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No Limitation For Taking Cognizance Of Offence – A Need For Justice
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NO LIMITATION FOR TAKING COGNIZANCE OF OFFENCE – A NEED FOR JUSTICE
AUTHORED BY - ABINASH
MAHAPATRA
Course- B.A.LL.B.(H)
Registration No.- 2141802004
S‘O’A NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF LAW (Faculty
Of Legal Studies)
CHAPTER-1: INTRODUCTION
Criminal law has always been one of the most important branches
of law because it deals with
the most serious offences and it helps
to protect society
from falling into a state
of anarchy. It consists of two branches- procedural
and substantive law.
Procedural law provides machinery for the implementation of substantive
criminal law. Substantive law provides a different kinds of offences and the
punishment which is imposed on the offenders. If there is no procedural law,
the substantive laws are of no use because no one will be able to know the way how the offenders will be prosecuted and they will be let off.
So, from this, we can conclude that both laws are complementary to each other.
The main objective of criminal procedure is to provide a full and fair
trial to the accused by taking into consideration the principles of natural
justice. Various processes need to be followed to administer justice including
pre-trial procedure lawsuits, answering a complaint, motion, discovery etc. The
trial procedure includes cognizance of offence, beginning of proceedings,
review of the procedure and finally arriving at a decision.
Under the Code of Criminal Procedure, there is a separate chapter that talks about “taking the cognizance of
offence by the Magistrate”. The power empowered on the Magistrate is not
absolute; it also puts certain
restrictions given under Sections 195 to 197 of the Code. Sections 190 and 193 talk about the mode
for taking cognizance.
But in this article, I am going
to emphasise on limitations of taking cognizance of an offence. It is
prescribed in Chapter XXXVI (from Section 467 to 473) of the Code itself.
Though the word ‘cognizance’ (rooting from Old French “conoisance“, based on Latin “cognoscere“) or the words ‘taking
cognizance’ have not been deciphered and defined in the procedural law, the
same derive definite connotation from a plethora of precedents and gain
perceptive explanation and incisive exegesis from judicial pronouncements.
While plain and dictionary meaning thereof is ‘taking note of, ‘taking account
of, ‘to know about, ‘to gain knowledge about, ‘awareness about certain things’
etc. – and in Tamil “(transliteration:- “gavanikkapada
vendiya vishayam“. “gavanam“), in
law, the common understanding of the term ‘cognizance’ is “taking judicial
notice by a court of law, possessing jurisdiction, on a cause or matter presented
before it to decide whether there is any basis for initiating proceedings and
determination of the cause or matter ‘judicially”.
Thus, legal sense of taking judicial notice by a court of law or a
Magistrate is altogether different from the view and idea a layman has for it;
however, a broad and general comprehension is ‘judicial notice by a court of law on a crime which, according
to such court, has been committed against the complainant, to take
further action if facts and circumstances so warrant’ – in Tamil,
(transliteration:- “Sattapadi
nadavadikkai edukka thakka kutram thodarpana vazhakkai koapil eduppadhu kurithu
aaraidhal“).
In the language of the
Hon’ble Apex Court employed in its earliest decision (Ref: R.R.Chari vs State
of U.P , “taking cognizance does not involve
any formal action
or indeed action of any kind
but occurs as soon as a Magistrate as such applies
his mind to the suspected
commission of offense“.
The purpose of enacting such provision is not to extinguish but to avoid
the unnecessary delay in filing a complaint by the
complainant.
Cognizance of any offence
is taken by:
?
Magistrate under Section 191.
?
Court of Session under
Section 193.
Limitation’ refers to a legally specified period beyond which an action
may be defeated. Any suit/trial prior to the institution must qualify the
indirect requirement of limitation. Thus, the proceeding must be within the
prescribed limitation period. The objective behind such provision is to protect
the accused from unnecessary harassment by prioritizing the presumption of
innocence. The concept of ‘Limitation period’ is commonly used in civil matters
such as contracts, Family Law, torts etcetera but seems peculiar in criminal
matters.
The requirement of ‘Limitation period’ in general can be traced back to
two famous legal maxims i.e., "Nullum
tempus occurrit regi" and "vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura
subveniunt." The former maxim states that the rights and power of the
supreme is above the doctrine of limitation. On the other hand, the latter maxims
imply a duty on the victim/plaintiff
to be vigilant in exercising their rights. Thus,
law should only assist those who are vigilant and should not cater to irresponsible and
lazy individuals.
These two maxims
raised a dilemma
in ascertaining the middle ground
as choosing any extreme
will either violate the right of the Victim or of the accused. The doctrine of
‘Limitation’ has perfectly struck a balance in ensuring justice to the victims
and prevent accused from unnecessary troubles. This essay will focus on the
significance of the doctrine of ‘Limitation’ and will analyse the same in the criminal
law through analysing catena of judgments, with the
objective of identifying the need and success in incorporating it in the Code
of Criminal Procedure,1973
Chapter XXXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 incorporates the
Doctrine of ‘Limitation’ for criminal offences. The chapter contains 7 sections
ranging from Section 467 to Section 473 of CrPC, 1973. The rationale behind
incorporating limitation period is that, criminal matters heavily depend upon
the witness testimony which obscures with the passage of time due to which the
investigation for the detained/arrested accused under CrPC is also time bound
under Section 167(2). Thus, opening of cases beyond a reasonable time will
compromise the witness
testimony and may lead
the court on a false trail due to lack and
non- authoritative evidences costing the accused.
The period of limitation under CrPC, 1973 varies from six months to three
years depending upon the duration
of punishment of the offence.
Offence punishable with just fine or 6 months
of imprisonment attracts a limitation period of 6 months. Whereas offence
punishable with imprisonment up to one year with/without fine attracts a limitation
period of 1 year and offences punishable with imprisonment up to three years
with/without fine holds a limitation period of 3 years. However, offences
holding punishment higher than three years does not attract limitation period and the case can be filed at any time post the occurrence of the offence.
Thus, in a layman term any offence under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 or
under any other criminal legislation, unless holds any special provision
contrary to the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, attracts a period of
limitation ranging from 6 months to 3
years. Thus, if the complainant whose proceeding is barred by such limitation
cannot proceed with such proceedings post the limitation period.
However, the legislation has ensured that if a proceeding
holds merit, then it is not debarred on the admission stage itself.
The concept of allowing certain proceedings post limitation period is
known as the ‘condonation of delay.’ The court holds the power to reject the
delay and allow the case to be admitted on merits. However, the condition
associated to such condonation is two-fold. First, that the prosecution must
explain the rationale behind such delay up to the satisfaction of the court.
Whereas, in certain circumstances the court can condone delay when it is
necessary to do so in the interests of justice. The legislative intent behind
such provision is to ensure that such limitation is not absolute and does not
deprive the victim of justice just on the basis of technicality.
The concept of condonation of delay ensures rationality to prevail over
absoluteness but does not provide any objective guidelines or framework
determining such rationale. Thus, giving the honourable judiciary an arbitrary
power to determine reasonable grounds. However, enactment of certain non-binding but persuasive guidelines or framework can provide an objectivity
to such reasoning. The honourable Supreme Court in catena of judgments has
provided the broad themes which can be used to create such a framework.
Whereas, the honourable court in State of Tamil Nadu vs N. Suresh Rajan
& Ors., held that delay due to lawyer’s contradictory advice is condoned.
The complainant argued that the lawyer advised him in contradiction to file the
Special leave petition before this honourable court so the delay of 1954 days
be condoned.
The court in Sarah Mathew vs the Institute of Cardio-vascular diseases
held that the delay caused by magistrate in taking cognizance of the offence
must be condoned as the victim’s intent was bona-fide and was out of his
control. On the other hand, the honourable court in Provident Fund Inspector, Ludhiana
vs Harminder Singh
& Anr., adjudicated on the issue that
the whether the fact that the legislation is a beneficial legislation is
sufficient to mechanically condone the delay. The court while adjudicating upon
the Employment provident fund act, 1952 provided a general ruling that the mere
fact of a legislation being beneficial does not condone the delay
automatically, circumstantial analysis is must.
The list or structure shall not be exhaustive and must be open to
amendment. Additionally, such list must also be non-binding and only persuasive as to provide the victims/ complainant or lawyers
sufficient understanding as to file an informed
application for condonation of delay. Thus, catena
of judgments and certain other
factors such as societal pressure
in cases of sexual
harassment etc. must be considered for enactment of a structured framework to
avoid the arbitrariness and to assist the judges in efficiently applying
judicial mind to cases of condonation of delay.
The two additional factors to be considered is the lawyer’s
negligence and delay caused due to
red - tapism in the governmental department. The former issue has been
adjudicated by the honourable Supreme Court
in Boutique Hotels India (P) Ltd. vs ACIT (ITAT
Delhi). The court held that pleader’s gross carelessness/negligence does not hold a sufficient ground to condone delay. Whereas, the court stated
that the delay can be condoned when it is proved that the lawyer or adviser
made a bona fide mistake and the council must disclose the particular
circumstance when such advice was given. Thus, mistaken advice given by a
lawyer negligently and without due care as well as a general statement as an
excuse is not sufficient cause.
CHAPTER-2: LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS
LIMITATION IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF OFFENCES
Law Relating to Cognizance Under the Code of Criminal Procedure: Under
chapter XIV of the code section 190 to 193 provides for taking cognizance, chapter XIV section 195 to 199 deals with the limitation on taking cognizance and chapter XXXVI,
sections 467 to 469 also
talk about the limitations.
It is
well-established fact that the power vested on Magistrate to take the
Cognizance of offence is not an absolute
power and is subjected to the limitations which have been provided
in the Chapter XXXVI (section 467 to 473) of the Act itself.
NON-APPLICABILITY OF THIS CHAPTER
The provision of this Chapter is not
applicable in the case of certain economic offences.
BARE ACT PROVISION
Section 190: Cognizance of
offences by Magistrates. —(1) Subject to the provisions of this Chapter, any
Magistrate of the first class, and any Magistrate of the second class specially
empowered in this behalf under sub-section (2), may
take cognizance of any offence—
(a)
upon receiving a complaint of facts
which constitute such offence;
(b)
upon a police report
of such facts;
(c)
upon
information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his
own knowledge, that such offence has been committed.
(2) The Chief Judicial Magistrate may empower any Magistrate of the
second class to take cognizance under sub-section (1) of such offences as are within
his competence to inquire into or try.
Section 191: Transfer on application of the accused.—When a Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence under clause (c) of
sub-section (1) of section 190, the accused shall, before any evidence is taken, be informed that he is entitled to have the case inquired
into or tried by another Magistrate, and if the accused
or any of the accused,
if there be more than one, objects to further proceedings before
the Magistrate taking cognizance, the case shall
be transferred to such other Magistrate as may be
specified by the Chief Judicial Magistrate in this behalf.
Section 192. Making over of
cases to Magistrates. — (1) Any Chief Judicial Magistrate may, after taking
cognizance of an offence, make over the case for inquiry or trial to any competent Magistrate subordinate to him.
(2) Any Magistrate of the first class empowered in this behalf
by the Chief Judicial Magistrate may, after taking cognizance of an offence,
make over the case for inquiry or trial to such other competent Magistrate as the Chief Judicial
Magistrate may, by general or special order,
specify, and thereupon such Magistrate may hold the inquiry or trial.
Section 193. Cognizance of
offences by Courts of Session. —Except as otherwise expressly provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, no Court of Session shall take cognizance of any offence as a
Court of original jurisdiction unless the case has been committed to it by a
Magistrate under this Code.
Section 195. Prosecution for contempt of lawful authority
of public servants,
for offences against public
justice and for offences relating to documents given in evidence. — (1) No Court shall
take cognizance-
(a) (i) of any offence
punishable under sections
172 to 188 (both inclusive) of the Indian Penal Code, (45 of 1860), or
(ii)
of any abetment of, or
attempt to commit, such offence,
or
(iii) of any criminal conspiracy to commit
such offence except on the complaint in writing of the public servant concerned
or of some other public servant to whom he is administratively subordinate;
(b) (i) of any offence
punishable under any of the following sections
of the Indian Penal Code (45
of 1860), namely, sections 193 to 196 (both inclusive), 199, 200, 205 to 211
(both inclusive) and 228, when such offence is alleged to have been committed
in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, or
(ii) of any offence described in section 463,
or punishable under section 471, section 475 or section 476, of the said Code,
when such offence is alleged to have been committed in respect of a document
produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any Court, or
(iii)
of
any criminal conspiracy to commit, or attempt to commit, or the abetment of,
any offence specified in sub-clause (i) or sub-clause (ii),[except on the
complaint in writing of that Court or by such officer of the Court as that
Court may authorise in writing in this behalf, or of some other Court to which
that Court is subordinate.]
(2)
Where a complaint has been made by a public servant
under clause (a) of sub-section
(1) any authority to which he is administratively subordinate may order the withdrawal
of the complaint and send a copy of such order to the Court;
and upon its receipt by the
Court, no further proceedings shall be taken on the complaint:
Provided that no such withdrawal shall
be ordered if the trial in the Court of first instance has been concluded.
(3) In
clause (b) of sub-section (1), the term "Court" means
a Civil, Revenue
or Criminal Court, and includes a tribunal constituted by or under a Central,
Provincial or State Act
if declared by that Act to be a Court for the purposes of this section.
(4) For the purposes of clause (b) of
sub-section (1), a Court shall be deemed to be subordinate to the Court
to which appeals
ordinarily lie from the appealable decrees or sentences
of such former Court, or in the case of a Civil Court from whose decrees no appeal ordinarily lies, to the
principal Court having ordinary original civil jurisdiction within whose local
jurisdiction such Civil Court is situate:
Provided that—
(a) where appeals lie to more than one Court,
the Appellate Court
of inferior jurisdiction shall be the Court to which
such Court shall be deemed to be subordinate;
(b) where appeals lie to a Civil and also to a Revenue Court,
such Court shall be deemed to be subordinate to the Civil or
Revenue Court according to the nature of the case or proceeding in connection
with which the offence is alleged to have been committed.
[195A. Procedure for witnesses in case of threatening, etc.—A
witness or any other person
may file a complaint in relation to an offence under section 195A of the
Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).]
Section 196. Prosecution for offences against
the State and for criminal
conspiracy to commit such offence. — (1) No Court shall
take cognizance of—
(a)
any
offence punishable under Chapter VI or under section 153A, [section 295A or
sub-section (1) of section 505] of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), or
(b)
a criminal
conspiracy to commit
such offence, or
(c)
any such abetment, as is described in section 108A of the Indian Penal
Code (45 of 1860), except with the previous
sanction of the Central Government or of the State Government.
[(1A) No Court shall take cognizance of—
(a)
any
offence punishable under section 153B or sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) of section 505 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), or a criminal conspiracy to commit such offence, except with the previous
sanction of the Central Government or of the State Government or of the District
Magistrate.]
(2) No
Court shall take cognizance of the offence
of any criminal conspiracy punishable under section 120B of the Indian
Penal Code (45 of 1860),
other than a criminal conspiracy to commit 4[an offence]
punishable with death, imprisonment for life or rigorous imprisonment for a term of
two years or upwards, unless
the State Government or the District
Magistrate has consented in writing to the initiation of
the proceedings:
Provided that where the criminal conspiracy is one to which the
provisions of section 195 apply, no such consent shall be necessary.
(3) The Central Government or the State
Government may, before according sanction [under sub-section (1) or sub-section (1A) and the District Magistrate may, before according
sanction under sub-section (1A)]
and the State
Government or the District Magistrate may, before giving consent under sub-section (2),
order a preliminary investigation by a police officer not being below the rank of Inspector, in which case such police
officer shall have the powers
referred to in sub-section (3)
of section 155.
Section 197. Prosecution of Judges and public servants. — (1) When any person who is or was a Judge or Magistrate or a public
servant not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Government is accused of any offence
alleged to have been
committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his
official duty, no Court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the
previous sanction [save as otherwise provided in the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act,
2013 (1 of 2014)]—
a)
in
the case of a person who is employed or, as the case may be, was at the time of
commission of the alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs of
the Union, of the Central Government;
b)
in
the case of a person who is employed or, as the case may be, was at the time of
commission of the alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs of a State, of the State Government:
[Provided that where the alleged offence was committed by a person
referred to in clause (b) during the period
while a Proclamation issued under clause
(1) of article 356 of the Constitution was in force in a State,
clause (b) will apply as if for the expression “State Government” occurring
therein, the expression “Central Government” were substituted.]
[Explanation. —For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that no
sanction shall be required in case of a public servant accused of any offence
alleged to have been committed under section 166A, section 166B, section 354,
section 354A, section 354B, section 354C, section 354D, section 370, section 375, section 376, section 376A, section 376C, section 376D or section 509 of the Indian Penal
Code (45 of 1860).]
(2) No Court shall take cognizance of any
offence alleged to have been committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Union while acting
or purporting to act in the discharge
of his official duty, except with the previous sanction of the Central
Government.
(3) The State Government may, by
notification, direct that the provisions of sub-section (2) shall apply
to such class
or category of the members
of the Forces charged with the maintenance of public order as may be
specified therein, wherever they may be serving, and thereupon the provisions
of that sub-section will apply as if for the expression "Central
Government" occurring therein, the expression "State Government"
were substituted.
[(3A) Notwithstanding anything
contained in sub-section (3), no court shall take cognizance of any offence, alleged to have been
committed by any member of the Forces charged with the maintenance of public order
in a State while
acting or purporting to act
in the discharge of his
official duty during the period while a Proclamation issued under clause (1) of
article 356 of the Constitution was in force therein, except with the previous
sanction of the Central Government.
(3B) Notwithstanding anything to the Contrary contained in this Code or
any other law, it is hereby declared that any sanction accorded by the State
Government or any cognizance taken by a court upon such sanction, during
the period commencing on the 20th day of August, 1991 and ending with the date immediately
preceding the date on which the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act,
1991 (43 of 1991), receives the assent of the President, with respect to an
offence alleged to have been committed during the period while a Proclamation
issued under clause (1) of article 356 of the Constitution was in force in the
State, shall be invalid and it shall be competent for the Central
Government in such matter to accord sanction and for the court to take
cognizance thereon.]
(4) The Central Government or the State
Government, as the case may be, may determine the person by whom, the manner in which, and the offence or offences for which, the prosecution
of such Judge, Magistrate or public servant is to be conducted, and may specify
the Court before which the trial is to be held.
Section 198. Prosecution for offences against
marriage. — (1) No Court shall take cognizance
of an offence punishable under Chapter XX of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) except upon a complaint made by some person
aggrieved by the offence:
Provided that—
(a)
where
such person is under the age of eighteen years, or is an idiot or a lunatic, or
is from sickness or infirmity unable to make a complaint, or is a woman who, according
to the local customs and manners, ought not to be
compelled to appear in public,
some other person may, with the leave of the Court, make a complaint on
his or her behalf;
(b)
where
such person is the husband and he is serving in any of the Armed Forces of the
Union under conditions which are certified by his Commanding Officer as
precluding him from obtaining leave of absence to enable him to make a
complaint in person, some other
person authorised by the husband
in accordance with the provisions of sub-section
(4) may make a complaint on his behalf;
(c)
where the person aggrieved
by an offence punishable under [section 494 or section 495] of the Indian
Penal Code (45 of 1860) is the wife, complaint may be
made on her behalf by her father, mother, brother, sister, son or
daughter or by her father's or mother's brother or sister [, or, with
the leave of the Court,
by any other person related to
her by blood, marriage or adoption].
(2) For the purposes of sub-section (1),
no person other than the husband of the woman shall be deemed to be aggrieved
by any offence punishable under section 497 or section 498 of the said Code:
Provided that in the absence of the husband, some person who had care of
the woman on his behalf at the time when such
offence was committed may, with the leave of the Court, make a complaint on his behalf.
(3) When in any case falling under clause
(a) of the proviso to sub-section (1), the complaint is sought to be made on behalf of a person under the age of
eighteen years or of a lunatic by a person who
has not been appointed or declared
by a competent authority
to be the guardian of the person of the minor or lunatic, and the Court
is satisfied that there is a guardian
so appointed or declared, the Court shall, before
granting the application for leave, cause notice
to be given to such guardian and give him a reasonable opportunity of
being heard.
(4) The authorisation referred to in
clause (b) of the proviso to sub-section (1), shall be in writing, shall be
signed or otherwise attested by the husband, shall contain a statement to the
effect that he has been informed of the allegations upon which the complaint is to be founded,
shall be countersigned by his
Commanding Officer, and shall be
accompanied by a certificate signed by that Officer
to the effect that leave of absence
for the purpose of making
a complaint in person cannot
for the time being be granted to the husband.
(5) Any document purporting to be such an
authorisation and complying with the provisions of sub-section (4), and any document
purporting to be a certificate required by that sub-section
shall, unless the contrary is proved, be presumed to be genuine and shall be
received in evidence.
(6) No Court shall take cognizance of an
offence under section 376 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), where such
offence consists of sexual intercourse by a man with his own wife, the wife being under 3[eighteen years of age], if more than one year has elapsed from the date of the commission of the offence.
(7) The
provisions of this section apply
to the abetment of, or attempt to commit, an offence as they apply to the offence.
[198A. Prosecution of offences under section 498A of the Indian Penal Code.—No Court
shall take cognizance of an
offence punishable under
section 498A of the Indian Penal Code (45 of
1960) except upon a police report of facts which constitute such offence or
upon a complaint made by the person aggrieved
by the offence or by her father,
mother, brother, sister or by her
father’s or mother’s brother or sister or, with the leave of the Court, by any other person
related to her by blood, marriage or adoption.]
[198B. Cognizance of offence. —No Court shall take cognizance of an
offence punishable under section 376B of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)
where the persons are in a marital relationship, except upon prima facie satisfaction of the facts which constitute the offence upon a complaint having been filed or made
by the wife against the husband.]
Section 199. Prosecution for defamation. — (1) No Court shall take cognizance of an offence
punishable under Chapter
XXI of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)
except upon a complaint
made by some person aggrieved by the offence:
Provided that where such person is under the age of eighteen years, or is
an idiot or a lunatic, or is from sickness or infirmity unable to make a
complaint, or is a woman who, according to the local customs and manners, ought
not to be compelled to appear in public, some other person may, with the leave
of the Court, make a complaint on his or her behalf.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in
this Code, when any offence falling
under Chapter XXI of the Indian
Penal Code (45 of 1860) is alleged
to have been committed against
a person who, at the time of such commission, is the President of India, the Vice-President of India, the Governor of a State, the
Administrator of a Union territory or a Minister of the Union or of a State or of a Union territory, or any other
public servant employed
in connection with the affairs of the Union or of a State in
respect of his conduct in the discharge of his public functions a Court of Session may take cognizance of such offence,
without the case being committed
to it, upon a complaint in
writing made by the Public Prosecutor.
(3) Every complaint referred to in
sub-section (2) shall set forth the facts which constitute the offence alleged,
the nature of such offence and such other particulars as are reasonably
sufficient to give notice to the
accused of the offence alleged to have been committed by him.
(4) No
complaint under sub-section (2) shall be made by the Public
Prosecutor except with the
previous sanction—
(a)
of the State Government, in the case of a person who is or has been the Governor
of that State or a Minister of that Government;
(b)
of the State Government, in the case of any other public
servant employed in connection with the affairs of the
State;
(c)
of the Central Government, in any other case.
(5) No Court of Session shall take
cognizance of an offence under sub-section (2) unless the complaint is made
within six months from the date on which the offence is alleged to have been
committed.
(6) Nothing in this section shall affect
the right of the person against whom the offence is alleged to have been
committed, to make a complaint in respect of that offence before a Magistrate
having jurisdiction or the power of such Magistrate to take cognizance of the
offence upon such complaint.
Section 467: Definitions. For the purposes of this
Chapter, unless the context otherwise requires," period of limitation" means the period
specified in section
468 for taking
cognizance of an offence.
Section
468: Bar to taking
cognizance after lapse of
the period of limitation.
(1) Except as otherwise provided
elsewhere in this Code, no Court shall
take cognizance of an
offence of the category specified
in sub- section (2), after the expiry
of the period of limitation.
(2)
The period of
limitation shall be-
(a)
six
months, if the offence is punishable with fine only
1. Provisions of this Chapter
shall not apply
to certain economic
offences, see the Economic Offences (Inapplicability of Limitation) Act, 1974 (12 of 1974),
s. 2 end Sch.
(b)
one
year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding
one year;
(c)
three
years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for term exceeding one
year but not exceeding three years.
(3) For the purposes of this section, the
period of limitation in relation to offences which may be
tried together, shall be determined with reference to the offence which is
punishable with the more severe punishment or, as the case may be, the most
severe punishment.]
Section 469: Commencement of the period of limitation.
(1)
The period
of limitation, in relation to an offender, shall commence,-
(a)
on the date of the offence; or
(b)
where the commission of the offence
was not known to the person aggrieved
by the offence or to any
police officer, the first day on which such offence comes to the knowledge of
such person or to any police officer, whichever is earlier; or
(c)
where
it is not known by whom the offence was committed, the first day on which the
identity of the offender is known to the person aggrieved by the offence or to
the police officer making investigation into the offence, whichever is earlier.
(2) In computing the said period, the day
from which such period is to be computed shall be excluded.
Section 470: Exclusion of time in certain
cases.
(1) In computing the period of
limitation, the time during which any person has been prosecuting with due diligence another prosecution, whether
in a Court of first instance or in a Court
of appeal or revision, against the offender, shall be excluded: Provided that
no such exclusion shall be made unless the prosecution relates to the same
facts' and is prosecuted in good faith in a Court which from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature,
is unable to entertain it.
(2) Where the institution of the
prosecution in respect of an offence has been stayed by an injunction or order,
then, in computing the period of limitation, the period of the continuance of the injunction or order, the day on which it was issued
or made, and the day on which
it was withdrawn, shall be excluded.
1. Ins. by Act 45 of 1978, s. 33 (w. e. f. 12- 12- 1978).
(3) Where notice of prosecution for an offence
has been given,
or where, under any law for the time
being in force,
the previous consent
or sanction of the Government or any other authority
is required for the institution of any prosecution for an offence, then, in
computing the period of limitation, the period of such notice or, as the case
may be, the time required for obtaining such consent or sanction shall be
excluded. Explanation. - In computing the time required for obtaining the consent
or sanction of the Government or any other authority, the date on which the application was made for
obtaining the consent or sanction and the date of receipt of the order of the
Government or other authority shall both be excluded.
(4)
In computing the period of limitation,
the time during which the offender-
(a)
has
been absent from India or from any territory outside India which is under the
administration of the Central Government, or
(b)
has avoided
arrest by absconding or concealing himself, shall
be excluded.
Section 471: Exclusion of date on which Court
is closed. Where
the period of limitation expires on a day when the Court is
closed, the Court may take cognizance on the day on which the Court reopens. Explanation.
- A Court shall be deemed to be closed on any day within the meaning of this
section, if, during its normal working hours, it remains closed on that day.
Section 472: Continuing offence. In the case of a
continuing offence, a fresh period of limitation shall begin to run at every
moment of the time during which the offence continues.
Section 473: Extension of period of limitation in
certain cases. Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions
of this Chapter, any Court may take cognizance of an offence after the expiry
of the period of limitation, if it is satisfied on the facts and in the
circumstances of the case that the delay has been properly explained or that it
is necessary so to do in the interests of justice.
THE LIMITATION ACT, 1963
Section 5: Extension of
prescribed period in certain cases. —Any appeal or any application, other than
an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the
applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making
the application within such period.
Explanation. —The fact that the appellant or the applicant was missed by
any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing
the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this
section.
CHAPTER-3: JUDICIAL ANALYSIS
Law Relating to Cognizance Under the Code of Criminal Procedure
Under chapter XIV of the code section
190 to 193 provides for taking cognizance, chapter XIV section 195 to 199 deals with the limitation on taking cognizance and chapter XXXVI,
sections 467 to 469 also talk about the limitations.
COGNIZANCE OF
OFFENCES BY MAGISTRATE
Any First class Magistrate and any Second Class Magistrate can
acknowledge any offence. Section 190-199 of the code defines the procedures by
which various criminal courts are entitled to take cognizance of offences, and
the restrictions under which they are entitled.
(a)
Section 190 of CrPC "Cognizance of offences by Magistrates"
(1) Subject to the provisions of this
Chapter, any Magistrate of the first class, and any Magistrate of the second
class specially empowered in this behalf under subsection (2), may take
cognizance of any offence-
(a)
upon receiving a complaint of facts
which constitute such offence;
(b)
upon a police report
of such facts;
(c)
upon
information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his
own knowledge, that such offence has been committed.
(2) The Chief Judicial Magistrate may
empower any Magistrate of the second class to take cognizance under
subsection (1) of such offences as are within his competence to inquire into or try.
(b)
Section 191 of CrPC "Transfer on application of the accused"
When a Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence
under clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 190, the accused shall,
before any evidence
is taken, be informed that he is entitled to have the case inquired into or tried by another
Magistrate, and if the accused or any of the accused, if there be more than one, objects
to further proceedings before the Magistrate taking cognizance,the case shall be transferred to such other Magistrate as may be specified by the Chief Judicial
Magistrate in this behalf.
(c)
Section 192 of
CrPC "Making over of cases
to Magistrates"
(1) Any Chief Judicial Magistrate may,
after taking cognizance of an offence, makeover the case for enquiry or trial
to any competent Magistrate subordinate to him.
(2) Any
Magistrate of the first class empowered in this behalf
by the Chief Judicial Magistrate may, after taking cognizance of an offence,
makeover the case for enquiry
or trial to such other competent Magistrate as the Chief Judicial
Magistrate may, by general or special order,
specify, and thereupon such Magistrate may hold the inquiry or trial.
Tula Ram & Ors vs Kishore Singh: 1977 AIR
2401, 1978 SCR (1) 615
Taking cognizance does not
require any formal
procedure, or indeed
intervention of any kind,
but happens as soon as a judge,
as such turns
his mind to the suspected crime of an offence for the purpose of continuing to take
further steps towards damage or trial. Furthermore, when a Magistrate applies
his mind not for the purpose of proceeding as mentioned above but for taking action
of some other kind, such as directing an investigation or issuing a search warrant for the purpose of investigation,
he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of the offence.
COGNIZANCE TAKEN BY A MAGISTRATE NOT EMPOWERED
If any magistrate were not allowed to recognize an offence under Section
190(1)(a) and 190(1)(b), if an offence is wrongly accepted
in good faith,
the proceedings shall not be set aside solely on the ground
that it is not permitted to do so. On the other hand, if
a magistrate who is
not empowered to take cognizance of an offence takes cognizance by information
received or his own knowledge pursuant to section 190(1)(c), his proceedings
shall be null and void. In such a case it is immaterial whether he was acting
erroneously in good faith or otherwise.
COGNIZANCE OF OFFENCES
BY COURT OF SESSION
According to Section
193, "Courts of Session are not permitted
to take note of any crime (as a
court of original jurisdiction) unless
the case is committed by a Magistrate." If it is specifically
established by this code or by any other statute, then only Courts of Session
are permitted. Limitations on taking cognizance under section 195 of the code
Section 195 of the code expressly imposed the limitation on taking
cognizance, under this section no court is entitle or allowed to take
cognizance of any offence which is punishable under section 172 to 188 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. It also prohibits in case of any abatement of, or attempt to commit
such offence except on the writing of the public servant concerned or the
public servant to whom he is administratively subordinate. The main object of this section is to protect
the person from being unnecessary harass by vexatious
prosecution in retaliation.
In the case of Sardul singh vs state of Haryana, it was observed that the
provision of section 195 coupled with the procedure in section 340 of the code
absolutely leave no doubt that not only cognizance of such offence without the
complaint in writing of the court is barred, but also the investigation into
such offence because that will amount to take over the function of the court.
Section 172 to 188 of Indian penal Code, 1860 referred to above relate to offence
of contempt of lawful
authority of public servant for instances, absconding to service of summons,
preventing service of summons, not obeying the legal order of public servant to
attained, not producing a document when so required by a public servant.
Intentionally omitting to give notice or information to a public servant,
knowingly furnishing false information, refusing to take oath.
Limitation on taking cognizance under section 196 of the
code
This section provides, that no court shall take cognizance of any offence
punishable under chapter VI or under 153A,
295A, 505(1). If there is a criminal
conspiracy to commit
an offence, or any such
abatement, as it describes in section 108A of Indian penal Code, 1860, then
also court shall not take cognizance on the matter. The object of conspiracy
has to be determined not only by the reference of the section
of the penal enactment refer to in the charge
but on the reading of charged themselves.
LIMITATION ON TAKING COGNIZANCE UNDER SECTION 197 OF THE CODE
This section provides that if any judge, magistrate or a public servant
not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the government,
if accused of any offence while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of
his official duty, no court is empowered to take cognizance unless there is a
previous sanction from the competent government.
Under this section, it is clear that, this section does not apply to
every public servant, it only applies on a judge, magistrate and those public
servants who is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of
the government. Here the government implies governor or president as the case may be, if a public servant
is removable below the authority
than governor or the
president, then this action does not apply.
Secondly, even the public servant
who is not removable other
than the concern
government or the judge or the magistrate, if the alleged
offence is showing
that, the offence
is not committed by the accused in the purporting his official duty
then also this section is not attracted.
WHETHER SANCTION
IS REQUIRED AFTER THE RETIREMENT?
The question arises when the accused retired from his post, in the case
of R. Bala Krishnan Jillai vs State of Kerala, the supreme court held in the
case of a person who is or was a public servant not removable from his office
save by or with the sanction of a government he is accused of an offence
committed in purporting his official duty, even after
retirement, sanction is required
under section 197. In case of Charanjit Das vs State of Orrisa,
it was held that where sanction was refused by the government when public servant
is or was in service,
he cannot be prosecuted later or after his
retirement. Under this section, any offence alleged to have been committed by
him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty.
Section 197(1) capable of a narrow as well as wide interpretation, if
this word construed too narrowly, the sanction will be altogether, sterile, for
it is no part of an official duty to
commit an offence. The Supreme Court held in the case of S. B Saha vs M.S Kochar that the question of
sanction under section 197 can be raised and considered at any stage of
proceeding.
In 2G spectrum case, the apex
court delivered landmark judgement.
The court refused to hold that question of granting sanction
for prosecution arises
only at the stage of cognizance and not
before that. the court further
held that grant
or refusal of sanction for prosecution is not a quasi-
judicial function and person for whose prosecution sanction is sought is not
required to heard by the competent authority to decide the question of sanction
and held that if decision is not taken by within the time limit sanction should
be deemed to be granted.
In the case of Kalicharan Mahapatra vs State of Orrisa while dealing with
a case under prevention of corruption Act, 1988, the apex court held that even if public servant
ceased to be public servant, so he liable to be
prosecuted under the Act, however, cognizance can be taken of offence even
without sanction if he is ceased to be public servant.
In the case of Md. Hadi Raja vs State of Bihar, it was held that
protection by way of sanction under sanction 197 is not applicable to the
officers of government companies or the public undertaking even when such public undertaking is state within the meaning
of Article 12 of the constitution of India on account of
deep and pervasive control of the government.
In the case of Choudhary Parveen Sultan vs State of West Bengal
an investigation officer
went to the house of complainant
and thereafter her husband to make a tortured statement and tried to obtain his
signature on a blank paper, the court held that for such excess or misuse of
authority no protection can be claimed.
In the case of Sambhoo
Nath vs State of U.P, complaint under section 409 and 420 Indian Penal Code 1860, was dismissed by the
trial court holding that sanction to prosecution has not been obtained. While resorting the complaint the apex court held that it is not official
duty of public servant to fabricate false report and misappropriate public
funds in furtherance or in discharge of his official duty is not
integrally connected or is it inseparably interlinked with the crime committed
in the course of same transaction.
In the case of Suresh Kumar Bhikamchand Jain vs Pandey Ajay Bhusan, apex
court held that it is for the accused
to produce relevant
material to sue whether necessary ingredients to attract section 197 are present or not as
the matter relates to the jurisdiction of the court to take a cognizance and
accused is not required to wait till the stage under section 246(4) of the code
of criminal procedure.
FOR WHOSE PROSECUTION, SANCTION
IS MANDATORY?
Prosecution without the sanction under section 197 shall be bad and taking cognizance will be without jurisdiction
in the case, the person accused belongs to following categories:
1.
A
judge as per section 19 of the Indian Penal Code 1860 or a magistrate, even
when exercising non judicial function.
2.
An ex- Judge or an ex- magistrate, this category has been included
by the new code by inserting the words was in section
197(5) to override
the supreme court
decision Keshav Lal vs State[1]. Under the old code that a public
servant was not entitle to
the protection of section 197 if the complainant against
him was brought
after he had left the service.
The new code accepted the view of law commission[2], that the need for the protection of
public servant for acts in the discharge of his official duty as much after
retirement as before.
3.
A
public servant who is not removable from his office save by or with the
sanction of the government.
4.
A person
was a public servant at the time when the court took cognizance of the offence the word was in new section
197(1) governs all the categories- judges, magistrate and the other public
servants.
The change in the law has been affected by the code of 1973, by inserting word ‘was’ after the
word ‘who is’ in subsection (1)[3].
Test for determination whether the act complained was done in the
purported discharge of official duty It is not possible to lay down test of universal application to find out in which cases
sanction under section 197 would be required. it will depend on the fact of
each case[4].
Though the principle relating to this question have been settle by a number of Supreme Court decisions, difficulty remains in the application of these principles in the facts
and circumstances of a
particular case before the court. From the leading decision it would appear
that the following test are to be applied in finding answer the present
questions:
1.
Whether
the public servant, when challenged, can reasonable claim that what he does
must be in virtue of his official duty[5].
2.
There must be reasonable relation between the act
and the official duty, even though it may
be in excess of the requirement of the situation[6].
If either of the two foregoing test are satisfied, sanction would be
required, irrespective of whether the act done was, in fact, a proper discharge
of his official duty, thus:
1. It being the duty of a civil surgeon
to give certificate, sanction would be required for prosecuting him, for the offence of giving a false certificate, but not for the offence
of abusing his subordinate
because such act cannot be reasonably, connected within the duty of civil
surgeon to carry on operation in course which the abuse took place[7].
2. No
sanction is necessary
where the act had no direct connection with his official duties,
but his official status only furnished him an occasion or opportunity of
committing the offence.
3. The test is not that the offence is
capable of being committed only by a public servant and not by and one else,
but that is committed by a public servant in or done or purporting to be done
in the excess of his duty.
5.
when the state’s officers
were required to take decision
in matter placed
before them by their
subordinates or were required to apply their mind or were required
to apply their mind or were
required to take decision in supervision and complete of the government project
or having regard to the rules of execution of business were required to take decision
for and on behalf of the
government or were required to by their superiors to render their individual options
or were members of a committee assignment they could not decline
or were under obligation to render
their option being such a member, each of them was performing the official duty, so section 197 of the code is necessary, even if after the retirement no sanction is necessary under section
19 of the prevention or corruption Act,1988.
Plea in case
of sanction
It is open to the accused to make an application to the criminal
court at any stage of proceeding
that the proceeding be quashed
for want of sanction on the ground
that the taking
of cognizance without
sanction is without the jurisdiction[9].
If such application is dismissed he may move to the High Court under Article
482 and from there to the Supreme Court of India[10].
Public servant who has no locus standi to take this plea of any stage prior to
take issue of process against him[11].
The plea that sanction is required to be taken under section 197 of the Cr. P.C
before cognizance is not considered even by raising at any stage of proceeding
and need not raised only when the court reaches the stage of framing of charge[12]. The plea can be taken
even at the conclusion or trial or after conviction[13]. However,
when the plea of want of sanction
was been raised at the initial stage, the court cannot postpone the
hearing of a late date[14].
State at which sanction
is required or to be obtained:
It is clear from the words
of section 197 that sanction
should be obtained
before cognizance is taken. If the sanction is obtained
after the cognizance is taken the trial vitiates[15].
Since the offence under section 341 and 409 of Indian Penal Code 1860 are
distinct and separate, then, prior sanction for prosecution under section 341
is must. The whole proceeding will not be vitiated for loss of it[16].
State at which question
of sanction arises
It is not always necessary that the need for sanction under section 197
is to be considered as soon as the complaint is lodged on the allegation
contain therein. The question may be raised at any stage of the proceeding[17].
Determination of the authority for sanction
To determine whether
it is the sanction of Central
Government or State Government, which is
required in the case, the question is to being asked is : where was the public
servant was employed at the relevant time, which means the date of commission of alleged offence[18]. Under Article 311(1) of the Indian
Constitution, an authority lower in rank than the appointing authority is not competent
to remove an employee. The same principle would apply in case
of sanction also. A valid sanction can only be given by a person who is
appointing authority.
Joint trial of offences in which
some requires sanction and other does not requires sanction.
If offences for which sanction
is required are tried with offence not requiring sanction,
the case cannot proceed without
sanction[19].
Sanction of speaker of Lok
Sabha for prosecution of Member of Parliament
Where the government stated that if CBI, furnishes to government of state case dairies relevant for processing, sanction will be
accorded. therefore direction were given to CBI to show or hand over the copies
of said dairies within one week to the government for examine and consider
matters and convey his decision to the court as early as possible[20].
LIMITATION UNDER SECTION
198 OF THE CODE
As per this section no court shall take cognizance of an offence
punishable under chapter XX of Indian Penal Code, 1860.
This section provides
that no person
other than the husband of the
woman shall be deemed to be aggrieved by any offence punishable under section 497
or 498 of the code. It also provided that in the absence of husband, some
person who had case of the woman on his behalf at the time when such offence was committed. The object of this section is exception to the general rule
that anybody having knowledge of the fact may file a complaint[21].
Under this section,
there is a bar on cognizance unless complained by the aggrieved person. If it is not
made by the aggrieved, the trial and conviction is to be considered as illegal[22].
for example, when an offence has been committed under section 494, 495, 498 the
aggrieved person would be the husband,
and no court can take cognizance unless
the complaint has been
filed by the husband, unless the husband is under the age of 18 years or is an
idiot or lunatic, or is from sickness of infirmly unable to make a complaint
some other person may with the leave of the court make a complaint on
his behalf. Where the complaint is filed without the leave of the court is not
maintainable.
Limitation under section 198A of the
code
No court shall take cognizance of an offence
punishable under section
498A of the Indian penal Code 1860, except upon a police
report.
There is no bar under section 498A of Indian Penal Code for divorced wife
to file complaint against her former
husband for offence,
committed by him during subsistence of their marriage under section 498A of IPC,
section 198A, of Cr.P.C enables divorced wife to file such complaint.
LIMITATION UNDER SECTION 198B OF THE CODE
under this section of the code, no court shall take cognizance of an
offence punishable under section 376B of the IPC, where the person are in
marital relationship of the fact, which constitute the offence upon a complaint
have been filed or made by the wife against the husband.
LIMITATION ON TAKING COGNIZANCE UNDER SECTION 199 OF THE CODE
Under this section of Cr.P.C, no court is entitle to take cognizance of
an offence punishable under chapter XXI of the IPC except upon a complaint made by some person aggrieved by the offence. It is also provided that where such person is under the age of eighteen years,
or is from sickness or infirmity unable to make complaint, some other
person may with the leave of the make a complaint on his or her behalf.
PERSON AGGRIEVED FOR THIS SECTION
the person aggrieved would be one against whom a defamative statement is
published, if it is said that Mr. ‘A’ is dishonest, or that he is a man of bad
character, the aggrieved person is certainly ‘A’. In some case the person other
than the person against whom the imputation is made against a member of joint
Hindu family then all the member of joint Hindu family will be said to
be aggrieved brother and sister
living jointly, the imputation of unchaste against
the sister makes the brother also aggrieved, but if the sister is living away and separately the brother cannot
be said to be aggrieved against the allegation[23].
Defamation of class
or society complained by an individual
As a matter of law, any person
filing a complaint
for demotion has to prove that, the imputation
refers to him. If a person complaint
that he has been defamed
as a member of the class, he must
satisfy the court that the imputation is against him personally and he is the
person aimed at before he can maintain prosecution for defamation. In the case
of defamation of a class of a person or society,
where everyone can be said to be defamed, the collection of persons must be
identifiable in the sense that one would with certainty say that his group of
particular people has been defamed as distinguished from the rest of community.
To say that the lawyer are dishonest is such a big class that no particular
lawyers can be said to have been aggrieved. to the contrary, the imputation
that the member of a particular Bar association are dishonest is certainly the defamation
of a
class of people
who can easily be ascertained, and in such a
case every individual of that society is an aggrieved person who can
easily be ascertained, and in such a case every individual; at that society is
an aggrieved person who can easily be ascertained, and in such a case every individual at that society
is an aggrieved person who can
who can file a complaint[24].
If a well-defined class is defamed, each and every member of that class is an aggrieved person and can
file a complaint. Where the words reflect on each and every member of a certain number or class, each or all can sue[25]. Explanation 2 of section
499 of IPC refers to defamation of a
company or an association or a
collection of persons as such. In
such cases one of their members may make a complaint make a complaint on behalf
of the collection or company
of persons as a whole, but the defamation must be shown to be of all the
person in the association or collection of such. Prosecution for defamation can
be filed by a company should be represented by a natural person. Criminal
complaint for defamation on behalf of a company cannot be filed by any and
every employee of a company any or every shareholder of the company[26].
Limitation for taking cognizance under chapter XXXVI of the code
This entire chapter
with sections 467 to 473 has been inserted on the recommendation of joint committee.
The main object of this chapter is to protect persons from prosecution from
state grievances and complaints which may turn out to be vexatious. The reason
for engrafting the rule of limitation is that, due to long lapse of time,
necessary evidence will be lost and person prosecuted will be placed in a
defenceless position. This may result in miscarriage of justice.
Section 467
This section is inserted with the purpose of
determining the limitations and scope that exists with regard to the specified
period of taking cognizance of an offence as provided under Section
468.
For the purpose of this chapter, “period of
limitation” is prescribed as the period specified for taking the cognizance of
offence as specified in Section 468 unless the context otherwise requires.
Infringement
of the prescribed period specified
in Section 468 will be considered as ultra vires to
the Section unless
the exceptional circumstances otherwise provide or amendment has been
made in the Code changing the above laws.
Section 468:
This section prescribes a period of
limitation of six months for offence punishable with fine only, one year for
those punishable for imprisonment up to one year and three years for those
punishable with imprisonment exceeding one year and not exceeding three years.
Under this section
the limitation therein
is only for the filing of the complaint and initiation of prosecution and for taking cognizance.
It of course, prohibits the court to take cognizance of offence when the
complaint is filed after the expiry
of period of limitation in the said chapter.
In case of Dharmendra Singh vs State of
Orrisa[27] the court held that where the cognizance of complaint
deemed to be taken on the date when the case was posted for enquiry then, such
cognizance is not barred under section 468(2)(c) of the code.
Mere filing of complaint, submitting of a
police report within the period of limitation is not enough. The court should
take cognizance of the offence within the period of limitation. For example, a complaint is filed on 5 Jan 2017 about an offence
punishable with fine only
which is committed on 5 July 2016, but court makes no order up
to 16 Jan 2017, the cognizance is illegal as it is not taken within the
prescribed time period.
There is no any limitation for taking cognizance of an offence
punishment with imprisonment for a period exceeds three
years[28].
When accused was charged with more than one offence.
Limitation prescribed for the offence which is punishable with the
highest punishment was considered merely because a sequent to filing of complaint, offence
with the highest
punishment was held to be not made out. It would
not make complaint time barred[29].
In the case of Yukub Ali Sarang vs State of
West Bengal[30] the order of taking cognizance beyond the period of three years,
as envisaged in section 468 of the code vitiated
and such the order is illegal,
incorrect and imperfect and the same cannot be sustained.
Bar to take the
Cognizance of an offence
·
No Court shall take the cognizance of an offence after the
expiry of the prescribed period as specified in subsection (2)
·
The period of limitation shall be:
|
Offence punishable with
|
Period of Limitation
|
|
Fine only
|
6 months
|
|
Imprisonment not exceeding 1 year
|
1 year
|
|
Imprisonment:
Minimum of 1 year
Maximum of 3 years
|
3 years
|
·
In
computing the period of limitation for the offence when two offences are tried
together; the period of limitation shall be determined in pursuance of the
offence which is punishable with the more severe punishment or the most severe
punishment.
Non- Applicability of Section 468
In the case of Nirmal Kanti Roy vs State of West Bengal[31],
the Supreme Court
held that Section 468 is not applicable to an
offence under Section 7 (1) (A) (ii) of Essential Commodities Act, 1955.
“The language of subsection (3) of section
468 gives a clear view that period of limitation that is provided under in Section 468 is in pursuance of the
alleged offence charged but it is not used in respect of offence which is
finally proved.”
In the case of Venkappa Gurappa Hosur vs Kasawwa (1997), the Court held that:
“Once the period of limitation begins to continue, it continues its full
course.” Section 469:
Under this section
commencement of the period of limitation is described, generally the period of
limitation in relation to an offence commences on the date of offence, where a
complaint under section 406 and 402 Indian penal code containing defamation
matters is filed against one, Mr. B, on 31st Jan 2015 and he is acquitted on 5
dec 2017, the limitation for filing a complaint by B for determination under
section 500 IPC will commence on the date of filing of complaint.
Methods of computing the period of limitation
In computing the period of limitation, the date from which the period is
to be computed is to be excluded. This provision corresponds to section 12(1), limitation Act, consequently the case
under that section will apply to this section[33]
Beginning of period
of limitation
The period of limitation commences from the following points:
·
On the day when
the offence was committed
·
When the person aggrieved by the act had no knowledge regarding
the commission the offence
or the police officer; it begins on the day when it comes to the knowledge of the aggrieved party or
police making an investigation into the case whichever is earlier.
·
When the person
who has committed an act is unknown or not being identified, the first date on which the accused was
known either to the aggrieved person or to the police officer making an
investigation into the case whichever is earlier.
The day
from which such period of limitation begins shall be excluded for the purpose of this Chapter. It means that the first day from which the period of limitation begins
to be calculated shall not be included while computing the period of
limitation. Let us understand from the example:
The offence punishable only with the fine was
committed on 1st May 2019. The period of limitation begins from 2nd May 2019
and not from 1st May 2019.
In the case
of State of Rajasthan vs Sanjay Kumar[34], the Court stated that
the period of limitation will not commence from the date when the sample was taken but from the date when the report of Public Analysts was
received in case of adulteration.
Section 470:
This section says, in computing the period of limitation. The principle
of this section is the protection against the bar of limitation of a person honestly doing his best to get his case tried.
Methods of computing the time to be
excluded
In excluding the time during which former prosecution was pending the day
on which that prosecution was instituted and the day on which that prosecution was instituted and the day on
which it ended shall both counted towards
the period to be excluded. Though there is no express provision in section 470(1) to
this effect being the general principle is applicable even to the section
470(1).
Computation of the period of limitation in case of sanction
or consent
Where in any law the previous sanction of government or any other
authority is required for the prosecution of a person then in computing the period of limitation, the time required
for consent or sanction
including the date on which the application was made and the date of receipt
of the order shall be excluded[35].
Situation when the offender is outside
India
In computing the period of limitation, the time during which the accused has been absent
from India or any territory under the administration of central
government shall be excluded.
Exclusion
of Time in certain cases
This section provides the period which shall
not be included in computing the period of limitation.
The period of limitation that is to be excluded
in computing the period of limitation is explained
below:
·
The time during which such person is prosecuting another
prosecution with due diligence whether it is a
court of appeal, or in the Court of the first instance against the offender.
Such period will not be excluded unless
another prosecution is related to the same circumstances or the facts of the
case for which the previous prosecution has been initiated or the court in
which the previous proceeding has been being is unable to entertain the case
due to lack of jurisdiction.
·
In the case where the institution of proceeding is
stayed by the order or injunction, the time shall exclude:
1.
The period during the continuance of such
order or injunction.
2.
The day on which it was
made or was issued.
3.
The day on which
it was withdrawn.
·
In a case where the notice of prosecution of offence is given or the previous
consent or the sanction
of the Government is mandatory
under this law or any other law for
the time being in force the time during which: -
1.
The period of notice
or;
2.
The period for obtaining the consent or sanction of the
Government shall be excluded.
3.
It also specifies that the time which is required for taking the
sanction or the permission from the Government or any other authority -The date
on which the application was made for taking the consent or sanction and;
The date
on which the permission or the consent
was granted shall be excluded.
·
In computing the period
of limitation such period
is to be excluded
1. The time during which the offender
is absent from India or from any territory which is outside from India but is under
the administration of Central Government.
2. The time during which the offender
has avoided arrest
either by concealing himself or either by absconding.
Section 471:
This section provides
for exclusion of date in computation when the court is closed.
Under the explanation to this section,
a court shall be deemed
to be closed if during any part of its normal
working hours it remains closed on that day.
Exclusion
of date on which court is closed:
The day
when the Court is closed is excluded from being accredited to the
specified period of limitation.
It is a rule that in the case when the period
of limitation expires on the day of the closure of court proceedings the
cognizance of an offence is taken when the court reopens.
When the court closes on normal working hours
for a particular period it is presumed that the Court has been closed for the
same day.
Section 472:
This section talks about the continuing offence, for this section ‘continuing
offence’ is susceptible of continuance and is distinguishable from an offence
which is committed once for all. it is an offence which arise out of a failure to obey or comply with a rule or its requirement[36].
In the case of continuing offence, there is thus the ingredient of
continuance of the offence which was absent
in the case of an offence, which takes place when an act for omission is
committed once and for all[37].
In the case of continuing offence, a fresh period of limitation shall begin to
run at every moment of the time during the offence continues.
When the offence
continues:
When the offences continue or are in the
process of happening; fresh limitation begins to run at every moment, the
offence is replicated throughout the full term that it continues.
Section 473: Extension of Period in Certain Cases:
·
This section is the pivotal section as it focuses on
administering justice. It gives a chance to the complainant or the aggrieved
person to institute the suit even after the expiry of the prescribed period of
limitation.
·
In normal circumstances, the case is not to be instituted after
the expiry of the prescribed period but in exceptional circumstances, the court
allows for the institution of the suit.
This section talks about the extension of period of limitation in certain
cases, this section empowers the court to take cognizance of an offence
after expiry of the period
of limitation if;
1.
It is satisfied that the delay
has been properly explained;
2.
If it necessary to take
cognizance in the interest
of justice.
Section 5 of the limitation Act gives a wide discretion to the court to
extent the prescribed period on being satisfied that there is sufficient cause.
the part of the section corresponds to section 5 of the limitation Act,
with the only difference that in section 5 of limitation Act, the words used
are ‘’he has sufficient cause’’ where as the present section uses the words
‘’the delay has been properly explained.’’ Though there is difference in words
but there seems to be no difference in the meaning.
The Supreme Court has observed ‘’in the words in showing sufficient cause
for the delay the party may be called upon to explain the delay[38].
Discretion of the Court
It is the discretion of the Court
to extend the period of limitation. This section does not mandate the court to extend the period of
limitation.
Conditions:
§ When the court is
satisfied with the facts and circumstances of the case that complainant was prevented by sufficient cause from not appearing before
the Court within the
prescribed period of limitation.
§ The cause
of the delay is properly
explained and the court is
satisfied with it.
§ The court is of the opinion
that it is necessary to extend the period
in the interest of justice.
The same provision
is also explained in the Limitation Act. Section 5: Extension of the
period in Certain Cases
Even in the civil case, the court has a discretionary power to extend the
period of limitation when the court is satisfied that there was sufficient
cause for not appearing within the prescribed period or that the cause of the reason was sufficiently explained or that it is necessary
to do in the interest of justice.
Case: State of Himachal Pradesh vs Tara
Dutta AIR 2000 SC 1729
The Court
held that:
“When the provision is being invoked by the Magistrate, and it condones
the delay then the order of Magistrate must show that the delay was properly
explained to him and it was necessary for the condonation of delay in the
interest of justice”.
In the case of Srinivas
Pal vs Union Territory of Arunachal Pradesh SC 1729, the Court held that:
“It is not mandatory to determine whether the extension of the period of
limitation under Section 473 must precede of taking the cognizance of the
offence.”
CHAPTER-4: CASE
REFFERED
|
Serial
Number
|
Cases
|
|
1
|
Abdul Wahab Anshari VS State of Bihar (2000)
8 SCC 500
|
|
2
|
Arulswami VS state of Madarash; AIR 1967 SC776
para 6
|
|
3
|
Baiznath VS State of Madhya Pradesh; AIR 1996 SC 220
|
|
4
|
Balbir Singh VS State, (2009)
Cri LJ 3674 (del)
|
|
5
|
Bhagwan vs Mishra AIR 1970 SC
1661
|
|
6
|
Boutique Hotels India (P)
Ltd. VS ACIT
(ITAT Delhi)
|
|
7
|
Budhi vs Sharma (1981)
CR. LJ 993
|
|
8
|
Charanjit Das vs State of Orrisa
|
|
9
|
Choudhary Parveen Sultan vs State of West Bengal
|
|
10
|
Dharmendra Singh
vs State of Orrisa
|
|
11
|
G
Narsimah VS T.V
chakkapt; AIR 1972
SC 2609
|
|
12
|
GillVS R; AIR 1948
PC 128 (133)
|
|
13
|
Gulabchandji Partani vs. Ashok & Anr. (1992) Crl. L. J.
2704.
|
|
14
|
Hira Lal VS Babban, 1968
ALJ 865
|
|
15
|
Kalicharan Mahapatra vs State of Orrisa
|
|
16
|
Keshav Lal vs State
|
|
17
|
M/s. Satyanarayana General Traders
& Ors. vs. State (1993)
2 Crimes 203
|
|
18
|
Matajog VS Bhari; (1955) 2 SCR
925
|
|
19
|
Md. Hadi Raja vs State of Bihar
|
|
20
|
Nirmal Kanti Roy vs State of West
Bengal
|
|
21
|
Pawan Kumar VS Ruldu Ram; 1983 Cri LJ 180
|
|
22
|
PK
Pradhan VS State
of Sikkim; AIR 2001 SC 2257
|
|
23
|
Pratap Chandra Guha VS Emperor AIR
1925 Cal.1121
|
|
24
|
Provident Fund Inspector, Ludhiana vs Harminder Singh & Anr
|
|
25
|
Pukhraj VS State of Rajasthan
|
|
26
|
R.
Bala Krishnan Jillai vs State
of Kerala
|
|
27
|
R.R.Chari vs State of U.P
|
|
28
|
R.S. Arora vs. The State
(1987) Crl. Law Journal 1225
|
|
29
|
Rajendara vs state of Punjab (1982)
Cr. LJ 1318
|
|
30
|
Rajiv Ranjan VS State
of Jarkhand; (2003) Cri LJ
622 (jhar)
|
|
31
|
Ram Lal vs Rewa Coal
Field Ltd
|
|
32
|
Ritesh kumar Bahari VS inspector Balakrishna; 1999 Cri LJ 207, Delhi
|
|
33
|
S.
B Saha vs M.S Kochar
|
|
34
|
Sambhoo Nath vs State of U.P
|
|
35
|
Sankaram Moitra VS Sadhana Das; AIR 2006 SC
1599
|
|
36
|
Sarah Mathew vs the Institute of Cardio-vascular diseases
|
|
37
|
Sardul singh vs state of Haryana
|
|
38
|
Srinivas Pal vs Union
Territory of Arunachal Pradesh SC 1729,
|
|
39
|
Srivastava VS Mishra AIR
1920 SC 1661
|
|
40
|
State of Himachal Pradesh vs Tara Dutta
|
|
41
|
State of Himachal Pradesh
vs Tara Dutta AIR 2000 SC 1729
|
|
42
|
State of Rajasthan vs Sanjay Kumar
|
|
43
|
State of Tamil Nadu vs N.
Suresh Rajan & Ors
|
|
44
|
State VS Kailash; AIR 1980
SC 522 para 3,5,6
|
|
45
|
Suresh Kumar Bhikamchand Jain
vs Pandey Ajay
Bhusan
|
|
46
|
Venkappa Gurappa Hosur vs Kasawwa (1997
|
|
47
|
Wire machining mfg. co vs state;
(1978) Cri.LJ 839
|
|
48
|
Yukub Ali
Sarang vs State
of West Bengal
|
CHAPTER-5: APPRAISAL AND SUGGESTION
Chapter XXXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 incorporates the
Doctrine of ‘Limitation’ for criminal offences. The chapter contains 7 sections
ranging from Section 467 to Section 473 of CrPC, 1973. The rationale behind
incorporating a limitation period is that criminal matters heavily depend upon
the witness testimony which obscures over time due to which the investigation for the detained/arrested accused under CrPC is also time bound under
Section 167(2). Thus the opening
cases beyond a reasonable time will compromise the witness
testimony and may lead the court on a false trail due to lack and
non-authoritative evidence costing the accused.
The period of limitation under CrPC, 1973 varies from six months to three
years depending upon the duration of the punishment of the offence. An offence
punishable with just a fine or 6 months of imprisonment attracts
a limitation period
of 6 months. Whereas offence
punishable with imprisonment up to one year with/without a fine attracts
a limitation period
of 1 year and offences punishable with imprisonment up to three
years with/without a fine holds
a limitation period of 3 years.
However, offences holding
punishment higher than three years
do not attract a limitation period and the case can be filed at any time
post the occurrence of the offence.
Thus, in layman's terms any offence under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 or
under any other criminal legislation, unless holds any special provision
contrary to the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, attracts a period of
limitation ranging from 6 months to 3
years. Thus, if the complainant whose proceeding is barred by such limitation
cannot proceed with such proceedings post the limitation period.
However, the legislation has ensured that if a proceeding
holds merit then it is not debarred on the admission stage itself.
The concept of allowing certain proceedings post limitation period is
known as the ‘condonation of delay.’ The court holds the power to reject the
delay and allow the case to be admitted on merits.
However, the condition associated with such condonation is two-fold. First, the prosecution must explain
the rationale behind such delay up to the satisfaction of the court. Whereas, in certain circumstances,
the court can condone delay when it is necessary to do so in the interests of
justice. The legislative intent behind such a provision is to ensure that such
limitation is not absolute and does not deprive the victim of justice just based on a technicality.
The concept of condonation of delay ensures rationality prevails over
absoluteness but does not provide any objective guidelines or framework
determining such rationale. Thus, giving the honourable judiciary an arbitrary
power to determine reasonable grounds. However, enactment of certain non-binding but persuasive guidelines or frameworks can provide objectivity to such reasoning. The
honourable Supreme Court in a catena of judgments has provided the broad themes
which can be used to create such a framework.
The honourable Court in Mohsina & Ors vs Union of India held that
illiteracy, poverty, and non-ability of a victim is a satisfactory rationale to condone
the delay. The victim is an illiterate and poor lady; she lost her
husband in the train accident; her father-in-law was pursuing the case before
the Claims Tribunal; her father-in-law expired,
whereupon her mother-in-law threw her out of the matrimonial home, and she is residing with
her father who is also handicapped; she was working
as a maidservant to make both ends meet due to which she made an 804 days
delay in filing the suit and seek condonation. The court after analysing the
surrounding facts held that considering the extreme poverty and illiteracy of
the appellants, the application is allowed and the delay in filing the appeal
is condoned.
Whereas, the honourable court in State of Tamil Nadu vs N. Suresh Rajan
& Ors., held that delay due to the lawyer’s contradictory advice is
condoned. The complainant argued that the lawyer advised him in contradiction
to file the Special leave petition before this honourable court so the delay of
1954 days is condoned.
The court in Sarah Mathew vs the Institute of Cardio-Vascular Diseases
held that the delay caused by a magistrate in taking cognizance of the offence
must be condoned as the victim’s intent was bonafide and was out of his
control. On the other hand, the honourable court in Provident Fund Inspector, Ludhiana
vs Harminder Singh
& Anr., adjudicated on the issue that
the whether the fact that the legislation is beneficial is sufficient to
mechanically condone the delay. The court while adjudicating upon the
Employment provident fund act, 1952 provided a general ruling that the mere
fact of legislation being beneficial does not condone the delay automatically,
circumstantial analysis is a must.
The list or structure shall not be exhaustive and must be open to
amendment. Additionally, such a list must also be non-binding and only
persuasive to provide the victims/ complainant or lawyers sufficient understanding
to file an informed application for condonation of delay. Thus, catena
of judgments and certain other
factors such as societal pressure
in cases of sexual
harassment etc. must be considered for the enactment of a structured framework
to avoid arbitrariness and to assist the judges in efficiently applying
judicial mind to cases of condonation of delay.
The two additional factors to be considered are the lawyer’s negligence
and delay caused due to red - tapism in
the governmental department. The former issue has been adjudicated by the
honourable Supreme Court in Boutique Hotels India (P) Ltd. VS ACIT (ITAT
Delhi). The court held that the pleader’s
gross carelessness/negligence does not hold sufficient ground to condone the delay. Whereas,
the court stated
that the delay
can be condoned when it is proved that the lawyer or adviser made a bona fide mistake
and the council must disclose
the particular circumstance
when such advice was given. Thus, mistaken advice given by a lawyer negligently and without due care as well as a general
statement as an excuse is not sufficient to cause.
With the passage
of time, the evidence deteriorates, the accused may become unidentified, the circumstances might be changed. So, the suit may be brought
within the specified period so that the lawyers
can find the evidence, the situation of the accused
does not change.
It was not possible to bring the suit within the appropriate time so for this purpose
Chapter, XXXVI was enacted. It is not brought to
extinguish the rights of the person but it is brought to avoid the unnecessary
delay in instituting a suit.
The period of limitation for criminal offences is necessary as to avoid
filing of frivolous litigation as to secure the alleged accused
from harassment and to safeguard the valuable time of
the Judiciary. However,
it is also significant to consider that a legitimate case is not rejected
just on the basis of the technicality
of limitation. Thus, there lies a provision
which allows the judiciary to apply
its judicial mind and decide whether the case holds any merit to qualify for
condonation of delay. It is also necessary to consider that there lies a need
to create a non- exhaustive and non-binding list of rationale suitable to hold
condonation of delay as to limit the arbitrary power of the court as well as to
provide the complainant and lawyer to have sufficient ground to seek the
condonation of delay. Such list can be prepared through judicial precedents and
certain other aspects.
CHAPTER-6: CONCLUSION
In the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Chapter XXXVI has been added
prescribing limitation for taking cognizance of certain offences with a view to
expedite the process of detection and investigation of crimes and also to ensure observances of the principle of fairness in the
total of the offences by barring belated prosecution. Delay in prosecution of
offences causes undue hardship as it keeps the sword handing on the heads of
accused persons and it also results in the material
evidence getting vanished.
This chapter applies
to all such offences for
which punishment prescribed is less than three years. But it does not apply to offences for which punishment prescribed is more than three years and to economic
offences under various Acts, which are excluded under Central
Act 12 of 1974 or any State Acts. It contains seven sections (467-473). Section
467 defines the expression ’period of limitation’ used in the chapter. Section
468 creates bar to taking cognizance of offences after lapse of period of
limitation. Sections 469 to 473 deal with various aspects of computation of
limitation. Of the aforementioned provisions, we are concerned with Sections
468 and 469. Sub-section (1) of Section 468 ordains
that no Court shall take cognizance of an offence
of the category specified in
sub-section (2), after the expiry of the ’period of limitation’ prescribed
thereunder. This, however, is subject to the other provisions of the Code.
Sub-section (2) postulates different period of limitation for offences with
reference to the punishment provided for them; if the punishment provided
for an offence in any Act is only fine, the period
of limitation fixed is six months; if the offence
is punishable with imprisonment for a term not
exceeding one year, the period of
limitation prescribed is one year and if the offence is punishable with
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years, the period of limitation laid down
is three years. And sub-section (3) spells out the rule of limitation in cases of joinder of charges;
if a
person is tried for more offences than one, then the period of limitation will be determined with reference to the offence
which is punishable with the more severe punishment or, as the case may be, the most severe
punishment; for example,
if a person is tried for various
offences and some of them are
punishable with fine and some
with imprisonment for a term less than a year and some for which the punishment is provided up to
three years, then the period of limitation for all the offences, if they are
tried together, will be three years.
Section 469 deals
with commencement of the period
of limitation and it reads
thus: " 469. Commencement of the period of limitation –
(1)
The period
of limitation, in relation
to an offender, shall commence –
a. on
the date of the offence; or
b. where the commission of the offence
was not known to the person aggrieved by the offence or to
any police officer, the first day on which such offence comes to the knowledge
of such person or to any police officer, whichever is earlier; or
c. where it is not known by whom the
offence was committed, the first the day on which the identity of the offender
is known to the person aggrieved by the offence or to the police officer making
investigation into the offence, whichever is earlier."
A plain reading of the provision extracted above shows that in sub-section (1) three alternative starting points of limitation
have been specified - (a) the date of the offence; (b) the first day on which
an offence came to the knowledge of the person aggrieved by the offence or to
any police officer, whichever is earlier, in a case where the commission of the
offence was not known to any of them, or(c) the first day on
which the identity of the offender
is known to the
person aggrieved by the offence or to
the police officer making investigation into the offence, whichever is earlier,
but this can be called in aid
in a case where it is not
known by whom the offence was committed. basically, from the date of the offence the period of limitation will start
but there will be cases where the commission of offence or identity of the
offender comes to knowledge of those concerned with it long thereafter so in
such situations clauses (b) and (c), as the case may be, would be the date of
commencement of period of limitation.
Now we shall see which clause of sub-section (1) of Section
469 is attracted to the facts of the
case. For this purpose, it will be necessary to revert to the facts of this case. The essence of the
offences charged is manufacture of adulterated, sub-standard, misbranded,
spurious drugs within the meaning of the relevant provisions of the Act and/or
storage, distribution and sale of such drugs in contravention of the provisions of the Act. On the date of collection of samples
from respondent No.16,
on February 29, 1988, it could not have been said that any offence
was committed as selling of drugs per se is no offence and the quality
of the drugs was not known to the Drugs Inspector, the complainant on that
date. It is only, when the report of the Government Analyst was received, that
it came to light that the provisions of the Act are violated and offence is committed. So, on the facts of this case, it cannot be said that Clause
(a) of
Section 469(1) is attracted. That the drugs which were offered for sale were
substandard/adulterated, within the meaning of the Act, came to the knowledge
of the Drugs Inspector only on July 2, 1988 when the report of the Government
Analyst was received by him; and therefore, clause (b) of Section 469(1) will
be attracted.
Under cognate legislations of different
States, similar questions arose before
the High Courts. In R.S. Arora vs The State (1987) Crl. Law Journal
1225, the question which fell for consideration of Delhi High Court was whether for prosecution under Sections 7, 19 and 16(1)
of the Seeds Act, 1966, the period of limitation of six months would start from
the date of collection of samples under clause (a) or from the date of Seed
Analyst report for purposes of
clause (b) of Section 469(1) Cr.P.C. The learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court took the view that the limitation commences
from the date of submission of the report by the Seed Analyst to the Inspector,
so Section 469(1) (b) would apply. The same view was taken by the Bombay High
Court in Omprakash Gulabchandji Partani vs Ashok & Anr. (1992) Crl. L. J. 2704.
In M/s. Satyanarayana General Traders & Ors. vs State (1993)
2 Crimes 203, a learned
Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh
high Court held that
for prosecution of offences of mis-branding
under Insecticides Act, the period of limitation would start from the date on
which the report of the Analyst was received but not from the date of taking samples and thus Section 469(1)
(b)
would
be attracted. We are in entire agreement with the views expressed by the
learned Judges of the High Courts in the above cases. For the above reasons, in
the instant case, the limitation for the purpose of Section 468(2) (c) will
commence from July 2, 1988, the date of knowledge of the commission of offence to the concerned officer under Section
469(1) (b) but not from February 29,1988 (the date of
collection of samples by the Drugs Inspector) and as the complaint was filed on
June 28, 1991 which is within three years so the complaint is not barred by limitation under
Section 468(2) (c). The
High Court has missed this germane aspect erroneously took the date of commencement of the limitation as February 29,1988,
the date on which
the samples were collected by the Drugs Inspector form accused No. 16. It is thus clear that the High Court has
committed illegality in so computing the period of limitation, which results in
miscarriage of justice.
REFERENCES (BIBLIOGRAPHY)
STATUTES REFERED
1.
THE
CODE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE, 1973
2.
THE
LIMITATION ACT
JOURNAL REFERED
1.
CRIMINAL LAW JOURNAL
WEBSITE REFERED
[1] AIR 1961 SC 1395
[2] 41st Report para 15, 123
[3] Rajendara vs state of Punjab (1982) Cr. LJ 1318
[4] Bhagwan vs Mishra AIR 1970 SC 1661
[5] 9892560909 - vsign
[6] Matajog VS Bhari; (1955) 2
SCR 925
[7] Srivastava VS Mishra AIR 1920 SC
1661
[8] Pukhraj VS State of Rajasthan
[9] State VS Kailash; AIR 1980 SC 522
para 3,5,6
[10] Arulswami VS state of Madarash; AIR 1967 SC776 para 6
[11] Budhi vs Sharma (1981) CR. LJ 993
[12] Abdul Wahab Anshari VS State of
Bihar (2000) 8 SCC 500
[13] PK Pradhan VS State of Sikkim; AIR 2001 SC 2257
[14] Sankaram Moitra VS Sadhana Das;
AIR 2006 SC 1599
[15] Baiznath VS State of Madhya
Pradesh; AIR 1996 SC 220
[16] Ritesh kumar Bahari VS inspector Balakrishna; 1999
Cri LJ 207, Delhi
[17] Batuk Lal’s commentary on the code
of criminal procedural,1973, 1177 (orient publishing company., 5th edn., 2014
reprinted)
[18] Basu DD. Criminal Procedural Code,
1973. 1212 (Lexis Nexis., 5th edn., 2014)
[19] Pawan Kumar VS Ruldu Ram; 1983 Cri
LJ 180
[20] Rajiv Ranjan VS State of Jarkhand;
(2003) Cri LJ 622 (jhar)
[21] Batuk Lal’s commentary on the code of criminal
procedural, 1973. 2704 (orient publishing company., 5th edn., 2014
reprinted)
[22] G Narsimah VS T.V chakkapt; AIR
1972 SC 2609
[23] Hira Lal VS Babban, 1968 ALJ 865
[24] Basu’s commentary, code of criminal procedure code 2663
(whytes & co., 12th edn., 2015)
[25] Pratap Chandra Guha VS Emperor AIR
1925 Cal.1121
[26] Sohoni’s code of criminal
procedure (lexis nexis 21st edn., 2015)
[27] (2001) Cri LJ 439 (ori)
[28] Batuk Lal’s commentary on the code of criminal
procedural,1973, 1216 (orient publishing company., 5th
edn., 2014 reprinted)
[29] Balbir Singh VS State, (2009) Cri
LJ 3674 (del)
[30] (1995) cal. Cr. LR 286 (cal.)
[31] (1998) Cr LJ 3282 (SC)
[32] AIR 2000 SC 297
[33] Batuk Lal’s commentary on the code
of criminal procedural, 1973. 2704 (orient publishing company., 5th
edn., 2014 reprinted)
[34] 1998 Cri LJ 256 (SC)
[35] ibid
[36] Basu’s commentary, code of criminal procedure code
2668 (whytes & co., 12th edn., 2015)
[37] Wire machining mfg. co vs state;
(1978) Cri.LJ 839
[38] Ram Lal vs Rewa Coal Field Ltd
Article Information
No Limitation For Taking Cognizance Of Offence – A Need For Justice
Authors: Abinash Mahapatra
- Journal IJLRA
- ISSN 2582-6433
- Published 2024/06/26
- Issue 7
About Journal
International Journal for Legal Research and Analysis
- Abbreviation IJLRA
- ISSN 2582-6433
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