The Undeserved Indignity: Making a Case For Muslim Dignity (By- Apala Vatsa)
The
Undeserved Indignity: Making a Case For Muslim Dignity
Authored By- Apala Vatsa
Abstract
A simple definition of Human dignity
describes it as a worth attached to every human being, by virtue of being born
as a human. But is the situation really so simple? Several instances reveal
that the notion, nature and operation of dignity evade such simplistic
definitions. As we delve deeper, an important question surfaces: how is it that
dignity remains most elusive for the Muslim populations? The so-defined age of
Terror further justifies such loss of dignity for the Muslim populations. It
must be stressed however, that while terror events like 9/11 (the USA) or 7/7
(London, UK) or 9/7 (New Delhi, India), have served to resuscitate the fear of
the radical other (that is, the Muslims) these attitudes go back a long time in
history. It is reflected in the general outlook towards Muslims. Undoubtedly,
there remain a section of terrorists, who borrow from a particular
interpretation of Islam. But is this cause enough for the wholesale othering of
the Muslim community? Having to live as second- rate people despite being
citizens, being saddled with assumed linkages to terrorism; these are just a
few dimensions of the otherising discourse. Islam comes into the picture not
only because the ‘terrorists’, in some cases, have been Muslims, but also
because these radical sections forward Islam as the source of their actions. We
need to question the uncritical homogenizing that follows such revelations,
viz. all Muslims are terrorists, Islam is a violent religion, Muslims are disloyal
and radical, so on and so forth.The perpetual tagging as the potential
terrorists causes not only an irretrievable loss of identity, but also a fatal
blow to one’s dignity. Here, Kant’s notion of dignity becomes useful for
understanding the problem of Muslim indignity.
Keywords: Identity, Dignity, Muslim minority, Islam, Terrorism, Homogenization.
On
Indignity
Laura Hillenbrand has written:
“Without Dignity, Identity is erased.”(Hillenbrand 2010) Nothing personifies
this statement better than the treatment meted out to the Muslim populations,
nationally and internationally, overtly and covertly, by the state and the
public at large. All of this takes place in a situation traversed by two
things: actual instances of terrorism as well as apprehensions over impending
acts of the same. The result has been a rise in actions and reactions that
remain only half-justified, whether it is the American led project of ‘War on
Terror’ or generalized perception of Muslims as terrorists. In an era unsettled by ‘Terror’ and
supposedly safeguarded by the ‘War on Terror’, the most easily crushed segment
of the human rights panorama remains the notion of ‘Human Dignity’.
An important qualification must be
added at this stage. While anti-terror moves have led to the securitization of
populations wholly, they have been especially discriminatory towards the Muslim
populations. The reason for it lies primarily in the historically tainted view
of Muslim populations in non-Muslim societies. The ease with which Europe glosses
over the earliest instances of its contact with Muslims/Islam, and locates it
suitably in experiences of colonialism, the suspicion with which the Muslim
minority is viewed in India, the damaging effects of the Headscarf affair in
France are just some of the many relevant examples.
Human identity is context dependent.
What we are or how we are recognized as, is a sum total of two things- things
that make us and things that do not make us. The latter also involves the
package of things that unmake us. Human dignity, propounded as something
conferred upon all human beings, simply by virtue of being born as a human,
also becomes context dependent. This unfortunate fact injuresthe fullness of
human experiences. This becomes all the more problematic in the face of the
following fact: it is always one specific community which has to face a massive
dissolution of its human dignity as well as citizenship rights, viz., the
Muslim community. In the list of things that un-make us, most important are the
ones that un-make or un-recognise us as humans. At the outset, the primary
question is, if human dignity is the fundamental value that all humans possess
naturally, how are we to recognise the entities that enjoy no dignity at all?
Muslim populations the world over have failed to achieve a dignified existence.
This is the most disturbing kind of unmaking. It entails the disadvantages
inherent in what Charles Taylor identified as ‘Mis-recognition’. (Gutmann
&Taylor, 1992)
With discussions and actions
regarding terrorism fast coalescing into extremely faulty identifications of
‘all’ terrorists as Muslims, human dignity for this section gets crushed
disturbingly. Unfortunately, nobody seems much disturbed. The axis of Security
States and Surveillance Societies suggests that the relationship between
Muslims and any society, in which their status is primarily that of a minority,
needs to be reconsidered. (Lyon, 2005) This is especially so because
Islam/Muslim has come to be seen as potential suppliers and donors of wholesale
‘Threat’ to everything non-Muslim or non-Islamic.
The question that we need to ask
ourselves and to every self-authorized security agency is this: how is it that
with every rising act of terror, there is a decrease in the share of Muslim
dignity? Of course there have been instances of Terror, where a particular
section of terrorists, cited a specific interpretation of Islam, as the source
behind their acts (The British bombingsare a case in point). Does this however,
justify the most stringent acts of discrimination against all members of a
society, who happen to be Muslims? Is their dignity as humans and their
identity as citizens so easily surpassable in the face of their chance
association to the same religio-social group as that of the terrorists?
The present tension, largely social
(in terms of its most immediately recognizable location) arises from a fear of
terrorist violence as well as a threat to national identity. Islam is seen as
providing an alternative “we” identity vis-à-vis European-ness/ Britishness/
Englishness/ Indian-ness and so on. Various measures taken by the state in the
name of counter-terrorism, reflect a politics of ‘othering.’ This is deeply
embedded in the state’s national self-definition as well as its security
policies. There has come up a dissonance
between how the Muslims see themselves and how they are seen as perpetually not
wanting to integrate.
Understanding
The Problem
Let us now look at the nature of the problem. Here, I wish to emphasize
upon two things. First, Muslim citizens are demarcated as citizens but it still
reflects the fears of Muslim ‘otherness’. In times marked with ‘politics of
unease’,the Muslim-otherness is viewed as an existential threat to societal
security. The point here is that since Muslim citizens are also parts of these
liberal democratic nations (with the inherent rights and duties that it
promises) they must not be dealt with as security hazards alone. What Chris
Allen has written about British Muslims is actually
applicable to the situation of
Muslims in many other parts of the world.
Allen has written, ‘British Muslims are in ‘a unique situation amongst
Muslims in Europe and [this] will no doubt play an important role in the
dynamics of representation and the future relationship with the state.’ (Allen, 2007)
Security concerns of the state have
come to conflict with the dignity considerations of its Muslims citizens. Any
liberal democracy must protect the rights of all its citizens, irrespective of
ethnic or religious background. At the same time, the state also has to respond
to what are described as threats to social security, such as the pressures
created by immigration and a multicultural, multi-ethnic or plural society. One
justification given by states for their treatment vis-à-vis their Muslim
populations is the latter’s identification (virtual/real) with the Umma. The
virtual transnational allegiance is often critiqued for surpassing the much
more immediate allegiance to national culture and its boundaries.
Owing to the transnational nature of
British Muslim cultures, identity and politics, several concerns and fears
(namely,the radicalization of Muslim youth, the parallel societies’ phenomenon,
divergent moral compasses, so on and so forth) take over when the state tries
to deal with its Muslim citizens. Buzan has written that these threats can be
explained via the notion of societal security, the threats to what is
identified as ‘we identities’. (Buzan, 1991) To come back to the original
point, British Muslims function as citizens within state boundaries and across
these boundaries as members of the Umma. The question then is does allegiance
to latter necessarily over-ride the former? Two different views predominate the
scene here.
Toby Archer propounds that British
Muslims cannot be unequivocally defined as a threat, for their
insider-citizenship thwarts this. In his conception, this is why the situation
of British Muslims cannot be explained through the ‘securitization of
immigration’ paradigm. (Archer, 2009) So while a state can underline the
‘otherness’ created by the transnationalism of Muslim citizens, their
citizenship as an existent reality (no matter how constrained it is) cannot be
over-rided. The securitizing claims against them are thus limited. Archer
agrees that undoubtedly there is disquiet about some elements of Islam in
Britain. The state also tries to wrestle the same. Despite this, the image of
Muslims as an existential threat has failed to persuade the wider public
opinion.
Scholars like Sean McLoughlin present
another perspective. He writes that transnationalism remains a threat to the
state.(McLoughlin, 2005) Didier Bigo too has advanced similar views. Speaking
of Britain, he argues that the understanding of risk is owed to ‘our conception
of the state as a body or a container for the polity, it is anchored in the
fear of politicians about losing their symbolic control over territorial
boundaries’. (Bigo, 2002)In short, Muslims have witnessed their categorization
as a threat, to societal and state security. Citizenship, thus, is rendered
ineffective if not really meaningless.
The point to be noted here is that
the virtual allegiance of the Muslim populations to Umma has come to limit
their real-time adherence to the states they form a part of. Without hoping to
cause any damage to the idea of Umma, I shall argue that a Muslim’s attachment
to Umma is not any different from the Hindu attachment to Ramrajya or the
Catholic regard for the Divine State.
Another argument forwarded by
security states is that Islam has acquired a considerable public presence. This
does not sit will with the liberal democratic objective of keeping religion
restricted to the private sphere. Such a paradigm excludes those communities
(Muslim and Jews, for instance) whose religion cannot be delimited to the
private sphere only. For a Jew, there is no ‘neutral’ space;God’s laws are
applicable in all places. Another argument shored up by anti-Muslim strands is
that certain interpretations of Islam are illiberal in themselves. This is slightly
more rooted in practical experiences than the other arguments. It derives
directly from the Islam-derived justification cited by some terrorists (the
progenitors of the 7/7 incidents in London, for example).
What is unfortunately lost sight of
howeveris the fact that radical strands exist in all cultures and religions.
This is not something unique to Islam. A Muslim fanatic is only as dangerous as
a Hindu Fundamentalist or a Christian enthusiast. As far as terrorism is
considered, there have also been examples of Irish terrorists and so on. Quite
simply then, the point is that the roots of terror, the acts of terrorism, and
the identification of terrorists cannot uncritically be equated to Islam,
Islamism or Muslims respectively. More importantly, such images cannot be
concretized in public memory for posterity.
Muslims have been subject to a new
kind of suspicion and hostility. Strong doubts have been cast upon their
allegiance as citizens. Whether Muslims can be, and are willing to be,
integrated into any non-Muslim society and its political ethics, has become a
part of mainstream anxiety. Broadly,
this ranges from apprehension
overradical cells and networks recruiting alienated young Muslims for engaging
in terror related activities abroad and as a ‘fifth column’ at home, to whether
Muslims are willing to assure loyalty to the British state rather than to
transnational Muslim heads and ideologues, and to whether Muslims are faithful
to what are taken to be the core British ideals of tolerance, freedom,
democracy, sexual equality and secularism.
Muslim populations seem to be
caught in a quagmire: their loyalties are being interrogated by all societies
they form a part of.In India, for example, riots in Gujarat and Muzaffarnagar
became especially worrying due to state apathy. State’s failure to protect the
Muslim populations in both these riots become exceptionally disturbing when one
looks at the number of years that separate these two incidents. The fear of the
radical Muslim undoubtedly has permeated the official discourse. More
importantly, nothing seems to have changed in this official attitude towards
Muslims from 2002 to 2014. To take another example, Britain, as a nation, is
still in the process of confirming its Englishness/Britishness. Despite this,
the provisional Britishness/ Englishness is easily advertised as the criteria
against which to judge the already precarious relationship between British
Muslims and the state. The British Muslim hybrid identity is severely
questioned. The argument forwarded is that one can either be British or Muslim,
not both.
In sum, the way security policies
have workedhas led to concretizing of identities. This is true for both the
majority and minority groups. The flawed hypothesis of cultural fixity and
homogeneity (both within the majority and minority ethnic communities) has made
inter community dialogue difficult. This is further aggravated by an inherent
shortcoming of liberal democratic systems.This reflects in the incoherence
between its determination to be all-inclusive and the distancing caused by its
homogenizing elements and representations.Minority groups are promised rights
and equal identities in all liberal regimes. However, the obsession with
securitization has sidelined these groups further. The innate exclusionary
presumptions limit their participation in the national life.
The problems emerging from such an
approach become more complex when the state responds by blaming the victims.
Instead of understanding how the societal and state discourses have contributed
to othering, both have turned to allocating blame to the ‘other’. Biological
and cultural discrimination seem to have intermingled with each other.This has
also tainted the government reaction to national crises. Post 7/7, for example,
the Muslims were immediately singled out for
they were biologically as well as culturally
different. This inter-mixing of two prominent prejudicial bases has led to the
generalized exclusion of Muslim and relatedly Islam. Nothing else explains why
a supposedly colour blind democracy become so obviously discriminatory of a
particular religion. It is this bigotry that presents the ‘Muslim’ as the most
charged communal group. There is an urgent need to redefine the borders of
dignity and make it inclusive of the Muslim populations.
On Dignity
The word “dignity” comes from the Latin word, dignitas (worthiness). In common sense understanding it implies
respect or status. Interestingly, dignity is identifiable more easily when it
is not visible. It is often invoked to suggest that a particular human being is
not receiving adequate amount of respect or is even failing to treat himself/
herself respectfully. The term has invited discussions in philosophical, legal,
political and social circles. It is very difficult to pin down the exact
essence of Dignity, because of which it is identifiable more by its conspicuous
absence rather than its tangible presence.
In politics the term is often summoned to appeal for the oppressed and
the disadvantaged. In social sphere the term is much easily dissolvable. This
means that in society, it is more difficult to distinguishbetween dignity and
indignity. Acts of indignity are often mixed with markers of dignity. For
instance, the ancient system ofManumission was such that one’s freedom was
dependent upon one’s ability to keep or release someone else from bondage.
(Baumann, 1988) The highest ranks enjoyed the most dignified existence owing to
this power-privilege accorded upon them. Dignity thus crucially rested upon the
practice of indignity.
From earliest
times, humans have conferred upon themselves the idea of dignity. In Immanuel
Kant’s view[i],
human beings have ‘an intrinsic worth, i.e., dignity,’which marks them as precious and ‘above all price.’ In Lecture on Ethics, Kantargues that other
animals have value only if they can serve human purposes (Kant, 1779). Arguing
that we have no direct duty towards animals, Kant suggests that animals exist
merely as means to an end. He further identifies that end as/in man. Animals
thus can be used in any way humans please. He also rids human concerns of a
‘direct duty’ to abstain from torturing them. In the Kantian
paradigm,tormenting animals can be wrong at times. However, this is not due to
some thoughtfulness for animals; it is rather because humans
may suffer as a
result of it. This is because “he who is cruel to animals becomes hard also in
his dealings with men” (Kant, 1779). Thus, animals possess no intrinsic
importance. Human beings on the other hand, have an intrinsic worth, commonly
known as dignity.
If we say that
human beings are recognizable by the innate dignity that they possess, then
Muslim populations would be faced with another complication. With flagrant
violations of their dignity, with dignity swiftly evaporating from their lives
and being, are we to assume that Muslims are not human beings? If dignity, as a
fundamental element of human lives, cannot be secured for all people,
irrespective of their religion, or other differential parameters, then there is
no use restoring dignity after all. But perhaps this is too radical an approach
to take.
In the context
of terror, it is almost as if a distinction is discernible between human beings
and Muslims. The solution then is to make dignity something that everybody has
to commonly strive for and eventually achieve and not something that one is
born with. If we work with the idea that mere birth as a Homo Sapien guarantees
dignity, and fail to actualize it for the Muslim populations, then we are
easily accusable of double standards. Kant’s conception of human beings being
‘above all price’ contains an objective evaluation of human beings in the
larger arrangement of things. In this conception, humans are placed above the
rest in the scheme of affairs. There are two important facts regarding people
that provide backing to this judgement.
The first fact
is that since people cherish certain goals and desires, other things come to
acquire a value ‘for them’, with regards to ‘their’ objectives. Things have
value only because they are means to certain ends conceivable by humans. In
other words, it is the conception of human ends that grants values to things.
Are Muslims serving only an important agenda in the securitizing framework?
Aren’t they simply being used as elements to serve the ‘war on terror’
mechanisms?A guitar has value only in so far as I have the intention of
learning how to produce music with it. A book has value only if I have the
desire of acquiring any knowledge through it. In absence of such ends, the
book, the guitar, or any other object, for that matter, has no value.
Unfortunately
the fate of a thing seems to have descended upon the Muslim populations the
world over. A Muslim terrorist is valuable because he/his image serves an
important securitizing purpose of security states. A suspicious Muslim is
similarly valuable for surveillance societies. It is because of this that a
regular, everyday Muslim fails to acquire any value for anybody. This explains
why
an average
Muslim does not capture the wider imagination?; why his standpoint is not taken
into account? This is the reason why even liberal democratic states fail to
incorporate the perspective of a routine Muslim citizen. This is the factor
behind Muslims (despite being citizens of the United Kingdom, India, the USA or
other liberal democratic states) being faced with dissolution of their rights.
Going back to a point made earlier, it is almost as if the world is divided on
security lines between the non-human, Muslim and the human non-Muslim
populations.
Two things
point towards such a possible division. Firstly, while the former face a perpetual
evaporation of a dignified existence, the latter are far removed from these
experiences. In fact, sometimes, they even serve to intensify such an
unfortunate loss of dignity and rights for the Muslim populations. Secondly,
the former has to be overtly securitized to reassure that the latter’s safety
is of utmost concern. Indubitably, there is a need to address the situation of
terror. There is however no need for the rest of the world to engage in a war
that spreads Terror of another kind. This new war has no clearly conceivable
end but one clearly identifiable enemy, the Muslims. Further, Muslim groupings
(non humanly conceived by the standards of dignity) is discussed only in so far
as it helps the remaining sections of the world make a theoretical or practical
point about their most immediate concern viz., security.
The second fact
that Kant highlights is that humans possess ‘an intrinsic worth’, definable as
dignity. This dignity derives from the fact that they are rational agents i.e.,
individual agents who possess the ability to make their own decisions and
regulate their lives by reason. The law of reason is actually the moral law.
This moral law is situated in the rational beings. Moral goodness thus can be
present in the world out of the acts of rational creatures. These rational
beings have to understand via reason what they should do and then, as a sense
of duty, also do it. This is the only thing that has ‘moral worth’. The moral
aspect of the world thus rests crucially upon the existence of the rational
man. In such a scenario then it is implausible to suggest that rational beings
are one of the many valuable things; they are the valuable things, for whom
everything else exists. Thus the value of rational human beings is beyond
price. Because of this importance, they must be treated ‘always as an end, and
never as a means only.’(Kant, 1997) It is important to mention that the second
fact thus means that we have a duty to promote the welfare of all people. We
must respect the rights of all peoples and ‘endeavor, so far as we can, to
further the ends of others.’ (Sherman, 2012)
However, an
important argument often is lost sight of here. Individuals are most valuable
because of their rationality. If we agree to this we also have to agree to
grant our absolute faith to all their judgments. This would also mean that we
must never engage in manipulating or deceiving people no matter how important
we think certain ends to be. Kant has also written that humans are superior
because they create the values of other things. Fascinating as it sounds, it
makes no room for those acts by some human beings that take away certain
fundamental values, namely dignity of other human beings. The situation of
Muslim populations suggests that we may not have sufficient safeguards against
the misappropriations of these two principles. Interestingly, the generalized
association of threat to Muslims reveals why we must not grant absolute faith
to the judgement of human beings.
While
discussing the importance of rationality and rationality bearing individuals,
we must focus on the difference between, (a) Treating somebody as a responsible person; and (b) Treating someone as
a person who is not accountable for his conduct. Animals, who are generally
only the means for human beings are not responsible for their actions;
since they are not responsible for their actions meaning they don’t know
whether they have done good or evil, and who cannot understand why they behave
in a particular manner themselves or why they get a particular kind of
treatment form others; then there is no choice but to manipulate them. They
cannot be dealt with as rational agents;
Rational
beings, on the other hand, take responsibility for their behavior and can also
be “held accountable” for the same. The system of rewards or punishment has
been developed as a method of dealing with people who we can hold accountable
as performers of specific actions. An important contradiction comes to the fore
here. While a Muslim is not considered rational enough to be treated with
dignity or dignified enough to be seen as possessing rationality, he is easily
held accountable for many actions, most importantly the ones he never
committed. When the entire Muslim community is labeled as terrorist or when the
call is made to the Muslim community to streamline its radical strands, this is
exactly what is taking place. He is made to bear the responsibility of
rationality without being made party to its advantages.
Here an
important dimension of ‘universality’ comes to the fore. When rational beings
choose to do something, that choice entails a desire to develop that action
into a ‘universal law’. How a rational person treats other people is exactly
how he wants people to be treated as. More significantly, it is
exactly how he
wants to be treated himself. In an important way then, various actions are just
repetitions of the rational man’s
judgment.
The challenge that faces us this: how are we
to associate dignity with rationality? This is more troubling because the
majority’s rationality (let’s assume the security state) seems to have
sanctioned several indignities (say, the Muslim communities the world over) for
the Muslim minorities. Can we really classify any action as rational, if it
discriminates with a large section of human beings on the basis of mere
prejudice? Faintly reminiscent of
Manumission, it is almost as of one’s rationality has to be confirmed by a
parallel confirmation of the other’s indignity.
Concluding Thoughts
What we need then is alternate conception to the way dignity and
rationality have become inter-twined in contemporary times. Any viable
alternative would have to recognise that if dignity is to become the signifier
of the human element, it must necessarily be extended to include the Muslim
community. Dignity will rest crucially on recognizing that all societies
comprise of liberal as well as illiberal cultures. Illiberal or radical strands
are not features of Muslim communities only. The security nexus between state
and society ends up establishing an essentialist discourse that labels
minorities for securitizing majorities. The concern for holistic security
requires attacking the wholesale threat. This is further exacerbated by a lack
of adequate focus on the cultural dimensions of citizenship.
A nation cannot only be a passport-guaranteeing agency for its citizens.
It has to be so much more than that. Not only does it have to grant Muslims
political representation and voice, it has to grant all of this with dignity.
In the words of Asaduddin Ovaisi, ‘Muslims need Development with Dignity.’
(Ovaisi, 2015)There is a need not only for political but also a dignified
representation of Muslims. Muslims (conceived of in dignity-deficient terms)
become important when they serve the ‘ends’ of security states or of political
parties. Debates on the ‘Muslim question’ (Ramadan, 2015) are generally debates
about Muslims and never really with them.
Dignity, marketed as foundational to human rights, can only result from
being treated with respect. How can we so easily let go off such a foundational
right for such a large section of people, for such an accidental basis as their
belonging to the same group as some of the terrorists? Moreover, in discussions
on Terrorism and Muslim/Islam, we need to steer clear of generalizations and
unjustified homogenizations. Perhaps the only homogenous category that we must
work with should be of human beings. All human beings, regardless of the many
differences about/between them must be eligible for a dignified existence.
Another qualification demands discussion at this point. Instead of the
premise that all humans are born with dignity, we need to shift to another
premise. The latter base would make dignity something that all human beings
strive for. Moreover from the universality that humans are universally
recognizable by the element of dignity, we need to move to another kind of
universality. This would mean understanding dignity as something that is truly
valuable only if it is equally accessible by all parties in the human contract.
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