Open Access Research Article
ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE (By –Aditi Sinha & Harshit Mangla)
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Article Details
ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY
AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE
L.L.M, Damodaram Sanjivayya National Law
University
Batch: 2021-22
Abstract
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE), is a group of 57 states headquartered in Vienna, Austria. It is
the largest regional security-oriented intergovernmental organization having United
Nations observer status. The OSCE takes a holistic approach to security. The
OSCE was established to serve as a multilateral forum for communication and
negotiation between the East and the West. Its origins can be traced back to
the early 1970s, during the détente period, and it aims to reduce the dangers
of armed conflict and misinterpretation or miscalculation of military
activities. The OSCE's key functions include border management, arms control,
conflict prevention and resolution. We will discuss the OSCE's participation in
the Russian-Ukraine crisis, as well as the Minsk Agreement and how Ukraine and
Russia approach it. This article also discusses Russia's engagement in the
Ukrainian war as well as recognition of the rebel organizations. The recent
invasion of Ukraine and OSCE operations in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, as well
as its gains, are addressed.
Introduction
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
or the OSCE, is a group of 57 states, with headquarters in Vienna, Austria. It
is the largest regional security-oriented intergovernmental organization with
observer status from the United Nations. “OSCE has a
comprehensive approach to security that encompasses politico-military, economic
and environmental, and human aspects. It therefore, addresses a wide range of
security-related concerns; including arms control; confidence and
security-building measures; human rights; national minorities; democratization;
policing; strategies; counter-terrorism; economic and environmental activities.
All 57 participating States enjoy equal status, irrespective of their
geographical area, and decisions are taken by consensus on a politically, but
not legally binding basis”[1].
Origin And Background
The beginnings of the OSCE may be traced back to
the early 1970s, during the détente period[2],
when the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was founded to
serve as a multilateral venue for communication and negotiation between East
and West. “On August 1, 1975, the leaders of the original 35 member nations
convened in Helsinki and signed the Final Act of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe. The Final Act, often known as the Helsinki Accords, is
not a treaty, but rather a politically enforceable accord consisting of three
main portions, colloquially known as ‘baskets’, that were adopted through
consensus. This comprehensive Act includes a wide variety of measures aimed at
improving security and cooperation in the region stretching from Vancouver to
Vladivostok.”[3] This
declaration featured a number of significant commitments on political,
military, economic, environmental, and human rights
issues that proved critical to the so-called ‘Helsinki process’ Since 1975, the
number of countries signing the Helsinki Accord was raised to 57 countries,
which reflected changes such as the break-up of Soviet Union.
Until 1990, the CSCE was largely a series of
meetings and conferences that built on and enlarged the member nations'
commitments while periodically reviewing their performance. With the end of the
Cold War, the Paris Summit in November 1990 defined a new course for the CSCE.
The Charter of Paris for a New Europe requested that the CSCE play a role in managing
Europe's historic change and responding to the new difficulties of the
post-Cold War period, which resulted in the formation of permanent structures
and operational capacity. As part of the institutionalisation process, the name
was changed from the CSCE to the OSCE in December 1994.
Functions Of OSCE
Arms control: The Helsinki Final Act of 1975 (which is the founding document) states
that there is a "need to contribute to reducing the dangers of armed
conflict and of misunderstanding or miscalculation of military activities that
could give rise to apprehension, particularly in a situation where
participating States lack clear and timely information about the nature of such
activities." They seek to decrease conflict, foster trust among OSCE member
states, and promote more openness and transparency in military planning and
operations. They can also be utilised as early warning indications of impending
violence. The Forum for Security Cooperation, the OSCE's decision-making body
for the politico-military aspects of security, supports these efforts by
issuing papers on CSBMs[4].
“The Forum helps to execute the OSCE Code of Conduct on Political-Military
Aspects of Security. The OSCE member states are obligated to share information
on the democratic management of their military and security forces under this
landmark declaration in security sector governance. Furthermore, the Forum
develops guidelines and provides practical assistance to stop the proliferation
of illegal small arms and light weapons”[5].
Border Management: By coordinating border-related policies and
practices in line with the OSCE Border Security and Management Concept and
pertinent Ministerial Council Decisions, the OSCE supports the efforts of its
Member States and Partners for Collaboration to develop border-related
agency capacities and foster cooperation between them.
The OSCE Border Security and Management
National Focal Point Network and the OSCE Policing OnLine Information System
(POLIS) are information and experience-sharing platforms for border-related
issues.
The Border Management Staff
College acts as a centre of excellence and a delivery platform for knowledge
and best practices in border management and security. “Several OSCE field
operations aid in successful border control. Their work includes keeping a
presence in border areas; helping border police and their counterparts in
other countries to cooperate and share information quickly; Training,
workshops, and awareness-raising for naval and border security officers,
customs workers, and aviation and airport security professionals on
Patrolling methods, surveillance tactics, marine security protocols, airport
safety management, anti-drug trafficking, travel document security,
international profiling techniques, combatting transnational organized crime,
illicit drug and chemical precursor trafficking; Meetings with border
authorities, local officials, and locals to provide early notice; and providing
technical advice and help in the prevention and response to border incidents”[6].
Conflict prevention and resolution: The major tools used by the Organization to
counteract this cycle are its field operations network and the Conflict
Prevention Centre (CPC). For example, the CPC serves as the OSCE's early
warning focal point, fosters communication, and supports mediation and other
conflict prevention and resolution activities.
The activities of OSCE field operations in
the sphere of conflict prevention and resolution include improving the skills
of local actors to reduce potential sources and causes of conflict;
facilitating communication between political and civic actors so that conflict
risks may be
resolved as quickly as
possible; facilitating dialogue, mediation, and confidence-building
measures between conflict-affected cultures and communities; observing the
security situation in OSCE member countries; fostering the development of
trust; and aiding in the development of national crisis response plans.
Russia- Ukraine Crisis And OSCE
In April 2014, Russia-backed insurgents
seized government facilities in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions — collectively
known as Donbas — declared the establishment of "people's republics"
and fought with Ukrainian soldiers. The separatist areas staged a popular vote
the next month to proclaim independence and seek to join Russia. According to
Ukraine, over 15,000 individuals have been killed in violence since then.[7]
Following a crushing defeat of Ukrainian
military in August 2014, envoys from Kiev, the rebels in the Donbas area, and
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) signed an
agreement in the Belarusian city of Minsk on September 14, 2014.
Minsk Agreement
It is
a trilateral agreement between Ukraine, Russia and OSEC, with mediations by the
leaders from France and Germany to resolve the ongoing war situation in Donbas
region. There were two agreements called as Minsk I and Minsk II. Minsk I was
signed on 5th September 2014 by the then self-proclaimed leaders of
Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic, which is
Russian-backed separatist of eastern Russia. The main objective of this
agreement was to stop the war and implement ceasefire. After its violation from
both the sides, it failed and was followed by Minsk II agreement which was
signed on 12th February 2015. This agreement was a 13-point package of measures meant to
facilitate the implementation of the initial Minsk Agreement. Some of which
were:
Military de-escalation: De-escalation of the military: The second
accord called for a "immediate and comprehensive" ceasefire in the
Donetsk and Lugansk areas. Furthermore, the two nations had to remove their
heavy weapons in a way that left a security zone at least 50 kilometres wide.
The OSCE was tasked with overseeing the entire process using all the
appropriate technological tools, including satellites, drones, radar equipment,
etc.
Local Elections in Donetsk and Lugansk: In line with Ukrainian law, the
Ukrainian government was urged to start a conversation on the specifics of
local elections in the two areas. This was in regards to both the future rule
in the rebel territories as well as the interim local self-government.
Additionally, the Ukrainian Parliament was expected to pass a resolution
outlining the regions benefiting from the special regime status within thirty
days of the agreement's signature. It aims to establish a long-term law
governing the two areas' unique status.
The border: The agreement stipulated that the Ukrainian
government must retake complete control of the state border throughout the
combat zone. This was to start after the local elections were over and the two
areas had reached a political agreement.[8]
The Minsk Conundrum:
As Chatham House[9]
pointed out, The Minsk-II Agreement supports mutually divergent
interpretations of sovereignty, namely, Ukraine's concept of sovereignty and
Russia's opposing version. The 'Minsk Conundrum' is made up of two opposing
notions.
Ukraine’s Version of Minsk II Agreement
The agreement is viewed by Ukraine as a precursor
to a series of events that will allow it to restore sovereignty. These include
a cease-fire followed by Russian withdrawal from Ukraine, restoring border
control, holding free and fair elections in the Donbas area, and delegating
limited authority to Russia's surrogate governments. As a consequence, the
country would be free to pursue its own internal and foreign policies.
Russia’s Version Of Minsk II Agreement
Russia sees the agreement as a means of undermining
Ukrainian sovereignty. The essential events of the Ukrainian interpretation are
reversed. Before Ukraine secures its borders, elections in the two rebel areas
would be held, followed by the grant of autonomy to the rebel areas, weakening
the central government in Kyiv. As a result, Ukraine would be unable to govern
itself efficiently or to orient itself toward the west. For example, point No.
10 of the 13-point Minsk II Agreement specifies that all foreign armed
formations and military equipment must be withdrawn from the two disputed areas
of Donetsk and Luhansk: Ukraine claims this refers to Russian soldiers, while
Moscow denies having any forces there.
How Is Russia Involved In The Conflict In Ukraine?
Moscow has maintained tight relations with
pro-Russian rebels in eastern Ukraine's Donbas area but denies any involvement
in their almost eight-year conflict with Ukrainian government forces. Since
April 2019, Moscow has granted 8,00,000 Russian passports to Donbas
people. “In 2016, a former senior official from the self-proclaimed
Donetsk People's Republic informed Reuters that Russia directly funds pensions
and public sector wages in the two separatist territories of eastern
Ukraine. Both separatist regions have abandoned the Ukrainian hryvnia in
favor of the Russian rouble as their official currency. Instead of the
Ukrainian curriculum, local schools now follow the Russian national curriculum.
On June 12,
2021, the Donetsk People's Republic observed
Russia Day, a national holiday in Russia commemorating Russia's declaration of
independence from the Soviet Union. Despite a Kyiv prohibition, local officials
in Donetsk said in January 2021 that Russia had begun distributing its Sputnik
V vaccination against COVID-19 to separatist-controlled Donetsk”[10].
Russian Recognition Of The Separatists Group And Invasion Of Ukraine:
Russian state television showed Mr. Putin signing
decrees recognising the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics and
authorising the Russian Defence Ministry to deploy soldiers in both territories
to carry out "peacekeeping responsibilities." The decision was
criticised by numerous states at an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security
Council as a breach of international law and Ukraine's sovereignty. After
recognising the independence of two Moscow-backed areas, Russian President
Vladimir Putin declared that the Minsk deal for settling the Ukraine issue
"no longer exists." On February 24, 2022, Russia launched a
full-fledged invasion of Ukraine.
OSCE Operations In Russia-Ukraine Conflict:
Following
Ukraine's appeal to the OSCE, it sent a monitoring operation known as the
Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) on March 21, 2014. SMM is an unarmed, civilian
mission that operates across Ukraine. It is one of the largest field operations
in the country's history, serving as eyes and ears on the ground and assisting
in the reduction of bloodshed along the line of demarcation between
government-controlled Ukraine and rebel organizations in Donetsk and Luhansk.
When Russia's invasion began on February 24, that mission still had almost 500
international monitors on the ground and continued to report as evacuations
began. The mission has now largely come to a standstill, however some Ukrainian
personnel are still on site to do a few restricted office tasks in select
locations.
OSCE’s
SMM mandate on Ukraine expired on 31st March 2022, the participating
states have not yet reached a consensus on its future operation. OSCE on 13th
February 2022, began to pull out their representatives from the rebel held Donbas
region. According to one diplomatic source, 160 OSCE personnel, including
Dutch, Canadian, Slovakian, and Albanian citizens, were evacuated from Ukraine.[11]
OSCE-Role In Resolving The Conflict
Since the onset of the crisis, Poland,
which preside over the organization in 2022, has postponed all normal
work, conducting only sessions of two political groupings - the Permanent
Council and the Forum for Security Cooperation - that have been entirely
dedicated to Ukraine. These meetings contained both loud condemnations of
Russia and planned walkouts. Similarly, in his monthly presentation to the UN
Security Council as OSCE Chair-in-Office on 14 March, Polish Foreign Minister
Zbigniew Rau linked Russia's activities in Ukraine to "state terrorism."
The OSCE has limited options for responding
to the crisis in Ukraine beyond symbolic gestures, such as condemnations, due
to the polarisation among its member states and its practise of acting by
consensus. On March 3, it formed a fact-finding expert panel to gather
information regarding human rights and international humanitarian law
violations committed during the war. This probe, however, will be constrained
by the fact that the panel must submit its findings within a few weeks. It
might have also preserved the OSCE's monitoring mission in Ukraine. This is a
concrete and significant action that could have been made. The OSCE can also
provide assistance by sending out UN or UN-OSCE peacekeeping missions. In this conflict, OSCE is
unlikely to serve as the main mediator between Russia and Ukraine because
Poland, who holds the chair for the year 2022, share tense relationship with
Moscow.
Osce-
Achievements
The
OSCE continues to play an essential role in conflict settlement in countries
other than Ukraine. Georgia is a prominent example, with Russia
recognizing two breakaway areas, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as
independent republics. “Since the conflict between Russia and Georgia, the OSCE
has operated as one of three international mediators, alongside the EU and the
UN. The trio is in charge of organizing the Geneva International
Discussions, a diplomatic process that brings together Georgia, the separatist
groups, Russia, and the US. The Geneva discussions kept communication channels
open and contributed in the resolution of issues that may have escalated
otherwise”[12].
The
OSCE has played a particularly important role in South Ossetia. The OSCE is
seen as an acceptable interlocutor by Russia and the allied de facto leadership
in South Ossetia, although being significantly less visible than the EU, which
runs a 200-person monitoring mission on territory controlled by the Georgian
government. As a consequence, the OSCE has been able to negotiate agreements,
such as those on water supply and agricultural land access, that have decreased
the danger of violence and improved the lives of people on both sides of the
line of separation. “The OSCE also plays a significant role in Moldova, serving
as a go-between for the Moldovan government and the de facto authorities in
separatist Transdniestria. Its efforts have aided in the containment of the
conflict, stabilizing the situation in the country that is prone to be inflamed
by tensions between Russia and the West”.[13]
India And OSCE
India on 4th March, 2022, while
addressing UNSC briefing, acknowledged the role of OSCE in Ukraine crisis. UN
Deputy Permanent representative R Ravindra noted, “While
noting the ongoing global counter terrorism efforts and contributions of OSCE,
we would like to take this opportunity to reiterate the importance of this
issue. OSCE was among the first regional organizations to strongly condemn the
terrorist attack on Indian Parliament in 2001.”
He further stated, “OSCE has been playing an important role in facilitating the implementation of the package of measures across both sides of the contact line in eastern Ukraine. However, recent developments in Ukraine and consequent deterioration of security situation have halted the functioning of the Special Monitoring Mission.” India called for direct contacts and negotiations with a view to cease hostilities. [14]
Conclusion
The OSCE's very
existence is jeopardized by the widening schism between Russia and the
West. As previously noted, the organization requires consensus to make
decisions, granting veto power to all member nations. In addition to paralysing
the OSCE, the war in Ukraine poses a danger to destabilise key aspects of its
operations. For example, unless participating nations achieve an agreement, the
OSCE's field operations, which attempt to improve regional stability and
governance reforms, will be impossible to operate since yearly mandate renewals
are required. Russia bears the brunt of the responsibility. It must no longer
hold the OSCE hostage while allowing basic activities to erode and Western
nations must perform their part.
Their ambassadors in
Vienna must find ways to engage Russia and seek actual collaboration, even if
it is difficult to do so in the face of an escalating war that disregards OSCE
principles.
They should not
utilize the "consensus minus one" criterion, which governments used
to temporarily remove the former Yugoslavia owing to egregious human rights
violations in the early 1990s, to drive Russia out of the organization. Using
this rule to remove Russia from the OSCE would be both ineffectual and
hazardous because even if Russia is ousted, its close ally Belarus could still
obstruct decisions, and it would almost certainly result in Russia's
withdrawal. The organization's capacity to serve as a mediator in its
neighbourhood and its involvement in conflict resolution in Bosnia,
Moldova, and Georgia would surely be jeopardized if Russia is excluded.
Thus, to keep communications channels open, promote dialogue and resolve the
conflict between the participating states and the world at large it is
important that states take action carefully.
Article Information
ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE (By –Aditi Sinha & Harshit Mangla)
Authors: Aditi Sinha, Harshit Mangla
- Journal IJLRA
- ISSN 2582-6433
- Published 2022/09/15
- Volume 2
- Issue 7
About Journal
International Journal for Legal Research and Analysis
- Abbreviation IJLRA
- ISSN 2582-6433
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