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FTC V. META: REDEFINING ANTITRUST IN THE DIGITAL AGE

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INTRODUCTION

Recently, there has been an important development in antitrust laws, specifically in the tech sector of the global world, through the famous case of the FTC v. META.¹ The case is currently undergoing trial before Judge James Boasberg of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Still, the institution of the antitrust suit against Meta (formerly Facebook), the leading tech giant, by the Federal Trade Commission puts a lot at stake for Meta. The FTC accuses the tech behemoth Meta of unlawfully maintaining a monopoly in the market for “personal social network services”² (PSNS) in the US, thereby violating section 2 of the Sherman Act.

In this blog, the author will first examine the background and evolution of the FTC v. Meta case, including the timeline of complaints, acquisitions, and regulatory scrutiny. Next, the discussion will focus on the critical issue of defining the relevant market, exploring the arguments put forward by both the FTC and Meta, and highlighting the economic and legal tools used to determine market boundaries. The blog will then analyze the FTC’s allegations of anti-competitive conduct, including acquisitions and platform strategies, followed by Meta’s defense and counterarguments. Finally, the blog will consider the potential implications of the

¹ Swastika Das Sharma, ‘FTC vs Meta: Antitrust Trial Begins; Facebook Parent Co Fights to Keep Instagram, WhatsApp – Key Details You Need to Know’ (Mint, 15 April 2025) <<https://www.livemint.com/companies/news/ftc-vs-meta-antitrust-trial-begins-facebook-parent-co-fights-to-keep-instagram-whatsapp-key-details-you-need-to-11744654222972.html>> accessed 16 August 2025.

² TRADE COMMISSION F, “SUBSTITUTE AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND OTHER EQUITABLE RELIEF” (2021) <https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/2021-09-08_redacted_substitute_amended_complaint_ecf_no._82.pdf> accessed 16 August 2025.

case for consumers, competition, and future regulatory approaches to big tech, while offering a reasoned assessment of likely judicial outcomes.

BACKGROUND

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC), which is the regulatory body for antitrust regulation in the United States, instituted its first suit against Meta in December 2020³ (during Trump's administration), seeking to force the company to divest Instagram and WhatsApp. However, the federal judge dismissed the initial complaint, saying the FTC failed to provide enough evidence that Meta held a monopoly. After this, the FTC amended its complaint in August 2021, and the judge allowed the case to proceed in January 2022, rejecting Meta's dismissal motion.

The FTC alleges Meta became a social media monopoly by buying rivals (Instagram, WhatsApp) and crushing competition, and wants to force Meta to divest Instagram and WhatsApp and restrict future mergers. Although the acquisition of Instagram and WhatsApp, respectively, in 2012 and 2014, was done with the due permission of the FTC and other authorities.⁴

DELIMITATION OF THE RELEVANT MARKET

The outcome of this case related to the delimitation of the relevant market is very critical to the entire case. If the judge, James Boasberg, agrees with the FTC's narrow definition of the "personal social networking services" market, the FTC has a much stronger chance of proving that Meta has monopoly power and that its acquisitions were anti-competitive. However, if the judge sides with Meta and finds the market to be much broader and more competitive, the FTC's case is likely to fail.

To establish any enterprise as dominant, it is necessary to identify the [relevant market](#).⁵ The main purpose of defining the relevant market is to identify the [actual competitors](#)⁶ and to

³ Ravi Hari, 'FTC vs Meta: Antitrust Trial Begins: Mark Zuckerberg and Other Key Witnesses to Testify' (*Mint*, 15 April 2025) <https://www.livemint.com/companies/news/ftc-vs-meta-antitrust-trial-begins-facebook-parent-co-fights-to-keep-instagram-whatsapp-key-details-you-need-to-11744654222972.html> accessed 1 August 2025.

⁴ Meta Platforms, 'Facebook to Acquire WhatsApp' (*Meta Newsroom*, 19 February 2014) <https://about.fb.com/news/2014/02/facebook-to-acquire-whatsapp/> accessed 10 August 2025.

⁵ *Laxmi v Union of India* (2014) 4 SCC 427.

⁶ *Competition Commission of India v Co-ordination Committee of Artists and Technicians of West Bengal Film and Television Industry* (2017) 5 SCC 17.

identify those who can place constraints on fair competition. Relevant markets can be determined with reference to the relevant product market and the relevant geographic market.

The FTC defines the relevant market to be the market for “personal social networking services”⁷ with the United States⁸ as the relevant geographic market. This market is characterized by friends and family sharing. In the present scenario, the uncontested relevant geographical market is the United States, but Meta is challenging, particularly the delimitation of the product market done by the FTC, which excludes the major competitors like TikTok and Snapchat.

The relevant product market includes all products or services that are regarded by consumers as interchangeable or substitutable based on their characteristics, prices, and intended uses.⁹ For the FTC v. Meta dispute, this exercise is crucial because the strength of the FTC’s claim hinges on proving that “personal social networking services” is a distinct and narrowly defined market where Meta holds monopoly power.

The FTC defines PSNS as online services enabling users to connect with friends and family, share personal content, and view updates from their connections.¹⁰ According to the FTC, platforms like Instagram and WhatsApp, both owned by Meta, fit squarely within this market, while platforms such as TikTok or YouTube do not, as they focus more on public content discovery rather than reciprocal personal interaction.¹¹ Meta challenges this, insisting the market is much broader, covering all social media and communication platforms where competitive rivalry is strong.

To resolve this dispute, competition authorities and courts often rely on **several economic tools** to delimit the relevant product market. These tools assess both **demand-side substitutability, which assesses** how easily consumers switch between products, and **supply-side substitutability, which assesses** how easily producers can shift to supplying competing products in response to price or quality changes. The main tools in this context include demand

⁷ TRADE COMMISSION F, “SUBSTITUTE AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND OTHER EQUITABLE RELIEF” (2021) <https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/2021-09-08_redacted_substitute_amended_complaint_ecf_no._82.pdf> accessed 16 August 2025.

⁸ *ibid.*

⁹ Competition Act 2002 s 3.

¹⁰ TRADE COMMISSION F, “SUBSTITUTE AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND OTHER EQUITABLE RELIEF” (2021) <https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/2021-09-08_redacted_substitute_amended_complaint_ecf_no._82.pdf> accessed 2 August 2025.

¹¹ *ibid.*

substitutability analysis, the SSNIP test, assessment of similar characteristics and end uses, and avoiding an overly narrow market definition.

Demand substitutability examines whether consumers perceive two products or services as viable alternatives to meet the same needs. The question here is whether users can readily switch from Meta's platforms (Facebook, Instagram, and WhatsApp) to rivals such as TikTok, Snapchat, or X (formerly Twitter) without significant loss of functionality. Meta contends that its platform is not just limited to friends and family sharing and has moved into the broader entertainment space¹², while the FTC argues that PSNS platforms have unique relationship-focused features that are not fully replaceable by entertainment-centric services like TikTok or YouTube.

Supply-side substitutability considers whether other firms could easily and quickly adapt their operations to provide PSNS services if Meta raised prices or degraded quality. For instance, could TikTok or Telegram introduce features enabling closer personal networking to compete directly with Facebook and Instagram? If so, this would broaden the relevant product market. Meta emphasizes the ease with which tech firms can integrate new features, while the FTC maintains that building the deep network effects and user relationships inherent to PSNS takes years, making supply-side substitution unlikely in the short term.

The SSNIP test¹³ evaluates whether a hypothetical 5–10% price increase—or equivalent quality reduction—would cause consumers to switch to other products. Since most social networking services are free, “price” here refers to factors such as increased advertising, reduced privacy, or diminished functionality. If such changes cause users to migrate to TikTok or Snapchat, the market may be broader; if they remain with Meta, the FTC's narrow market definition is reinforced.

Platforms fall within the same market if they share core functional characteristics and serve the same end use. The FTC argues that PSNS platforms are uniquely centered on reciprocal

¹² Meta's Antitrust Trial to Put Mark Zuckerberg, Serial Witness, to the Test Again Cecilia Kang, 'Meta's Antitrust Trial to Put Mark Zuckerberg, Serial Witness, to the Test Again' (*The New York Times*, 14 April 2025) <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/14/technology/meta-antitrust-trial-ftc.html> accessed 14 August 2025.

¹³ Kaushal Kumar Sharma, 'SSNIP Test: A Useful Tool, Not a Panacea' (Competition Commission of India, 26 July 2011) http://164.100.58.95/sites/default/files/presentation_document/SSNIPTestKKSharma260711.pdf accessed 6 August 2025.

personal sharing, while others like YouTube Shorts or TikTok prioritize broadcasting and content consumption.¹⁴

In *Sonam Sharma v. Apple*,¹⁵ the Competition Commission of India observed that minor functional differences should not create separate markets where core functionality overlaps. Meta indirectly relies on this reasoning to argue that rivals share enough similarities to be in the same market. Defining the market too narrowly can exaggerate monopoly power by ignoring significant competitive constraints. Excluding platforms like TikTok or Snapchat from the analysis may misrepresent the competitive landscape. Meta argues that such exclusion distorts reality, while the FTC claims these platforms operate under fundamentally different dynamics and do not constrain Meta in the PSNS space.

EC's DELIMITATION OF THE RELEVANT MARKET

In contrast to the FTC's narrow market definition, the European Commission (EC) has generally adopted a broader and multi-market approach. For instance, in the Facebook Marketplace case,¹⁶ the EC defined the relevant product market to encompass not only the market for social media services but also online display advertising and the market for online classified ad services. This contrasts with the FTC, which relied heavily on price-based tests, the EC relied on the quality-based tool of the SSNDQ test, as Facebook provides services at zero cost. While the EU's broader and multi-market perspective offers a fuller picture of competition, the FTC's narrow approach risks overlooking the wider competitive realities of the digital economy. Instead of mechanically delineating the relevant market, as the entire ruling will depend upon this, the FTC should have adopted a pragmatic approach like the EC did.

WHAT IS THE STANCE OF THE FTC IN THE CASE?

In this landmark case against Meta, the FTC has portrayed a picture of a tech behemoth that

¹⁴ TRADE COMMISSION F, "SUBSTITUTE AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND OTHER EQUITABLE RELIEF" (2021) <https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/2021-09-08_redacted_substitute_amended_complaint_ecf_no._82.pdf> accessed 16 September 2025.

¹⁵ *Shri Sonam Sharma v Apple Inc USA & Ors*, Case No 24/2011 (Competition Commission of India, 19 March 2013).

¹⁶ EUROPEAN COMMISSION and DG Competition, "COMMISSION DECISION of 14.11.2024 Relating to a Proceeding under Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 54 of the Agreement on the European Economic Area (AT.40684 – Facebook Marketplace)" (2024) report <https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases1/202513/AT_40684_10582539_13405_4.pdf> accessed 16 Sept 2025.

has consolidated its dominance not by innovation but by neutralizing competition. In its revised complaint, the FTC alleges that Meta has used its immense market presence to suppress competitors, inhibit innovation, and entrench its monopoly in the market for personal social networking services.¹⁷

FTC alleges that Meta has followed the strategy of “it is better to buy than compete,” highlighted by Mark Zuckerberg’s 2008 email. FTC claims that Meta has embraced this strategy, purchasing nascent potential rivals such as Instagram in 2012 and WhatsApp in 2014 at a time when Facebook itself was facing existential problems.

According to the FTC, Meta’s acquisitions of WhatsApp and Instagram were aimed at eliminating competition and maintaining its monopoly in the personal social networking services market.

But the FTC does not stop here. There is more beyond these high-profile acquisitions. Facebook launched the “Facebook Platform” in 2007 and initially offered 3rd-party developers open access to APIs, and later revoked access to competing ones or those supporting rival platforms. This mode of conditional dealing policies was also ingrained in the agreements with firms that interfaced with its platform.¹⁸ This, according to the FTC, is a way to weaponize platform access. Facebook enforced these agreements and applied them where it was necessary to cripple rising competitors and entrench its monopoly.

According to the FTC, this not only caused harm to potential rivals but also to the consumers, as they were deprived of any choices, additional innovation, and quality improvements.¹⁹

In short, the FTC accuses Meta of maintaining monopoly power not by innovation or progress but by stifling competition.

META’S DEFENCE

Meta denied the allegations. The primary contention is the way the market is being delineated by the FTC. As discussed earlier in the delimitation of the relevant market, Meta contended

¹⁷ *ibid.*

¹⁸ *ibid.*

¹⁹ *ibid.*

that the product market is being construed very narrowly as it still faces competition from other apps, such as TikTok, YouTube, and others.²⁰ While connecting friends and family is one of the essential functions of Meta, it is also involved in “the general idea of entertainment and learning about the world and discovering what’s going on.”²¹ Meta also denied the FTC’s allegation that WhatsApp and Instagram didn’t grow at the pace they should have to allow Facebook to remain relevant.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE CASE

This case will have far-reaching implications for how regulators and courts will treat Big Tech in the future. This is the third major case in the US targeting a tech giant, with earlier cases focusing on Google.²² The FTC has also sued Amazon for illegally maintaining a monopoly.²³ If the FTC succeeds, it could set a precedent for regulators worldwide to scrutinize acquisitions more aggressively, particularly in emerging fields like AI, virtual reality, and digital platforms, where acquisitions or consolidation could have an adverse impact on competition.

We have two precedents, *United States v. Microsoft*²⁴ and the European Commission’s *Google*²⁵ case, to consider. These cases show that regulators worldwide are willing to impose heavy penalties and structural remedies on tech giants that violate antitrust laws.

If Meta succeeds, this case shows that past regulatory approvals do not shield mergers from future challenges. Big tech companies, therefore, will face ongoing investigation when they wish to acquire rivals. Therefore, future acquisitions of big tech are likely to be examined under a stricter lens to ensure that they do not maintain dominance at the expense of innovation and consumer welfare.

²⁰ European Commission, Decision relating to a proceeding under Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Case AT.40684) https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases1/202513/AT_40684_10582539_13405_4.pdf accessed 16 August 2025.

²¹ *ibid.*

²² United States Department of Justice, ‘Department of Justice Prevails in Landmark Antitrust Case Against Google’ (17 April 2025) <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/departments-justice-prevails-landmark-antitrust-case-against-google> accessed 16 August 2025.

²³ Federal Trade Commission, ‘FTC Sues Amazon for Illegally Maintaining Monopoly Power’ (26 September 2023) <https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2023/09/ftc-sues-amazon-illegally-maintaining-monopoly-power> accessed 14 August 2025.

²⁴ *United States v Microsoft Corp*, Findings of Fact (US District Court for the District of Columbia, 5 November 1999) <https://www.justice.gov/atr/us-v-microsoft-courts-findings-fact> accessed 6 August 2025.

²⁵ European Commission, ‘Antitrust: Commission Fines Google €4.34 Billion for Illegal Practices Regarding Android Mobile Devices to Strengthen Dominance of Google’s Search Engine’ (Press Release IP/18/4581, 18 July 2018) https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_18_4581 accessed 1 September 2025.

IS THE FTC WEAK?

Analysis of the litigation strategy used by the Federal Trade Commission shows that there are a number of issues that arise in connection with the merits of the case against Meta Platforms. While the Federal Trade Commission has sought to characterize this case as a paradigmatic monopolization case under Section 2 of the Sherman Act,²⁶ it is hard to see how such a case can be made out in the contemporary economy. There are a number of hurdles that the Federal Trade Commission must clear, and some of the strategies that it is using seem to be counterproductive.

First of all, it will be very hard for the FTC to define a relevant market that is so narrowly defined as “personal social networking services.” The validity of the FTC’s claim will rest almost entirely on the court’s willingness to accept this narrow definition of the market. If the market is simply those sites that allow users to connect with friends and family, then Meta’s market power is obviously huge. But if the market is more broadly defined to include other social networking sites that compete for the attention of users, such as TikTok, YouTube, or Snapchat, then Meta’s market power is obviously much less significant. The truth is that most social networking sites offer the same thing when it comes to messaging, video sharing, content discovery, and creator tools. It may be hard to distinguish between personal networking sites and entertainment sites based on functionality. Courts are always very reluctant to accept a narrow definition of the market that ignores obvious competitors.²⁷

Secondly, the FTC needs to take into consideration the issue of opposing mergers that were approved a very long time ago. The acquisition of Instagram in 2012 and WhatsApp in 2014 was approved by the concerned authorities, including the FTC itself. Although it is a fact that antitrust laws have a provision to oppose mergers in the future if they are found to have a negative impact on competition, it is not very easy to reverse mergers that occurred more than a decade ago. Over the years, Instagram and WhatsApp have become an essential part of Meta’s overall network. Their user base has increased significantly, and their technology is integrated with Meta’s network. It seems to be a very drastic step to ask the court to reverse these companies after such a long time.

²⁶ Sherman Antitrust Act 1890, s 2.

²⁷ David Glasner and Sean P Sullivan, ‘The Logic of Market Definition’ (2020) 83 *Antitrust Law Journal* 293 <https://www.jstor.org/stable/27006872> accessed 26 August 2025.

Thirdly, the FTC is also challenged with the task of proving harm to consumers.²⁸ In contemporary antitrust litigation, the task of proving harm to consumers is a major consideration in a monopolization suit. However, the truth of the matter is that most of these online services, including Meta's, are provided to consumers free of charge. This means that since consumers do not have to pay a price to use Facebook, Instagram, and WhatsApp, the FTC will have to find other ways to prove that consumers have been harmed, such as the absence of innovation, poor services, and diminished protection of privacy. These are much tougher ways of proving harm. Meta will be able to prove that it has been innovating over the years and that it will be difficult for the FTC to prove that consumers have been harmed.

Another issue that the FTC may face is related to the way people use social media platforms. The assumption made by the Commission in its argument is that the time spent on Meta's platforms is only spent in the personal social networking market, while the time spent on other platforms like TikTok or YouTube is spent in a different market. However, the reality is that people do not spend time on only one platform. It is most likely that a person will communicate with his friends on WhatsApp, watch videos on TikTok, and share content on Instagram at the same time. This habit shows that people generally switch between platforms depending on their needs. If people can switch between these platforms, it will be difficult to say that Meta is operating in a different and isolated market.

Finally, the record of the FTC in pursuing antitrust cases against large technology companies also reflects the challenges of regulating digital platforms using antitrust law. The FTC has pursued several cases against large technology companies such as Amazon and Google.²⁹ However, these cases are often complex and may take several years to resolve. Antitrust law was developed to regulate monopolies in the traditional sectors. However, the application of antitrust law to regulate the digital economy is often difficult. The courts are required to apply old antitrust laws to the new economy, which is often difficult.

²⁸ Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Trade Commission Act: Section 5 — Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices (Consumer Compliance Handbook, June 2008) <https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/supmanual/cch/200806/ftca.pdf> accessed 28 August 2025.

²⁹ Federal Trade Commission, 'FTC Sues Amazon for Illegally Maintaining Monopoly Power' (26 September 2023) <https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2023/09/ftc-sues-amazon-illegally-maintaining-monopoly-power> accessed 16 August 2025.

Cumulatively, all these factors appear to suggest that the prospects of the FTC case are likely to face some serious challenges. The lack of clarity on the definition of the relevant market, the fact that the FTC is trying to challenge mergers that were approved a long time ago, the fact that it is difficult to establish harm to consumers in zero-price markets, and the fact that the digital competition landscape is constantly evolving make the FTC case more difficult to win. Although the case appears to suggest that the regulatory bodies are increasingly concerned about the threat posed by the dominant technology leaders, the success of the FTC will depend on its ability to convince the court that Meta has actually harmed competition.

SUGGESTED/ SPECULATIVE JUDGEMENT

If the overall situation is taken into consideration, it can be seen that the acquisition has been made with the prior approval of the Federal Trade Commission.³⁰ At the time of the acquisition, it did not appear to be harmful to competition. Moreover, there does not appear to be much evidence that has come to light that has directly affected the consumer due to the acquisition. In fact, both Instagram and WhatsApp have increased their overall user base³¹ and have brought about a number of new features³² due to the acquisition made by Meta Platforms. This would appear to be an indication that the services are still being used by the consumer and that they are still being developed. On the basis of this analysis, it would appear that a court would not easily impose the remedy of divestiture in this case.

Another significant factor that would influence the outcome of the case is the definition of the relevant market. The success of the FTC's claim is significantly dependent on whether the court would accept the FTC's narrow definition of the relevant market for personal social networking services. If the court accepts the FTC's definition of the relevant market, then Meta's position seems to be dominant. However, if the court accepts Meta's definition of the relevant market that includes other competing social networking sites, then the FTC's claim of monopoly power seems to be difficult to sustain.

³⁰ John M Yun, 'Going Backwards: The FTC's New Prior Approval Policy' (*Competition Policy International NA Column*, March 2022) <http://competitionpolicyinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/NA-Column-March-2022-Full.pdf> accessed 1 September 2025.

³¹ Richter F, 'Facebook's Acquisitions: How It Started, How It's Going' (Statista, 10 December 2020) <https://www.statista.com/chart/23742/monthly-active-users-of-instagram-and-whatsapp/> accessed 16 August 2025.

³² WhatsApp rolls out major update: New features for groups, events, calls and more Swetha Savvy, 'WhatsApp rolls out major update: New features for groups, events, calls and more' (*LiveMint*, 11 April 2025) <https://www.livemint.com/technology/tech-news/whatsapp-rolls-out-major-update-new-features-for-groups-events-calls-and-more-11744385924250.html> accessed 6 August 2025.

Moreover, the reversal of these mergers at this late stage may also give rise to new issues in relation to the competitive environment. Over the last ten years, Instagram and WhatsApp have become an integral part of the Meta environment and the overall digital world. The reversal of these mergers may give rise to new issues in relation to the existing business environment. It may also give rise to new issues in relation to the overall market environment, as it may inadvertently give rise to the dominance of other large platforms such as TikTok or YouTube.³³ This may not necessarily be in the best interests of consumers and investors and may be contrary to the overall aim of antitrust laws, which is to protect competition and promote innovation while ensuring that consumers have a choice in the market.

In this case, a structural remedy such as the dissolution of Meta may not be of much use in improving competition or consumer welfare. The courts are always very reluctant to take this extreme measure of action, especially in the tech industry, which is always undergoing a very rapid pace of change. Therefore, the likelihood is that the court may decide to take an alternative measure of action that is not so visible if it comes to the conclusion that Meta has been carrying out anticompetitive practices. For instance, the court may impose behavioral restrictions or fines if sufficient evidence is placed before it by the FTC. A full divestiture of Instagram or WhatsApp may be considered too harsh.

CONCLUSION

FTC v. Meta is more than a lawsuit involving past acquisitions; it is a trial for how antitrust law adjusts to a rapidly shifting digital landscape. The FTC claims that Meta has maintained a position of dominance through acquisitions of potential competitors, but there are a few reasons to believe that the FTC may be in for an uphill struggle. The acquisitions were previously approved, no harm has come to the consumer, and Instagram and WhatsApp have significantly grown as a result of their acquisition by Meta.

Ultimately, the determination will come down to how the court defines the market. If the court chooses to accept the definition provided by the FTC, Meta may be considered a monopoly, but if a more realistic definition of the market is taken, the case for the FTC may be significantly

³³ Alessia Sophia D'Amico, 'Closing the Tech Acquisitions Enforcement Gap: From Article 22 to Article 102' (2024) 20 *European Competition Journal* 193 <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17441056.2023.2270744> accessed 16 August 2025.

undermined. Moreover, if the court were to undo a decade of mergers, it could have the unintended consequence of creating a monopoly in a different form, which goes against the purpose of antitrust law: to create a competitive environment that allows for innovation and consumer choice.

Essentially, this case illustrates the difficulties which regulators encounter in attempting to apply traditional antitrust rules to digital markets. A full breakup of Meta will not be in the interests of consumers or competition, which will likely result in less drastic measures being imposed, such as fines, rather than behavioral modifications. In addition to Meta, this case will set an important precedent in the regulation of big tech companies in the future. It will illustrate to regulators the importance of balancing the need to prevent anti-competitive practices while also being sensitive to the ever-evolving nature of tech markets.

The FTC v. Meta case will not only be significant in determining the future of Meta but will also set the tone for the way in which tech giants, digital markets, and innovation-based markets are regulated around the globe in the future.

