Open Access Research Article
THE DICHOTOMY OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT VS IMPRISONMENT TILL DEATH: QUESTIONING THE SUPREME COURT’S ACT OF CREATING A NEW CATEGORY OF PUNISHMENT
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Article Details
THE DICHOTOMY OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT
VS IMPRISONMENT TILL DEATH: QUESTIONING THE SUPREME COURT’S ACT OF CREATING A
NEW CATEGORY OF PUNISHMENT
AUTHORED BY - ANIMESH
JHA & HIMANSHU RANJAN
ABSTRACT
Every civilised criminal justice
system reserve with itself, the right to inflict ‘just’ punishment to an
offender. Sinceeons, the concept of ‘just’punishment has vexed the
criminologist and penologist alike. In ancient Bharat, the concept of Prayashchita,
or what we call repentance or redemption was a cardinal factor for the kings
and his courtiers in determining the justness of the punishment awarded to the
wrongdoer. The story or Maharshi Valmiki and Samrat Ashok gives us a very clear
idea that no man, howsoever evil, is incapable of change. In ancient Bharat,
the concept of Danda (Punishment) and Prayashchit (Repentance and
Reformation) were the two wheels which propelled the chariot of penal system.
It is not untrue that the modern principles of law, namely the reformative
theory of punishment is giving us nothing new, but is only reminding us of our
ancient Indic values. The judgement of Supreme Court of India in Swamy
Shraddanand case seems to overrun the ancient principle of proportionality
in punishment by creating a new category of punishment- life imprisonment
beyond the scope of remission. This paper argues against the inclusion of
such punishment in our criminal justice system, both from the constitutional
and policy point of view.
Introduction
The renowned jurist Salmond, was of
the view that if criminals are to be sent to prison to be transformed into good
citizens by physical, intellectual, and moral training, prisons must be turned
into comfortable dwelling places.[1]
The Supreme Court of India, through a
catena of judgements has increasingly emphasised and punctuated on the
importance of infusing principles of ‘reformation’ and ‘humanitarianism’ in
awarding punishment. In Narotam Singh v. State of Punjab[2], the Supreme Court observed-
“Reformative
approach to punishment should be the object of criminal law, in order to promote
rehabilitation without offending community conscience and to secure social
justice.”
Unfortunately, the
theory of reformative justice has suffered a fatal blow from the same Supreme
Court only, when it decided to create a special category of punishment through
judicial fiction in Swamy Shraddanand @ Murli v State of Karnataka[3]
–life imprisonmentbeyond the scope of remission.
Through this research
work, our aim is to scrutinise the constitutional validity of such categoryof
imprisonment created by the Supreme Courts,which has effectively tied the
appropriate Government’s hands from remitting the sentence of a convicted
person under Code of Criminal Procedure [CrPC]. We also examine whether
such kind of punishment in any way serve the cause of larger‘public interest,’
as claimed by the honourable Apex Court in Swamy Shraddanand and later
cases.
Firstly, we map the scope of imprisonment for life as
a punishment provided under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 [IPC, 1860]. Secondly,
we discuss the concept of remission, its scope, and the relevant procedure
under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [CrPC, 1973]. Thirdly,
we briefly elaborate how the Supreme Court through a series of judgements,
starting from Swamy Shraddanand, has been awarding a special category of
punishment created through the controversial route of judicial legislation.Fourthly,
we discuss whether awarding the aforesaid category of punishment is violative
of Article 21, the fundamental right to life and personal liberty[4]
and Article 14, the fundamental right to equality[5]enshrined
underthe Constitution of India, 1950 [Constitution]. Fifthly, we
examine whether the creation of a special category of offence is in violation
of the doctrine of separation of powers enunciated under the Constitution.
Finally, we analyse the impact of such kind of punishment on the prison
administration and how it is antithetical the cause of ‘public interest,’ which
the Apex Court seems desirous of protecting.
It is necessary for us to mention in
this context, that the constitutional power of the President of India under Article
72 and that of the Governor[6]
under Article 161 of the Constitution[7] is
yet not the subject matter of discussion, particularly in our research work.
Nor the power of the appropriate government to commute under Section 433 of the
Cr.P.C.[8]
under discussion. What isunder limited discussion in our research work is the
remission power available to the appropriateGovernment under Section 432 of the
Cr.P.C.[9]
I.
Mapping
the scope of the punishment- ‘imprisonment for life’
Under Chapter III of the IPC, 1860
[Of Punishments], Section 53lists down the punishment to which the
offenders are liable and which the Courts are authorised to award in cases of
conviction[10]. The
Second clause states the punishment of ‘imprisonment for life’. Section 45
provides that the word “life” denotes the life of a human being, unless
the contrary appears from the context. The punishment of imprisonment for life
was not originally present in IPC, 1860.[11]
It was introduced through an amendment in the year 1956[12].There
are more than 50 sections in the code which provide for the punishment of life
imprisonment. It is inter alia awarded for heinous offences like
sedition[13], murder[14],
rape[15]
etc.
Any Court in India is authorised to
give punishment only as prescribed under the IPC, 1860 or special penal
legislations. Article 20(1) of the Constitution bestows the fundamental right
of protection in respect of conviction for offences on the offenders[16].
Under this, the Courts as well as quasi-judicial body are prohibited from
imposing a punishment greater than what is prescribed under the law in force at
the time of commission of offence. This has been affirmed by the Supreme Court
in the case of State of West Bengal v S.K. Ghosh[17].
It must be noted that neither Section 53 nor any of the provisions under the
IPC, 1860 provides for the punishment of ‘life imprisonment’ sans
remission.
An insight about this issue can be
taken from the provisions of CrPC under which an Additional District Judge or
District Judge can sentence a person prescribed by law. Here the term
‘prescribed by law’ is of some significance here. The punishments that are
prescribed by law are provided in Section 53 of IPC. Under Section 53, while
the term ‘life imprisonment’ is mentioned, the term ‘life imprisonment without
remission’ is not mentioned, raising a statutory conflict.[18]
Supreme court in its discussion on this aspect, has not considered this
dichotomy as the Life imprisonment is essentially different from imprisonment
till death.
under CrPC
The CrPC, 1973 in its definition
clause does not provide what constitutes remission. However, under chapter
XXIII, it provides the power of the appropriate government to suspend or remit
a sentence under Section 432.[19]The
Madhya Pradesh High Court in Babu Pahalwan v State of Madhya Pradesh
& Anr held thatremission’ means reducing the amount of sentence
awarded to a convict without changing the character of sentence.[20]
Section 432(1) provides that,
whenever any person has been sentenced to punishment for an offence, the
appropriate government may, either conditionally or unconditionally suspend the
execution of sentence or remit the whole or any part of the punishment to which
he has been sentenced.[21]The
power of the government to remit the sentence is not absolute. Section 433A
disallows the government to release the prisoner, where a sentence of
imprisonment for life is imposed on him for an offence for which death is one
of the punishments provided by law, unless he has served fourteen years of
imprisonment.[22]
The effect of an executive order of
full remission is that, it wipes out the remaining part of the sentence that
has to be served by the prisoner and thus in practice, reduces the sentence to
the period already undergone in prison.[23]
It must be noted that the power to grant remission is completely an executive
function and the Courts do not have the power to remit the sentence.
As we have discussed in the above
section, there is no absolute restriction in the CrPC, 1973 on executive’s
power to remit sentencesof imprisonmentfor life, awarded by trial
courts.However, unfortunately, the Supreme Court of India, through the route of
judicial legislation has created a special category of punishment – imprisonment
for life beyond the scope of remission.
It was in Swamy Shraddhanand
Case[24]
that the Supreme Court first created the judicial fiction of granting a
sentence of imprisonment for life sans remission. The petitioner in this case
was convicted under Section 302 and Section 201 of the IPC, 1860. The Sessions
Judge had sentenced him to death for the offence of murder and to a term of
five years rigorous imprisonment and fine of rupees ten thousand for causing
disappearance of evidences. The
Karnataka High Court upheld the conviction and the death sentence awarded to
the appellant against which the petition was filed in the Supreme Court.
Interestingly,
the appeal in the Supreme Court was first heard by a division bench comprising
Justice S.B. Sinha and Justice M. Katju. Though the honourable divisional bench
unanimously upheld the appellant’s conviction, but they came to different
conclusions with respect to the punishment to be awarded to the appellant.
While Justice Sinha was of the opinion that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the punishment of
life imprisonment, rather than death would serve the ends of justice, he made
it clear that the appellant would not be released from prison till the end of
his life. Justice Katju, on the other hand was ofthe view that the appellant
deserved nothing but death.
An appeal arose from the judgement of
division bench and was heard by a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court
comprising B.N Agarwal, G.S. Singhvi and Aftab Alam JJ.
After
hearing the arguments and taking into consideration relevant factors and
circumstances, the three-judge bench of the apex court, writing through Justice
Alamsubstituted the
death sentence given to the appellant by the trial court and confirmed by the
High court to imprisonment for life. However, a condition was attached to the
aforesaid punishment- the petitioner shall not be released from prison till the rest of his life.
Justice
Aftab Alam traced the genesis of this new category of punishment in a 30 years
old judgement of the Supreme Court- Dalbir Singh and Ors v State of
Punjab.[25]
In
paragraph 14 of the judgment this Court held and observed as follows:
14. [T]he
sentences of death in the present appeal are liable to be reduced to life
imprisonment. We may add a footnote to the ruling in Rajendra Prasad case.
Taking the cue from the English legislation on abolition, we may suggest that
life imprisonment which strictly means imprisonment for the whole of the men's
life but in practice amounts to incarceration for a period between 10 and 14
years may, at the option of the convicting court, be subject to the condition
that the sentence of imprisonment shall last as long as life lasts, where there
are exceptional indications of murderous recidivism and the community cannot
run the risk of the convict being at large. This takes care of judicial
apprehensions that unless physically liquidated the culprit may at some remote
time repeat murder.
Thus, the Supreme
Court effectively made a new category of punishment- imprisonment for life till
the last breath, which would be beyond the scope of statutory remission under
Section 432 of the CrPC.It
is very important for us to understand the rationale behind the creation of new
category of punishment.
The Supreme Court, in Swamy
Shraddhanand Case observed that there are certain cases which fall short of
the rarest of rare doctrines (as propounded in the Bacchan Singh v State
of Punjab[26]
case) and, the courts are reluctant in imposing the death sentence. However, if
in such circumstances, life imprisonment that is subject to remission (which
generally works out to a period of 14 years) is awarded as a punishment, the
Court was of the opinion, that it would be highly disproportionate and
inadequate having regard to the nature of crime committed.
To fill this gap of ‘supposed’
inadequacy, the Supreme Court introduced the special category of punishment,
which it announced to be ‘more just, reasonable and proper course.’ According
to the Supreme Court, if in the light of the facts and circumstances of theSwamy
Shraddhanand case, it awarded life imprisonment simpliciter, the sentence
would amount to no punishment at all.[27]Therefore,
to fill the ‘hiatuses’ between 14 years of imprisonment and death
penalty, the Court felt the necessity of introducingnew category, i.e., life
imprisonment till last breath without any scope of statutory remission. The
Court further noted that the formalisation of this special category of sentence
would be a positive step in “reassertion of the Constitution Bench decision
in Bachan Singh (supra) besides being in accord with the modern trends in
penology.”
The view of the three-judge bench in Swamy
Shraddananda case has been cited by Supreme Court in 73 cases, while the
High Courts all over the India have cited it in 278 cases.[28]
The punishment of life imprisonment
sans remission was reiterated and imposed subsequently in a catena of
judgements including Union of India v SriHaran@ Murugan & Ors[29]
(2016), Sudam & Rahul kaniram Jadhav v The State of Maharashtra(2019)[30], Accused X vs The State Of Maharashtra
(2019), and recently in Shatrughna
Baban Meshram vs The State Of Maharashtra(2020)[31]
Importantly, we can observe that the
purpose of the apex court in defining a new category of punishment was bona
fide. However, as we will see in the parts that follow, even with the best of
intentions, the Supreme Court, which is not infallible, frequently errs in ways
that prove to be catastrophic for the pursuit of justice.
In 2012, the new category of sentence
introduced by Swamy Shraddananda Case was examined by the Supreme
Courtin Sangeet & Anr v State of Haryana.[32]
In this case, as many as six persons (including the appellant) were accused of
various offences under the IPC, 1860 and Arms Act, 1959. Except the appellants,
five other accused persons were awarded a sentence of rigorous imprisonment for
life and payment of fine. The appellants were, on the other hand, awarded death
sentence. The limited question in appeal to the apex court was the sentence
awarded to the appellants.
While considering the
issue of remission, the Supreme Court examined the question whether the power
of the appropriate Government to grant remission can be injuncted through the
decision of the Courts as espoused by the three-judge bench in Swamy
Shraddananda Case. The division-bench of Supreme Court comprising Justice
K.S Radhakrishnan and Justice Madan B. Lokur answered the question in the
negative. According to the Court, “the appropriate Government cannot be told
that it is prohibited from granting remission of a sentence. Similarly, a
convict cannot be told that he cannot apply for a remission in his sentence,
whatever the reason”[33].
Justice Madan B. Lokur,
who authored the judgement in the Sangeet Case was of the opinion
that,the grant of remission under Section 432 CrPC is a statutory power which
is accompanied by certain substantive and procedural checks under Sub-section
(2) to (5) of Section 432, Section 433-A of CrPC and State specific prison
& jail manuals.Accordingly, it disagreed with the Swamy Shraddananda Case
to the extent it prohibited the Government from exercising such power in case
of sentence of life imprisonment. Importantly, in the Sangeet Case,the
divisional bench of the Supreme Court mandated the Government to ‘obtain the
opinion (with reasons) of the presiding judge of the convicting or confirming
Court’ before exercising power of remission under Section 432 CrPC.It is to
be noted that this is contrary to the plain meaning of Section 432 CrPC,
whichprovides that the Government may, at any time, ‘without conditions
or upon anyconditions which theperson sentenced accepts, suspend the execution
of his sentence or remit thewhole or any part of the punishment to which he has
been sentenced’
The overruling of the
special category of punishment propounded in the Swamy Shraddananda Case
was re-examined by a Constitutional bench in Union of India v V. Sriharan
@, Murugan& Ors[34]
in the year 2015. In the Sriharan case, the Supreme Court considered 7
questions. One of which was, whether as per the principles enunciated in paras
91 to 93 of Swamy Shraddananda, a special category of sentence may be made for
the very few cases where the death penalty might be substituted by the
punishment of imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term in excess of
fourteen years and to put that category beyond application of remission?
In this case, the then
Chief JusticeF.M. Ibrahim Kalifulla authored the majority judgement on behalf
of himself, Justice H.L. Dattu and Justice P.C. Ghose. Justice U.U Lalit
dissented with the majority bench and his dissent was concurred by Justice
Abhay Manohar Sapre.
The majority bench
overruled the finding of divisional bench in Sangeet Caseand upheld the
principles of sentencing introduced by the Swamy Shraddananda case.
According to Justice Kalifulla;
“87.
…. [W]hen we consider the views expressed in Shraddananda (supra) in
paragraphs 91 and 92, the same is fully justified and needs to be upheld. By
stating so, we do not find any violation of the statutory provisions
prescribing the extent of punishment provided in the Penal Code. It
cannot also be said that by stating so, the Court has carved out a new
punishment. What all it seeks to declare by stating so was that within the
prescribed limit of the punishment of life imprisonment, having regard to the
nature of offence committed by imposing the life imprisonment for a specified
period would be proportionate to the crime as well as the interest of the
victim, whose interest is also to be taken care of by the Court, when considering
the nature of punishment to be imposed.”[35]
The majority bench was,
therefore reached the conclusion that the ratio laid down in Swamy Shraddananda
with respect to a special category of sentence; instead of Death; for a term
exceeding 14 years beyond the application of remission is well founded.
Interestingly, Justice
U.U Lalit dissented with the observation of the majority bench and agreed with
the ruling of thedivision bench in the Sangeet Case. Justice Lalit after
examining all the relevant provisions and judgements eloquently held that:
“438.
[I]n our view, it would not be open to the Court to make any special
category of sentence in substitution of death penalty and put that category
beyond application of remission, nor would it be permissible to stipulate any
mandatory period of actual imprisonment inconsistent with the one prescribed
Under Section 433A of Code of Criminal Procedure”[36]
The rational of the
dissenting opinion had ‘separation of powers’ between executive and judiciary
at its heart. Justice Lalit, whose views were concurred by Justice Sapre,
differentiated between the Constitutional powers of President and Governor
under Article 72 and Article 161 respectively with the Central Government’s
power under Section 432 CrPC. The dissenting opinion observed that by putting
the matters of life imprisonment beyond remissions, Justice Lalit was of the
opinion that the Court would in fact be creating a new punishment.
II.
Scrutinising the punishment,
‘imprisonment for life sans remission’ On the touchstone of Fundamental Rights
Part III of the
Constitutionguarantees certain inalienable fundamental rights to everyone. One
of them being, the right to protection of life and personal liberty enshrined
under Article 21.[37]According
to the aforesaid provision, no person shall be deprived of his life or personal
liberty except according to procedure established by law.[38]Post
the Maneka Gandhi v Union of India judgement[39],
the ‘procedure’ prescribed by law has to be fair, just and reasonable, not
fanciful, oppressive or arbitrary. Another important fundamental right is the
right to equality under Article 14 of the Constitution[40]
which guarantees immunity against unjust, arbitrary, and disproportionate state
action.
The Supreme Court of
India in the case of State
of Andhra Pradesh v. Challa Ramkrishna Reddy[41],
held that a prisoner is entitled to all the fundamental rights unless
specifically curtailed by the constitution.In State of Maharashtra v. Prabhakar Pandurang Sanzgir[42], the Supreme Court affirmed that
every prisoner retains all such rights that are enjoyed by free citizens except
the one that is lost necessarily as an incident of confinement. Consequently,
inCharles Sobaraj v. Supdt Central Jail Tihar[43], it observed that all the rights
available to prisoners under Articles 14, 19 and 21 are though limited but
cannot be said to be static. They are bound to or rather will rise to new human
heights when challenging circumstances arise.
The imposition of life imprisonment
sans remission offends both Article 21 and Article 14 of the Constitution. It
is crueller than the punishment of death sentence as the latter at least offers
an aspect of certainty. There is none but William Douglas, former Associate
Justice of Supreme Court of the United States, who best understood this agony
when he proclaimed,“In death there is peace. There is terror only in
the fear of death.”
The punishment of life imprisonment
till last breath sans remissionforces the prisoner to helplessly await death.
As the chances of re-integrating into society are shut down, howsoever good the
conduct of the prisoner may be, the awarding of life imprisonment sans
remission effectively sucks the “life” from the prisoner like leeches suck the
blood from their prey. This is manifestly disproportionate and harsh even if we
compare it with sentence of death and smacks of inhumanity, lack of reformative
approach and utmost severity.
In Francis Coralie Mullin v.
The Administrator, UT Delhi[44] Justice
Bhagwati quoted Justice Marshall:
“I have previously
stated my views that a prisoner does not shed his basic constitutional rights
at the prison gate and I fully support the court’s holding that the interest of
inmate.”
However, by imposing
the new or special category of life imprisonment, the Supreme Court has
unintentionally stripped the prisoner of his most important constitutional
right- the right to life.
III.
Testing the punishment of ‘life imprisonment sans
remission’ on the anvil of the doctrine of Separation of Power
The doctrine of separation of power,
upheld as a part of the basic structure of the Constitution[45]governs
the domain of functions of the three branches, viz, legislature, the judiciary
and the executive. To avoid conflicts and friction between the three pillars of
the democracy- the Constitution entrusts the task of drafting laws and policies
on the legislature, implementation ofsuch laws on the executive and
adjudication of disputes on the judiciary. For the smooth entourage of
democracy, it is quintessential that the three branches don’t step on each
other’s jurisdiction. The aforesaid doctrine is best encapsulated by Justice
B.K. Mukherjea in Rai Sahab Ram Jawaya v State of Punjab[46]
as:
“[T]he Indian Constitution has not indeed
recognised the doctrine of separation of powers in the absolute rigidity but
the functions of the different parts or branches of the Government have been
sufficiently differentiated and consequently it can very well be said that our
Constitution does not contemplate assumption by one organ or part of the State
of the functions that essentially belong to another.[47]”
In this backdrop, it is important to
understand here that awarding a sentence is a part of the trial and is a purely
judicial function. The executive cannot interfere whatsoever in the manner in
which the sentence is awarded by the Court.[48]
However, once the sentence has been awarded to an offender, the CrPC, 1973
empowers the executive to remit, suspend or commute the sentence. The
alteration with the execution of sentence is a purely administrative function[49],
though it is subject to the judicial review.[50]
The decision of Supreme Court to
create a new category of punishment- life imprisonment sans remission, beyond
what is prescribed under Section 53 of the IPC, 1860 indicates that it has
robbed the executive of its power to remit the sentence in accordance with
Section 432 of the CrPC, 1973.Even with a bona fide intention, we are of the
view that it is not for the Court to frame a new scheme of sentencing. It is
only the legislature who is obligated under the Constitution to undertake such
task.
To analyse a
sentencing policy comprehensively and critically, it is incumbent to look at
the latest Prison Statistics of India Report- 2020 [“PRI-2020”],
prepared by the National Crime Records Bureau under the aegis of Ministry of
Home Affairs, Government of India.
According to
PRI-2020, occupancy rate in the prisons at the end of the year stood at 118.5%.[51]
The state of Uttar Pradesh reported the highest occupancy rate (177.0%)
followed by Sikkim (173.8%) and Uttarakhand (168.6%) as on 31st December, 2020[52].
The number of deaths in jails has increased by 7.0%, from 1,764 in 2019 to
1,887 in 2020.[53]
From 160 in 2019 to 189 in 2020, the number of unnatural prison deaths has
grown by 18.1%.Besides this, 156 inmates committed suicideand 3 inmates died as
a result of assault by outside factors.[54]
The data regarding
prison staff is more distressing. As of December 31, 2020, the sanctioned
strength of jail staff was 87,961 while the actual strength was 61,296 due to
unfilled vacancies. Officers (DG/Addl. DG/IG, DIG, AIG, Supdt. etc.),
Jail-cadre Staff (Head Warder, Head Matron, Warder, etc.), and Correctional
Staff (Probation Officer / Welfare Officer, Psychologist / Psychiatrist, etc.)
had a sanctioned strength of 7,167, 65,742, and 1,315, while their actual
strengths were 4,958, 46,839, and 789 respectively. As of December 31,
2020, the authorised Medical Staff strength was 3,316 whereas the actual
strength was 2,232.
Justice Kalifulla in
Sriharan @ Murugan Case[55],
while unambiguously affirming the judicial fiction of sentence of life
imprisonment sans remission, proclaimed that such move is in the
interest of the public at large and
the society.
In our humble view,
if the Apex Court based the creation of the new category of punishment on the
infrastructure of ‘public interest,’ the fore coming superstructure
willdefinitely lack strong foundations. Contrary to what the Court has
emphasised, such category of punishment is at loggerheads with the doctrine of
public interest. The reason lies in the ‘hopelessness’ which it heralds and
harbingers on the prisoner. If the convicted person residing in jail has no
chances of being released, nor is allowed the mercy of death, S/he will be
living either in absolute fear or in absolute fearlessness. Both situations
will severely affect the efficacy of prison administration.
If a convict is
serving a punishment of life imprisonment, one of the major incentives for him
to keep good conduct in prison is the hope of the sentence being remitted after
completion of minimum of 14 years in jail as per the mandate of Section 433-A
CrPC. However, if the Courts take away the chance of being considered eligible
for remission with this new category of punishment, there will be little or no
incentive of maintaining appropriate disciplined behaviour for the inmates.
This may lead to increased prison violence.
To add more to this
problem, Indian prisons suffer from immense over-crowding of under-trial
prisoners, lack of basic amenities and inhuman liveable condition, staff
shortage, inadequate prison program, poor budget for healthcare in prison and
have the infamous history of unreported custodial torture and custodial deaths.
In short, it will be antithetical to the
same public interest, which the Supreme Court seems to proudly endorse and
safeguard.
[1]Anne Salmond, Two worlds: First meetings between Maori and
Europeans, 1642-1772,University of
Hawaii Press(1992).
[2]Narotam
Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1978 SC 1542.
[3]Swamy Shraddananda
v. State of Karnataka,AIR 2008 SC 3040.
[8]Code
of Criminal Procedure, No. 2, Acts of Parliament, 1973 § 433 (India).
[9]Code
of Criminal Procedure, No. 2, Acts of Parliament,
1973 § 432 (India).
[10]Indian
Penal Code, 1860, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860, § 53.
[11]Indian
Penal Code, 1860, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860, § 45.
[12]Indian
Penal Code, 1860, Act 26 of 1955.
[13]Indian
Penal Code, 1860, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860, § 124A.
[14]Indian
Penal Code, 1860, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860, § 300.
[15]Indian
Penal Code, 1860, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860, § 375.
[17]State
of West Bengal v. S.K. Ghosh, 1963 AIR 255.
[18]Indian
Penal Code, 1860, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860, § 53.
[19] Code
of Criminal Procedure, No. 2, Acts of Parliament, 1973 § 432 (India).
[20]Babu
Pahalwan v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr, 1990 (0) MPLJ 682.
[21]Code
of Criminal Procedure, No. 2, Acts of Parliament,1973
§ 433 (India).
[22] Code
of Criminal Procedure, No. 2, Acts of Parliament, 1973 § 433A (India).
[23] Sarat
Chandra Rabha v. Khagendranath, AIR 1961 SC 334.
[24]Swamy
Shraddanand @ Murli v. State of Karnataka, AIR
2008 SC 3040.
[25]Dalbir
Singh and Ors v. State of Punjab,AIR 2008 SC
2389 (India).
[26]Bacchan
Singh v. State of Punjab,AIR 1980 SC 898
(India).
[27]Swamy
Shraddanand, supranote 24.
[28]The
above information has been retrieved from Manupatra Authoritative check:
Interactive timeline, https://www.manupatrafastin.nlujodhpur.remotexs.in/Defaults/ExtRes/help/AuthorityCheckInteractiveTimeline.html.
[29]Union
of India v. SriHaran@ Murugan & Ors, (2016) 7 SCC 1 (India).
[30]Sudam
& Rahul kaniram Jadhav v. The State of Maharashtra,(2011) 7 SCC 125 (India).
[31]Accused
X vs The State Of Maharashtra,(2021) 1 SCC 596
(India).
[32]Sangeet
& Anr v. State of Haryana,(2013) 2 SCC 452
(India).
[39]Maneka
Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597
(India).
[41]State
of Andhra Pradesh v. Challa Ramkrishna Reddy,AIR
2000 SC 2083.
[44]Francis
Coralie Mullin v. The Administrator, UT Delhi,AIR
1981 SC 746.
[46]Rai
Sahab Ram Jawaya v. State of Punjab, AIR 1955 SC 549.
[48] Maru
Ram v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 107 (India).
[50]
Baljit Singh v. State of Punjab, 1986 Cri LJ 1037 (P& H) (India).
[51]See
Prison Statistics India, 2020, National Crime Records Bureau, Ministry of Home
Affairs, Government of India, https://ncrb.gov.in/sites/default/files/PSI_2020_as_on_27-12-2021_0.pdf.
[55]SriHaran,
supranote 29.
Article Information
THE DICHOTOMY OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT VS IMPRISONMENT TILL DEATH: QUESTIONING THE SUPREME COURT’S ACT OF CREATING A NEW CATEGORY OF PUNISHMENT
Authors: ANIMESH JHA, HIMANSHU RANJAN
- Journal IJLRA
- ISSN 2582-6433
- Published 2023/10/04
- Issue 7
About Journal
International Journal for Legal Research and Analysis
- Abbreviation IJLRA
- ISSN 2582-6433
- Access Open Access
- License CC 4.0
All research articles published in International Journal for Legal Research and Analysis are open access and available to read, download and share, subject to proper citation of the original work.
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of International Journal for Legal Research and Analysis.