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BEYOND THE BRANCHES: DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS
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BEYOND THE
BRANCHES: DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS
AUTHORED BY - SAMIYA CHOUDHARY
Abstract
The doctrine of separation of powers
is considered to be an essence of democracy. In the Indian Constitution, though
the doctrine hasn’t been expressly envisaged, the provisions mentioned therein
provide for such differentiated powers amongst the organs of the government.
The doctrine finds its origin in America in its absolute rigidity. However,
different countries have adopted it as per their needs and circumstances
prevailing in their countries. In India, it hasn’t been found in its absolute
rigidity. Therefore, the paper highlights the origin, the concept, and its
practical applicability in India and explores various provisions in the
constitution dealing with the doctrine. It also focuses on the relevance of
this old doctrine and the instances and judicial interpretations pertaining to
it.
Keywords: Checks
and Balances, Organs, Separation, Functions, Overlapping, etc.
INTRODUCTION
Separation of Powers implies the
distribution of powers within the different organs of the government. In India,
there are three government organs, namely the legislature, executive, and
judiciary. These organs have been
separated from each other on the grounds of powers given to them in terms of
their workings and functioning. They have been given different functions to
perform, as one organ cannot do everything on its own, and absolute autonomy or
arbitrariness might exist in the system. The separation of powers exists in the
Indian constitution, which is a written constitution. It is prevalent in other
constituents as well. However, the countries differ in their pursuit of this
doctrine, which is on the question as to whether the constitution of the country
has adopted the doctrine in rigid terms or not in absolute terms. The Indian
constitution has provided for the doctrine of separation of powers in express
provisions. It provides that the legislature has the function or the authority
of law-making, while the executive has the function of executing or applying
the laws made by the legislature and lastly, the judiciary has to check whether
the other organs are working properly within the authority and powers conferred
on them. Moreover, it has the power to adjudge the disputes and declare any law
made by the legislature as invalid or unconstitutional if it exceeds the
limitation provided by the Constitution. The functions of these three organs
are differentiated by the constitution of India, but this doesn’t mean that
they only have to confine themselves to those functions. Hence, the
constitution envisages the doctrine of separation of powers but not in the
strict sense; this means that though the different organs are provided with
different functions to perform, there are times, circumstances, or situations
that necessitate going or performing beyond their powers. This is of immense
importance for the proper and effective functioning of the country and to have
a balanced system of working thereby avoiding any kind of instability in the
workings and functioning of the country. Moreover, the provisions that provide
for such powers do not mention the limitations to their authority or the
powers, and hence, the doctrine adopted by the Indian constitution is different
from the doctrine adopted in other countries. Indian constitution focuses on
having comprehensive development, which is only possible if there is
comprehensiveness in the workings of the bodies. Therefore, to better understand the doctrine
of separation of power, it becomes important to have insights into the aspects
of the principle on which the doctrine is based and its applicability in the
Indian constitution and a comparison with other constitutions.
HISTORICAL
ASPECTS OF THE DOCTRINE
The doctrine of separation of powers
is said to have evolved from Montesquieu. However, the doctrine can be traced
back to the juristic philosophy of Aristotle, who, while recognizing the
division of powers, did not envisage the absolute or rigid division of powers.
Therefore, the origin of the doctrine can be traced back to ancient
philosophies; though these philosophies were subjected to criticism, they are
still relevant today. Particularly, two principles can be made out of the
ancient philosophies for this doctrine. Firstly, that the powers of the
government are of 3 types, and secondly, that the most beneficial and least
frictional constitution is that in which the various elements are carefully
controlled[1].
So, therefore the doctrine of separation was provided or analyzed by Aristotle
but not in the proper sense. Apart from him, English theorist John Locke has
also talked about the same in his book. It was only Montesquieu who further
propounded the theory in the proper manner. Montesquie believed that the aim of
the government is liberty and for achieving liberty, the system of checks and
balances is required for the smooth functioning of the government and its
functions. According to Mr. Justice Miller, It is believed to be one of the
chief merits of the American system of written constitutional law that all the
powers entrusted to government, whether state or national, are divided into the
three grand departments, the executive, the legislative, and the judicial. That
the functions appropriate to each of these branches of government shall be
vested in a separate body of public servants, and that the perfection of the
system requires that the lines which separate and divide the departments shall
be broadly and clearly defined. It is also essential to the successful working
of this system that the persons intrusted with power in one of these branches
shall not be permitted to encroach upon the powers confided to the others, but
that each shall by the law of its creation be limited to the exercise of the
powers appropriate to its own department and no other. [2]
Therefore, with the developments in
British constitutional history, Montesquieu gathered the information and
analyzed the doctrine of separation of powers. The doctrine varies from country
to country and also its origins may vary from country to country. For instance,
in England, there were problematic relations between the king and the
parliament. There was a separation of powers existing between them, though that
type of separation of powers is not followed in today’s times, the functions
were differentiated such as the king was to perform the executive functions,
the parliament was to perform a legislative function, and last, the judiciary
dealt with the court matters.
Therefore, it can be said that it was
Monttesquie who systematically, and scientifically propagated the theory in his
book ook 'Espirit des Lois' (The Spirit of the Laws), published in the year
1798. Philosophers like Aristotle and Plato have given their views on the
theory in their times. Montesquie, while giving the theory, was of the view
that there must be a separation of powers in order to maintain stability in
terms of the absence of arbitrariness. He believed that tyraany pervades when
there is no separation of powers. There would be an end to everything, where
the same man or same body, whether of the nobles or of the people, to exercise
those three powers of enacting laws, executing public resolutions, and of
trying the causes of individuals.[3]
This means that if all the powers,
whether legislative, executive, or judiciary
in the hands of one single person, then there would exist a situation of
tyranny where the single person would enact the laws as per his interest and
convenience and also would execute the same in a tyrannical manner or in the
manner he pleases and also the judicial control would be in his own hands and
there would be no challenge to the existing tyrannical powers. Hence, there
would be chances of conflicts between the rights and freedoms of people and the
exercise of powers in such a tyrannical manner. Therefore, because of such
apprehensions, MOntesqie advocated for the separation of powers. He observed
that where it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subjects
would be exposed to arbitrary control, where the judge would then be the
legislator. Where it joined the executive power, the judge might behave with
oppression and violence.[4]
His thoughts were based on the British constitution. According to him, the
secret of Englishmen's liberty was the separation and functional independence
of three departments of the government from one another.
Blackstone believed that if all the
powers of the government were in one hand, then it would be an end to personal
liberty. Personal liberty is one of the important freedoms provided by the
Indian constitution, and this implies the relevance and importance of the
application of this doctrine in India. So, the power can't be exercised on one
hand, and the separation, though not in an absolute sense, is required to
achieve the ideals enshrined in the Constitution. Therefore, the origin of the
doctrine seems to be a rigid one. However, different countries have adopted it
as per the situations and circumstances occurring in the country. Hence, the doctrine holds great importance in
the 21st century, which envisages the rule of law and the absence of the misuse
of the powers or the exercise of arbitrary or tyrannical powers.
DOCTRINE OF
SEPARATION OF POWERS IN INDIA
During the constitutional debates,
the doctrine was put forth to be included in the directive principles of state
policy and not in the stricter sense. However, several members were of the view
that we must incorporate the doctrine in a stricter sense and gave their
reasoning for the same. For instance, Mr. K.T. Shah gave an amendment for
absolute division of powers between the three organs and observed that “if you
maintain the complete independence of all the three, you will secure a measure
of independence between the Judiciary, for example, and the Executive, or
between the Judiciary and the Legislature. This, in my view, is of the highest
importance in maintaining the liberty of the subject, the Civil Liberties and
the rule of law. If there was contract between the Judiciary and the
Legislature, for instance, if it was possible to interchange between the
highest judicial officers and the membership of the legislature, then, I am
afraid, the interpretation of the law will be guided much more by Party
influence than by the intrinsic merits of each case. The Legislature in a
democratic assembly is bound to be influenced by Party reasons rather than by
reasons of principle.[5] In
response to this amendment bt Mr. Shah, it was Shri K. Hanumanthaiya who observed that our country is a
parliamentary democracy and what the amendment reflects vis that we have a presential system and he further observes
that “if there is separation- not separation but Prof. Shah wants complete
separation- then conflicts are sure to arise between these Departments of the Government
and main reason is that this house is wedded to parliamentary system of
democracy and this view clause is out of place in such a constitutional
structure.”[6]
Therefore, the majority of the members were of the opinion that we must
incorporate the doctrine in our system in the absolute sense.
In India, the doctrine of Separation
of Powers is adopted as a part of the constitution of India, but not in the
strict sense as with changing circumstances and needs of the society; hence,
following a holistic approach requires holistic strategy or interdependence,
interactions and cooperation between the organs of the government. In Udai Ram
Sharma v. Union of India[7],
The Supreme Court has held that the American doctrine of separation of
legislative and judicial powers has no application to India.
There are numerous provisions in the
constitution that provide for the separation of powers between the three organs
of the government. The three organs are – the legislative, the executive, and
the judiciary. In India, each is independent in its own spheres, i.e., one is
concerned with law-making, the other is concerned with the execution of laws
enacted by parliament and the third one is concerned with the role of checking
the validity of the laws. The Doctrine
of separation of powers is based on certain principles, these are:-
·
That
the same person cannot be a member of more than one organ.
·
That
they must not perform the functions assigned to the other organ.
·
They
should not interfere in each other's sphere.
The Constitution of India itself
envisages and has incorporated express provisions regarding the division of
powers. In India, two important principles or doctrines, i.e., the doctrine of
separation of powers and the federal principle, play crucial roles in the
functioning of parliamentary democracy. There is a clear division between the
center and the state. However, this is also not absolute, and that is the
reason our constitution is called a quasi-federal constitution. Similarly,
there is a parliament at the center level which has plenary powers of
law-making, while the president is the executive at the center. In the same
way, such division occurs at the state level as well. The judiciary constitutes
the supreme court, high courts, and all other subordinate courts. For instance,
Article 62-72 [8]deals
with the president and its functions. While Articles 226[9],
227[10],
32[11],
136[12]
etc, deal with the judiciary. This is how thw constitution has provided with
the demarcation of the functions of the three organs. Adoption of the doctrine
in a stricter sense implies that there is a clear-cut demarcation in the
division of powers and no one organ can interfere at all with the functioning
of the other, while adoption in India which is in a broader sense implies that
though the functions are clearly demarcated by the constitution, however, there
are instances where one organ has undertaken the function of the other but that
is not considered to be going beyond the limits provided to them. Such
cooperation and interdependence between these organs are necessary for the
proper functioning of our parliamentary democracy in India.
P.M Bakshi has observed the position
of this doctrine of separation of powers in India and has observed that-
·
The
Indian constitution does not contain any formal declaration of the doctrine of
separation of powers.
·
The
Indian constitution in its actual position, does not exhibit any scrupulous
regard for the doctrine of separation of powers.
·
Legislation
in India cannot be declared to be void merely on the grounds that it amounts to
adjudication. The authority on this point is not very strong, but in principle,
this appears to be the position.
·
Legislation
amounting to adjudication may, however, be held to be void if it discriminates
against any person or group without justification.
·
The
legislation amounting to adjudication may be void on the grounds that it takes
away the property of an individual without providing them compensation or
unreasonably restraining the enjoyment of property.
·
The
act of the legislature of conferring the legislative powers of the executive
might be void on the grounds of an undue delegation of powers.
·
If
the executive assumes the adjudicatory functions, such an assumption cannot be
void merely on grounds of the doctrine of separation of powers.
·
If
the judiciary assumes legislative or executive functions, such an assumption
would be void, not on any theoretical basis, but on the general principle that
the court cannot exercise powers not conferred upon it by law.[13]
CHECKS AND BALANCES
APPROACH
Indian parliamentary democracy has a
system of checks and balances. The main purpose of having such a system is to
keep the powers of the organs under control so that one organ might not become
too powerful to include all the functions within its ambit. Therefore, all
three organs have to perform checks and balances; this implies that the three
organs have the authority and power to check the functioning of the other
organs. This does not mean that they will interfere with the other organs;
however, they will just keep a check. This will further provide balance and a stable
form of government. For instance, the parliament, i.e., the law-making body,
does not have the power to interfere in the role of the judiciary but has the
power for the appointment and removal of judges. Article 124(2)[14]
provides that the judge of the Supreme Court shall be appointed by the
president; this means that there is interdependence of the executive and
judiciary. As the Supreme Court in the
case has observed that P. Kannadasan & Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu[15],
where an Act made by the State legislature is invalidated by the courts on the
ground that the State legislature was not competent to enact it, the State
legislature cannot enact a law declaring that the judgment of the court shall
not operate; it cannot overrule or annul the decision of the court. But this
does not mean that the legislature which is competent to enact that law cannot
enact that law. Similarly, it is open to a legislature to alter the basis of
the judgment while adhering to the constitutional limitation. In such a case
the decision of the Court becomes ineffective. The new law cannot be challenged
on the ground that it seeks to circumvent the decision of the Court. The Court
observed that this is what meant by "checks and balances" inherent in
a system of Government incorporating the concept of separation of powers[16].
RELEVANCE
OF THE DOCTRINE
The relevance of the doctrine can be
viewed by its successful implementation in India and at the international
level. Moreover, the doctrine is a part of the basic structure of the
Constitution. Basic structure implies the soul and fabric of the constitution
which cant be altered or destroyed by any authority. The basic structure of the
constitution theory was laid down in the case of Kesavananda Bharti v State of
Kerela.[17]
In the case, Kartar Singh V state of Punjab[18],
one of the justices observed that It is a part of the basic postulate under the
Indian constitution that the legal sovereign power has been distributed between
the legislature to make the law, the executive to implement the law and the
judiciary to interpret the law within the limits set down by the constitution[19].
Therefore, in India, the doctrine is practically applicable to all three
government organs. However, the executive, at times, in the exercise of its
powers conferred by the constitution, performs judicial functions, for
instance, granting pardons, reprieves, commuting, etc. Moreover, the executive
also performs legislative functions in terms of ordinance-making, delegated
legislation, etc. Hence, it shows the applicability of the doctrine in India
not in a stricter sense but in a broader sense.
At the international level, the
doctrine has been adopted by several countries; some have adopted it in the
stricter sense, while some have not adopted it in the absolute sense. For
instance, in The position in the United States in respect of separation of
powers, enshrined in its Constitution for well over two centuries, is of great
relevance to India. In the United States, the head of the executive branch, the
President, and his Cabinet are not members of the Congress. The Judges of the
Supreme Court in the United States are appointed for life after being nominated
by the President and approved by Congress. However, once appointed, they are
accountable to no other branch of the State. Their job is to uphold the
Constitution, which empowers them to overrule other branches of the Government.
In the United States, each Judge is appointed for life, and the President and
the Congress have only limited flexibility in influencing the Court's
composition during their tenures. No one has ever questioned the unfettered
right of the Courts to review whether decisions taken by Congress and State
Legislatures are in conformity with the Constitutional provisions. [20]
In England, it is opposite to the USA as in the UK, the constitution is not
written, and also, there is no clear division of powers between the three
organs of the government. The three branches often overlap due to unclear and
undefined division or demarcation of powers. However, senior justices have
stated that the division of powers is the foundation.[21]
Therefore, it will be very incorrect to say that the doctrine has lost its
relevance in today’s time as the basic essence and the logic of the doctrine,
i.e the absence of tyranny, is still of great importance
CASE LAWS
1. Ram Jawaya v State of Punjab:[22]
The facts of the case are that in pursuance of its policy of nationalizing
textbooks used in schools in the state, the Punjab government issues an
executive order acquiring the copyright in selected books from authors and
undertaking itself printing, publishing, and sale of books. Private publishing
houses were thus ousted from the book business. This order was challenged on
the grounds that executive power if the state did not extend to undertaking
trading activities without a legislative sanction. The court observed that ordinarily the
executive power connotes the residue of governmental functions that remain
after the legislative and judicial functions are taken away. It is neither
necessary nor possible to give an exhaustive enumeration of kinds and
categories of executive functions. Article 73[23]
of the constitution provides that the executive power of the union shall extend
to the matters with respect to which the parliament has the power to make laws.
Similarly, Article 162[24]
provides for in the case of the state government. So, neither of these articles
contains any definition of executive function and activities within its scope.
On the other hand, the language of these articles clearly indicates that the
powers of the union/ state executive do extend to matters upon which the
parliament /state legislature is competent to legislate and are not confined to
matters over which the legislation has been passed already. Indian Constitution
has not indeed recognized the doctrine of separation of powers in the stricter
sense or absolute rigidity, but the function of different parts of the
government have been sufficiently differentiated, and consequently, it can be
very well said that our constitution does not contemplate assumption by one
organ or part of the state of functions that essentially belong to another. The
executive branch can exercise the powers of departmental or subordinate
legislation when such powers are delegated to it by the legislature. It can
also, when so empowered, exercise judicial functions in a limited way. The
executive government, however, can never go against the provisions of the
constitution or of any law. But as we have already stated, it does not follow
from this that in order to enable the executive to function, there must be a
law already in existence and that the powers of the executive are limited
merely to the carrying out of these laws. The limits within which the executive
function can function under the constitution of India can be ascertained
without much difficulty by reference to the form of the executive which our
constitution has set up. Our Constitution though federal in structure is
modeled on the British parliamentary system where the executive is deemed to
have the primary responsibility for the formulation of the governmental policy
and its transmission into the law, though the condition precedent to the
exercise of this responsibility is it's retaining the confidence of the
legislative branch of the state. The executive function comprises both the
determination of the policy and carrying it into execution. This evidently
includes the initiation of legislation, the maintenance of the order, the
promotion of social and economic welfare, the direction of foreign policy, in
fact, the carrying on or supervision of the general administration of the
state. Therefore, the court was of the
opinion that the functions of a modern state, like the police of states of old,
are not confined to mere collection of taxes or maintenance of laws and
protection of the realm from external or internal enemies. A modern state is
certainly expected to engage in all the activities necessary for the promotion
of the social and economic welfare of the community. It is not necessary that
in order to enable the executive to function, there must be a law already in
existence, and the powers of the executive are limited merely to carrying out
these laws. Thus, in the present case, there is no fundamental right of the
publishers that any of the books printed and published by them should be
prescribed as textbooks by the school authorities, or if they are once accepted
as textbooks, they cannot be stopped or discontinued in future.
2. Asif
Hamid v. State of J&K[25],
the facts of the case are that the selection of MBBS/BDS course for the session
1988-89 in the two government medical colleges of the state of Jammu and Kashmir has been set aside by the
J&K High court on the ground that the selection was not held in accordance
with the directions of the said court given in an earlier case, i.e Jyotsana
Sharma V State of J&K[26].
In that case, the high court directed the state government to entrust the
selection process of two medical colleges to a statutory independent body that
was free from executive influence. No such body was constituted. The primary
issues in this case were whether the High Court had the competence to issue
directions to the state government to constitute a statutory body for medical
colleges selection and whether the selection made by any other authority was
invalid on that ground alone. The court in the present case observed that,
Although the doctrine of separation of powers hasn’t been recognized under the
constitution, the constitution makers have carefully defined the functions of
various organs of the state. Legislature, Executive, and Judiciary have to
function within their own spheres and such demarcation of powers is provided under
the constitution. No organ can use the
functions assigned to another; the functioning of democracy depends upon the
strength and independence of each of its organs. The legislature and executive
have all the power, including that of finance. The judiciary has the power to
ensure that all the aforesaid two main organs of the state function within the
constitutional limits. Judicial Review is a powerful weapon to restrain the
unconstitutional exercise of power by legislature and executive. The
constitution does not permit the courts to direct or advise the executive in
matters of policy or to sermonize qua any matter which under the constitution
lies within the sphere of legislature or executive, provided these authorities
do not transgress their constitutional limits or statutory powers. Hence, the
court observed that when the constitution gives power to the executive to lay
down policy or procedure for admission to the medical colleges in the state,
then the high court has no authority to divest the executive of that power The
state government in its executive powers, in the absence of a law on the
subject, is the competent authority to prescribe method and procedure for
admission to medical college by the executive instructions, but the high court
transgressed its self imposed limits in issuing the directions for constituting
statutory authority. However, the selection procedure is always open to
judicial review on the grounds of unreasonableness, etc. Hence, the High Court,
in this case, was patently in error in issuing directions in the Jyotsana
Sharma case and reiterating the Same in this case as well. Thus, the judgment
of the high court is set aside.
3. In Delhi
Laws Act, 1912, In re[27],
a seven-judge Special Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, has considered the
doctrine of separation of powers and ruled that strictly speaking, it has no
place in the system of governance in India nor at the present day under the
Constitution. Unlike the American and Australian Constitutions, the Indian
Constitution does not expressly vest the different sets of powers in the
different organs of the State. Under Article 53(1)[28],
the executive power is indeed vested in the President, but there is no similar
vesting provision regarding the legislative and judicial powers. Our
Constitution, though federal in its structure, is modeled on the British
parliamentary system, the essential feature of which is the responsibility
of the executive to the legislature. The President, as the head of the
executive, is to act on the advice of the Council of Ministers, and this
Council of Ministers, like the British Cabinet, is “a hyphen which joins—a
buckle which fastens—the legislative part of the State to the executive part.”
4. In Bhim
Singh v. Union of India[29]
the court observed that in modern governance, the strict separation of powers
is neither possible nor desirable. The Indian Constitution does not prohibit
the overlap of functions, but in fact, it provides for accommodating some
overlap as a parliamentary democracy. But what it prohibits is such exercise of
the function of the other branch, which results in wresting away from the
regime of constitutional accountability. This is the test for violation of
separation of powers. The constitutional principle of separation of powers will
only be violated if an essential function of one branch is taken over by
another branch, leading to the removal of checks and balances. Till the
principle of accountability is preserved, there is no violation of the separation
of powers.
5. In Smt.
Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain[30], Hon'ble
Justice Chandrachud observed: “The American
Constitution provides for a rigid separation of Governmental Power
governmental powers into three basic divisions: the executive, legislative and
judicial. It is an essential principle of the Constitution that powers
entrusted to one department should not be exercised by any other department.
The Australian Constitution even follows the same pattern
of power distribution. Unlike these Constitutions, the Indian Constitution does not expressly vest the three
kinds of powers in three different organs of the State. But the principle of
separation of powers is not a magic formula for keeping the three organs
of the State within the strict ambit of their functions.”
6.
In Sri Ram v. State of Bombay[31],
it was held that the absolute separation of powers is not possible by any form
of Government. In view of the varying situations, the legislature cannot
anticipate all the circumstances to which a legislative measure should be
extended and applied. Therefore, the legislature is empowered to delegate some
of its functions to executive authority. However, one thing is here: the legislature
cannot delegate its essential legislative power.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, a rigid and clear
demarcation of the powers of the organs is not feasible in any constitution. As
in Ram Jawaya Kapur v Union Of India[32],
it was observed by one of the justices, that The Indian Constitution has not
indeed recognized the doctrine of separation of power in its absolute rigidity
but the functions of the different parts or branches of the Government has been
sufficiently differentiated and consequently if can be very well be said that
our Constitution does not contemplate assumption, by one organ or part of the
State, of function that essentially belongs to another. [33]
Hence, in India, the doctrine is practically applicable but not in a stricter
sense, as is evident from the interpretation of the courts and its usage. The
principles on which the doctrine is based are not fulfilled in India; this is
because one organ is interdependent on the other and, at times, even performs
the functions assigned to the other organ.
Hence, history proves the fact that
if there is a complete separation of powers, the government cannot run
effectively and smoothly. The smooth running of government is possible only by
cooperation and mutual adjustment of all three organs of the government. Prof.
Garner has rightly pointed out that the doctrine is impracticable as a working
principle of government. It is not possible to categorize the functions of all
three branches of government on a mathematical basis[34],
The observation of Frankfurt is notable in this connection. According to him, a
rigid conception of separation of powers would make government impossible.[35]
[1] Jacob Finkelman, ‘Separation
of powers: A Study in Administrative Law’, The University of Toronto law
journal, Vol. 1, No.2, (1936).
[3] Vrad Kilor, Criminalization in
Politics and Separation of Powers, (2022) PL February 64.
[4] Karan Tyagi, ‘The Doctrine of
Separation of Powers and its Relevance in time of Coalition politics’, Vol. 69, No. 3, The Indian Journal of Political
Science, pp. 619-625,
(2008).
[5] constituent assemble
debates(proceedings)- volume VII- Friday, 10th Dec, 1948, para 20.
[6] Constituent assemble
debates(proceedings)- volume VII- Friday, 10th Dec, 1948.
[7] AIR 1968 SC 1138 at p. 1152.
[8] INDIA CONST. art. 62-72.
[9] INDIA CONT. art. 226.
[10] INDIA CONT. art. 227.
[11] INDIA CONT. art. 32.
[12] INDIA CONT. art. 136.
[13] P.M Bakshi, Comparative Law:
Separation of Powers in India, 42 A.B.A.J. 553 (1956).
[14] INDIA CONT. art. 124(2).
[15] 1996 (5)
SCC 670
[16] P. Kannadasan & Ors. v. State
of Tamil Nadu 1996(5) SC 670.
[17] Kesavananda Bharti V. State of
Kerela, (1973) 4 SCC 225.
[18] 1994 SCC (3) 569.
[19] Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569.
[20] Karan Tyagi, ‘The Doctrine of
Separation of Powers and its Relevance in time of Coalition politics’, Vol. 69, No. 3, The Indian Journal of Political
Science, pp. 619-625,
(2008).
[21] Richa Goel, ‘Separation of Power’,
(3 october, 2022), <Separation of
powers (ipleaders.in)>, accessed on 22 April, 2024.
[22] AIR 1955 SC 549.
[23] INDIA CONT. art. 73.
[24] INDIA CONT. art. 162.
[25] 1989 Supp (2) SCC 364.
[27] 1951 SCC 568.
[28] INDIA CONT. art. 53(1).
[29] (2010) 5 SCC 538.
[30] 1965 SCC 1.
[31] AIR 1959 SC 459.
[32] Supra note 22.
[33] Ram Jawaya Kapoor V. Union Of
India AIR (1955) SC 569.
[34] Mahantesh, Dyanmics of
Constituionalism in iNida- An Appraisal, IJLS(2018) 28.
[35] Frankfurter-The Public and its Government (1930) quoted by B.
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Article Information
BEYOND THE BRANCHES: DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS
Authors: SAMIYA CHOUDHARY
- Journal IJLRA
- ISSN 2582-6433
- Published 2024/05/10
- Issue 7
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International Journal for Legal Research and Analysis
- Abbreviation IJLRA
- ISSN 2582-6433
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