Open Access Research Article
CASE ANALYSIS ON THE TOPIC ISSUING FALSE CERTIFICATE AND FABRICATING FALSE EVIDENCE OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860 BY: ASHISH KUMAR YADAV & JAGATPAL CHOUDHARY
Published Paper
Article Details
CASE
ANALYSIS ON THE TOPIC
“ISSUING
FALSE CERTIFICATE AND FABRICATING FALSE EVIDENCE”
OF THE
INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860
AUTHORED BY: ASHISH KUMAR YADAV
& JAGATPAL CHOUDHARY
1.
Sukhbir Singh Badal v Balwant Singh
Khera and Ors.
(AIR 2023 SC 3053)
Decided On: 28th NOVEMBER
2023
1.1 Introduction of the Case:
The case of Sukhbir Singh Badal v Balwant Singh Khera
and Ors. (AIR 2023 SC 3053)[1],
SC held that for the offence of forgery, a false document must be made with
intent to cause damage or injury to the public or any person. The complainant
filed a complaint alleging that the accused had committed fraud, forgery, and
cheating to obtain the registration of a political party.
The complainant claimed the accused had filed a false
constitution with the Election Commission of India to gain recognition as a
political party.
The brief
facts of the present case are:
A private complaint was filed against Sukhbir Singh
Badal, Sukhdev Singh Dhindsa and Daljit Singh Cheema for offences under
Sections 463, 465, 466, 467, 468, 471. 191, 192 of the Penal Code, 1860 (IPC).
Prakash Singh Badal was not arrayed as an accused in the said complaint. It was
alleged that Prakash Singh Badal, the then President of the Shiromani Akali Dal
(SAD), filed an affidavit with the Election Commission of India (ECI), stating
that the SAD was adhering to the principles of secularism. Still, the said
affidavit conflicted with the undertaking/affidavit given to the Gurudwara
Election Commission (GEC). The earlier affidavit submitted to the GEC conformed
with the Sikh Gurudwaras Act, 1925, which prescribes that only Sikhs can become
voters or contest elections to the Shiromani Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee
(SGPC). Therefore, it was alleged that the SAD had filed a false Constitution
with ECI to gain recognition as a political party.
Thereafter, after a period of nine years, the
complainant sought an amendment to the complaint, to add five persons as
accused persons. Prakash Singh Badal was introduced as an accused after the
said amendment to the complaint, and the Trial Court passed summoning orders on
04.11.2019, against the appellants to face the trial for the offences under
Sections 420, 465, 466, 467, 468, 471 read with 120B IPC. Aggrieved by the
summoning order, the appellants applied to the High Court under Section 482
CrPC to quash the complaint and the summoning order dated 04.11.2019.
1.2 Sections of Law involved:
The sections of law involved in the present case are:
§ Indian
Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) - Section 420[3]
§ Representation
of the People Act, 1951 - Section 29A[4]
§ Indian
Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) - Section 463[5]
§ Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) - Section 482[6]
§ Indian
Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) - Section 192[7]
§ Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) - Section 202[8]
1.3
Name of the Judge &
Advocates:
The name of the Hon’ble Judge who delivered judgment
in the present case is:
§ Justice MR
Shah
§ Justice C.T.
Ravikumar
§ The name of
the advocate who represented the appellant is:
§ Advocate K.V. Viswanathan,
§ Senior Advocate R.S. Cheema,
§ Advocate Gore, Sandeep Kapur,
§ Advocate Tarannum Cheema,
§ Advocate Virinder Pal Singh Sandhu
§ The name of
the advocate who represented the respondent is:
§ Advocate
Indira Unninayar, AOR
1.4 Judgement of Trial Court:
learned Sessions Court came to be dismissed, observing
that the revision is not maintainable against an interlocutory order and that
no order has been passed by the learned Trial Court on the application dated
06.04.2011 of the complainant regarding not pursuing the complaint against
them.
the learned Trial Court held the inquiry under Section
202 Cr.P.C. and recorded the statement of the concerned witnesses.
The Supreme Court had in
November stayed proceedings in the matter before a Punjab court, and
issued notice. High Court had dismissed the revision application and
refused to quash the criminal proceedings and the summoning order. Thus,
aggrieved by the High Court's order, the appellants filed an appeal
before the Court. Shri Parkash Singh Badal, one of the accused, was
added as an accused in an amendment. The High Court dismissed the revision
application and refused to quash the criminal proceedings and summoning order[9].
1.5
Final Judgement:
The court allowed the appeals and quashed the impugned
judgment and order passed by the High Court. The court held that the
ingredients of the offenses were not made out, even assuming the complaint's
averments to be true. The court found that the summoning order was vitiated due
to the lack of mandatory inquiry under Section 202 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure[10].
The Court referred to the relevant provisions of the
IPC and said that the allegations made in the complaint were not at all
appreciable. The Court said that the ingredients for the offence of cheating
were not satisfied and there was no question of deceiving any person,
fraudulently and dishonestly. As far as the offence under Section 465 was
concerned, the Court said that for the offence of forgery, there must be the
making of a false document with intent to cause damage or injury to the public
or to any person. Therefore, making false documents is sine qua non; in the
present case, no false document was produced[11].
Further, the Court said that according to the
complainant, a claim was made at the time of the registration of the Party that
it had adopted a memorandum accepting secularism; however, making a false claim
and producing a false document is distinct. The Court also said that on a plain
reading, no case was made out for the offences under Sections 466, 467, and 468
of the IPC[12].
Thus, the Court said that if the criminal proceedings against the appellants
were continued as per the summoning order, it would abuse the process of law.
Therefore, the entire criminal proceedings against the
appellants were quashed along with the summons passed by the Trial Court. The
Court also observed that it had not expressed anything on the Constitution of
the SAD and that the Court's order shall not affect the pending proceedings
before the High Court of Delhi against the order of the ECI on SAD's
registration.
Thus, the Court allowed the appeals and set aside the
order passed by the High Court wherein the appellant's revision
application was dismissed.
Looking to the averments and allegations in the
complaint and even the material/evidence collected/ recorded during the course
of the inquiry and even assuming the complaint's averments to be true, the
ingredients of the offence punishable Under Sections 420, 465, 466, 467, 468,
471 are not at all made out.
1.6
Conclusion / Ratio Propounded:
The case of Sukhbir Singh Badal v Balwant Singh Khera
and Ors. (AIR 2023 SC 3053)[13], the court
allowed the appeals and quashed the criminal proceedings and summoning order.
The court found that the offenses of cheating and forgery were not made out and
that the summoning order was vitiated[14].
The court held that the complaint was filed belatedly and was an abuse of
process of law and court[15].
In the present case, no false document has been
produced. What was produced was the Memorandum, and no other documents were
produced. Even according to the original complainant, the Memorandum and the
claim made at the time of registration of the Party that it has adopted a
Memorandum accepting secularism, the same was contrary to the Constitution of
the Party produced before the Gurudwara Election Commission. Making a false
claim and creating and producing a false document are both different and
distinct.
For the offence of forgery, a false document must be
made with intent to cause damage or injury to the public or any person.
2. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. Vs.
Rajendra D. Harmalkar
(2022 SCC ONLINE SC 486)
DECIDED ON- 21st APRIL 2022
2.1 Introduction of the Case:
In the case, Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. Vs. Rajendra
D. Harmalka (2022
SCC ONLINE SC 486),[16]
the Supreme Court of India dealt with the issue of disciplinary action against
an employee for producing a false and forged SSLC (Secondary School Leaving
Certificate). The employee was dismissed from service by the Disciplinary
Authority, and the High Court interfered with the punishment imposed by the
Disciplinary Authority, directing the reinstatement of the employee without
back wages or benefits.
The Supreme Court held that producing a false
certificate is grave misconduct and justified the punishment of dismissal
imposed by the Disciplinary Authority. The Court observed that the High Court
erred in considering the punishment of dismissal to be disproportionate to the
misconduct established and proved. It emphasized that the Tribunal should only
usually interfere with the quantum of punishment imposed by the employer if an
appropriate case is made out.
The Court also referred to the case of Hombe Gowda
Educational Trust and another v. State of Karnataka and others[17],
where it was held that the Tribunal should follow the decisions of the Supreme
Court applicable to the facts of the case and not ignore the ratio laid down by
the Supreme Court.
The brief facts of the present case
are:
The facts leading to the present appeal in a nutshell are
as follows:
That the respondent herein original writ petitioner
was initially appointed in the year 1982 as a casual employee, he moved an
application seeking the position of Refueling Helper, wherein under the heading
of qualifications, he mentioned that he passed Secondary School Leaving
Certificate (hereinafter referred to as “SSLC”) in April 1986 from Karnataka
Secondary Education Board. He was thereafter appointed as Helper as per the
regularization policy, regularizing the casual employees, inter alia, subject
to the contents prescribed in the application form for employment being
correct. At that stage, the original writ petitioner submitted SSLC of
Karnataka Board bearing No. 206271 dated 19.05.1986.
The Manager, ER, thereafter requested the authorities
of the Secondary Board to check their records and confirm whether they had
issued any marks certificate carrying details available on the photocopy of the
SSLC marks sheet. In response to the same, the Board informed the authority
that “as per the record, SSLC statement of marks for the year March 1986
bearing Registration No. 206271 relate to one Agrahar Jayant S/o Satyanarayana
A.L. DOB - 15.02.1968 and does not belong to Rajendra Dattaram Harmalkar S/o
Datta Ram Harmalkar, DOB - 08.12.1962”.
In the above circumstances, a departmental inquiry was
initiated against the original writ petitioner.
2.2 Sections of Law involved:
The sections of law involved in the present case are:
§ The
Constitution of India – Article 226[21]
2.3
Name of the Judges & Advocates:
The name of the Hon’ble Judges who delivered judgment
in the present case is:
§ Justice MR
Shah
§ Justice
B.V. Nagarathna
The name of the advocate who represented the appellant
is:
§ Advocate
Rajiv Shukla
The name of the advocate who represented the
respondent is:
§ Advocate
Suruchi Suri
2.4
Judgement of Trial Court &
High Court:
The original writ petitioner was served with the
charge sheet containing two charges, which read as follows:
“1. Wilful insubordination or disobedience, whether or
not in combination with another, of any lawful and reasonable order of a
superior.
2. Giving false information regarding one's age,
father's name, qualifications or previous service at the time of employment.[22]”
The High Court also observed that the petitioner had
been out of service from the year 2006 and, as the counsel for the petitioner,
had made a statement that he would forgive his back wages and promotion, by the
impugned judgment and order the High Court allowed the said writ petitioner and
the directed the appellant to reinstate the original writ petitioner from the
date of dismissal from service in the post of Refueling Helper, however without
any back wages or benefits.
It appears that the High Court has
denied the back wages and other benefits and has ordered reinstatement on a
concession given by the learned counsel on behalf of the original writ
petitioner[23].
2.5 Final Judgement
Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied
with the impugned judgment and order dated 29.06.2015 passed by the High Court
of Judicature at Bombay at Goa in Writ Petition No. 660 of 2013 by which the
High Court has partly allowed the said writ petition preferred by the
respondent herein (hereinafter referred to as the “original writ petitioner”)
directing the petitioner herein to reinstate the original writ petitioner
without any back wages and other benefits by substituting the punishment of dismissal
imposed by the Disciplinary Authority, the employer - Indian Oil Corporation
Ltd. has preferred the present appeal.
The High Court, in exercising its
powers under Article 226[24] of the Constitution of
India, exceeded its jurisdiction by interfering with the order of punishment
imposed by the Disciplinary Authority. The Appellant argues that the High
Court's decision to reinstate the original writ Petitioner without back wages and
other benefits should be quashed and set aside.
The court observed that: “The
question is one of a TRUST. How can an employee who has produced a fake and
forged marksheet/certificate, that too, at the initial stage of appointment, be
trusted by the employer? Whether such a certificate was material or not and/or
had any bearing on the employment is immaterial. The question is not of having
an intention or mens rea. The question is producing the fake/forged
certificate. Therefore, in our view, the Disciplinary Authority was justified
in punishing dismissal from service.[25]”
Because of the above and for the
reasons stated above, the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court
interfered with the order of punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority
of dismissing the original writ petitioner from service and ordering
reinstatement without back wages and other benefits is hereby quashed and set
aside. The order passed by the Disciplinary Authority dismissing the original
writ petitioner from service on the misconduct proved is hereby restored.
The Court also observed that the High
Court gave no specific reasoning on how the punishment imposed by the
Disciplinary Authority could be said to be shockingly disproportionate to the
misconduct proved. “As per the settled position of law, unless and until it is
found that the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority is shockingly
disproportionate and/or there is procedural irregularity in conducting the
inquiry, the High Court would not be justified in interfering with the order of
punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority which as such is a prerogative
of the Disciplinary Authority.[26]”
Reasoning:
Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. Rajendra D. Harmalkar
(2022 SCC ONLINE SC 486)[27]:
This judgment is directly applicable to the user's current legal question as it
analyzes the case in detail and provides the reasoning behind the Supreme
Court's decision to uphold the punishment of dismissal imposed by the
Disciplinary Authority for producing a false and forged SSLC.
2.6 Conclusion / Ratio Propounded:
In this case, the disciplinary authority dismissed the accused
from service for producing a forged certificate of educational qualification.
It was argued by the accused that no age limit or educational qualification was
used to secure a job or promotion. The intention to submit forged documents was
only to maintain records. The High Court of Bombay acknowledged this argument
and declared the action of the disciplinary authority as disproportionate.
Conversely, the Supreme Court observed that the question is not of intention
or mens rea but of trust. This is grave misconduct, and whether the
certificate has any bearing on employment is immaterial. It accordingly quashed
the Bombay High Court and justified the disciplinary authority's decision of
dismissal from service.
By concluding the decision, it relied
upon the decision of this Court in the case of Om Kumar v. Union of India,
(2001) 2 SCC 386[28];
Union of India v. G. Ganayutham, (1997) 7 SCC 463[29], it is submitted that
while interfering with the order of punishment imposed by the Disciplinary
Authority the High Court has exceeded in its jurisdiction while exercising its
powers under Article 226[30] of the Constitution of
India. It is submitted that as per the settled position of law, unless there is
a procedural irregularity in conducting the disciplinary proceedings and/or the
punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate to the proved misconduct,
then only, the High Court can exercise powers under Article 226[31] of the Constitution of
India and interfere with the order of punishment imposed by the Disciplinary
Authority.
3. Premlata v State of Rajasthan
(1997 SCC ONLINE RAJ 325)
DECIDED ON- 18th NOVEMBER 1997
3.1 Introduction of the Case:
The case of Premlata v. State of Rajasthan (1997 SCC
ONLINE RAJ 325),[32]
Rajasthan High Court, involves allegations of using a false certificate to
establish eligibility for a teaching position. The accused, Smt. Premlata and
the headmaster of the school, Shri Pradeep, were charged with offences under
Sections 198, 420, 465, 468, 471, and 120B of the Indian Penal Code.
The brief facts of the present case are:
The applications were invited from the candidates by
Mahila Vikas Abhikaran, Dungarpur, for appointment as “Pracheta”. According to
the notification, only those candidates were eligible who belonged to one of
the five categories mentioned in the notification. The petitioner, Smt.
Premlata was one of those candidates who applied for the post.
Feeling aggrieved by the framing of the charges, Smt.
Premlata had filed this petition under Section 482, Cr.P.C., praying that the
charges against her should be quashed. The Director of Zila Mahila Vikas
Abhikaran, sent a first information report to the police based on the allegations.
The investigation revealed that the certificate on which Smt. Premlata
established that Shri Pradeep issued her eligibility, which contained false
information.
The charges against Smt. Premlata were framed, and she
filed a petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code seeking to
quash the charges. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate stated charges against
Smt. Premlata and Shri Pradeep. The petition filed by Smt. Premlata sought to
quash the charges against her. The High Court, after hearing the arguments,
dismissed the petition.
3.2 Sections of Law involved:
The sections of law involved in the present case are:
§ Indian Penal Code 1860, (IPC) - Section 197[33]
§ Indian Penal Code 1860, (IPC) - Section 198[34]
§ Indian Penal Code 1860, (IPC) - Section 420[35]
§ Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) - Section 161[36]
§ Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) - Section 482[37]
§ Indian Penal Code 1860, (IPC) - Section 471[38]
§ Indian Penal Code 1860, (IPC) - Section 474[39]
3.3
Name of the Judge & Advocates:
The name of the Hon’ble Judge who delivered judgment
in the present case is:
§ Justice
A.K. Singh
The name of the advocate who represented the appellant
is:
§ Advocate A.K. Rajvanshy
The name of the advocate who represented the
respondent is:
§ Public Prosecutor Chandralekha
3.4 Judgement of Trial Court:
The Trial Court had framed charges against the
Petitioner for offences of criminal conspiracy, possession of a document
knowing it to be forged and intending to use it as genuine, using as genuine forged
document or electronic record, cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of
property, and offences against marriage.
After hearing the arguments of both parties, the
learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dungarpur, framed charges under Sections
120B and 466, I.P.C. against Pradeep. Charges under Sections 120B, 474, 471,
420 and 198, I.P.C. were framed against Smt. Premlata. Feeling aggrieved by the
framing of the charges, Smt. Premlata had filed this petition under Section
482, Cr.P.C., praying that the charges against her should be quashed.
3.5
Final Judgement:
The statement recorded putting of signatures by
co-accused on the certificate amounted to an admission of contents written in
the certificate, and, therefore, the contents of the certificate had not been
forged. However, they may need to be corrected. Therefore, Sections 474 and
471, I.P.C. against the petitioner are hereby quashed, and charges under
Sections 120B, 420 and 198, I.P.C. were framed correctly.
The petition is partly allowed. A bare perusal of
Section 197, I.P.C. shows that the certificate dealt with by this Section must
be a certificate which is required by law to be given or signed or is relating
to any fact of which such certificate is by law admissible in evidence[40].
And, therefore, so far as the signatures of the
headmaster and certificate are concerned, no forgery appears to have been
committed. Section 464, I.P.C. is, therefore, not applicable to this document
and consequently, the charges under Sections 474 and 471, I.P.C. cannot be said
to be prima facie made out Section 198, I.P.C. does not describe the
certificate the use of which is made punishable by it. There is a substantial
distinction between a mere statement in writing not amounting to a certificate
contemplated by Section 197, I.P.C. and a statement in writing amounting to a
certificate contemplated by Section 197, I.P.C. the distinction between the
two; the statements in writing not amounting to certificate and the statement
in writing amounting to a certificate is this that the former cannot be treated
as legal evidence of the facts mentioned in the certificate[41].
Still, the written statement that amounts to a
certificate can be used as legal evidence of the facts mentioned in the
certificate[42].
Keeping this distinction between the two statements in writing, one can be used
as legal evidence without formal proof, and the other cannot be used as legal
evidence unless formal proof is given according to law. The statement is
subjected to scrutiny by cross-examination, or otherwise, it would be proper to
hold that no statement in writing can amount to a certificate within the
meaning of Section 197, I.P.C. unless the law enacted by a competent
legislature permits the issue of such certificate or provides that the certificate
shall be receivable as legal evidence of the facts mentioned therein[43].
The fact that the document is described as a
certificate does not make it a certificate in the eye of the law[44].
That being the legal position, the certificate dated 28-9-1989 could not be
used as legal evidence to prove that Smt. Premlata fulfilled the eligibility
clause contained in the notification.
However, Smt. Premlata cannot avoid the responsibility
under Section 198, I.P.C., for using this certificate. So far as charge under
Section 420, I.P.C. is concerned prima facie, it appears that Smt. Premlata
wanted employment as “Pracheta”. For the reasons mentioned above, under Section
420, I.P.C. cannot be quashed at this stage. Therefore, the charge under
Section 120B, I.P.C. cannot be quashed at this stage.
3.6
Conclusion / Ratio Propounded:
In the case of Premlata v. State of Rajasthan (1997
SCC ONLINE RAJ 325),[45]
the High Court of Rajasthan considered the evidence and allegations against
Smt. Premlata and Shri Pradeep. The court found sufficient material to frame
charges against them under Sections 120-B and 466 of the Indian Penal Code.
The court's decision to dismiss the petition seeking
to quash the charges indicates that it found the evidence against Smt. Premlata
and Shri Pradeep are to be sufficient to proceed with the trial. This case
serves as a precedent for similar cases involving allegations of using false
certificates or documents to establish employment or other benefits
eligibility. It is important to note that this analysis is based solely on the
information provided in the legal document. For a comprehensive understanding
of the case, it is recommended to refer to the complete judgment and consult
with legal professionals.
The Honorable Justice noted that the “Court shall
quash charges framed against accused in the absence of corroborative evidence
of the law.”
4. Baban Singh and Ors v Jagdish Singh and
Ors
(AIR 1967
SC 68)
DECIDED ON- 08th February 1966
4.1 Introduction of the Case:
A piece of evidence is rightly regarded as an
essential element of law. It is generally known as a proof legally present at a
trial, which is supposed to convince the judge based on the material facts of a
case However, quite often false evidence is fabricated, with the aim of
diverting the verdict. The present case deals with one such incident.
The brief facts of the present case are:
Jagdish Singh and Parmhans were appellants in F.A. 301
of 1952 in the High Court at Patna. Mst. Dharichhan Kuer was respondent No. 13
in that appeal. During the pendency of the appeal a compromise was said to have
been arrived at between Dharichhan Kuer on the one hand and Jagdish Singh and
Parmhans on the other. Dharichhan Kuer and Jagdish Singh swore an affidavit on
June 22, 1953 in support of the petition for compromise which was filed in the
High Court. Baban Singh's brother identified Dharichhan Kuer before the Oath
Commissioner and Rs. 4,000 were paid to Dharichhan Kuer under the terms of the
compromise in the Commissioner's presence. Dharichhan Kuer also passed a
receipt and her thumb impression was identified by Baban Singh's brother. The
petition of compromise was filed in court on July 13, 1953. The same day Baban
Singh swore an affidavit (Ex. B) denying the compromise or that his wife had
received Rs. 4,000. This affidavit was filed in the High Court on July 31,
1953. On September 9, 1953 Dharichhan Kuer also filed an affidavit (Ex. A) in
support of her 13-09-2023 (Page 1 of 4) www.manupatra.com Gujarat National Law
University husband. 3. As the compromise was in dispute the High Court ordered
the Registrar to hold an enquiry. Nine witnesses were examined on behalf of
Jagdish Singh and Parmhans including the Oath Commissioner. Dharichhan Kuer and
her husband Baban Singh have evidence on their own behalf. The Registrar
reported on July 14, 1954 that the compromise was genuine and that Dharichhan
Kuer had, in fact, sworn the affidavit before the Oath Commissioner and had
received Rs. 4,000. B. N. Rai and Kanhaiya Singh, JJ. accepted the report by
their order dated October 5, 1956. One of the terms of the compromise was that
if Dharichhan Kuer resiled from it the amount of Rs. 4,000 would be refunded
with costs Rs. 500.
4.2 Sections of Law involved:
The sections of law involved in the present case are:
4.3
Name of the Judge &
Advocates:
The name of the Hon’ble Judge who delivered judgment
in the present case is:
§ Justice K.
Subba Rao
§ Justice
R.S. Bachawat
§ Justice M.
Hidayatullah
The name of the advocate who represented the appellant
is:
§ Advocate Naunit Lal
The name of the advocate who represented the
respondent is:
§ Advocate Afzal Ansari
§ Advocate Rakesh Kumar Singh
4.4 Judgement of Trail Court & High Court:
There was no trial court judgment and This is an
appeal under section 476-B[55]
of the Code of Criminal Procedure by one against a judgment and order of the
High Court at Patna. The learned Judges in the High Court did not take action
in respect of the offence of giving false evidence on oath, as defined in
Section 191 and punishable under Section 193 of the Indian Penal Code, because
they were of the opinion that Section 479-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure
would be applicable to that offence even though the Registrar recorded
evidence. The High Court selected for action the offence in relation to the two
affidavits holding that prima facie an offence under Section 199, Indian Penal
Code was committed. That offence is also punishable in the same manner as if
false evidence was given. The difference between Sections 191 and 199 is this;
Section 191 deals with statements and declarations falsely made by a person
legally bound by an oath or by an express provision of law to state the truth.
Section 199 deals with statements and declarations made voluntarily provided
they are capable of being used as evidence and which the court is bound to
receive as evidence.
4.5
Conclusion / Ratio Propounded:
Does the swearing of the false affidavits amount to an
offence under Section 199, Indian Penal Code or under either Section 191 or
192, Indian Penal Code ? If it comes under the two latter sections, the present
prosecution cannot be sustained, Section 199 deals with a declaration and does
not state that the declaration must be on oath. The only condition necessary is
that the declaration must be capable of being used as evidence and which any
court of justice, public servant, or other person, is bound or authorised by
law to receive as evidence. Section 191 deals with evidence on oath and Section
192 with fabricating false evidence. If we consider this matter from the
standpoint of Section 191, Indian Penal Code the offence is constituted by
swearing falsely when one is bound by oath to state the truth because an
affidavit is a declaration made under an oath. The definition of the offence of
giving false evidence thus applies to the affidavits. The offence may also fall
within Section 192. It lays down inter alia that a person is said to fabricate
false evidence if he makes a document containing a false statement intending
that such false statement may appear in evidence in a judicial proceeding and
so appearing in evidence may cause any person who, in such proceeding is to
form an opinion upon the evidence, to entertain an erroneous opinion touching
any point material to the result of such proceeding.
5. Subhash Kashinath Mahajan v The State
Of Maharashtra and Ors.
AIR2018SC1498
Decided on: 20th March,
2018
5.1 Introduction
of the Case:
The case of Subhash Kashinath Mahajan v The State of
Maharashtra and Ors. to prevent the misuse of the Act by Dalits and other SC
and ST people. This verdict led to protests in various states of the country by
Dalit groups who showed disregard for the said judgment. This judgment is a
landmark judgment in the history of the era. The Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 Act was enacted to safeguard the
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes people from different types of
discrimination and atrocities and other problems they are facing in society. The Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention
of Atrocities) Act, 1989 Act was enacted to safeguard the Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes people from different types of discrimination and atrocities
and other problems they are facing in society. It is only possible to arrest a
public employee with the appointing authority's consent. Arresting a non-public
employee is only permitted with the Superintendent of Police's consent. The
approving authority must document the justifications for such approvals. The
Magistrate must carefully review these recorded grounds before approving
additional detention. Before filing FIRs under the Act, Dy.S.P. level police
officers must conduct an initial investigation to determine whether the claims
are baseless or unfounded.
The brief facts of the present case are:
The accused in this case, the appellant, is charged
with violating the Indian Penal Code of 1860, Sections 182, 192, 193, and 219
read with 34, as well as Sections 3(1)(ix), 3(2)(vi), and 3(2)(vii) of the
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.
(IPC). He was the State of Maharashtra's Director of Technical Education in the
relevant period. 2. The complaint, the second respondent, works for the
department. He was assigned to the Pune-based Government Distance Education
Institute. His seniors, Drs. Satish Bhase and Kishor Burade, who do not belong
to the scheduled caste, wrote a negative entry in his annual confidential
report regarding his honesty and character. 3. On January 4, 2006, he filed a
formal complaint with the Karad Police Station under the Act against the two
officers in question. 4. On December 21, 2010, the concerned Investigating
Officer submitted an application to the Director of Technical Education seeking
sanctions against them under Section 197 Cr.P.C. 5. On January 20, 2011, the
appellant rejected the punishment. As a result, a C Summary Report was
submitted against Bhise and Burade, but the court rejected it. He then filed
the current FIR against the appellant. The complainant argues that the Director
of Technical Education lacked the authority to issue or withhold sanction
because the two individuals in question are Class-I officers and only the State
Government has the authority to do so.Thus, in his view, the appellant violated
the charges made in the FIR dated March 28, 2016, by improperly handling the
sanction issue. 6. The High Court rejected the appellant's request to have the
aforementioned complaint quashed.
5.2 Sections of Law involved:
The sections of law involved in the present case are:
§ Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) – Section 182[60]
§ Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) – Section 192[61]
§ Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) – Section 197[62]
§ Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) – Section 468[63]
§ Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) – Section 492[64]
§ Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) – Section 498-A[65]
5.3
Name of the Judge &
Advocates:
The name of the Hon’ble Judge who delivered judgment
in the present case is:
§ Justice
Adarsh Kumar Goel
§ Justice
U.U. Lalit
The
name of the advocate who represented the appellant is:
§ Advocate Maninder Singh
§ Advocate Amarendra Sharan
§ Advocate Amit Anand Tiwari
The
name of the advocate who represented the respondent is:
§ Advocate Neelesh Singh Rao
§ Advocate C. George Thomas
5.4 Judgement of Trail Court & High Court:
Respondent No. 2 sought sanction for his
prosecution under the provisions of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled
Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 and for certain other connected
offences. The quashing of the said complaint has been declined by the High
Court. Dr. Satish Bhise and Dr. Kishor Burade, who
were his seniors but non-scheduled caste, made an adverse entry in his annual
confidential report to the effect that his integrity and character was not
good. The High Court rejected the petition. In the facts and circumstances,
inherent power to quash could not be exercised as it may send a wrong signal to
the downtrodden and backward sections of the society. It was submitted by
learned amicus that FIR was lodged after five years of the order passed by the
appellant. One sided version, before trial, cannot displace the presumption of
innocence. Learned amicus submitted that this Court has generally acknowledged
the misuse of power of arrest and directed that arrest should not be
mechanical. It has been laid down that the exercise of power of arrest requires
reasonable belief about a person's complicity and also about need to effect arrest.
Learned amicus further submitted that Section 18 of the Atrocities Act, which
excludes Section 438 Cr.P.C., violates constitutional mandate under Articles 14
and 21 and is ultra vires the Constitution. The learned Counsel added a new
dimension to the argument by invoking Article 21 of the Constitution. She had
made a complaint against him for her sexual harassment and as a reaction, the
FIR was lodged by respondent No. 2 by way of the Atrocities Act. Her
anticipatory bail application was rejected by the session court but the High
Court, vide order dated 23rd November, 2017, granted interim protection against
arrest.
5.5
Conclusion / Ratio Propounded:
Proceedings in the present case are clear abuse of
process of court and are quashed. To avoid false implication of an innocent, a
preliminary enquiry may be conducted by the DSP concerned to find out whether
the allegations make out a case under the Atrocities Act and that the
allegations are not frivolous or motivated. The appeal is accordingly allowed
in the above terms.
6.
State of Punjab and Ors. v Amritsar
Beverages Ltd. and Ors.
(AIR2006SC2820)
Decided on – 8th August,
2006
6.1 Introduction of the Case:
A raid was conducted in the premises of the
respondent, during which a large number of books and documents were seized by
the officers of the Sales Tax Department of the State of Punjab. The seizure of
documents was done under Section 14(3) of the Act. The officers of the Sales
Tax Department asked the Respondents to appear on several occasions so as to
enable them to verify the contents thereof. Cooperation from the Respondents
was not forthcoming as a resultwhereof the documents were not returned within
the period stipulated thereunder.
The brief facts of the present case are:
The facts leading to the present appeal in a nutshell
are as follows:
In this case, a raid was conducted in the respondent’s
premises, who within the meaning of the Punjab General Sales Tax, 1948 stands
to be a dealer. The raid was conducted by the officers from the Sales Tax
Department of the State of Punjab. During the raid, the officers seized a large
number of books and documents such as registers and cashbook ledger. All these
files were stored on a hard disk.
The power for the seizure of documents exercised by the
authorities was granted under Sec 14 of the Punjab General Sales Tax, 1948. The
section talks about Production and Inspection of Books, Documents and Accounts.
According to Sec 14 (3) of the said Act, the officer shall immediately provide
a receipt for seizing the documents, books, registers and accounts. It also
mentions the periods within which the files should be returned, which is 10
days for accounts, register, book or documents and 60 days in any other case.
The respondent was asked to put in an appearance
several times by the officers of the Sales Tax Department so as to enable
themselves to verify the contents in the hard disk. But the respondent did not
cooperate resulting in the delay in the return of the documents and books.
The respondent then filed a writ petition and prayed
the court to issue a writ in/of the nature of mandamus asking to direct the
officers to return the seized documents, books, accounts and hard disk (in
which all of these files were stored).
The court applied the principle of literal interpretation and mandamus
was issued, along with that Rs. 2,500 was imposed in each case. It was also
stated that the costs would not be paid by the State exchequer but by the
officers who withheld the accounts, documents etc.
6.2 Sections of Law involved:
The sections of law involved in the present case are:
6.3
Name of the Judge &
Advocates:
§ The name of
the Hon’ble Judge who delivered judgment in the present case is:
§ Justice
S.B. Sinha
§ Justice
Dalveer Bhandari
§ The name of
the advocate who represented the appellant is:
§ Advocate Sarup Singh
§ Advocate R.K. Pandey
§ Advocate Arun Kumar Sinha
§ The name of
the advocate who represented the respondent is:
§ Advocate Vikas Mahajan
§ Advocate Bhaskar Y. Kulkarni
6.4 Judgement of Trail Court & High Court:
The court observes that the said Act
was enacted in 1948 and since then there has been a lot of development in
information technologies with the emergence of the internet and other devices.
The technologies also brought with them problems in the field of law that could
not have been foreseen earlier, one such example would be determining the
statutory liabilities in this case. The difficulties faced by the officers in
this case to tackle the new circumstance could also have been avoided. Even
though the amendments in the Information Technology Act, 2000 tried to include
different types of cybercrimes but could not deal with all the problems that
came in front of the officers. And even though there were amendments made to
Sec 14 of the said Act, the court thinks that creative interpretation should be
allowed owing to the circumstances. To execute the provisions of Sec 14, many
difficulties must have arisen for the officers. After the examination and
taking copies of the documents and files, it is mandatory for the officers to
return these files to the dealer within a period of sixty days. But in this
case, it was required to make a copy of the files on the hard disk and also to
get the copy verified, the respondents were asked to verify the copy but they
still need to do it. In order to attach the provisions of sub-section (3) of
Sec 14, the respondent’s active cooperation was required. When it comes to the
hard disk, complying with the literal interpretation of the provision was impossible.
It can be said that the Respondent’s non-cooperation did not prevent the
officers from making copies of the files from the hard disk or getting a hard
copy of the files so as to affix it with the official seal and signatures. But
the High court did notice that the officers faced this problem for the first
time and they might have failed to lay down their own procedure. To avoid the
complications that arose regarding the seizure of the hard disk, according to
the respondent’s offer their representative should make themselves available
while obtaining the respondent’s signature on the receipt or on the hard disk
copies. The court decided to set aside the previous judgement, according to
which the officers were asked to pay the costs from their pockets and appeal
was allowed to the extent discussed.
6.5
Conclusion / Ratio Propounded:
The development in informational
technology has been fast-paced since the time of its inception. The internet
and other technologies have revolutionised each and every part of your life
unexpectedly. One such aspect of your life is law, which is equally impacted by
these developments. This case manages to bring the question into a discussion
with just an issue of the hard disk, which in 2021 is already outdated. Today,
we also have the option to store the information virtually in cloud storage
allowing us to access our files from any place and any device, which could
allow the offender to modify the files in the devices that may be seized.
Therefore, it is very important not
just for ourselves but for the various sectors of society to adapt and develop
according to these fast-paced technological developments. The said Act, in this
case, was enacted in 1948, the sector of information technology was not even
known then. One can only imagine the developments that have happened since then
in this sector, making it crucial for the lawmakers and executors to adapt and
work while keeping that in mind and the present case is the example for it, the
judges gave the verdict by being cognizant regarding the aforesaid issue and
allowed different interpretations of the provision in the discussion. The court
stated that even if amendments have been made to cope with the IT developments,
procedural laws should be understood as ongoing statutes like the constitution
and different or creative interpretations should be allowed according to the
situation
Bibliography
A.
Books
1.
K D Gaur, Textbook on Indian Penal Code
(Lexis Nexis 2023).
2.
Ratan Lal & Dhirajlal, The Indian Penal
Code (Lexis Nexis 2020).
B.
Cases
1.
Om
Kumar v. Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC 386
2.
Union
of India v. G. Ganayutham, (1997) 7 SCC 463
3.
Hombe Gowda
Educational Trust and another v. State of Karnataka and others, (2006) 1 SCC
430
4.
Daljit Singh
Cheema v Balwant Singh Khera and Ors, (AIR
2023 SC 3053
5.
Public Prosecutor
v. Suryanarayana Moorty, 13 CrLJ 145 (Mad) (A).
6.
State of Andhra
Pradesh v. Rayavarapu Punnayya and Ors, 1977 CrLJ 1 : AIR 1977
7.
Virsa Singh v. The
State of Punjab, 1958 CriLJ 818.
C. Statues
1.
Indian Penal Code,1860, No. 45, Acts of
Parliament, 1860 (India).
2.
The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, No. 2,
Acts of Parliament, 1974 (India).
3.
The Constitution of India, 1950.
4.
The Representation of People Act, 1951, No.
43, Act of Parliament, 1951 (India).
[2] The Indian Penal Code, 1860, §
415, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).
[3] The Indian Penal Code, 1860, §
420, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).
[4] Representation of the People Act,
1951, § 29A, No. 43, Act of Parliament, 1951 (India).
[5] The Indian Penal Code, 1860, §
463, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).
[6] The Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973, § 482, No. 2, Acts of Parliament, 1973 (India).
[7] The Indian Penal Code, 1860, §
192, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).
[8] The Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973, § 202, No. 2, Acts of Parliament, 1973 (India).
[14] Id.
[16] Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. Vs. Rajendra D. Harmalkar
(2022 SCC ONLINE SC 486)
[17] Hombe Gowda Educational Trust and
another v. State of Karnataka and others (2006) 1 SCC 430
[18] The Indian Penal Code, 1860, §
468, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).
[19] The Indian Penal Code, 1860, §
471, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).
[20] The Indian Penal Code, 1860, §
197, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).
[21] INDIA CONST. art. 226.
[22] Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. Vs. Rajendra
D. Harmalka (2022 SCC ONLINE SC 486), 2.
[23] Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. Vs.
Rajendra D. Harmalka (2022 SCC ONLINE SC 486), 5.
[24] INDIA CONST. Art. 226.
[26] Id.
[27] Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v.
Rajendra D. Harmalkar (2022 SCC ONLINE SC 486)
[28] Om Kumar v. Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC 386
[29] Union of India v. G. Ganayutham, (1997) 7 SCC 463
[30] INDIA CONST. Art. 226.
[31] Id.
[32] Premlata v. State of Rajasthan
(1997 SCC ONLINE RAJ 325)
[33] The Indian Penal Code, 1860, §
197, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).
[34] The Indian Penal Code, 1860, §
198, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).
[35] The Indian Penal Code, 1860, §
420, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).
[36] The Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973, § 161, No. 2, Acts of Parliament, 1973 (India).
[37] The Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973, § 482, No. 2, Acts of Parliament, 1973 (India).
[38] The Indian Penal Code, 1860, §
471, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).
[39] The Indian Penal Code, 1860, §
474, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).
[40] [40]
Premlata v. State of Rajasthan (1997 SCC ONLINE RAJ 325), 3.
[42] Id.
[43] Premlata v. State of Rajasthan
(1997 SCC ONLINE RAJ 325), 5.
[44] Id.
[45] Premlata v. State of Rajasthan
(1997 SCC ONLINE RAJ 325).
[46] The Indian Penal Code, 1860, §
191, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).
[47] The Indian Penal Code, 1860, §
192, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).
[48] The Indian Penal Code, 1860, §
199, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).
[49] The Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973, § 476, No. 2, Acts of Parliament, 1973 (India).
[50] The Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973, § 477, No. 2, Acts of Parliament, 1973 (India).
[51] The Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973, § 478, No. 2, Acts of Parliament, 1973 (India).
[52] The Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973, § 479, No. 2, Acts of Parliament, 1973 (India).
[53] The Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973, § 479A, No. 2, Acts of Parliament, 1973 (India).
[54] The Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973, § 479-A(6), No. 2, Acts of Parliament, 1973 (India).
[55] The Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973, § 476-B, No. 2, Acts of Parliament, 1973 (India).
[56] The Indian Penal Code, 1860, §
191, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).
[57] The Indian Penal Code, 1860, §
192, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).
[58] The Indian Penal Code, 1860, §
193, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).
[59] The Indian Penal Code, 1860, § 26,
No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).
[60] The Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973, § 182, No. 2, Acts of Parliament, 1973 (India).
[61] The Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973, § 192, No. 2, Acts of Parliament, 1973 (India).
[62] The Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973, § 197, No. 2, Acts of Parliament, 1973 (India).
[63] The Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973, § 468, No. 2, Acts of Parliament, 1973 (India).
[64] The Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973, § 492, No. 2, Acts of Parliament, 1973 (India).
[65] The Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973, § 498-A, No. 2, Acts of Parliament, 1973 (India).
[66] The Indian Penal Code, 1860, § 29,
No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).
[67] The Indian Penal Code, 1860, §
167, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).
[68] The Indian Penal Code, 1860, §
172, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).
[69] The Indian Penal Code, 1860, §
192, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).
[70] The Indian Penal Code, 1860, §
463, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).
[71] The Indian Penal Code, 1860, §
464, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).
Article Information
CASE ANALYSIS ON THE TOPIC ISSUING FALSE CERTIFICATE AND FABRICATING FALSE EVIDENCE OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860 BY: ASHISH KUMAR YADAV & JAGATPAL CHOUDHARY
Authors: ASHISH KUMAR YADAV, JAGATPAL CHOUDHARY
- Journal IJLRA
- ISSN 2582-6433
- Published 2023/11/18
- Issue 7
About Journal
International Journal for Legal Research and Analysis
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- ISSN 2582-6433
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