Published Paper
Article Details
AR
ANTULAY V. RS NAYAK
AUTHORED BY - POLAVARAPU RAGHURAM
BBALLB (HONS)
SCHOOL OF
LAW, PRESIDENCY UNIVERSITY
BANGLORE, KARNATAKA,
INDIA.
ABSTRACT
The case was a landmark judgment as
it stated the corruption cases that are triable by a special judge, cannot be
transferred to a High Court judge for a hearing. After the judgment of this
case, many legal academics pointed out how the legal system of India is
restricted by the limitations of human foresight. In the famous Sahara’s case,
the court stated this case to be of irrelevant precedent and the judgment must
be cited as a precedent, only when confined to the facts and circumstances of
the cases.
INTRODUCTION
Mr. Antulay, the Respondent in this
landmark case, was the then Chief Minister of Maharashtra who resigned and left
office on January 20, 1982, while the petitioner, Mr. Nayak, was a political
figure with political ties. The lawsuit centers on the Respondent’s claim that
his fundamental rights had been violated. The Apex Court had issued a landmark
decision, stating that the High Court’s rulings were in violation of Section 7(1)?of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952, as well as the appealing party’s
fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India.
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES:
This
research paper especially speaks about the case study of the case AR Antulay v.
RS Nayak. It was a landmark judgment where it is triable by a special judge,
and it cannot be transferred to a high court judge for a hearing. After hearing
the case it has pointed out the many different provisions in the legal system
of India.
RESEARCH PROBLEM:
The
research problem of this research paper talks about how the perspective of the
Indian legal system is restricted by the limitations of human foresight.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS:
Statue
must be read as whole, Clear, and unambiguous language.
What are
the facts and the judgment of the case?
What is
the different perspective given in the case?
RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS:
In the
case of AR Antalya v. RS Nayak (1988) is one of the landmark
judgments in Indian legal history because it established that corruption
matters tried by a Special Court cannot be referred to a High Court judge for a
hearing. Despite much criticism, the Supreme Court of India was certain that
justice had been delivered properly. This subsequently led several legal
scholars to assert that law was being hampered by human foresee constraints.
SCOPE OF STUDY:
The
research paper talks about the concept of clear and numerous meaning n the
statue.
The scope
of study of the research paper also deals with the case law which states the
clear example of clear and unambiguous meaning.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY:
Descriptive
and analytical methodology has been followed by the research through the
research paper. Secondary sources like books, articles and websites have been
referred by the accomplishment of the research paper.
STATUTE MUST BE READ AS A
WHOLE
When a question arises as to meaning of a certain
provision in a statute,
it is known that it should be read as whole in its context.
The context over here means, the statute as a
whole, the previous state of law, other statutes in "Pari
Materia"(same matter or same subject), the general scope and the mischief
that it was intended to remedy. It is an established rule now that the intention of the legislature must
be found by reading the statute as a whole. The rule is said to be compelling
rule or elementary rule or settled rule.
Lord Davey "every clause of a statute should be construed with reference to
the context and other clauses of the Act, so as, as far as possible, to make a
consistent enactment of the whole statute or series of statutes relating to the
subject matter".
The above mentioned rule is said to be "ex
visceribus actus".
Lord Coke: "to construe one part of the statute by another part of the same
statute, for the best preset the meaning of the makers". To ascertain the
meaning of a clause in a statute the court must look at the whole statute, at
what precedes and what succeeds and not merely at clause
PLAIN OR AMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE
The same word may mean one thing in one context and
another in different context. For this reason the same word used in different
sections of a statute or even used at different places in the same clause or section
of a statute may bear different meanings. The conclusion that the language used
by the legislature is plain or ambiguous can only be truly arrived by studying
the statute as a whole. How far and to what extent each component part of the
statute influences the meaning of the other part would be different in each
given state.
CASE LAW
Citation: AIR 1988
SC 1531
Judges/Bench:
Sabyasachi Mukherjee, G.L. Oza, M.N. Venkatachaliah, Ranganath Misra, JJ., B.C.
Ray, S. Natarajan, S. Ranganathan
Court : Supreme Court of India
Petitioner: A.R
Antulay
Respondent: R.S
Nayak
Date of the judgment: 29th April 1988
Referencence: The
Constitution of India, The Indian Penal Code, Criminal Amendment Act
1963, Criminal Procedure Code 1973
& Criminal Law Amendment Act 1952
Legislation and Rules: 1.
Sections 6 & 7- offences Criminal Law 1952
2. Sections 374, 406 & 407
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973
3. Articles 13, 14, 21, 32, 134,
136, 139, 141, 142 of the Constitution of India
FACTS
Mr. Antulay (Barrister Abdul Rahman
Antulay) had resigned as Maharashtra’s Chief Minister on January 13, 1982,
after the Bombay High Court sentenced him to prison for coercion. The Court
found that Antulay had illegally bought Bombay region developers in exchange
for more concrete than the quantity distributed by the government to Indira
Gandhi Pratibha Pratishthan Trust, which was of the few trusts he had set up
and controlled. The Court eventually released him on bond. However, the Supreme
Court later cleared him of the charge. An appeal was filed under Article 136 of the Constitution on February 16, 1984, and the
Supreme Court’s Constitution Bench ruled that a member of the legislative
assembly is not always a public worker thereby reversing the previous order.
Rather than returning the case to a Special Judge for disposition as required
by law, the Supreme Court unilaterally removed it from the Special Judge’s
Court and transferred it to the Bombay High Court.
CONTENTIONS
The Appellant party had claimed that
he was forced to deal with bias without being given the opportunity to present
any pleadings or contentions in front of the Court, which he claimed was a
violation of his fundamental right under Article 14 of the Indian Constitution.
It was also argued that the litigant’s fundamental Right to Trial by a Special
Judge under Article 21 of the Constitution was contravened. The fundamental
rights of equality and justice, which stipulated that no one should suffer the
brunt of technical faults, were blatantly infringed, according to the
Appellant. The appealing party had also lost two important rights, namely the
ability to appeal to the High Court under Section 9?of the Criminal Law Amendment Act and the opportunity to
appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution.
The respondent argued that the High
Court could withdraw the matter from the Special Judge under the Criminal Law
Amendment Act by means of Section 407 of the Criminal Procedure Code if the conditions were right. It was stated that
the matter was transferred without providing the appellant an opportunity to
present his reasons, which was unacceptable. The issue of whether the superior
court had jurisdiction was debated and it was contended that the Court could
not be held liable for such charges unless it had behaved in a Coram
non-judice (not before a judge) manner.
DECISION
The Supreme Court’s decision, in this
case, was handed down by a seven-judge panel. The Bench ruled in 1988 that the
case’s 1984 ruling was unreasonable, unlawful, and unconstitutional under
Article 21 of the Indian Constitution because Antulay’s right to use the appeal
system was limited. The Apex Court stated that Section 406 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 allows for the
transfer of criminal cases and the Supreme Court to move cases and requests.
According to the law, the Court may coordinate a specific case or allure from
one High Court to the next High Court, or from a Subordinate Criminal Court to
another Criminal Court of equivalent or upper-level purview.
The Supreme Court lacks the authority
to transfer cases to itself. Only the Parliament, by law, has the authority to
create or expand the jurisdiction. The judiciary has not been vested with such
power. It was also noted that the appellant had the fundamental right under
Article 21 of the Constitution, a Special Judge’s trial under Section 7(1) of
the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952, and the right not to suffer as a result
of any judgment rendered by the Court in violation of natural justice.
LEGAL
VIEWPOINTS
The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and
its viewpoint
The case of A.R. Antulay vs R.S.
Nayak & Anr (1988) is commonly referred to while studying Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 which talks about
the jurisdiction of the civil courts. The Supreme Court had clarified in this
case that the subject matter of jurisdiction of a court has obtained a
legislative character, which is to say that the judiciary has no role in
widening or narrowing its jurisdiction by itself.
The judiciary can only interpret laws
and in doing so, it cannot expand or reduce the jurisdiction of a court. In
this scenario, the consent of a court is immaterial as the judiciary cannot
surpass the legislative decision-making. Along with the power to create and
enlarge jurisdiction, the legislature has also been vested with the power to
confer a right of appeal or take away the same from a particular court. The
Parliament alone can do it by law and no court, whether superior or inferior or
both combined can enlarge the jurisdiction of the court or divest a person of
his or her rights of revision and appeal.
Constitutional viewpoint
The rule of law is the core of our
democracy, which means we need an independent judiciary, and judges who can
make decisions regardless of the political winds that are blowing. The other
branches of the government including the executive and legislative branches,
must not obstruct the judiciary’s ability to do justice. Judges must be able to
carry out their duties without fear of reprisal or favor. The primary aim of
judicial independence is for judges to be able to settle a matter before them
based on the law, without being affected by any other element.
Though there is no clear provision in
the Indian Constitution in relation to the separation of powers, the
independence of the judiciary and the rule of law are fundamental characteristics
of the Constitution that cannot be changed, as the Hon’ble Supreme Court had
observed in the case of S.P. Gupta v Union of India (1962).
Article 50 of the Indian Constitution specifically mentions the
independence of the judiciary that is the separation of the judiciary from the
executive organ of the government. Although different compartments are
functioning different roles in the parliamentary form of government, hardly can
the executive and the legislature be distinguished from each other. What is
interesting to note in this viewpoint when put on the same plate as the present
case is that determination of jurisdiction does not come under the ambit of
judicial independence.
This is because the independence of
the judiciary does not signify taking away legislative power of law-making,
instead what it does mean is to interpret the laws made by the legislature in
such a way so that a common man can understand the meaning of the same. Thus
although the judiciary is supposed to be independent of the other two organs of
the Indian government, it cannot determine its own jurisdiction.
Administrative perspective
Article 12 of the Indian Constitution defines “State”. It states
that the term ‘State’ includes the Central and state governments, Parliament,
and legislatures, and all local or other authorities functioning under India’s
government or Indian territory. Whether the judiciary is included in the broad
term “State” is a significant question to be addressed in this context. The
judiciary’s position under Article 12 is based on judicial and non-judicial
decisions, whereby if the judiciary is deciding cases, it cannot be referred to
as a State.
However, if it is performing
non-judicial functions, it is included in the definition of State, because if
the courts are completely exempt from the State, it will have unrestricted
power to make laws that violate fundamental rights. This is backed by Article 13 which provides that any law that violates basic rights
is unconstitutional, and since courts have the power to establish laws, this
suggests that they are performing a State duty. Article 141, on the other hand, states that the Supreme Court’s decision
is binding on all courts within India’s territory. As a result, Supreme Court’s
verdicts are unassailable, but the lower court’s conclusions can be appealed if
they infringe fundamental rights.
Where in a case the appellant filed a
complaint against the respondent, A.R. Antualy, a public servant being the
Chief Minister of Maharashtra State under ss. 161, 165 I.P.C. and s. 5 of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (1947 Act) alleging abuse of office of Chief
Minister, the issue as regard to interpretation of the act came before the
court.
If the
language is clear and unambiguous, no need of interpretation would arise. The
5-judge bench further observed that the question of construction arises only in
the event of an ambiguity or the plain meaning of the words used in the Statute
would be self-defeating.
CONCLUSION
When the Supreme Court handed down
this verdict in 1988, it drew criticism from observers, notably legal
professor Upendra Baxi, who believed that India’s anti-corruption legislation
protected the guilty. The Court, on the other hand, believed
that “finality is fine, but justice is better.” In this instance, the
principle of Ibi jus ubi remedium, which states that if a person’s legal
rights are violated, he has the right to seek redress in a court of law, has
been applied. It is important to remember that judges and judgments play an
important role and should not be skewed in any way. As a result, technical
faults or ideological differences should not be reflected in judgments, if they
are, our fundamental rights will be violated.
BIBLOGRAPHY
Article Information
AR ANTULAY V. RS NAYAK
Authors: POLAVARAPU RAGHURAM
- Journal IJLRA
- ISSN 2582-6433
- Published 2023/11/18
- Issue 7
About Journal
International Journal for Legal Research and Analysis
- Abbreviation IJLRA
- ISSN 2582-6433
- Access Open Access
- License CC 4.0
All research articles published in International Journal for Legal Research and Analysis are open access and available to read, download and share, subject to proper citation of the original work.
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of International Journal for Legal Research and Analysis.