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# **PATENTS, ECOSYSTEMS AND INJUNCTIONS: THE EVOLUTION OF GLOBAL FRAND DISPUTES**

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## **Abstract**

The integration of Wi-Fi and data transmission standards into various consumer markets has changed the global intellectual property landscape. This change affects areas, including smart infrastructure, medical devices, Internet of Things (IoT) and connected automotive supply chains. At the heart of this change is the disagreement between holders of Standard Essential Patents (SEPs) and market implementers over reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) licensing terms.

What started as disputes over contracts or antitrust issues has become complex multi-jurisdictional litigation. This paper looks at how the legal strategy has changed from royalty calculations to complex battles over market exclusion and global forum shopping.

The research examines how the strategic use of relief has driven this change. It looks at the requirements for obtaining injunctions in countries, including the United States, the United Kingdom, the European Union and the influence of the Unified Patent Court (UPC) and Indian courts.

This study evaluates how the availability of remedies affects the tension between "patent hold-up" and "patent hold-out." It also considers policy shifts, such as the European Commission's proposed SEP Regulation and the push, for specialized FRAND tribunals.

Through an analysis the paper explores the rise of cross-border procedural conflicts, including the use of anti-suit and anti-anti-suit injunctions. Ultimately this research provides a framework to help practitioners and policymakers navigate the enforcement ecosystem. It advocates for negotiating protocols that protect research and development incentives without limiting open market interoperability.

**Keywords:** Standard Essential Patents (SEPs); FRAND Licensing; Injunctive Relief; Patent Hold-out; Unified Patent Court (UPC); Anti-Suit Injunctions; Technology Ecosystems.

## DISCUSSION

### Chapter I

#### Introduction and Foundations of the SEP-FRAND Architecture

##### 1.1 The Genesis of Inter-connectivity

The digital economy is about connection these days. We have moved from using technological devices to being part of a huge network where everything works together. The key to this is making sure that all these devices and systems can talk to each other. In the past standards for telecommunications like 2G and 3G were mainly used for making voice calls and sending data on mobile phones. Now with the introduction of 5G networks and the development of 6G systems and the widespread use of Internet of Things (IoT) frameworks these standards are being used in many more areas.

Different parts of the market do not work in isolation from each other anymore. For example, smart grids use networks to balance power supply across cities. The automotive industry uses systems to connect cars to everything around them and to make semi-autonomous driving possible. For all these industries to work together thousands of parts made by different companies all around the world need to be able to communicate with each other.

This is made possible by standards, which are like blueprints that make sure a connected car in Europe can communicate with a smart charging station in Asia. However, the ideas and inventions that make these standards possible are not freely available to everyone. They are developed by companies that invest a lot of money in research and development. They are protected by patents. When a patented invention becomes essential for a standard it is called a Standard Essential Patent (SEP). This means that any company that wants to make a product that follows the standard has to use these SEPs, which can lead to issues.

The number of SEPs used in a device is very high. While in the past a standard might have involved a number of essential patents a single 5G smartphone or connected car can involve tens of thousands of individual patents held by hundreds of different companies around the world. This creates a situation where companies have to deal with layers of intellectual property rights just to bring a product to market. As a result, technical standardization is not a technical challenge, but also a critical commercial issue where the rules of patent enforcement can affect market access and global competition.

## 1.2 The Role of Standard Development Organizations (SDOs)

Standard Development Organizations (SDOs) like the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) are the groups where these technical standards are discussed and agreed upon. The main challenge for SDOs is to balance the need for companies to work together to create standards with the need for these companies to protect their inventions.

To encourage companies to share their inventions with everyone SDOs have to make sure that these companies can get a fair return on their investments. If the protection for patents is weakened companies might not want to share their technology, which can lead to standards that're not very good or are fragmented. On the hand if the companies that own SEPs have too much power, they can charge very high fees to use these patents, which can hurt the market.<sup>1</sup> To avoid this SDOs make a deal with the companies that own patents. In exchange for including their technology in a standard these companies have to promise to license their SEPs to anyone who wants to use them under Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) terms. This promise is like a safety valve that helps to prevent companies from using their patents to dominate the market.

## 1.3 The Legal Nature of the FRAND Commitment

The idea of FRAND is widely accepted, but its exact meaning in terms is still not clear. Courts and scholars look at FRAND in ways: as a contract as a limit on property rights or as a way to defend against competition law.

When seen as a contract the FRAND promise is like an agreement between the company that owns the SEP and the SDO. The SDO represents the industry so the companies that want to use the SEP are like parties that benefit from the contract. If the company that owns the SEP does not offer terms the other company can sue for breach of contract.

FRAND can also be seen as a limit on property rights. When a company promises to license its SEP under FRAND terms it is giving up some of its rights as the owner of the patent. The patent is no longer a way to stop others from using the invention but a way to get fair payment for its use.

Finally, FRAND can be seen as a way to defend against competition law. If a company that owns an SEP refuse to license it on terms it can be seen as abusing its dominant position in the

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<sup>1</sup> European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) Intellectual Property Rights Policy, Clause 6.1

market. The legal nature of FRAND is complex. Involves contract law, property law and competition law.<sup>2</sup>

#### **1.4 Scope and Methodology of the Study**

The way of dealing with intellectual property disputes is to look at each case individually and decide on the rights and wrongs of each situation. However, this approach does not work well in an economy where products are made and used all around the world.

Modern technology products are made from parts that come from different countries. If a company infringes a patent, the owner of the patent can sue in the country where the infringement happened. With global supply chains and interconnected markets this approach is not practical.

This study looks at how courts in countries are dealing with these issues. It compares the approaches of courts in the US, the UK, the EU and India to see how they determine rates for using SEPs how they decide if a company is willing or unwilling to negotiate and how they use injunctive relief, in international tech enforcement.

By comparing these approaches this study aims to identify the problems that are threatening the open market and to find a balanced way forward for global tech enforcement. The study will look at how different jurisdictions have developed their ways of dealing with global disputes and will try to find a way to make the system work better for everyone.

## **Chapter II:**

### **The Economic and Behavioural Friction Points: Hold-Up vs. Hold-Out**

#### **2.1 The Patent Hold-Up Phenomenon**

The way essential patent (SEP) licensing works is different from traditional intellectual property negotiations. This is because of the "lock-in" effect that happens when a technology becomes a standard. Before a standard is chosen many technologies are available and patent holders compete to have their technology included. At this stage market forces keep royalty expectations in check. Once a standard is adopted the situation changes dramatically.

Companies that want to make products that fit the standard have to invest a lot in manufacturing machines change their supply chains and design software that works with the standard. This investment creates a kind of lock-in. Once the industry has committed to this path it becomes

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<sup>2</sup> Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2012)

very costly to switch. That's when the risk of "patent hold-up" appears.<sup>3</sup>

A SEP holder can take advantage of this lock-in by demanding royalty rates. These rates don't reflect the value of the technology itself. Rather the cost the implementer would face if it had to abandon its investment. By threatening to stop production or get an exclusion order the patent holder can extract a lot of money from the implementer. The FRAND commitment was made to prevent this kind of exploitation.

## 2.2 The Implementer Hold-Out Strategy

While patent hold-up is a problem there's another issue that's become common: implementer "patent hold-out."<sup>4</sup> This is when an implementer deliberately delays signing a licensing agreement. In industries like consumer electronics and automotive implementers often use the uncertainty around FRAND to delay negotiations.

Implementers use tactics to hold out. They might engage in pointless negotiations, challenge the importance or validity of patents, or refuse to sign non-disclosure agreements. The main reason hold-out works is that patent litigation is expensive and takes a long time. Implementers know that they can keep making and selling products without paying royalties, which puts the SEP holder at a disadvantage.

This can cause financial problems for small innovators or companies that rely on licensing revenue. It shifts the bargaining power to the implementer.

## 2.3 Information Asymmetry in Licensing Negotiations

The problems of hold-up and hold-out are made worse by a lack of information in licensing negotiations. In a commercial transaction both parties have a clear idea of the market value. In SEP licensing negotiations often happen in the dark. Implementers are asked to pay millions of dollars for access to a portfolio without knowing its value.

There are two issues:

- **Essentiality Uncertainty:** Patent owners declare which patents might be essential to a standard but there's no independent check. Studies show that up to 50% of declared SEPs are not essential or are invalid. Implementers have to guess whether they're paying for innovations or not.
- **The Comparable Licensing Shield:** To check if an offer is fair an implementer needs to

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<sup>3</sup> Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 1991 (2007)

<sup>4</sup> Richard P. Vari, The Problem of Patent Hold-Out in Standard-Essential Patent Licensing, 11 J. Competition L. & Econ. 351 (2015)

compare it to what its competitors paying. Prior licensing agreements are kept confidential.

When a SEP holder says its offer is in line with market rates the implementer has no way to verify this without going to court. This lack of information paralyzes negotiations.

## **2.4 Conceptualizing the "Willing vs. Unwilling" Licensee**

Courts have moved away from using math to figure out FRAND rates. Instead, they're looking at the behaviour of both parties. The idea is that FRAND is a two-way street and a party's actions affect their remedies.

The European Court of Justice established a framework, for this in the Huawei v. ZTE case.<sup>5</sup> The court said that parties must follow a process to prove they're acting in good faith.

If an implementer rejects an offer, it can't just say no. It must make a counter-offer and provide security like putting disputed royalty fees into an escrow account.

This approach has been adapted in countries. In the UK courts look at the party's overall behaviour to see if an implementer is just trying to delay. In India courts emphasize the need for implementers to make security payments during a trial to prevent delay tactics. By focusing on behaviour courts aim to prevent both patent hold-up and implementer hold-out.

## **Chapter III:**

### **Changing The Way We Think About Injunctive Relief: The Ultimate Weapon**

#### **3.1 Injunctions as Bargaining Chips**

When we talk about essential patent lawsuits injunctive relief is the most powerful tool a patent owner has. Normally a patent dispute is about figuring out how much money one company owes another for using their invention. But an injunction is different. It can stop a company from selling a product. For companies that make things like smartphones or cars that rely on a standard an injunction is not just a problem it can be a disaster. The company that owns the patent has the power to stop them from selling their products, which can put them out of business.

This makes the threat of an injunction a powerful tool in negotiations. If a company knows that the patent owner can get an injunction, they will be more likely to agree to pay a price for the patent. This is what is known as patent hold-up. On the hand if courts decide that injunctions are not an option then the company that wants to use the patent has no reason to be afraid. They

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<sup>5</sup> Case C-170/13, Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd v. ZTE Corp.

can just wait for the court to decide how much they have to pay. They can keep selling their products in the meantime.

### **3.2 The Situation in the US: The eBay Standard and Irreparable Harm**

The way US courts think about injunctions in patent cases changed a lot after the Supreme Court's decision in the eBay case in 2006.<sup>6</sup> Before that if a company proved that someone was using their patent without permission, they would usually get an injunction. After eBay the court said that the company had to prove that they would be seriously harmed if they did not get an injunction. They also had to show that money would not be enough to make up for the harm.

For companies that do not make products but just license their patents this has been a high standard to meet. US courts have said that if these companies are already willing to license their patents, then they cannot prove that they will be seriously harmed. This means that injunctions are not usually an option for these companies. As a result the focus in the US has shifted to figuring out how much money the company that used the patent has to pay.<sup>7</sup>

### **3.3 The European Union Approach: Huawei v. ZTE**

The European Union has an approach to injunctions. Of focusing on whether the patent owner will be seriously harmed they look at how the companies are negotiating with each other. The European Court of Justice laid out the rules for this approach in the Huawei v. ZTE case in 2015. According to these rules a patent owner can get an injunction if the company that wants to use the patent is not negotiating in faith.

The process works like this: the patent owner sends a letter to the company that wants to use the patent explaining which patent they are using and how. The company then has to say that they are willing to pay for a license. The patent owner then has to make an offer, including how much they want to be paid. The company can then make a counter-offer. If they do not agree they have to put up a guarantee that they will pay if they lose the case. If the company is not negotiating in faith the patent owner can get an injunction.

### **3.4 The Unified Patent Court and Germany**

Even though the Huawei v. ZTE case set the rules for the European Union the actual enforcement of patents is still done by countries. Germany has been a place for patent owners

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<sup>6</sup> eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006)

<sup>7</sup> Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014)

to go to court because their system allows for quick decisions on whether a patent is being used without permission. This can lead to a situation where a company is banned from selling a product in Germany even if the patent is later found to be invalid.

The new Unified Patent Court is changing this. It can make decisions that apply to all of Europe. It has been willing to grant injunctions to protect patents. In some cases it can even grant an injunction without giving the company that wants to use the patent a chance to respond. This has made Europe an attractive place for patent owners to enforce their rights.<sup>8</sup>

### **3.5 The Situation in India: Strict Enforcement and Temporary Deposits**

India has become a pro-patentee place in recent years. The courts there have been willing to enforce patents decisively. One of the ways they do this is by requiring companies that want to use a patent to put up a deposit if they are found to be stalling. If the company does not put up the deposit the court can grant an injunction immediately.

This approach has changed the balance of power, in India. Companies that want to sell products have to be willing to negotiate quickly and in good faith or they risk being shut down. The Indian courts have recognized that companies were using the pace of the court system to avoid paying for patents and they have taken steps to stop this. As a result, India is now an important place for patent owners to enforce their rights.<sup>9</sup>

## **Chapter IV**

### **Judicial Methods in FRAND Royalty Determination**

#### **4.1 The Valuation Challenge: Choosing the Base**

The step from finding a patent infringement to calculating a royalty rate is the most economically tricky part of standard essential patent (SEP) litigation. Since Standard Development Organizations (SDOs) leave the definition of FRAND open courts have to design methods to find the value of a patented technology. This happens on a disputed battleground mainly about selecting a suitable economic base. To stop innovators from getting a monopoly premium out of lock-in courts usually rely on two main methods: the top-down approach and the comparable licensing approach.

The top-down approach is a method that tries to prevent royalty stacking. Royalty stacking

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<sup>8</sup> Agreement on a Unified Patent Court (UPCA), OJ C 175, 20.6.2013, p. 1. And also local German implementations of Huawei v. ZTE, such as Federal Court of Justice (BGH) rulings in FRAND-Einwand I (KZR 36/17) and FRAND-Einwand II (KZR 35/19).

<sup>9</sup> InterDigital Technology Corp. v. Xiaomi Communications Co. Ltd., I.A. 8773/2020 in CS(COMM) 295/2020 (Delhi High Court)

happens when a product includes SEPs and each patent holder wants a share. If every licensor calculates their rate the total royalty burden would exceed the devices manufacturing cost stopping industry implementation. To prevent this the top-down approach starts by setting the royalty percentage for a technology standard, like 5G or Wi-Fi 6 within a device category. Then it counts the number of essential patents and isolates the plaintiffs share adjusting for technical value and geographic distribution. This method ensures the final rate is mathematically sustainable for the market.

On the hand the comparable licensing approach uses real-world licensing agreements as a guide. This method looks at agreements between similar companies and considers them the most reliable indicator of what is fair. A court will review the plaintiffs existing licensing agreements filtering out those signed under pressure. It analyses these deals to find indicators adjusting for factors like market volume and geographic scope. While this approach benefits from reflecting commercial transactions it is often hindered by confidentiality restrictions.

#### **4.2 The Apportionment Debate: Rejection of the SSPPU**

Closely tied to the valuation method is the apportionment debate, which addresses what product component should serve as the royalty base. Historically implementers supported the "Smallest Saleable Patent-Practicing Unit" (SSPPU) methodology. Under this doctrine the royalty base is limited to the level physical component that executes the standardized technology like a baseband processor chip. Implementers argued that calculating a percentage based on a product unjustly enriches the patentee.

In years global courts have largely rejected the SSPPU model in favor of end-device net selling price valuation. Courts have recognized that the true commercial value of an SEP is not isolated within a microchip but in the functionality, it unlocks for the entire product. A baseband chip alone has zero consumer utility; its value is realized when integrated into a smartphone or vehicle.

The Delhi High Court's 2024 judgment in *Ericsson v. Lava* codified this shift<sup>10</sup>. The court rejected the implementers argument to use the baseband chip as the royalty base holding that the net selling price of the mobile handset was the only suitable base for FRAND calculations. By linking royalties to the selling price of the final product modern courts have aligned legal apportionment with real-world market valuation practices.

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<sup>10</sup> Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson v. Lava International Ltd., 2024: DHC:2698 (Delhi High Court, March 28, 2024)

### 4.3 Global Rate Setting Determinations

The evolution of methodology in FRAND is the willingness of national courts to assume international jurisdiction becoming global rate-setting tribunals. Traditionally patent law is territorial. A sovereign state grants a patent and its domestic courts enforce or value that patent within borders. If an innovator wanted to enforce a portfolio against a multinational corporation it had to file parallel lawsuits in many countries.

The United Kingdom Supreme Court's 2020 ruling in *Unwired Planet v. Huawei* disrupted this limitation<sup>11</sup>. The UK Supreme Court held that English courts could determine a FRAND royalty rate for a multinational portfolio provided the patentee held at least one valid UK essential patent. The court issued an ultimatum to the implementer: either accept the court-calculated global portfolio rate or face an injunction blocking all sales within the UK market. This ruling fundamentally altered IP litigation by giving a single national court the leverage to dictate commercial terms across the globe.

This global rate-setting paradigm has been echoed across major jurisdictions triggering a race to the courthouse. Courts in China Western Europe and India have asserted a matching willingness to fix portfolio rates. This has led to cross-border procedural warfare with companies rushing to file in jurisdictions they perceive as favourable, to their economic interests. By shifting from technical assessments to global portfolio rate-settings national judiciaries have effectively outpaced international policymakers constructing an ad-hoc, judicially managed global framework to regulate international technology supply chains.

## Chapter V

### Jurisdictional Warfare and Geopolitical Policy Shifts

#### 5.1 Anti-Suit and Anti-Anti-Suit Injunctions

Standard essential patent litigation has become a high-stakes game. This is because national courts are willing to decide on portfolios. Intellectual property is tied to specific countries and licensing is a global thing. So big companies try to find the best court to fight in. They look for courts that can give them results or good valuation methods. On the hand the companies that use these patents try to find courts that will give them lower rates. This has led to a kind of war. There are two weapons in this war: Anti-Suit Injunctions and Anti-Anti-Suit Injunctions.<sup>12</sup>

An Anti-Suit Injunction is when a court in one country tells a company not to take a case to a

<sup>11</sup> *Unwired Planet International Ltd v. Huawei Technologies (UK) Co Ltd*, [2020] UKSC 37.

<sup>12</sup> *InterDigital v. Xiaomi*, supra note 9, where the Delhi High Court granted an anti-anti-suit injunction to neutralize an anti-suit injunction issued by the Wuhan Intermediate People's Court of China.

court in another country. In the context of essential patents, a company that uses a patent might get an Anti-Suit Injunction from a court in its home country. This would stop the patent owner from taking the case to another court. Courts in other countries do not like this. They think it is a threat to their power and the rights of the patent owners. So, they came up with the Anti-Suit Injunction. This is when a court tells a company to stop trying to enforce an Anti-Suit Injunction from another country. If the company does not stop it might have to pay a fine or lose some of its assets. This has created a situation where a company can get orders from courts in different countries that contradict each other.

## **5.2 The Regulatory Vacuum: The Collapse of the EU Standard Essential Patent Proposal**

As companies fought in courts around the world there was a lack of rules to guide them. The European Commission tried to change this by proposing a set of rules for standard essential patents. This proposal included a register of essential patents a way to check if a patent was really essential and a process to help companies agree on a fair rate. Many companies did not like this proposal. They thought it would create much bureaucracy and slow down innovation. The companies that own patents thought it would make it harder for them to get a deal. The companies that use patents thought it did not do enough to stop patent owners from being too aggressive. After years of debate the proposal was dropped<sup>13</sup>. This meant that there was still no set of rules to guide companies.

## **5.3 Alternative Forums and Innovations**

Since there are no rules, some countries have tried to find new ways to solve these problems. They have created courts and processes to help companies resolve their disputes. The United Kingdom, Brazil and India are some of the countries that are trying things. They want to make it easier and faster for companies to resolve their disputes. In the United Kingdom the Intellectual Property Office has created guides to help companies negotiate with each other. In Brazil the courts have become more specialized. Can handle complex patent cases. In India the courts have found ways to speed up the process and make it more efficient. These countries are trying to show that they can provide a way to resolve disputes than the traditional court system.

## **5.4 Institutional Boundaries: Watchdogs vs. Civil IP Courts**

As the courts have evolved there has been a debate about who has the power to make decisions.

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<sup>13</sup> European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Standard Essential Patents, COM(2023) 232 final (April 27, 2023)

This is especially true when it comes to essential patents. The companies that own these patents have a lot of power and the companies that use them can feel forced to agree to terms. This is where antitrust watchdogs come in. They are supposed to make sure that companies are not being too aggressive and hurting competition. There is a question about whether these watchdogs have the power to intervene in patent disputes. In India the courts have said that they have the say in these cases<sup>14</sup>. In Europe the courts have also set boundaries around what the antitrust watchdogs can do. The key is to find a balance, between letting the courts handle patent disputes and letting the antitrust watchdogs make sure that companies are not being too aggressive. Standard essential patents are a part of this debate. The companies that own these patents need to be able to license them in a way that's fair and predictable. The companies that use these patents need to be able to access them without being taken advantage of.

## Chapter VI

### Conclusion and Regulatory Policy Recommendations

#### 6.1 Summary of Findings

The way Standard Essential Patent litigation has changed over the twenty years is really something. It used to be a dispute between two companies but now it is a complex game that involves many countries. In the beginning courts could handle these disputes easily. Now it is much harder. The courts used to think that the promises made by companies to license their patents fairly were between two parties but now they realize that these promises affect many companies.

As technology has improved devices can do more things like connect to the internet and talk to other devices. This has made it much harder for courts to handle patent disputes. One device can use thousands of patents from different companies. This has made companies realize that they need to find a way to handle these disputes. They cannot just go to court in each country because that would be too expensive and time-consuming.

The United Kingdom Supreme Court made a decision in a case called Unwired Planet. The court said that it had the power to set royalty rates for patents that are used over the world. This decision has caused other courts to react. Now courts are fighting with each other to control the patent system. They are using something called -suit injunctions to try to stop other courts from getting involved.

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<sup>14</sup> Competition Commission of India v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, Civil Appeal No. 4047/2014 (Supreme Court of India / Delhi High Court Division Bench)

This study has found that the current system is not working well. The courts are trying to handle these disputes. It is not stable. The companies are still fighting with each other. The courts are not able to keep up. The European Commission tried to make a new law to handle these disputes, which did not work.

## **6.2 Proposed Harmonization Framework**

To fix this problem we need a system. We need a system that's fair and transparent. We need a system that will allow companies to license patents without having to go to court all the time. We propose a system called the Dual-Track Protocol. This system has two parts. The first part is called Track I. It is used to verify which patents are really essential. The second part is called Track II. It is used to set the royalty rates for these patents.

Track I uses a team of experts to review a sample of patents. This team uses tools to determine which patents are really essential. The result is a report that shows which patents are essential and which are not. This report is used to set the royalty rates for the patents.

Track II is used to set the royalty rates for the patents. The companies involved in the dispute are required to go to arbitration to set the rates. The arbitration is fast and fair. It is based on real data. The companies are required to agree to the rates within a time period or they will have to go to court.

## **6.3 Final Recommendations**

To make the patent system work better we need to make some changes. We need to make sure that the courts are handling these disputes in a transparent way. We need to make sure that the companies are not using the patent system to hurt each other and that the patent system is promoting innovation not stifling it.

First the courts need to be careful when they are deciding whether to grant an injunction. An injunction is a court order that requires a company to stop doing something. The courts should only grant an injunction if a company is not acting in faith. If a company is trying to negotiate a license but the other company is not responding then the court should not grant an injunction. Second the courts and the regulatory agencies need to work. They need to make sure that they are not duplicating their efforts and that they are not hurting each other. They need to make sure that they are promoting innovation and fairness in the patent system.

The Standard Essential Patents are really important for the economy. They allow companies to make devices that can connect to the internet and talk to each other. They allow companies to make innovative products. We need to make sure that the patent system is working well so that

these companies can continue to innovate. We need to make sure that the patent system is fair and transparent so that all companies can participate. The Standard Essential Patents are a part of the global economy and we need to make sure that they are handled in a way that promotes innovation and fairness. The Standard Essential Patents are essential, for the future of the economy and we need to make sure that we get it right.

