

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL FOR LEGAL RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS



Open Access, Refereed Journal Multi Disciplinary
Peer Reviewed

www.ijlra.com

DISCLAIMER

No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored, transmitted, or distributed in any form or by any means, whether electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without prior written permission of the Managing Editor of the *International Journal for Legal Research & Analysis (IJLRA)*.

The views, opinions, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in the articles published in this journal are solely those of the respective authors. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the Editorial Board, Editors, Reviewers, Advisors, or the Publisher of IJLRA.

Although every reasonable effort has been made to ensure the accuracy, authenticity, and proper citation of the content published in this journal, neither the Editorial Board nor IJLRA shall be held liable or responsible, in any manner whatsoever, for any loss, damage, or consequence arising from the use, reliance upon, or interpretation of the information contained in this publication.

The content published herein is intended solely for academic and informational purposes and shall not be construed as legal advice or professional opinion.

**Copyright © International Journal for Legal Research & Analysis.
All rights reserved.**

ABOUT US

The *International Journal for Legal Research & Analysis (IJLRA)* (ISSN: 2582-6433) is a peer-reviewed, academic, online journal published on a monthly basis. The journal aims to provide a comprehensive and interactive platform for the publication of original and high-quality legal research.

IJLRA publishes Short Articles, Long Articles, Research Papers, Case Comments, Book Reviews, Essays, and interdisciplinary studies in the field of law and allied disciplines. The journal seeks to promote critical analysis and informed discourse on contemporary legal, social, and policy issues.

The primary objective of IJLRA is to enhance academic engagement and scholarly dialogue among law students, researchers, academicians, legal professionals, and members of the Bar and Bench. The journal endeavours to establish itself as a credible and widely cited academic publication through the publication of original, well-researched, and analytically sound contributions.

IJLRA welcomes submissions from all branches of law, provided the work is original, unpublished, and submitted in accordance with the prescribed submission guidelines. All manuscripts are subject to a rigorous peer-review process to ensure academic quality, originality, and relevance.

Through its publications, the *International Journal for Legal Research & Analysis* aspires to contribute meaningfully to legal scholarship and the development of law as an instrument of justice and social progress.

PUBLICATION ETHICS, COPYRIGHT & AUTHOR RESPONSIBILITY STATEMENT

The *International Journal for Legal Research and Analysis (IJLRA)* is committed to upholding the highest standards of publication ethics and academic integrity. All manuscripts submitted to the journal must be original, unpublished, and free from plagiarism, data fabrication, falsification, or any form of unethical research or publication practice. Authors are solely responsible for the accuracy, originality, legality, and ethical compliance of their work and must ensure that all sources are properly cited and that necessary permissions for any third-party copyrighted material have been duly obtained prior to submission. Copyright in all published articles vests with IJLRA, unless otherwise expressly stated, and authors grant the journal the irrevocable right to publish, reproduce, distribute, and archive their work in print and electronic formats. The views and opinions expressed in the articles are those of the authors alone and do not reflect the views of the Editors, Editorial Board, Reviewers, or Publisher. IJLRA shall not be liable for any loss, damage, claim, or legal consequence arising from the use, reliance upon, or interpretation of the content published. By submitting a manuscript, the author(s) agree to fully indemnify and hold harmless the journal, its Editor-in-Chief, Editors, Editorial Board, Reviewers, Advisors, Publisher, and Management against any claims, liabilities, or legal proceedings arising out of plagiarism, copyright infringement, defamation, breach of confidentiality, or violation of third-party rights. The journal reserves the absolute right to reject, withdraw, retract, or remove any manuscript or published article in case of ethical or legal violations, without incurring any liability.

FROM CLASSROOM TO COURTROOM: THEORY VS. REALITY: A CRITICAL STUDY OF CIVIL LITIGATION PRACTICE AND DISTRICT COURT FUNCTIONING THROUGH THE INTERNSHIP LENS

AUTHORED BY - KARRE SAI CHARAN

B.B.A. LL.B

WOXSEN UNIVERSITY

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the gap between civil procedural law as taught in Indian law schools and as it functions in the district courts of Telangana. Drawing from a four-week internship at the Ranga Reddy and Medchal District Courts during April–May 2026, the author observes that while the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and allied legislation represent carefully designed procedural frameworks, district courts operate under conditions of systemic delay, evidence-centricity, and institutional pragmatism that diverge sharply from the textbook ideal. The paper further analyses the fundamental difference between moot court training and real court functioning — in terms of drafting standards, procedural pace, and the judicial role — and argues that the adversarial system's prioritisation of legal proof over moral truth is the most disorienting and most important lesson of civil litigation practice. Finally, the paper critiques the current Bar Council of India internship framework as insufficient for producing practice-ready lawyers and proposes a reformed model of pre-bar practical training inspired by the medical profession's compulsory internship requirement.

Keywords: *Civil Procedure, District Court, Legal Internship, Moot Court, Evidence, Judicial Delays, Legal Education Reform, Bar Council of India*

INTRODUCTION

Legal education starts in the classroom, progresses via moot courts, and is put to the ultimate test in the hallways of a district court. No exam, lecture, or moot court problem can adequately prepare a law student for the gap that exists between these three worlds: the textbook, the simulated courtroom, and the real courtroom. Based on firsthand personal observation, this paper examines that divide.

Two of the most meticulously crafted civil laws in the Indian legal system are the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. According to its Statement of Objects and Reasons, the CPC was created to establish a consistent, organized, and logical process from the filing of a plaint to the execution of a decree by consolidating and amending legislation pertaining to the procedure of courts of civil judicature.¹ The rights and obligations of parties to transactions involving immovable property are also clearly defined by the Transfer of Property Act. The law appears to be thorough and logical on paper.

Yet, during a four-week internship at the Ranga Reddy District Court and the Medchal District Court, Telangana, in April–May 2026, the author observed a reality that the books do not capture. Cases filed in 1997 remained pending. Summary suits designed for speed took years to reach judgment. Plaints drafted with apparent care were dismissed because a boundary description was wrong. And through it all, the court asked not what was true, but what could be proven.

This paper proceeds in five substantive parts. Chapter 2 examines the legislative framework for the CPC, TPA and allied statutes and appreciates their design as an ideal framework. Chapter 3 examines the actual role of an intern in civil practice and compares court internship with law firm internship. Chapter 4 analyses the gap between moot court training and real court functioning. Chapter 5, the centrepiece of this paper, examines the distinction between truth and evidence, and the dominance of the question of law over the question of fact. Chapter 6 critiques the current internship framework and proposes reform.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

In its structure, the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is fundamentally one of the most organized procedural statutes in Indian law. It sets out a fairly linear and logical framework for a civil action. That the plaint is filed under Order VII, summons is issued under Order V, the written statement is filed under Order VIII, issues are framed under Order XIV, evidence is adduced, oral arguments are made, and finally the decree and judgment is delivered under Order XX — is not arbitrary in nature. There is a reason why every step in civil procedure has its purpose, so that all parties are equally given an opportunity to prove their case logically before the court.³ Order XXXVII of the CPC discusses summary suits — a separate fast track for prompt recovery of certain liquidated sums mainly in commercial and financial disputes. Rules 1 to 4

of the same require the defendant to make an application for leave to appear; in the absence of which, an immediate judgment can be granted in favour of the plaintiff.⁴ Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC govern the grant of temporary injunctions on three established grounds: (i) a prima facie case; (ii) balance of convenience; and (iii) irretrievable injury.⁵ Section 151 gives the court inherent powers to make such orders as may be necessary in the ends of justice.⁶

Transfer of Property Act, 1882

Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act defines what a sale is, specifically for immovable property, and distinguishes it from an agreement to sell. It draws a clear demarcation: in terms of law it is founded on the passing of property, whereas an agreement to sell creates only a contractual right — a right to sue for specific performance.⁷ The Specific Relief Act, 1963 (under Sections 10 and 19) gives clear shape to this.⁸

Section 31 of the Act deals with the cancellation of void or voidable instruments, whereby any person may approach the court if an unremedied instrument might cause serious injury.⁹ Section 38 deals with a perpetual injunction, restricting a party from committing a breach of obligations already created in favour of the applicant.¹⁰

Supporting Legislation

The Indian Contract Act, 1872 (Sections 17 and 18) provides that fraud and misrepresentation are grounds for avoidance of a contract, and the same may result in restitution under Section 65.¹¹ The Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (as amended in 2005) confers on daughters equal rights over ancestral property as coparceners — a measure that appeared in practice through partition suits observed during the internship.¹² The Limitation Act, 1963 is of immense practical importance: in money recovery suits, the last date of acknowledgment of debt determines the viability of further proceedings.¹³

All the above Acts form a coherent structure for a civil suit. The actual question this paper addresses is not whether these laws are adequate — they are — but what happens when these statutes are confronted with the human, institutional, and structural factors operating in a district court.

METHODOLOGY

This paper is based primarily on empirical observation and doctrinal analysis. The empirical component draws on firsthand observation during a four-week internship (April–May 2026) at the Ranga Reddy District Court and the Medchal District Court, Telangana, conducted under

the supervision of Advocate Kiran Kanth Reddy. Observations were recorded in a personal internship diary noting case details, procedural stages, hearing outcomes, and courtroom conduct.

The doctrinal component involves critical analysis of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the Specific Relief Act, 1963, the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the Indian Contract Act, 1872, the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, and the Limitation Act, 1963 — all read through the lens of how these statutes actually operate at the district court level.

Secondary sources consulted include standard legal textbooks (C.K. Takwani, Mulla, Ratanlal and Dhirajlal), the Law Commission of India Report No. 245, the DAKSH India State of the Indian Judiciary Report, National Judicial Data Grid statistics, and the Bar Council of India Legal Education Rules, 2008. Comparative references to the medical internship model and UK solicitor training contract are drawn from publicly available regulatory documents.

This paper does not claim statistical representativeness; its findings are qualitative and interpretive, grounded in a specific site and period of observation. The value of the methodology lies in its granularity — the ability to observe the texture of daily litigation at the district court level in a manner that quantitative studies cannot replicate.

MAIN ANALYSIS

The Intern in the Civil Court — Role, Reality and Public Misconception

The most prevalent public image of a law intern is one that describes a student who is virtually involved in actual litigation — presenting arguments before the judge or even chasing evidence. Nothing could be more contrary to the truth. According to the Bar Council of India Rules on Standards of Professional Conduct and Etiquette, a person who has not been enrolled as an advocate shall not be entitled to practise in any court or tribunal.¹⁴ Thus an intern, regardless of her academic or institutional background, has no locus standi in any courtroom proceeding, cannot file anything in his/her own name, and cannot represent a party in the eyes of the law. In reality, the educational experience is quieter and considerably less dramatic. As an intern at Ranga Reddy and Medchal District Courts, tasks included noting how documents and the Vakalatnama are filed, attending various hearings across more than one court in the same day, assisting in the carrying of case files, watching how cases progress from the summons to the evidence stage, and observing how the advocate meets clients at his chamber in the evening.

What the intern sees, above everything else, is the tempo of litigation. Cases get adjourned; opposite sides stay away. Summons often go unserved. Things the client thinks are urgent become almost commonplace on the court's docket. This observation, unaccompanied by any active participation, is still a deeply legal way of learning.

Court Internship vs. Law Firm Internship

The experience of interning in a court differs fundamentally from interning at a law firm. A law firm internship places the intern at the drafting table preparing complaints, written statements, agreements, and legal opinions. The intern sees how a case is constructed before it enters the courtroom, how facts are selected and framed, and how arguments are anticipated and countered in advance. However, the law firm intern rarely visits court, and the lived reality of litigation — the delays, the adjournments, the emotional weight of a pending property dispute — remains invisible to them.

Neither experience alone is complete. The court internship teaches the life of litigation; the law firm internship teaches its anatomy.

Aspect	Court Internship	Law Firm Internship
Court Exposure	High — daily attendance	Rare to none
Drafting Learning	Observational only	Active and hands-on
Client Interaction	Occasional observation	Frequent and direct
Case Lifecycle View	Middle stages only	Pre-litigation and filing
Procedural Understanding	Real but fragmented	Theoretical
Emotional Reality of Litigation	Fully visible	Not visible
Understanding Delays	Direct experience	Abstract concept

Moot Court vs. Real Court — The Drafting Gap

Moot court trains students to reverently respect the written brief. Every word of the moot court complaint or memo is read by judges, marked, argued around, and the decision sometimes hinges on a particular wording. This is a good lesson, but it does not prepare students for the reality of the district court, where the judge does not read the entire complaint at the time of hearing.

This does not mean drafting is unimportant; on the contrary, when there is an error, it becomes a tragedy and is irreparable. In O.S No. 75/25 at the Ranga Reddy District Court on 27 April 2026, the plaintiff's suit concerning property rights failed on the basis that the description of the boundaries of the property in the complaint was incorrectly stated.¹⁶ A decree was made in

favour of the defendant and an appeal has since been filed, but a single error in the plaint had already cost the plaintiff the suit. At moot court, such an error leads to deduction of marks; at the real court it costs the client their case.

Moot Court vs. Real Court — The Procedural and Delay Gap

The most immediate and visceral difference between moot court and real court is time. A moot court problem is resolved in a single sitting of thirty to forty-five minutes. The district court operates on an entirely different temporal scale. The following cases were observed during the internship:

Case	Year Filed	Stage in 2026	Years Pending
O.S. No. 229/2018	2018	Injunction application — adjourned for orders	8 years
O.S. No. 1827/2021	2021	Summons stage	5 years
O.S. No. 877/22	2022	Judgment pending	4 years
O.S. No. 1312/21	2021	Injunction hearing — ongoing	5 years
Cases from 1997	1997	Still pending	~29 years

The DAKSH India State of the Indian Judiciary Report documents that the average disposal time for civil cases in Indian district courts ranges from three to fifteen years.¹⁷ The Law Commission of India, in its Report No. 245, identified systemic causes including understaffing, frequent adjournments, and procedural misuse.¹⁸ The National Judicial Data Grid confirms that as of 2024, over four crore cases remain pending across Indian courts.¹⁹

Truth, Evidence and the Adversarial System — The Court Does Not Seek Moral Truth

The first thing an intern must learn at the district court, and the most startling as well as disconcerting, is that what the court wants to know is not what happened, but what can be proved to have happened and what the law would say about what is proved. The court is not a forum for seeking moral truth; it is a forum for determining what can be proved on the basis of available evidence, applicable law, and proper procedure.

This is not a failure of the legal system; it is the essence of the adversarial system in which India operates. In this system, each side asserts its narrative of events through the presentation of evidence and argument. The judge is not an inquisitor but an adjudicator. The onus of proof rests entirely on the parties, as explicit in Sections 101 to 104 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.²⁰ Section 101 states that whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right

or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist.²¹

Evidence as the Measure of Legal Reality

This principle manifested clearly in several cases during the internship. O.S. No. 794/23 before the District Court, Ranga Reddy, was a suit for specific performance of a sale agreement posted for marking of documents.²² Whether or not a sale agreement was made is inconsequential; the entire fate of the suit depends on the marking of the relevant documents as evidence. If these documents are not marked, it matters little how genuine the agreement may have been — it has no legal existence.

Likewise, in O.S. No. 45/23, a suit for cancellation of a sale agreement and refund of ten lakhs paid as advance, the plaintiff's sincere complaint about nearby construction devaluing the property required translation into the legal language of Sections 17 and 18 of the Indian Contract Act.²³ The Court does not merely accept that the plaintiff was cheated because the story presented is convincing. The plaintiff must prove that the defendant committed fraud or misrepresentation within the legal sense of the term.

This was vividly felt when the author himself lodged a criminal complaint concerning fraud involving ₹10,000. A fraudster had taken money from the author under the pretext of a railway ticket and disappeared.²⁴ The moral simplicity of this was undeniable, yet its legal articulation demanded that every ingredient of Section 415 of the Indian Penal Code be satisfied by evidence — deception, inducement, and dishonest intention from the very beginning. Moral conviction that the person was a fraudster did not constitute enough.

Judges Do Not Help the Side of Truth

In the moot court setting, judges frequently ask questions that help participants develop their arguments and clarify the legal position. This is pedagogically valuable. It is also entirely unlike the real court.

In the district court, a judge's questions are directed at legal clarification, not at assisting either party. The judge is constitutionally and ethically required to be neutral. As Ratanlal and Dhirajlal observe in their foundational text on the Law of Evidence, the judge in an adversarial system is an arbiter, not an inquisitor.²⁵ The burden of presenting the case lies entirely with the advocate. If the advocate fails to lead the right evidence, ask the right questions, or make the right legal submissions, the client suffers the consequence even if the truth was entirely on their side.

The Question of Law Overrides the Question of Fact

At the end of the day, every case is a case about law. The human story — the faltering friendship in O.S. No. 497/24; the sister's claim to ancestral property in O.S. No. 877/22; the wasted advance money in O.S. No. 45/23 — recedes, and the question becomes: Is this claim barred by the Limitation Act? Is this claim recognised by the Hindu Succession Act? Does this misrepresentation allow for a remedy under the Indian Contract Act? A human story only has legal resonance when it aligns with a legal provision a court can apply.

This is where the gap between legal education and legal practice is most profound. Law schools teach the law. But they cannot teach how it feels to witness a legally indisputable case fail due to an evidentiary problem, or succeed due to an overly convenient fact relating to limitation, while the truth of the matter fades.

"The district court does not dispense moral justice — it dispenses legal justice. The difference between the two is the most important lesson an intern learns, and the one least taught in any classroom."

Rethinking Legal Internships — The Duration Problem

Under the Bar Council of India Legal Education Rules, 2008, every law student must undergo 12 weeks of internship during the period of their degree.²⁶ This requirement is not adequately structured to create practice-ready lawyers.

The main issue is temporal. When a student enters the chamber of a practising advocate, there is no certainty that a new case will be filed during the internship. Even if a fresh case is filed on the first day, it would require 4–8 weeks simply to receive the first date for issuing summons. Hence, interns are only introduced to cases filed months earlier, where a great chunk of the process has already taken place and the context of the stage is completely unknown to them.

The author's own internship corroborates this. The cases observed ranged from O.S. No. 229/2018 (filed eight years ago) to O.S. No. 75/25 (filed in 2025). Across this range, the student has no opportunity to witness even one case from start to any stage of completion. Cases filed in 1997 that are still pending after nearly three decades are a testament to the above.

Rethinking Legal Internships — The Continuity Problem

To truly understand civil litigation one would need to see a case unfold from the beginning — the plaint, what relief to claim, what jurisdiction, what facts to aver — through registration, service of summons, the written statement, framing of issues, recording of evidence, arguments, and the eventual decree and execution. This is a complete civil suit. A one-to-two

month attachment could, at best, allow an intern to view two or three of these stages — rarely all in the same case.

Rethinking Legal Internships — The Reform Argument

This paper argues that Indian legal education should embrace a model like the compulsory internship component in medical education. Under National Medical Commission regulations, a medical graduate cannot be fully registered or commence independent practice until completion of a year-long compulsory rotating internship under supervision.²⁷ The rationale is obvious: sound theoretical knowledge, while essential, does not adequately equip a person to practise in a profession where mistakes have tangible implications for human beings.

The rationale applies equally to law. A law graduate who has passed the All-India Bar Examination and is registered as an advocate is, from the date of registration onward and without the need for any mandatory post-qualification supervised practice beyond the twelve-week internship included in the degree, perfectly capable in the eyes of the law of appearing before any court in India. It is submitted that this is structurally deficient.

It is proposed that a pre-bar mandatory practical training year be implemented. This year of formally assessed, structured, and supervised training would comprise a minimum of six months at a district court under the mentorship of an enrolled advocate and a minimum of six months in a law firm or legal office. During this year the student would be required to maintain a verified case diary, track at least one case through at least three stages of procedure, draft a minimum number of documents, and attend a minimum number of court hearings. On successful completion verified by the supervising advocate and Bar Council, the student would be eligible to appear for the bar examination.

This idea is not novel; international precedents exist. In the United Kingdom, prospective solicitors are required to complete a two-year training contract under a qualified solicitor before admission to the roll.²⁸ The United States recognises the need for post-degree supervised practice in many states. With the size of the country and the volume of cases heard by Indian courts, the Indian legal profession should accept no less.

The Law School Curriculum Gap

Beyond the internship, the structure of law school itself deserves scrutiny. Teaching involves books — the CPC is taught as provisions and the Evidence Act as sections — and application to real courtroom situations is never taught under real conditions. A law student could pass civil procedure with marks above 90 and still never have seen one hearing in their life.

The first two or three years post-enrolment for almost all junior advocates become an informal long apprenticeship whereby they work under a senior for no or nominal remuneration, watching and learning a practice for which they were not properly prepared. This paper contends that this post-qualification learning needs to be formalised and taken up before qualification.

CONCLUSION

The objective of this paper was to critically analyse the discrepancy between what the law says and what happens in district courts of Telangana, and to place that analysis in the context of a larger criticism of legal education in India and how — or whether — it equips students for practice.

Firstly, what the law dictates is well conceived. The Code of Civil Procedure, the Transfer of Property Act, the Specific Relief Act and allied legislation represent excellent legislation and careful consideration of all stages involved. The issue is not legislative negligence; rather, no law can fully account for the real-life complexities, human failings, and structural factors that create a gap between law on the books and law in action — a backlog of decade-old cases, constant adjournments, parties and lawyers missing, and an overflowing, understaffed judiciary.

Secondly, although the observer is invisible in court and the role of an intern purely observational, the experience proves immensely educational if viewed with the right perspective. A district court internship introduces one to the life of legal practice; a law firm internship teaches its anatomy. The combination is important and is not substantially included in the current BCI framework.

Thirdly, moot court practice is useful, but it gives a distorted idea of actual court practice by simulating perfect preparation, quickness, and information — conditions generally absent in real courtrooms. The resulting shock when one moves from simulation to reality could and should be mitigated by structural reform.

Fourthly, and most crucially, the district court decides cases not on what is factually true or morally fair, but on what is supported by evidence and dictated by law. This principle is fundamental to the adversarial system. While all law students know of it, it is only in

courtrooms and through firsthand experience that they begin to truly understand it — something examinations and moot courts cannot test.

Fifthly, the current internship framework — which spreads a mere twelve weeks over a three or five year course — does not provide adequate exposure for lawyers to function effectively in the real world. This paper proposes a compulsory one-year practical training period prior to Bar admission, modelled on the medical internship.

A lawyer who has only studied law is merely familiar with the rules of a game that has never actually been played. The district courts are where that game is played, and no one should be considered a lawyer until they have seen, felt, and learned how it is actually played.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. Statutes

1. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
2. Transfer of Property Act, 1882
3. Specific Relief Act, 1963
4. Indian Contract Act, 1872
5. Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (as amended in 2005)
6. Indian Evidence Act, 1872
7. Limitation Act, 1963
8. Advocates Act, 1961
9. Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Section 415

II. Books and Commentaries

10. C.K. Takwani, Civil Procedure, 8th ed., Eastern Book Company, Lucknow
11. Mulla, Code of Civil Procedure, LexisNexis India
12. Ratanlal and Dhirajlal, The Law of Evidence, 28th ed., LexisNexis India

III. Reports and Committees

13. Law Commission of India, Report No. 245 — Arrears and Backlog: Creating Additional Judicial (Wo)manpower, 2014
14. Justice Madhava Menon Committee Report on Legal Education Reform, Bar Council of India

15. DAKSH India, State of the Indian Judiciary Report — www.dakshindia.org

IV. Rules and Regulations

16. Bar Council of India Rules, Part VI — Standards of Professional Conduct and Etiquette

17. Bar Council of India Legal Education Rules, 2008

18. National Medical Commission (Compulsory Rotating Medical Internship) Regulations, 2021

19. Solicitors Regulation Authority, Qualifying as a Solicitor — www.sra.org.uk

V. Online Sources

20. indiacode.nic.in — Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of India

21. indiankanoon.org — Free Access to Indian Law

22. njdg.gov.in — National Judicial Data Grid

23. barcouncilofindia.org — Bar Council of India

24. dakshindia.org — DAKSH India

VI. Primary Source

25. Personal Internship Diary, Ranga Reddy District Court and Medchal District Court, Telangana, April–May 2026 [unpublished]

¹ Statement of Objects and Reasons, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, indiacode.nic.in

² Preamble, Transfer of Property Act, 1882, indiacode.nic.in

³ Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Orders V, VII, VIII, XIV, XX — indiacode.nic.in

⁴ CPC Order XXXVII, Rules 1–4

⁵ CPC Order XXXIX, Rules 1–2; see also C.K. Takwani, *Civil Procedure*, 8th ed., Eastern Book Company, p. 412

⁶ CPC Section 151

⁷ Transfer of Property Act, 1882, Section 54 — indiacode.nic.in

⁸ Specific Relief Act, 1963, Sections 10, 19

⁹ Specific Relief Act, 1963, Section 31

¹⁰ Specific Relief Act, 1963, Section 38

¹¹ Indian Contract Act, 1872, Sections 17, 18, 65

¹² Hindu Succession Act, 1956, Section 6 (as amended by Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005)

¹³ Limitation Act, 1963, Articles 36–37 (money suits); see also Section 18 on acknowledgment of liability

¹⁴ Bar Council of India Rules, Part VI — Standards of Professional Conduct and Etiquette — barcouncilofindia.org

¹⁵ Personal Internship Diary, Ranga Reddy and Medchal District Courts, 21 April 2026

¹⁶ Personal Internship Diary, Ranga Reddy District Court, 27 April 2026

¹⁷ DAKSH India, State of the Indian Judiciary Report — dakshindia.org

¹⁸ Law Commission of India, Report No. 245, *Arrears and Backlog: Creating Additional Judicial (Wo)manpower*, 2014

¹⁹ National Judicial Data Grid — njdg.gov.in

²⁰ Indian Evidence Act, 1872, Sections 101–104 — indiacode.nic.in

²¹ Indian Evidence Act, 1872, Section 101

²² Personal Internship Diary, Ranga Reddy District Court, 15 April 2026

²³ Personal Internship Diary, Ranga Reddy District Court, 23 April 2026; Indian Contract Act, 1872, Sections 17, 18

²⁴ Personal Internship Diary, 18 April 2026

²⁵ Ratanlal and Dhirajlal, The Law of Evidence, 28th ed., LexisNexis, Introductory Chapter

²⁶ Bar Council of India Legal Education Rules, 2008, Schedule III — barcouncilofindia.org

²⁷ National Medical Commission (Compulsory Rotating Medical Internship) Regulations, 2021

²⁸ Solicitors Regulation Authority, Qualifying as a Solicitor — sra.org.uk

