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## **CASE COMMENT: SHEELA BARSE v. UNION OF INDIA (1986)**

AUTHORED BY - RUPANTIKA ROY & TANISHA SWETTA

**CITATION:** 1986 AIR 1773; 1986 SCC (3) 596; JT 1986 136; 1986 SCALE (2) 230

**BENCH:** Chief Justice P.N. Bhagwati and Justice Ranganath Misra

**JUDGEMENT:** 05 August 1986 and 13 August 1986

### **INTRODUCTION:**

Children and youth are among the most valuable assets of any nation, and it is essential that they are properly educated, nurtured, and guided so they can contribute positively to the country's growth. While the law requires that criminal behaviour be prosecuted and punished, it also recognizes that juveniles deserve a different approach—one that emphasizes rehabilitation<sup>1</sup> over retribution<sup>2</sup>. In line with this principle, the Children Act of 1960 was enacted to create a specialized legal framework for the care, treatment, and rehabilitation of young offenders. However, despite its clear intent, the Act's implementation was largely ineffective. Many states either failed to adopt its provisions or lacked the necessary institutional and administrative support to enforce them properly.

The present case was brought forward by journalist and social activist Sheela Barse, who uncovered a deeply troubling reality. She found that a large number of children and juveniles were being held in regular adult prisons, often alongside hardened criminals. Many of these young people were not conventional offenders at all—they were homeless, abandoned, orphaned, or simply in need of care—but they were detained in adult jails, often under the guise of "safe keeping" or simply due to the absence of alternative facilities.

Recognizing the seriousness of the situation, Sheela Barse filed a petition directly with the Supreme Court, which was accepted as a Public Interest Litigation (PIL)<sup>3</sup>. The Court acknowledged that the case concerned the rights of a vulnerable and sizable segment of society,

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<sup>1</sup> The process of returning to a healthy or good way of life, or the process of helping someone to do this after they have been in prison, been very ill, etc.

<sup>2</sup> The act of punishing or taking vengeance for wrongdoing, sin or injury.

<sup>3</sup> Borrowed from American jurisprudence, it means a litigation filed in a court of law, for the protection of public interest like pollution, terrorism, road safety, constructional hazards etc.

elevating it to an issue of national importance and paving the way for systemic reforms in the treatment of juveniles<sup>4</sup>. Over time, the judgment grew into a landmark decision, shaping the trajectory of juvenile justice and human rights in India.

### **FACTS OF THE CASE:**

The case began with Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 1451 of 1985, filed under Article 32 of the Constitution by social activist Sheela Barse, along with other concerned citizens, on behalf of children under the age of 16 who were being held in ordinary adult jails across India. The petitioners highlighted that a large number of these children were not convicted criminals at all—they were homeless, orphaned, destitute, or simply in need of care. Yet they were detained alongside adult prisoners, often under the guise of “safe keeping” or because authorities lacked alternative facilities such as juvenile homes or observation centres.

The petition sought several key measures: the release of such children, full disclosure of the number and conditions of children in detention, the establishment of proper juvenile institutions, regular judicial inspection of prisons, and the provision of legal aid for children held in custody. The respondents named in the case included the Union of India, as well as all State Governments and Union Territories where such practices were prevalent.

The Supreme Court issued a notice on 24 September 1985, and the matter was repeatedly adjourned over the following months to ensure compliance and receive detailed counter-affidavits from all concerned authorities. These affidavits were required to provide information on children under 16 held in adult jails, including their ages, offences, duration of detention, and prior history. Authorities were also asked to disclose the existence and functioning of juvenile institutions, observation homes, remand homes, and other rehabilitative facilities, as well as to explain the steps taken to implement the Children Act, 1960, and the reasons for any failure in enforcement. In addition, information on legal aid provisions for child prisoners and the inspection or monitoring procedures by District Judges, jail authorities, or social welfare officers was sought to ensure the welfare of these children.

Initial hearings began in late 1985. While some States filed affidavits, others failed to respond. In early 1986, the Court held multiple hearings to review compliance reports, request further details about child detainees, and examine the conditions of existing facilities. Crucial hearings took place in April 1986, during which the petitioners submitted detailed evidence documenting the detention of children in adult jails. The Court continued to monitor the

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<sup>4</sup> Relating to a young person who is not yet old enough to be considered an adult.

situation through hearings in June and July 1986, demanding updated affidavits and reports on compliance measures from the States.

The proceedings continued for nearly a year, and by August 1986, the Court noted that the matters would be taken up in the next hearing scheduled for 1 September 1986. This underscored the Court's deep concern over the unacceptable delays in ensuring justice for such vulnerable children.

### ISSUES:

The issues in the *Sheela Barse v. Union of India* case that the Supreme Court had to address after reviewing the facts are as follows:

1. Whether the practice of detaining children in ordinary adult jails, instead of placing them in specialized juvenile homes or observation centres, violated the fundamental rights of children—particularly their Right to Life and Personal Liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution.
2. Whether the right to a speedy trial is an inherent and mandatory aspect of Article 21, and whether this right applies specifically to juveniles in conflict with the law.
3. What specific measures and directions were required to ensure that the State Governments and Union Territories properly implemented the Children Act, 1960, and effectively safeguarded the welfare, rehabilitation, and legal rights of children in their care.

### RULES:

In *Sheela Barse v. Union of India*, the Supreme Court relied on the following rules and provisions of the Constitution:

- <sup>5</sup>*Article 32 of the Indian Constitution*, guarantees the right to constitutional remedies, allowing any individual to directly approach the Supreme Court if their fundamental rights are violated. It empowers the Court to issue writs, orders, or directions to enforce these rights. In this case, the Court held that the petition was maintainable under Article 32, even though the children themselves could not file it. Since the affected children were in custody and unable to assert their rights, a public-spirited citizen like Sheela Barse had the full legal standing to approach the Supreme Court on their behalf.

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<sup>5</sup> RIGHT TO CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES

- <sup>6</sup>*Children Act, 1960* provides a framework for the care, protection, maintenance, welfare, training, education, and rehabilitation of neglected or delinquent children. It also governs the trial of delinquent children in Union Territories. The Court emphasized that the Act prohibits keeping children in regular jails and mandates their care and rehabilitation through Juvenile Courts and child-care institutions. Any failure to implement these provisions was deemed unconstitutional and contrary to the principles of juvenile justice.
- <sup>7</sup>*Article 144 of the Indian Constitution*, requires all civil, judicial, and executive authorities across India to aid and comply with the Supreme Court's directions. The Court held that High Courts, District Judges, and jail authorities are constitutionally bound under Article 144 to follow its orders. Their failure to submit reports or ensure humane conditions for detained children amounted to a dereliction of duty. The Court directed District Judges to inspect jails at least once every two months and instructed High Courts to monitor compliance.
- <sup>8</sup>*Article 39(f) of the Indian Constitution*, is a directive principle that obliges the State to provide children with opportunities and facilities for healthy development, freedom, and dignity, and to protect them from exploitation and abandonment. The Court ruled that the State's failure to provide remand homes, observation homes, and other juvenile facilities—and the continued practice of placing children in jails—violated Article 39(f). Administrative or financial difficulties could not justify neglecting this constitutional duty.
- <sup>9</sup>*Article 21 of the Indian Constitution*, guarantees that no person shall be deprived of life or personal liberty except according to the procedure established by law. The Supreme Court has interpreted this right broadly to include dignity, humane treatment, protection from arbitrary detention, and a speedy trial. In this case, the Court held that placing children in adult jails violated Article 21 because it endangered their dignity, mental health, and overall development. The Court also affirmed that a speedy trial is a fundamental right under Article 21, and any delay in providing justice infringes upon a child's personal liberty.

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<sup>6</sup> CHILDREN ACT, 1960, (26AD).

<sup>7</sup> CIVIL AND JUDICIAL AUTHORITIES TO ACT IN AID OF THE SUPREME COURT

<sup>8</sup> CERTAIN PRINCIPLES OF POLICY TO BE FOLLOWED BY THE STATE

<sup>9</sup> PROTECTION OF LIFE AND PERSONAL LIBERTY

## JUDGEMENT:

### *<sup>10</sup>Judgment of 5 August 1986 (Interim/First Major Order):*

the Supreme Court accepted the petition under Article 32 of the Constitution and addressed the urgent need to protect children detained in adult jails. The Court observed that while several States had enacted “Children Acts,” many had not brought these laws into force. It emphasized that such legislation was intended to fulfil a constitutional obligation and served a clear social purpose, leaving little justification for non-enforcement.

As a result, the Court directed all States to immediately bring their Children Acts into effect and administer them as prescribed. It required every District and Sessions Judge to appoint a Judicial Magistrate—often the Chief Judicial Magistrate—to visit all district and sub-jails in their jurisdiction. The magistrate’s responsibilities included determining how many children under the age of 16 were being held, recording their offences, duration of detention, and any previous detentions. They were also to check whether these children had been produced before children’s courts, whether they were receiving legal aid, and, if necessary, personally interview the child detainees. The magistrate was granted full access to jail registers and other records, and jail Superintendents were directed to provide all assistance. A detailed report was to be submitted to the Supreme Court through the High Court Registrars within ten weeks.

The report was also to include information on existing children’s homes, remand homes, and observation homes in the district. Where such institutions existed, the magistrate was required to inspect them, evaluating their conditions and facilities, including education and vocational training programs. Additionally, the Court directed that State Legal Aid Boards—or any existing legal aid organizations—provide legal assistance by sending two lawyers per week to each jail to represent children under 16.

The Court highlighted those jails are inherently unsuitable for children. It noted that incarceration in adult prisons stunts a child’s development, exposes them to harmful influences, hardens their conscience, and alienates them from society. This reasoning was grounded both in statutory law and broader social welfare considerations. The petition was adjourned for further hearings, with the Court making it clear that the States and judiciary were now under an obligation to implement these directives without delay.

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<sup>10</sup> SHEELA BARSE v. UNION OF INDIA (1986), Supreme Court of India (1986), <https://www.sci.gov.in/judgements-case-no/>.

<sup>11</sup>Judgment of 13 August 1986 [Further / Final Orders (on Interim Basis)]:

after reviewing the reports submitted by the States and assessing their compliance with earlier directions, the Supreme Court issued additional and more concrete orders. Recognizing that the right to a speedy trial is an essential part of the fundamental right to life and personal liberty under Article 21, the Court laid down strict timelines for juvenile cases. It held that for children under 16 accused of offences punishable with imprisonment of up to seven years, the investigation must be completed within three months from the filing of the First Information Report (FIR), and the trial must be concluded within six months from the filing of the charge sheet. Any delay not attributable to the child would render the prosecution liable to be quashed. The Court reiterated that children accused of offences must not be kept in ordinary jails. They should be placed in remand homes or observation homes, or, where such facilities are unavailable, granted bail. The Court emphasized the urgent need for States to establish sufficient remand, observation, and juvenile homes to accommodate child offenders, as well as destitute, abandoned, or neglected children.

The Court also noted the problem of having different Children Acts in each State, which created fragmented and inconsistent protections for juveniles. It suggested that a uniform central legislation would help ensure consistent standards for the treatment, trial, and rehabilitation of children across the country. Importantly, the Court stressed that enacting legislation alone was not enough; effective implementation was equally critical. Administrative or financial difficulties could not be used as an excuse for non-compliance.

The 13 August order was not intended as the final disposal of the case. Instead, the Court made it clear that it would continue to monitor compliance and scheduled the next hearing for 1 September 1986 to review the status of implementation.

### ANALYSIS:

The *Sheela Barse* case stands as a landmark moment in the evolution of juvenile justice in India, exposing the systemic neglect and constitutional violations faced by children detained in adult jails. The Supreme Court's intervention made it clear that children—including those who were homeless, orphaned, or simply in need of care—cannot be treated as ordinary prisoners. Detention in adult facilities exposes them to psychological harm, stunts their moral and social development, and alienates them from society.

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<sup>11</sup> SHEELA BARSE v. UNION OF INDIA (1986), Supreme Court of India (1986), <https://www.sci.gov.in/judgements-case-no/>.

The case reinforced statutory provisions such as the Children Act, 1960, are not merely symbolic; they constitute a constitutional duty for States to provide protective and rehabilitative measures for juveniles. By mandating judicial inspections, legal aid, regular reporting, and placement in specialized juvenile institutions, the Court institutionalized accountability, making children's welfare a central concern of the criminal justice system.

Additionally, the Court's recognition that the right to a speedy trial is an essential part of Article 21 emphasized that the developmental and constitutional rights of juveniles cannot be compromised by procedural delays. The orders adopted a holistic approach, combining legal safeguards with social welfare imperatives, and underscored that detention should always be a last resort, aimed at rehabilitation rather than punishment.

The case also highlighted the shortcomings of fragmented State-level implementation and suggested the need for uniform central legislation to ensure consistent standards in the treatment, trial, and rehabilitation of children. In this way, the judgment laid the groundwork for a cohesive national framework for juvenile justice.

Overall, *Sheela Barse v. Union of India* demonstrates the transformative power of public interest litigation, showing how judicial intervention can correct systemic failures, uphold constitutional rights, and create mechanisms that prioritize the protection, rehabilitation, and overall welfare of children.

### AFTERMATH:

<sup>12</sup>Following the 1986 rulings, Sheela Barse, frustrated with the slow and inadequate progress by several States, filed Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 3128 of 1988. She sought further directions from the Supreme Court and even requested permission to withdraw the original Public Interest Litigation, expressing deep concern that the implementation of the Court's earlier orders had become stagnant and largely ineffective. In her petition, Barse documented ongoing violations—children continued to be held in adult jails, proper child-care institutions were still lacking, and instances of custodial abuse persisted—arguing that the 1986 directives had not resulted in substantial change.

The Supreme Court, however, refused to allow withdrawal of the PIL. It held that matters involving the rights and welfare of children could not be abandoned merely because the petitioner was dissatisfied. The Court noted that it had taken *Suo motu* cognizance of systemic

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<sup>12</sup> SHEELA BARSE v. UNION OF INDIA (1988), Supreme Court of India (1988), <https://www.sci.gov.in/judgements-case-no/>.

issues, and the litigation had evolved into a continuing mandamus. The judgment reaffirmed that the rights of children and prisoners fall squarely under Article 21 and require ongoing judicial supervision. The 1988 ruling made it clear that the protection of vulnerable groups cannot depend solely on a petitioner's willingness to pursue litigation, strengthening the Court's own obligation to ensure compliance with constitutional guarantees.

This case marked a turning point in India's approach to juvenile justice, custodial rights, and prison reform. In its 13 August 1986 order, the Supreme Court had explicitly recommended replacing the patchwork of State-specific laws with a uniform national legislation to provide consistent protections and institutional mechanisms for juveniles across the country. This vision was realized with the enactment of the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986, which replaced scattered Children Acts and established a unified framework for juvenile justice. The Act introduced specialized institutions and procedures for juvenile delinquents and neglected children, including Juvenile Courts, Juvenile Welfare Boards, Observation Homes, and Special/Remand Homes, creating statutory safeguards that distinguished juvenile cases from adult criminal procedures.

Over time, however, the 1986 Act revealed limitations, particularly regarding scope, definitions, and alignment with international standards. Following India's ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), Parliament repealed the 1986 Act and enacted the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (JJ Act 2000). This legislation broadened the scope by redefining "child/juvenile" to include all persons under 18 years, and by distinguishing between "children in conflict with law" and "children in need of care and protection." Further reforms followed with the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, which introduced provisions allowing juveniles aged 16–18 involved in heinous offences to be tried as adults under certain conditions, subject to evaluation by a Juvenile Justice Board.

The case also strengthened the foundation of Public Interest Litigation (PIL), affirming that individuals like Sheela Barse have the standing to act on behalf of vulnerable populations unable to access the courts themselves. This expanded judicial intervention in matters involving prisoners, institutionalized children, and other marginalized groups. Additionally, the Court's directives requiring weekly legal aid visits to jails were adopted by Legal Services Authorities and eventually integrated into the functioning of the National Legal Services Authority (NALSA), improving access to justice for juveniles and prisoners nationwide.

On a broader level, the judgment contributed to a cultural shift within the justice system. It advanced the understanding that children in conflict with the law are not criminals, but

individuals in need of care, protection, and rehabilitation. This perspective influenced national policies on child rights, led to the creation of Child Protection Units, and shaped the formulation of the Integrated Child Protection Scheme (ICPS). The case also set a precedent for subsequent landmark decisions addressing custodial violence, rights of undertrial prisoners, and systemic reforms in prison administration, leaving a lasting impact on India's human rights and juvenile justice landscape.

### **CONCLUSION:**

The Sheela Barse case marked a major shift in the way India views and safeguards the rights of children in custody. Through its interventions in 1986 and again in 1988, the Supreme Court transformed the treatment of juveniles from a routine administrative issue into a constitutional duty, emphasizing dignity, care, and protection. By drawing on Articles 21, 32, 39(f), and 144, the Court made it clear that the State has an active responsibility: to establish proper juvenile homes, ensure speedy inquiries and trials, prevent any abuse in detention, and guarantee humane living conditions for every child.

When the Court in 1988 refused to allow the Public Interest Litigation to be withdrawn, it sent a powerful message—that the welfare of vulnerable groups cannot depend on a single petitioner, and ongoing judicial oversight is necessary. The case prompted States to reform prisons and child-care facilities and laid the groundwork for the Juvenile Justice Act of 1986, which became the cornerstone of modern child-protection laws. Ultimately, *Sheela Barse v. Union of India* reaffirmed that children's rights and custodial justice are firmly protected under Article 21, making it a landmark decision in India's human rights history.