standards applied in categorising these species," ⁹²

 

⁸⁹ Supra note 81

⁹⁰ Application of certain enactments to liability under sec 2

⁹¹ McQuaker v Goddard [1940] 1 KB 687 (CA) 695.

⁹² Supra note 11

CHAPTER 2:

JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS

 

 

# CASE-1

In Breeden v Lampard⁹³ (1985) The claimant's leg was broken when the horse she was riding approached another horse too quickly from behind and kicked it. Lloyd LJ stated, "If liability is based on the possession of some abnormal characteristic known to the owner, then I cannot see any sense in imposing liability when the animal is behaving in a perfectly normal way for all animals of that species in those circumstances, even if it wouldn't be normal for those animals to behave in that manner in other circumstances, for example, a bitch with pups or a hob wiggling its tail." The commentator said that Section 2(2)(b)⁹⁴ was a one-legged stool, and that the court's ruling "severely restricted the application of s.2(2)⁹⁵ to aberrant animals because of this. Since the case included a study of natural behaviour, it is in the favour of the keepers.

 

# CASE-2

Flack v Hudson⁹⁶ (2000) explains what's behind a peculiar characteristic. When Mrs. Flack's horse saw an approaching tractor, it became quite nervous and bolted down the road in front of her. Mrs. Flack's fall caused her to sustain injuries that ultimately proved deadly. The abnormal behaviour of this horse was clearly in violation of subsection 2(2)(b)⁹⁷. Not all horses will run away if they see a tractor, but if they are frightened, their instinct is to go away as quickly as possible. Since Sebastian's source of concern is not one that many horses often feel, his behavior—namely, racing away—was seen as peculiar. These examples, such as Breeden and Fox v. Kohn, show that stable owners are not responsible for injuries their horses cause while behaving normally. This allows the counterargument that keepers are not subjected to an undue share of the regulatory burden as a consequence of the Animals Act⁹⁸.

⁹³Breeden v Lampard [1985] WL 542478.

⁹⁴ Supra note 37

⁹⁵ Supra note 37

⁹⁶ Flack v Hudson [2001] QB 698.

⁹⁷ Supra note 37

⁹⁸ Supra note 5

                # CASE-3

In Mirvahedy v Henley⁹⁹, (2003) By a vote of 3 to 2, the House of Lords decided that if a non- dangerous animal causes damage by acting in a way that is not typical of the species as a whole but is typical of the species under certain circumstances, the animal's keeper will be held strictly liable under section 2(2)(b)¹⁰⁰ of the Animal Welfare Act. Due to the fact that this is not typical behaviour for the species as a whole, this choice was chosen. Since all horses react similarly when sufficiently terrified, a horse that rushes away because it is fearful of something it has never seen before is deemed to be responding properly given the circumstances. Since this is a violation of the second prong of subsection 2, (2)(b)¹⁰¹. The House of Lords also restated that section 2(2)(b)¹⁰² had two potential paths to liability. The judgement in the case of Mirvahedy might be interpreted to mean that owners are now liable for damage caused by their animals while acting normally. Due to the closeness of the vote tally, the opinions of their Lordships must be considered; in particular, the views of Lord Scott and Lord Slynn, who were among the Lords who voted against the judgement. The majority opinion, given by Lord Nicholls, took into account the contrasting findings of Lords Cummings and Breeden.

 

#CASE-4

In Clark v Bowlt¹⁰³ (2006) Injuries were sustained by the claimant when his automobile was struck by the defendant's horse, Chance, as he attempted to pass two horses being ridden by the defendant. The defendant was found guilty at first instance for exhibiting the propensity to behave in a way that deviated from the court's instructions, which the judge deemed sufficient to establish liability under section 2(2)(b)¹⁰⁴. The Court of Appeals ruled that the judge erred in his application of Mirvahedy when he decided that clause 2(2)(a)¹⁰⁵ was met because of the fact that Chance's weight was likely to inflict significant injury (b). Since a horse's weight is an inherent quality of the species, this provision could never have been met. The opposite of what was intended by the Act would happen if weight was considered an abnormality in horses. The court said that the case "has restricted the meaning of section 2¹⁰⁶ by underlining the necessity for a homogeneous reading of subsections (a) and (b)." Because the

⁹⁹Mirvahedy v Henley per Lord Nicholls at para.48.

¹⁰⁰ Supra note 37

¹⁰¹ Supraa note 37

¹⁰² Supra note 37

¹⁰³ Clark v Bowlt [2006] EWCA Civ 978.

¹⁰⁴ Supra note 37

¹⁰⁵ Supra note 37

¹⁰⁶ Supra note 37

desire to deviate from the prescribed course of action cannot be considered a trait within the meaning of subsection 2(2)¹⁰⁷, the Court of Appeal sided with the appellant (b). Sedley LJ held that the purpose of section 2(2)¹⁰⁸ was not to make pet owners habitually responsible for harm caused by the species's innate tendencies. The absence of the necessary element to hold the keeper responsible in this case is a significant limitation on the scope of the claim.

 

#CASE-5

Welsh v Stokes¹⁰⁹ (2007) Defendants' 17-year-old employee was wounded when a horse leaped out of the water and fell on top of her. All three conditions of subsection 2¹¹⁰ were found to have been satisfied, as the Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision. A fall from a rearing horse is very dangerous and may result in severe harm, as stated in Section 2(2)(a)¹¹¹. Specifically, the accused argued that the trial judge had improperly interpreted Sections 2(2)(b)¹¹² and 2(2)(c)¹¹³.

Given that horses as a species will raise under particular conditions, the court ruled that the trait of rearing was characteristic for the horse under section 2(2)(b)¹¹⁴.

The key question, as noted by Dyson LJ, was not whether Ivor had a propensity to rear in general, but whether he had the trait of rearing under those particular circumstances. Therefore, the court properly read clause 2 (2)(b)¹¹⁵.

 In their defence, the defendants claimed that the issue with section 2(2)(c)¹¹⁶ was that the court did not examine whether or not they had sufficient evidence that Ivor had the trait of rearing in particular circumstances, as opposed to horses in general.

 The defendant's appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal because it was determined that knowing that the general species may act in such a way under specified circumstances is sufficient to satisfy section 2(2)(c)¹¹⁷.

¹⁰⁷ Supra note 37

¹⁰⁸ Supra note 37

¹⁰⁹ Welsh v Stokes [2007] EWCA Civ 796.

¹¹⁰ Supra note 37

¹¹¹ Supra note 37

¹¹² Supra note 37

¹¹³ Supra note 37

¹¹⁴ Supra note 37

¹¹⁵ Supra note 37

¹¹⁶ Supra note 37

¹¹⁷ Supra note 37

CHAPTER 3:

JUDICIAL VIEW IN 21^ST CENTURY

 

#CASE-1

Freeman v Higher Park Farm¹¹⁸ (2008) contains what is perhaps the most extreme instance of deliberately accepting risk of all the cases employing section 5(2)¹¹⁹, and it exemplifies exactly why the defence is so crucial to the Animals Act¹²⁰. Although the claimant had been advised beforehand that her horse was prone to bucking when breaking into a canter, she stated that this behaviour did not bother her and that the ride did not dampen her enthusiasm. The claimant said that she had begun to canter and that the horse had buckled somewhat, at which point she had inquired as to whether or not it was safe for her to continue. The second time, the horse gave a few good bucks, sending the claimant flying from the animal and into serious injury. Due to the high probability of severe injury for anybody falling from a bucking horse, the Court of Appeals found that the conditions of section 2(2)(a)¹²¹ had been satisfied. Bucking, however, was ruled not to qualify as a "trait not frequently observed in horses" under the first prong of Section 2(2)(b)¹²². No evidence was also found to support the idea that bucking is a typical behaviour for horses, but rather one that manifests only in certain contexts. This meant that consideration of section 2(2)(c)¹²³ was utterly unnecessary since the second prong could not be fulfilled. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's ruling that the section 5(2)¹²⁴ defence was applicable. At least twice, the claimant was asked whether she wanted to continue and canter again, and each times she said “yes" even though it was probable that Patty may buck again. "the appellant voluntarily assumed that risk and its ramifications," as stated by Etherton LJ.

 

#CASE-2

In Jones v Baldwin¹²⁵ (2010) When the claimant rode too closely to the defendant's horse from behind, the

¹¹⁸ Freeman v Higher Park Farm per Etherton LJ at para.51.

¹¹⁹ Supra note 81

¹²⁰ Supra note 5

¹²¹ Supra note 37

¹²² Supra note 37

¹²³ Supra note 37

¹²⁴ Supra note 81

¹²⁵ Jones v Baldwin [2010] (Unreported) Cardiff County Court, 12 October.

horse kicked him, causing bodily harm. The animal then reared up and kicked the claimant as a result. All three of Section 2's requirements had been completed, but it was crystal clear that the defendant had a defence available under that section's fifth prong (1). This was because the claimant had brought about his own injuries via his own actions.

 

Two important points are reinforced by this case: first, that horse keepers are not responsible for actions that are inherently equine, and second, that those who choose to engage in the extremely dangerous activity of horseback riding are fully responsible for their own actions, no matter how they turn out.

 

#CASE-3

In Bodey v Hall¹²⁶ (2011) At the time of the incident, the claimant was serving as her friend's groom as she drove her horse in a trap. The trap tipped over and the claimant was hurt when the horse became scared and ran. Because of the high probability of serious harm, subsection

(a)                of section 2¹²⁷ was met. Since it is known from Mirvahedy that all horses have the trait of running away when startled, the requirements of Section 2(2)(b)¹²⁸ were also fulfilled. The defendant was a skilled horsewoman, thus it was shown that she was aware of the fact that horses, as a species, tend to run away when they're terrified (section 2(2)(c)¹²⁹). The claimant was also a skilled horsewoman, thus the High Court ruled that the willing acceptance of risk defence of Section 5(2)¹³⁰ applied.

 

#CASE-4

In Goldsmith v Patchcott¹³¹ (2012) The plaintiff was riding a horse named Red when the steed was frightened and bucked. After the claimant fell from the horse, Red kicked her in the face. Initially, the court ruled that Section 2's requirements had been completed, but he also ruled that the defendant might raise the willing acceptance of risk defence. Following an appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower

 

¹²⁶ 5 Bodey v Hall [2011] EWHC 2162 QB

¹²⁷ Supra note 37

¹²⁸ Supra note 37

¹²⁹ Supra note 37

¹³⁰ Supra note 81

¹³¹ Goldsmith v Patchcott [2012] EWCA Civ 183.

court's ruling that all three of Section 2's requirements had been fulfilled. The second half of criterion 2(2)(b)¹³² is met since bucking is a behaviour that all horses display under certain situations, especially when they are frightened by anything. All horses have the ability to buck when startled. The Court of Appeals also upheld the trial court's ruling that section 5(2)¹³³ applied. Claimant said that although she understood there was a chance Red may buck, she did not realise he could buck as hard as he did. Despite her awareness of the potential for Red to buck, she continued. "the fact that Red bucked more violently than predicted cannot carry this case beyond s.5(2) in order to defeat the defendant's defence," said Jackson LJ. It may be shown that the defendant insurers' exposure to the possibility that a claimant would be held liable for the animal's normal behaviour would be much reduced if they took a broad reading of section 5(2).¹³⁴

 

#CASE-5

In Turnbull v Warrener¹³⁵ (2012) The defendant's bitless horse, named Gem, was being ridden by the claimant. After taking Gem for a walk in a ring, the two females agreed that he responded well to a bridle. Due to Gem's uncontrollability, the claimant fell off as the horse deviated through a hole in the hedge. Nothing in section 2(2)¹³⁶ had been shown, and even if it had, the defendant might have utilised subsection 5(1)¹³⁷ to claim that the victim was solely to blame for the injury. In response to the claimant's appeal, the defendant argued that the claimant had voluntarily accepted risk in violation of Section 5(2)¹³⁸. As the Court of Appeals explained, the judge improperly interpreted Section 2(2)¹³⁹. Since horseback riding is inherently dangerous, subsection (a)of that law must be applied. The judge considered whether or not it was common for horses to disobey directions when he arrived at his conclusion about Section 2(2)(b)¹⁴⁰. Maurice Kay LJ stated that this consideration was ‘too simplistic’¹⁴¹ and that as the judge had held that the claimant could not stop the horse because of the bitless bridle, he should have instead asked whether it was normal for horses not to respond to instructions in circumstances where they are wearing a bitless bridle which they are unaccustomed to.

¹³² Supra note 37

¹³³ Supra note 37

¹³⁴ Ibid per Jackson LJ at para.59.

¹³⁵ Turnbull v Warrener per Maurice Kay LJ.

¹³⁶ Supra note 37

¹³⁷ Supra note 81

¹³⁸ Supra note 81

¹³⁹ Supra note 37

¹⁴⁰ Supra note 37

¹⁴¹ Turnbull v Warrener per Maurice Kay LJ at para.21.

This question would therefore have most likely led to the second limb of section 2(2)(b)¹⁴² being satisfied. It was also clear to the Court of Appeal that section 2(2)(c)¹⁴³ would have been satisfied due to the fact that the two women were experienced horsewomen. Because, as Maurice Kay LJ put it for the Court of Appeal, "to find that Ms Turnbull was 'wholly' at blame cannot cohabit with the judgement that Mrs Warrener was not negligent," the Court of Appeal concluded that the section 5(1)¹⁴⁴ defence did not apply.’¹⁴⁵ However, the court ruled in favour of the defendant, citing section 5(2)¹⁴⁶, since the claimant knew that a horse would refuse to follow a rider's commands if it was unfamiliar with the equipment being used, in this case the bitless bridle. It was for this reason that they first tried Gem in a confined space while bridled.

 

CHAPTER 4:

CHALLENGES THAT ARE NOT COVERED IN THE ACT

In response to a rise in dog attacks in recent years, the House of the Kanpur Municipal Corporation (KMC) has approved a resolution to outlaw the breeding of pit bulls and rottweilers inside municipal limits.¹⁴⁷

The resolution states that a fine of up to Rs 5,000 and the confiscation of the animal would be given to anybody caught in possession of either of the two species.

 

On the other hand in Cubbon Park, Residents who love their pets are fuming because, beginning of July 1, the city's Horticulture Department will no longer let them to bring them into Cubbon Park. In response to widespread public outcry and demonstrations, the department reversed a restriction it had previously placed on bringing pets to the park over five years ago.

 

In Kanpur, over the course of the previous two months, pit bulls have been responsible for attacking half a dozen individuals across three states. An old woman died of her wounds in Lucknow in July. This month, a pit bull attacked a 10-year-old child in Ghaziabad, requiring 150 stitches. A teenager was severely mauled by a pit bull and taken to the hospital in Meerut. A pit bull attacked a lady, leaving her with significant injuries in Gurugram. In Kanpur, one dog attacked a cow.

¹⁴² Supra note 37

¹⁴³ Supra note 37

¹⁴⁴ Supra note 81 ¹⁴⁵ Ibid at para.29.

¹⁴⁶ Supra note 81

¹⁴⁷ Kanpur bans rearing of pitbull, rottweiler dog breeds within city limits, ET Spotlight Special, Sep 28, 2022

The Kanpur resolution said that the reason pit bulls and Rottweilers get stressed and attack people is because their owners do not have a big enough home or farm house to properly care for them.

Animal rights campaigner Priya Chetty Rajagopal was surprised by the move to prohibit dogs. But if it turns out that unrestrained dogs and unpicked faeces are at the root of the problem, I really hope pet owners behave civically and do something about it. She emphasised the need of leashing dogs and picking up waste whenever owners left the dog park's property.¹⁴⁸

 

CHAPTER 5:

CRITICAL ANALYSIS

Case law decided in recent years shows that the Animals Act of 1971¹⁴⁹ does not require updating since it adequately safeguards and defends the rights of caretakers.

 

The major substance of Section 2¹⁵⁰ would be deleted if the Bill were to become law, along with the phrases "except at particular times or circumstances" and "characteristics of the animal not typically found in animals of the same species". According to the bill's original intent, "damage related to an animal's unusual or conditional characteristic" would have replaced section 2(2)(b)¹⁵¹. "Uncommon" here implies "not shared by animals of that species generally." A conditional characteristic "is commonly shared by organisms of that species, but only under particular conditions."

 

The case law that emerged in response to the Mirvahedy judgement suggests that the answer is likely not positive, as it applies in most situations when the voluntary acceptance of risk defence provided by Section 5(2)¹⁵² of the Act is at issue. This claim may be contested, nevertheless it is not completely nonsensical. Once the dangers posed by the animal are known by all parties, "serious hurdles for claimants beginning lawsuits" arise. This could be significant in certain ways.

 

The need that the accused be "scienter," or "knowing," is what makes accountability possible under the rule in question. Researchers distinguished between animals of the ferae naturae and mansuetae naturae. One related to wild animals and the other to pets and livestock. A mansuetae naturae animal's keeper

¹⁴⁸ Pets to be banned in Cubbon Park from July 1, The Hindu Editorial, 25 June, 2022

¹⁴⁹ Supra note 5

¹⁵⁰ Supra note 5

¹⁵¹ Supra note 5

¹⁵² Supra note 5

would only be held responsible for any hurt or damage the animal caused if they knew of the animal's violent propensities, while the keeper of a ferae naturae animal would have been found severely guilty for any harm or injury the animal caused.

 

CHAPTER 6:

SUGGESTIONS & CONCLUSION

BIBLIOGRAPHY