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ANALYZING BAIL JURISPRUDENCE UNDER UAPA IN REFERENCE TO WATALI CASE AND POST-WATALI TRENDS BY – NEHA GUPTA
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Article Details
ANALYZING BAIL JURISPRUDENCE UNDER UAPA
IN
REFERENCE TO WATALI CASE AND
POST-WATALI
TRENDS
AUTHORED BY – NEHA GUPTA
MOBILE NO. – 8707555454
EMAIL ID – gn98eha@gmail.com
INTRODUCTION
The word
‘Bail’ is not defined in any of the laws in India neither in ordinary criminal
law nor under special laws. Black’s Law Dictionary defines ‘bail’ as ‘Procuring
the release of a person from legal custody, by undertaking that he shall appear
at the time and place design himself to the jurisdiction and judgement of the
court.[1]
The law pertaining to bail has its
own philosophy and hold a significant place in the administration of justice
and its concept materializes from the conflict between the state power to
restrict liberty of the accused and the principle of presumption of innocence
in favour of that person.
The
jurisprudence of bail or the rationale behind granting bail is based on the
formulation of Article 21 of the Constitution which states that liberty can be
deprived only through the procedure established by law and the law and procedure both must be just, fair and
reasonable.[2]
The significance of this article in terms of bail is that it makes the
deprivation of liberty, fleeting and an issue of grave concern and allows only
to the extent of meeting the standard community good and compelling interest of
State.
In the
ever-appreciated words of Justice Krishna Iyer- “The issue of ‘Bail or
Jail’-at the pretrial or post-conviction stage-although largely hinging on judicial discretion, is one of liberty, justice, public safety and
burden of the public treasury, all of which insist that a
developed jurisprudence of bail is
integral to a socially sensitized judicial process.”[3]
Bail should always be construed as balancing the individual liberty of a person
with the larger societal interest rather than using it as a tool to punish
people by detaining them unnecessarily. The
consequences of pre-trial detention are grave and the accused is being deprived
physically and psychologically which are usually more as compared to what is
generally imposed on defendants who has been convicted. “The jailed
defendant loses his job if he has one and is prevented from contributing to the
preparation of his defence. Equally important, the burden of his detention frequently falls heavily on the innocent
members of his family.”[4]
However, there is reversal of the general principles of criminal law in
special legislation like UAPA which makes them special or different from the
ordinary law of the land. Under this law, jail is the rule and an accused is
presumed to be guilty unless proven innocent. This presumption is antithetical
to the tenets of criminal jurisprudence but has always been justified by the
state on the ground of national security and larger public interest.
Recently, the decision of the Apex Court in Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali
case[5] attracted a lot of
criticism owing to its narrow interpretation of section 43D(5) which almost
rendered the grant of bail impossible in UAPA cases. This paper seeks to
analyze the bail jurisprudence under terror laws like UAPA with the help of
decided cases with specific reference to Watali and the impact of the
restrictive interpretation adopted on subsequent cases.
RESEARCH
QUESTIONS
·
What makes bail difficult under UAPA and how is it
different from ordinary criminal law?
·
How UAPA is being used as a tool to achieve political
ends?
·
What is the fallacy of the term ‘prima facie’ under
section 43D (5) of UAPA?
·
What is the effect of Watali on the judgment of
subsequent cases?
OBJECTIVES
·
To analyze the bail jurisprudence under UAPA and to
find out how is it different from ordinary law.
·
To find out the problems in the interpretation of the
vague and ambiguous term like ‘prima facie’.
·
To analyze the post watali trends in reference to
grant of bail in cases registered under UAPA.
BAIL JURISPRUDENCE UNDER UAPA
In ordinary
criminal law, it has always been reiterated that ‘Bail is rule and jail an
exception and the court further emphasizing on this rule observed that the purpose of bail is to ensure that the accused individual will
attend at the trial, not as a form of punishment or prevention. The Apex Court
in this case made it clear that “The courts owe more than verbal respect to
the principle that punishment begins after conviction, and that every man is
deemed to be innocent until duly tried and duly found guilty.”[6] Since,
the objective of granting bail is to secure the appearance of the accused in
court at the time of trial and to ensure fair trial therefore, the restriction
on liberty would only be justified if it poses a flight risk, evidence tampering
and witness intimidation.
The court in State of UP v. Amarmani tripathi[7] laid
down certain conditions to be considered while deciding an application for bail
which are as follows – “(i) whether there is any prima facie or
reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence; (ii)
nature and gravity of the charge; (iii) severity of the punishment in the event
of conviction; (iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on
bail; (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused;
(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; (vii) reasonable apprehension of
the witnesses being tampered with; and (viii) danger, of course, of justice
being thwarted by grant of bail. In addition to this well settled
considerations section 43D(5) of UAPA provides for another ground for
the court to refuse fail and it is in addition to the restriction under the
code or any other law for the time being in force.”[8]
The restricted interpretation of this provision by courts has resulted in
reversal of the general criminal law and made the grant of bail under UAPA an
exception.
Section 43D
(5) is the most contentious provision in the act as
it mandates the court to not to release the person on bail if it has reasonable
ground to believe that the allegation against the accused is prima facie true
on examining the case diary or report made under section 173 CrPC. This
provision was introduced through the amendment in 2008[9] in the aftermath of Bombay
terror attack case and is applicable only to cases falling under Chapter IV and
VI of the Act i.e, terrorist activities and terrorists organization. The
proviso to this section almost turned down the principle of ‘presumption of
innocence’ which gives an upper hand to the state machinery.
Patterns of
larger use of the UAPA suggest its targeted application by the state. The law
enables prolonged pre-trial custody of individuals through drawn-out
investigation and exceedingly limited grounds to secure bail. UAPA accused are
very often acquitted in their trials due to insufficient evidence, yet, forced
to remain in custody, often for years. This ensures the legal process itself
becomes punishment. This Committee reiterates the urgent need for a
comprehensive review of the UAPA.[10]
The Watali judgement by the Apex Court prohibits the court
from considering the merits or demerits of the evidence when deciding on a bail
request and would also refrain from exploring the conclusions that the
prosecution has reached from the evidence and other materials presented to the
court.[11] This decision made this draconian law the most feasible tool for the
executive to thwart the grant of bail and to keep the accused in jail for indefinite
period. Therefore, it becomes important to discuss this case in detail before
moving into the intricacies of the provision and the fallacy of ‘prima facie’.
STATISICS –
A PUSH FOR RECONSIDERATION
According to government statistics, 3,579 of the nearly 4,250 UAPA cases
that were scheduled for inquiry between 2014 and 2020 are still outstanding.
4,101 cases remained open as of the end of 2020, 1,818 of which had been
waiting for an investigation for more than three years. 2020 saw the
charge-sheeting of 398 UAPA cases, of which 63.56 percent were filed within a
year and 27.88 percent between one to two years. Similar to that, as of 2017,
43.02 percent of these cases had been pending for one to three years.[12]
A total of 72.4% of cases were dismissed or acquitted between 2014 and
2020, while 27.5% resulted in convictions. In these seven years, 57 persons
have been released, 253 have been found guilty, and 493 have been acquitted.
This appallingly low UAPA conviction rate suggests that the law is being abused.
UAPA – A TOOL TO ACHIEVE POLITICAL ENDS
The
security law in India has undergone a significant evolution since the time
before independence. The Naxalite movement in central India, political
uprisings in Punjab, militant activity in Jammu and Kashmir, insurgent
organisations in the north-eastern states, and other internal disputes posed a
serious threat to national security throughout the post-independence era.
Anti-terror laws were required by this domestic crises to protect India's
sovereignty and territorial integrity.[13]
Therefore,
maintaining a balance between enhancing national security protections and
upholding citizens' rights is a requirement sine qua non in a democratic system
like India. However, the state should be careful not to go into repression and
authoritarianism while protecting the territorial integrity and sovereignty of
the State as well as the safety of its residents. The Unlawful Activities
Prevention Act of 1967 has received a lot of criticism for being an oppressive
law that goes against the spirit of democracy and violates fundamental rights.
It is also used as a tool by the government to suppress political dissent by
criminalizing it.
Political justice, in theory, is concerned with defending the state from
external and internal adversaries who have established bases within the borders
of a state for operational convenience. In reality, a social class with
established authority or even a group of party leaders may view themselves as
the state in order to further their own goals. The second sort of political
justice inevitably draws the ire of historians or modern critics because it is
nearly always brutal on top of being unscrupulous in practise.[14]
The Unlawful Activities Prevention Act of 1967 has also received a lot
of criticism for being an oppressive law that goes against the spirit of
democracy and violates fundamental rights. By eliminating the line between
criminal activities and political dissent, it is argued that this criminalizes
political dissent. The act gives the government a great deal of unrestricted
power by using various overly general and ambiguous terms and phrases. Certain
terms in the Act, such as affecting the interests of India and if the
government believes give room for subjective interpretation and, as a result,
egregious misapplication of the provisions because the term
"interests" is not defined and also excessively enlarge the authority
of the government. This provides the government the authority to repress any
dissent, no matter how small.[15]
There are examples of people connected to organisations that oppose the
ruling regime have been charged under UAPA. For instance, the Delhi Police
detained Imran Kirmani, a Kashmiri aeronautical engineer for alleged ties to
LeT, a group that is prohibited and included in the Act's First Schedule. He
was acquitted after spending five years of his life in jail. Amitabh Bagchi, a
member of the Politburo of the Communist Party of India (Maoist), was also
arrested under the UAPA, in spite of the fact that no firearms were found on
him, as part of an effort by the executive to ban critical thinking. His
indictment was justified by the literature that was found on him and the
knowledge that he belonged to a banned organization.[16] It is clear from the
above stated facts that it is being used to repress dissent through harassment
and intimidation, endangering press freedom and public discourse as well as
criminalising the exercise of civil liberties.
Examining the UAPA's provisions, the low conviction rate, and reports of
abuse of the law's provisions show that, like TADA and POTA before it, the UAPA
has also shown to be a tool of oppression in the hands of the government used
to stifle dissent and pursue political rivals under the guise of fighting
terrorism and illegal activities. It is fascinating to observe that nearly all
significant counterterrorism laws have been introduced in a hurry and in
response to large acts of mass violence both domestically and overseas. The
definition of the mentioned offences share the characteristic of being broad
and comprehensive. It enables even routine criminal activity to fall within
their purview.
Arun Ferreira, Sudha Bharadwaj, Vernon Gonsalves, Varavara Rao, Anand
Teltumde, Gautam Navlakha, and other well-known human rights advocates, civil
society leaders, activists, and even student protestors have all been detained
under the UAPA and sedition laws over the course of the past four years, in
particular. These activists were detained in relation to their suspected
participation in the remembrance event for Bhima-Koregaon that took place on
January 1, 2018.[17]
Aside from these, a number of activists, academics, and leaders of the
right to information have been charged with violating the UAPA and sedition
laws, including Assamese activists Akhil Gogoi and Jamia Milia Islamia
University students Safoora Zargar and Pinjra Tod who participated in
demonstrations against the contentious Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA). Umar
Khalid, a student activist, was also detained for his alleged involvement in
the Delhi riots that took place earlier this year.
Although UAPA cases have increased significantly in recent years, misuse
of the law has existed for much longer and has occurred throughout all regimes
and types of governments. The UAPA's lack of a legal process for those
classified as terrorists—individuals or organizations—to contest their
identification as such is particularly alarming.
THE
(IN)FAMOUS CASE OF NIA v ZAHOOR
AHMAD SHAH
WATALI
The accused
‘Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali’ was arrested under UAPA on allegation of terror
funding wherein he acted as a conduit for transferring funds from the terrorist
Hafeez Sayid to secessionist/ Hurriyat leaders and helping them in waging war against the Government
of India through repetitive attack on security forces and government
establishments. The provisions of UAPA invoked by NIA against the accused were
“Section 16 (punishment
for terrorist act), Section 17 (punishment
for raising funds for terrorist act). Section 18 (punishment for conspiracy), Section 20 (punishment for being member of terrorist gang or
organization), Section 39 (offence
relating to support given to terrorist organization) and Section 40 (offence for raising funds for a terrorist
organization).”
Order of
District and Session Judge rejecting bail –
The court
held that in view of stated facts and circumstances, statement of witnesses and
other materials produced by NIA, a prima facie case has been made out against
the accused and therefore by virtue of section 43D(5)[18],
the prayer of accused for bail cannot be granted. The statements recorded under
section 161 CrPC on which the court relied were not even tested and therefore
could not have been read as evidence. Further, the statement of witnesses
(Charlie and Romeo) recorded under section 164 CrPC was also not provided to
the accused as per section 207 CrPC. If the idea was to protect the witnesses
as per section 44[19]
of UAPA then the prosecution could have done it by omitting the name or address
of the witnesses from the statement thereby not disclosing the identity of the
witnesses. The document no. 132(a) which was relied upon by the NIA to
establish the connection of the accused with the terror funding was yet to be
established as genuine as it was a loose green sheet containing the signature
of the accused at the right hand bottom corner and mere signature cannot be the
proof of its contents.
Order of
Delhi High Court granting bail –
The high
Court granted bail to the accused and asked him furnishing a personal bond of 2
lakh along with two sureties of like amount to the satisfaction of the trial
court. The court has reversed the order of the trial court rejecting bail
saying that there are no reasonable ground at this stage to form an opinion
that the case against the accused is prima facie true. While granting bail, the
court imposed certain conditions and in case of any breach, NIA was given an
option to apply for cancellation of bail. The HC took into account the
proposition that when special laws concerning serious offences are invoked
against a person inviting grave consequences then the trial court will
scrutinize the evidences with additional care.
This makes
it evident that court has always an option to protect the liberty of the person
without compromising the interest of the State by invoking the provision of
cancellation of bail. Indefinite detention of accused on the pretext of him
tampering with the evidence or flight risk which may or may not happen is
contrary to the principles of presumption of innocence and violate the
fundamental right of the accused.
Order of
Supreme Court denying grant of bail -
The Supreme
Court reversed the order of Delhi HC and held that the accused is not entitled
to bail. It further observed that the court should not have gone into the
merits and demerits of the case and examined the admissibility of evidences.
The court further held that bail can be denied to the accused under section
43D(5)[20]
by relying on the materials produced by the prosecution even though there are
chances of them being inadmissible as evidence during trial because at the
stage of deciding an application of bail, the court should decide on the basis of the materials produced
before it on broad probabilities.
THE FALLACY OF ‘PRIMA FACIE’ – A TECHNICALITY TO CUT DOWN THE
SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS
As Annelise Riles[21] explained in her paper
the vice of technicality inculcated in the statute by the executive to mould
the law in favour of the State. The technical character of law encompasses
three things – Ideology, Actors and problem solving paradigm.
One such technicality enumerated in the law is section 43D (5) of UAPA.
The problem with the mandate of section 43D(5) is the construction and
determination of allegations to be ‘prima facie’ true. In watali,[22] the Supreme Court
observed that “the expression ‘prima facie’ true means that the
evidences collected by the investigating agency unless contradicted or
disproved must show on its face the complicity of the accused in the commission
of the offence.” The court is required to peruse the case diary or charge
sheet while engaging with the question of ‘prima facie’.
The court further held that in order to avoid conducting a mini-trial at
the bail-granting stage, the court should just consider the general
probabilities of the accused's involvement rather than weighing the evidence's
merits or shortcomings. Now, in the absence of examination of evidence how the
accused would prove that the evidence presented by the prosecution does not
pass the standard of ‘prima facie’.[23] In the wake of such
non-examination of evidence, it becomes almost impossible for the accused to
secure bail by disproving the case of the prosecution. The Delhi High Court[24] while granting bail to
Watali observed that the examination of evidence is necessary to determine
whether a prima facie case exist or not.
The apex court in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v State of Maharashtra[25] in reference to TADA
observed that the designated court should be cautious while invoking the provisions of TADA because more often than not, the investigating officer chooses to add
an offence while opposing grant of bail. Therefore, an onerous duty is cast
upon the court to take extra care to scrutinize the material on the record and
apply their mind to the evidence and documents available with the investigating
agency before charge-sheeting an accused and should not solely rely on the
version presented by the investigating agency.
Moreover, the fallacy also lies in the fact of assuming the
determination of prima facie involvement of accused when the investigation is
itself in the process and the court is only required to rely upon the material
produced by the prosecution which in itself leaves a scope for arbitrary
exercise of power in the hands of executives. This provision leads to deference
of judiciary to the executive as they are acting as mouthpiece of the State
machinery.
The judiciary has received a lot of criticism recently over cases
involving UAPA, while being the most important institution for safeguarding and
providing prompt remedy of violations of fundamental rights. Several retiring
Supreme Court justices have expressed their shock at the upper courts' shocking
indifference to flagrant abuses of civil freedoms under the new UAPA system.
Such an interpretation against the courts has a strong foundation. Even in
cases when there has been no progress in the police investigation or
prosecution, the Supreme Court, high courts, and subordinate courts have shown
little to no rush to issue bail.
Due to their unreasonably high threshold, these bail requirements make
it nearly impossible for an accused person to obtain bail. The requirements for
bail are more stringent than those for an acquittal. Because of this, under
specific legislation, the accused are typically denied bail and are kept in
detention even if they are ultimately found not guilty. Since, Section 43D(5)
solely refers to the prima facie requirement, the UAPA prohibits taking the
triple test into account. Furthermore, the Supreme Court in the Watali case
viewed prima facie under the UAPA significantly differently even though the
UAPA imposes the same threshold of prima facie as utilised by the courts in
granting bail under the CrPC.
The court in watali held that the phrase ‘prima facie’ in Section 43D(5)
requires that the information gathered by the investigating agency be taken as
factual unless it is proven otherwise by additional evidence contained in the
chargesheet. At the time of giving bail, the probability, or the improbable
likelihood, of its veracity, cannot be taken into account. Additionally, the issue
of admissibility is not to be addressed at this time, especially if any
collected evidence is not thought to be acceptable as evidence.
A FLICKER OF HOPE - POST WATALI TRENDS
Undoubtedly, the decision of the Supreme Court in Watali set a bar so
high that it made the grant of bail virtually impossible in UAPA cases.
However, this court in Twaha Fasal v Union of India[26] tried to correct the
wrong done by its judgement in watali and move beyond the strict construction
of UAPA provisions by granting bail to the accused and reading down section 38
and 39 of the act. The court observed that the vague allegations of conspiracy,
based on the general behaviour of the accused, or of the materials that might
have been recovered from them, is not enough: it is for the chargesheet to
establish the prima facie existence of the requisite
intention, from specific overt acts.
Further, in Union of India v KA Najeeb[27] the
court observed that the rigorous provision of the UAPA Act, particularly
Section 43D (5) cannot oust the ability of the constitutional courts to grant
bail on breach of Part III of the Constitution and when the period of
incarceration undergone by the accused has surpassed a considerable part of the
sentence then the right of the accused should be safeguarded as right to fair
and speedy trial[28]
is a fundamental right recognized under article 21of the constitution.
Though the court in this case granted bail to the accused but its
acceptance of the rule laid down in watali is somewhat problematic as it
furthers the idea of grant of bail as an exception in terror cases. It observed
that the High Court had re appreciated the entire evidence on record to
overturn the Special Court conclusion of their being a prima facie case of
conviction and concomitant rejection of bail and conducted a mini-trial and
determined the admissibility of certain evidences, which exceeded the limited
scope of a bail petition.
This approach can be summed up as follows - Given the strict
requirements of the UAPA and the near-impossibility of obtaining bail, courts
must adhere to two principles if individual liberties are not to be completely
supplanted by the demands of anti-terror law[29] -
·
A strict and narrow construction must be applied to
the UAPA's definitional sections. This is what the Bombay High Court did
regarding Section 20 of the UAPA in Iqbal Ahmed Kabir Ahmed, the Delhi High
Court did regarding the definition of "terrorism" in Asif Iqbal
Tanha, and what the Supreme Court has recently done in Thwaha Faisal.
·
The charges on the chargesheet must be specific,
factual, and individualised. Inferences or supposition cannot bridge the gap
between what someone is accused of doing and the actual circumstances. This is
once more shown in the analysis of the Thwaha Faisal ruling.
In Asif Iqbal Tanha , the Delhi HC held that “there are no
reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations against the appellant are
prima facie true and the proviso to section 43D(5) would not apply; and we must therefore fall back upon the
general principles of grant or denial of bail to an accused person charged with
certain offences.”[30] Pre-trial incarceration would undermine the presumption of
innocence in addition to causing needless psychological and physical suffering;
more importantly, it would substantially impair the appellant's ability to
participate in and contribute to the development of his defence during the
trial. Imposing necessary conditions on the grant of bail can address the three
main objections to bail pending trial, which are evidence tampering, witness
intimidation, and absconding.[31]
Further, In Devangana Kalita,[32] the
court which emphasizing upon the grant of bail observed that even though this
involved the court exercising discretion, it was important that this discretion
be used wisely and not just automatically or routinely. The nature of the
charges, the seriousness of the penalty, and the type of evidence used to
support the accusations must all be taken into consideration by the court when
deciding whether to grant bail. The court must carefully consider the veracity
of the prosecution while rationally evaluating the suspicion of flight risk,
evidence tampering, and witness intimidation in addition to being prima facie
satisfied with regard to the accusations brought. The character, behaviour,
means, position, and status of the accused as well as the likelihood of the
crime being repeated must all be taken into account by the court.
CONCLUSION
The majority of definitions and words in legislation like the
UAPA were taken from previously abolished laws, and the Parliament took no
effort to clarify them adequately, resulting in ambiguous definitions that
cover a wide variety of behaviours. The law enforcement agencies may
misinterpret these definitions, which would be a violation of an individual's
freedom. One such phrase is ‘prima facie’ as defined by section 43D (5) of the
UAPA, whose strict application has all but prevented the granting of bail in
UAPA cases.
The legislation of bail in India is based on the maxim ‘Bail
is rule, denial is exception,’ yet UAPA flips this maxim. Due to the existence
of section 43 D, courts are compelled to exercise caution while granting bail.
A person may be kept in jail even if there is just a remote chance that he
committed the crime. The burden of proof for the prosecution does not
correspond to the seriousness of the offence, and the presumption of innocence
is unfairly biased against the accused. Sections like 43 D may be essential in
the battle against terrorism, but safeguards against the wrongdoing of
investigation authorities are also necessary to protect people's right to life.
As per the holdings in watali, the court is required to
assume that the prosecution's case is accurate before deciding whether a prima
facie case has been established. This represents a serious erosion of judicial
authority. The common law’s prima facie requirement is a discretionary
criterion that enables the judge to determine whether the evidence against the
accused is convincing and adequate to support conviction. The prima facie
criterion has been stripped of its crucial discretionary essence by the Watali
decision of the Supreme Court, turning it into a rigid test. By doing so, it
makes the error of presuming that the information is accurate unless shown otherwise.
This is a significant shift from the idea of prima facie that has been
established through decades of related case law. There is nothing in the UAPA
to support this constriction of judicial discretion. In fact, Watali has had
the effect of negating the progressive statutory position adopted in the UAPA
wherein the UAPA discarded the almost impossible standard contained in the
predecessor anti-terror laws of POTA and the TADA.
Nothing in the UAPA supports this limitation of the court's
discretion. Watali actually has the effect of undermining the forward-thinking
statutory position chosen in the UAPA, which did away with the nearly
unattainable criteria contained in the precursor anti-terror statutes of POTA
and the TADA. Therefore, in order to grant or deny
bail under UAPA, the burden of proof on the prosecution must be high enough to
match the seriousness of the charge and the scope of the court's discretion
must be broad enough to take into account factors that have been carefully,
elaborately, and scientifically determined. When evaluating whether to grant
bail requests under UAPA, consideration should be given to the consequences of
UAPA and the accused's risk assessment.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
CASES
·
Devangana Kalita v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2021 SCC
Online Del 3255.
·
Asif Iqbal Tanha v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2021 SCC
Online Del 3253.
·
National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah
Watali, (2019) 5 SCC 1.
·
Sanjay Chandra v. Central Bureau of Investigation, AIR
2012 SC 830.
·
State of U.P. v. Amarmani Tripathi, (2005) 8 SCC 21.
·
Twaha Fasal v. Union of India, (2021) SCC OnLine SC
1000.
·
Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713.
·
Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar, AIR 1979 SC
1369.
·
Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali v. National Investigating Agency,
2018 SCC OnLine Del 185.
·
Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra, AIR
1994 SC 2623.
·
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597.
·
Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor, 1978 SCC
(1) 240.
·
Moti Ram v. State of M.P., AIR 1978 SC 1594.
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·
Annelise Riles, A New Agenda for the Cultural Study of
Law: Taking on the Technicalities (2005) Cornell Law Faculty Publications http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub/782.
·
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[1] Black’s
Law Dictionary 181 (3rd ed. 1933).
[2] Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India,
AIR 1978 SC 597.
[3] Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public
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[4] Moti Ram v. State of M.P., AIR
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[5] National Investigation Agency v.
Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali, (2019) 5 SCC 1.
[6] Sanjay Chandra v. Central Bureau
of Investigation, AIR 2012 SC 830.
[7] State of U.P. v. Amarmani Tripathi, (2005) 8 SCC 21.
[8] Unlawful Activities (Prevention)
Act, 1967, § 43D(6), No. 37, Acts of Parliament, 1967 (India).
[9] Unlawful Activities (Prevention)
Amendment Act, 2008, No. 35, Acts of Parliament, 1967 (India).
[10]
https://theleaflet.in/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/uncertain-justice-citizens-committee-report-on-north-east-delhi-violence-2020.pdf.
[11] Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb,
(2021) 3 SCC 713.
[12] Shaoni Das, The Unlawful
Activities (Prevention) Act and a long way to justice [May 7, 2022]
https://theleaflet.in/unlawful-activities-prevention-act-and-a-long-way-to-justice/.
[13] Radhika, Evaluating the
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https://sprf.in/evaluating-theunlawful-
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[14] Otto Kirchheimer, Political
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[15] Tanishk Gautam & Josheca
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26 Supremo Amicus [524] (2021).
[16] Anushka Singh, Criminalising
Dissent – Consequences of UAPA (Sept 22, 2012)
https://www.epw.in/journal/2012/38/commentary/criminalising-dissent.html.
[17] Niranjan Sahoo and Jibran Khan, UAPA
and the growing crisis of judicial credibility in India (Nov 21, 2020)
https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/uapa-growing-crisis-judicial-credibility-india/.
[18] Unlawful Activities (Prevention)
Act, 1967, § 43D(5), No. 37, Acts of Parliament, 1967 (India).
[19] Unlawful Activities (Prevention)
Act, 1967, § 44, No. 37, Acts of Parliament, 1967 (India).
[20] Unlawful Activities (Prevention)
Act, 1967, § 43D(5), No. 37, Acts of Parliament, 1967 (India).
[21]Annelise Riles, A New Agenda for
the Cultural Study of Law: Taking on the Technicalities (2005) Cornell Law Faculty Publications http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub/782.
[22] National Investigation Agency v.
Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali, (2019) 5 SCC 1.
[23] Panel Report - Jail is the Rule:
Bail Jurisprudence under the UAPA (October 1, 2021) https://www.sociolegalreview.com/post/panel-report-jail-is-the-rule-bail-jurisprudence-under-the-uapa#viewer-ch5hf
[24] Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali v.
National Investigating Agency, 2018 SCC Online Del 185.
[25] Hitendra
Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1994 SC 2623.
[26] Twaha Fasal v. Union of India,
(2021) SCC OnLine SC 1000.
[27] Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb,
(2021) 3 SCC 713.
[28] Hussainara Khatoon v. State of
Bihar, AIR 1979 SC 1369.
[29] Gautam Bhatia, Supreme Court
Judgment In Thwaha Fasal UAPA Case- A Flicker of Hope [November 2, 2021]
https://www.livelaw.in/columns/supreme-court-thwaha-faisal-judgment-bail-in-uapa-cases-active-association-intention-bombay-hc-delhi-hc-184814?infinitescroll=1.
[30] Asif Iqbal Tanha v. State (NCT of
Delhi), 2021 SCC Online Del 3253.
[31] Id.
[32] Devangana Kalita v. State (NCT of
Delhi), 2021 SCC Online Del 3255.
Article Information
ANALYZING BAIL JURISPRUDENCE UNDER UAPA IN REFERENCE TO WATALI CASE AND POST-WATALI TRENDS BY – NEHA GUPTA
Authors: NEHA GUPTA
- Journal IJLRA
- ISSN 2582-6433
- Published 2023/10/27
- Issue 7
About Journal
International Journal for Legal Research and Analysis
- Abbreviation IJLRA
- ISSN 2582-6433
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