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CASE COMMENTARY: ADDAGADA RAGHAVAMMA AND ANR. Vs. ADDAGADA CHENCHAMMA AND ANR. (AIR 1964 SC 136; 1964 (2) S.C.R 933)
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CASE COMMENTARY: ADDAGADA
RAGHAVAMMA AND ANR. Vs. ADDAGADA CHENCHAMMA AND ANR. (AIR 1964 SC 136; 1964 (2) S.C.R 933)
Author By- Shruti Verma
NLIU
BHOPAL (4TH YEAR)
CHAPTERISATION
·
Chapter 1- Background of
the Case.
·
Chapter 2- Statement of Facts
·
Chapter 3- Argument of
Petitioner
·
Chapter 4- Argument of
Respondent
·
Chapter 5- Judgement and
Ratio Decidendi
·
Chapter 6- Conclusion and
Suggestions
CASE NAME: ADDAGADA RAGHAVAMMA
AND ANR. Vs. ADDAGADA CHENCHAMMA
AND ANR [ AIR 1964 SC 136; 1964 (2) S.C.R 933 (9 April 1963)]
PETITIONER: ADDAGADA RAGHAVAMMA AND ANR.
RESPONDENT: ADDAGADA CHENCHAMMA
AND ANR.
COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER: Mr. Bhimasankaram, G. Jagapathi Rao and Satyanarayana
COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT: D.Narsaraju, Advocate-General for the State of Andhra
Pradesh, and T. V. R. Tatachari
BENCH: K. SUBBA RAO, RAGHUBAR
DAYAL AND J. R. MUDHOLKAR. (DIVISION BENCH)
DATE OF JUDGEMENT- 9 April, 1963
MATERIAL FACTS
• By their
geneology the appellants and the respondents trace their interest and rights to
Veeranna who died in 1906.
• One of his son
named Pitchayya , who had predeceased him in 1905, is alleged to have taken up
Venkaya his brother's son Chimpirayya in adoption sometime before his death.
• In addition, it
is alleged that Veeranna and his four sons partitioned the properties of Joint
Family. After having a son named Subbarao, Venkayya died in 1938.
• Chimpirayya died
after executing a will in 1945 to the daughter of her predeceased daughter
named Kamalamma and Subbarao, where they were given their properties in equal
shares.
• He also
instructed his brother Pitchayya's wife Raghavamma to take possession of,
manage and pass them over to his two grandchildren, the whole property
belonging to him, when they had reached a majority.
Following the
death of Chimpirayya, Raghavamma let the entire property to be managed by
Chenchamma and then the entire property was came into the possession of
Chenchamma accordingly..
In 1949, Subbarao
passed away. Raghavamma filed a suit before the Subordinate Judge, Bapatlal, in
order to possess the claimed scheduled property, and in that proceeding
Chenchamma became the first defendant; Kamalamma, the second defendant; and China
Punnayya, Veeranna's second son by his second wife, was made as the third
defendant.
The first
defendant refused to accept that Venkayya was given in adoption to Pitchayya or
that the family of Veeranna had a partition as the plaintiff alleged. She claimed
that Chimpirayya died undivided from Subbarao, his grandson, and that Subbarao
was thus entitled by survivorship rights to all the possessions of the joint
family. She did not acknowledge that Chimpirayya executed the will in a sound,
disposable frame of mind. She also failed to accept that the Schedules attached
to the complaint were correct.
Reference of
Family Tree is given below:
ISSUES
(1) Whether
unequivocal recitals in Will declaring intention to divide will constitute
severance in status without the knowledge of the affecting coparceners?
(2) Whether the communication to all the members
of the Joint Family is necessary?
(3) Whether the knowledge of intention to sever
dates back to the date of declaration?
CONTENTIONS OF THE PLAINTIFF
Plaintiff’s stand: : The will of the undivided properties of B1
took place four months before his death in 1945, with its two equal portions
being divided in two parts: one for his grandson, B1SS, and the other for his
granddaughter (B1DD). Because they both had been minors, he stated in his will
that the plaintiff (B2W: Raghavamma), who is a widow of a testator's brother,
should be responsible for managing those properties until they reach majority,
and that if any of those beneficiaries died, then under the will, his/her share
will vest absolutely in a plaintiff.
It is important
to note that management and inheritance was absolutely excluded for the
testator's own daughter-in-law (B1SW: Chenchamma), the mother of B1SS, i.e.
Legatee. When B1 (Legator) passed away, the plaintiff who was intended to
manage property in accordance with the directions under the Will, permitted the
defendant on behalf of her minor son and B1DD to take possession and manage the
property. Four years later, however, B1SS died and as he died without majority
attainment, the plaintiff claimed a half part in the property, as instructed in
the Will.
Plaintiff’s counsel argument: Partition necessitates the coparcener’s
unilateral, unambiguous and clear declaration of his intention to sever the
status, and in such a case, the recitals in the will reveal a clear and
unambiguous statement of B1's intention to divide and that it is, by itself, a
severance in status, which allows it to execute the will. It could not
influence his status as a divided member even though the indication of his
intention was not communicated or disclosed before his death to other
coparceners or to his guardian. The knowledge was from the date of execution of
the will, which is why when B1 passes away he should be considered separate
from the family, resulting in the will acting in his separate interest.
CONTENTIONS OF THE DEFENDANT
Defendant’s Stand- The first defendant
refused to accept that Pitchayya has adopted Venkayya and argued that the
partition has never took place in Veeranna family as alleged. She then argued
that Chimpirayya had died undivided from his grandson Subbarao, and Subbarao
was thus granted entire property through the right of survivorship. She also
did not accept that Chimpirayya was in a sound and disposing frame of mind,
when he executed the will. Nor did she accept that the schedules connected to
the complaint were correct. The second defendant submitted a statement which
was in favor of the plaintiff.
In a statement,
the third defendant denied the claims in the complaint and questioned several
elements in the plaint schedules to be true. He additionally argued that some
of the items were solely belonged to him and that Chimpirayya had no right over
it.
Defendant’s Counsel Argument: The defendant argued that when B1SS had died, he
was the sole surviving coparcener, so on his death through inheritance his
share would go to her as her mother and not as directed in the will. Her
principal argument was that when B1 performed this will, he was an undivided
coparcener with his grandson (B1SS), and as an undivided coparcener, he had no
right to make a will for his undivided share in the Mitakshara coparcenary. As
a result, the will was therefore invalid and could have no effect.
JUDGEMENT OF SUBORDINATE COURT
After reviewing
all of the oral and documentary evidence in the case, the learned Subordinate
judge concluded that the plaintiff had failed to establish the fact of
Venkayya's adoption by her husband Pitchayya, as well as that she had also
failed to establish that Chimpirayya and Pitchayya were divided; as a result,
the suit was dismissed with costs.
JUDGEMENT OF HIGH COURT
On appeal, the
Andhra High Court, divisional bench, re-examined all of the evidence and
confirmed the conclusions of the learned judge in both issue. Another issue was
brought before the learned judges, which is that the recitals of Chimpirayya in
the Will reveal a clear and unequivocal intention that this declaration was a
severance of his status in order to enable him to implement his will.
The learned judge had
refused the plea for two reasons: Firstly, that the will had no such
declaration; and secondly, that the claimant had to claim, a division of the
entire family property, i.e. not just the property claimed by Chimpirayya but
also the property claimed by Pitchayya, and that the suit could not be
maintained as framed. The appeal was thus dismissed with costs.
ISSUES ARISING OUT OF THE CASE
ISSUE 1- WHETHER AN UNEQUIVOCAL RECITALS
IN WILL DECLARING INTENTION TO DIVIDE WILL CONSTITUTE SEVERANCE IN STATUS
WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE AFFECTING COPARCENERS?
Issue -
Before the learned judges the issue rose was that the recitals of Chimpirayya
in the Will reveal a clear and unequivocal intention that this declaration was
a severance of his status in order to enable him to implement his will.
Analysis - If a Will only speaks since
the testator's death. An undivided coparcenary member is legally able to
execute a will; nevertheless, the joint family property cannot legitimately
bequest its undivided share. If an undivided family member has died, the other
members of the family will survive in his interest, and thus the will cannot
work for the joint family property. The question was further referred to the
Hindu Law book and analyzed in two aspects, i.e. the declaration of intention
and the communication of said intention to the other persons concerned.
It was quoted in Saraswati Vilasa, "From this it is known that without any
speech (or explanation) even by means of a determination (or resolution) only,
partition is effected, just as an appointed daughter is constituted by mere
intention without speech." [1]
As a result, the
Mitakshara law supports the severance in status created by declaration of
unequivocal intention since severance is nothing but a state for condition of
mind, and declaration is merely a representation of that mental state. Because
declaration or manifestation can't happen in a vacuum, and declaring is to
proclaim or make known to others, those others should be the ones who are
affected. Following a lengthy series of rulings, the concept that family members
must be aware of one of their members' expressed intention to separate from
them is an essential prerequisite for that member's severance from the family
was authoritatively laid down.
The Judicial
Committee observed in Girja Bai vs
Sadashiv Dhundiraj[2]
that to the other coparcener the evident intention must be "clearly
intimated".
Even, Sir John Wallis C. T. and Kumaraswami
Sastri J. in the case of Kamepalli
Avilam v. Mannem Venkataswamy[3]
said that “the intention to be separated
into other coparcenters, even if explicit or apparent, does not have an impact
on a breach of status if the co-parcent does not communicate in his lifetime”.
The judicial commission laid down the settled law in Syed Kasam v. Jorawar Singh,[4] after
re-examining its earlier decision:
“It is
settled law that in the case of a joint Hindu family subject to the law of the
Mitakshara, a severance of estate is effected by an unequivocal and unilateral
declaration of the intention to sever on the part of one of the joint holders
of his intention to bold his share separately, even though no actual division
takes place.”
Therefore, in
order to unilaterally affect a separation of status from a joint family, the
intention to separate from the joint family needs to be announced.
Result - The learned judge
had thus refused the plea for two reasons:
(1)
that the will had no such declaration; and
(2)
that the claimant had to claim, a division of the entire
family property, i.e. not just the property claimed by Chimpirayya but also the
property claimed by Pitchayya, and that the suit could not be maintained as
framed. The appeal was thus dismissed with costs.
ISSUE 2 – WHETHER THE COMMUNICATION
TO ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE JOINT FAMILY IS NECESSARY?
ANALYSIS- Viswanatha Sastri, J., in Adiyalath Katheesumma v. Adiyalath Beechu[5],
extensively and completely analyzed the matter that is presently brought before
us. In that case, on the Karnavan of the tarwad, a member of a tarwad given
notice of his unequivocal or clear intention to split from the other members of
the family.
The question posed before the learned judges were whether
the act of communication of intention was adequate to the Karnavan. The first
appeal was before Panchapagesa Sastri JJ and Satyanarayana Rao. The notice did
not suffice since it was not served to all other members of a tarwad,
Satyanarayana Rao J. ruled and that Panchapagesa Sastri,J. considered the
Karnavan Service or Joint Family Manager adequate enough since he was the
family representative.
Because there was a difference of view between the two
respected judges, the case was brought before Viswanatha Sastri. J. and it was
thus held that “There must be some
manifestation, indication, intimation or expression of that intention to become
divided, , so as to serve as authentic evidence in case of doubt or dispute.
What from that manifestation, expression, of intention should take would depend
upon the circumstances of each case, there being no fixed rule or right
formula. The dispatch to or receipt by the other members of the family of a
communication or notice announcing the intention to divide on the part of one
member of the family is not essential nor its absence fatal to a severance in
status.”
JUDGEMENT
OF SUPREME COURT
The development of the theory Severance of joint
status may be examined in two parts:
(a) The declaration of intention and
(b) the communication of the declaration of
intent to those affected.
As far as the first part is concerned, the law
is well-established, namely that a separation from the joint status is a matter
of individual discretion, and that a clear, unequivocally defined declaration
should be made thereby, even though there is not an actual division in the law.
With regard to the second component, the Supreme Court remarked that one cannot
proclaim or express his or her mental state in a vacuum. The idea of
"declaration" implicitly requires that it should be brought to the
knowledge of those who are impacted thereby.
COMMENT– The researcher agree with the learned
judge that the intention to split must be intimated, indicated or expressed,
and that what should be done in this manifestation depends on the circumstances
of each instance. However, if the learned judge has meant with the statement that
one can represent a severance of status without being brought to the knowledge
of the other family members in one way or another, it is difficult for the
researcher to accept it. In the researcher’ opinion, the word 'declaration'
implicitly indicates that it should be known to the individual concerned. A
non-communicated statement is nothing more than the creation or harboring of
intention to sever. So, only after communicated to the person or persons
affected thereby will it become effective as a declaration.
Thus, via a process of reasoning through Hindu law texts
and the pragmatic approach by Courts it is apparent that a declaration to be
effective must reach the individual or persons concerned by one way or another,
according to any specific circumstance.
However, this viewpoint does not provide a complete
solution to the problem. There's one more stumbling block. Given that a
declaration is only effective if it is brought to the attention of the other
members affected, three questions arise: what should be the way to which the
intention shall be communicated to the other members; (ii) when should it be
deemed to have been brought to the attention or knowledge to the other members
of the family; and (iii) When it was brought to their attention, what would be
more important in determining the severance date , the date on which expression
of intention took place or the date of knowledge would be more crucial? In a
rapidly changing society, the questions raised create challenging issues.
Applying these principles in the present case, there are
just two members in the joint family in this appeal, and therefore it is not
possible that following Chimpirayya's demise Subba Rao had no awareness of the
conditions of the will.
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS
A number of issues
have been addressed in the Addagada Raghavamma and Anr. v Chenchamma and Anr
which makes this case as one of the leading case when it comes to family law.
This case has been regarded as decisive on a number of matters such as
evidence, severance of status, Doctrine of relation back and so on and so
forth.
The law cannot
presume to separate from unclear and ambiguous circumstances unless a clear and
unambiguous declaration of intent to divide has been made by the coparcener seeking
partition. The presumption under Hindu law is always for the benefit of a joint
family. The burden of proving the partition is with the plaintiff and it was
not discharged. Although the "will" may be supposed to include the
executors' intention for separation but the partition cannot be effective
unless other members are aware of such intention.
In the present case, the researcher
is of the view that the contents of the Will before the testator died were not
known by either the minor coparcenary (Subbarao) or his guardian
(Mother-Chenchamma). The plaintiff had failed to discharge him of the burden of
proving the fact of partition and the entire case collapsed there itself. She
could not claim property since the property was given to the minor coparcener
(Subbarao) through survivorship and after his death to Chenchemma. This case is
therefore unique for the evolution of
Indian law and the eternal reference for the courts in jurisprudence and
family law in particular.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BOOKS· Family Law II, Dr Poonam Pradhan Saxena, Second Edition, LexisNexis Butterworths Wadhwa_
· Wilson, Roland Sir and Ali, Abdullah Yusuc ,Anglo-Muhammadan law (6th ed).
· Paras Diwan, "Family Law", Allahabad Law Agency; Faridabad (Haryana): 2009.
· Muslim Law: The Personal Law of Muslims in by Faiz Badruddin Tyabji, 4th Ed _
· Mulla_ Principles of Mahomedan Law Calcutta: Eastern Law House, 2017.
Article Information
CASE COMMENTARY: ADDAGADA RAGHAVAMMA AND ANR. Vs. ADDAGADA CHENCHAMMA AND ANR. (AIR 1964 SC 136; 1964 (2) S.C.R 933)
Authors: Shruti Verma
- Journal IJLRA
- ISSN 2582-6433
- Published 2023/02/15
- Volume 2
- Issue 7
About Journal
International Journal for Legal Research and Analysis
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